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This dissertation explores the rhetorical imaginary of internetworked societies by examining 
three cases where actors in the blogosphere shaped public deliberation. In each case, I analyze a 
trope that emerged organically as bloggers theorized their own rhetorical interventions, and 
argue that these tropes signal shifts in how citizens of networked societies imagine their 
relations. The first case study, on the blogosphere’s reaction to Trent Lott’s 2002 toast to Strom 
Thurmond, examines how bloggers “flooded the zone” by relentlessly interpreting the event and 
finding evidence that eventually turned the tide of public opinion against Lott. Flooding the zone 
signifies the inventional possibilities of blogging through the production of copious public 
argument. The second case study, focusing on the 2003 blogging of the Salam Pax, an English-
speaking Iraqi living in Iraq on the precipice of war, develops the idea of “ambient intimacy” 
which is produced through the affective economy of blogging. The ambient intimacy produced 
through blogging illustrates the blurring of traditional public/private distinctions in contemporary 
public culture. The third case study, on the group science blog RealClimate, identifies how blogs 
have become sites for translating scientific controversies into ordinary language through a 
process of “shallow quotation.” The diffusion of expertise enabled by the interactive format of 
blogging provides new avenues to close the gap between public and technical reasoning. The 
dissertation concludes by examining the advent and implications of “hyperpublicity” produced 
by ubiquitous recording devices and digital modes of circulation. 
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CHAPTER 1—INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Three (Rhetorical) Challenges for Public Deliberation  
 A crowd gathers for a public debate on physician-assisted suicide. The debaters, at the 
front of the chamber, have diligently prepared their remarks and await the conclusion of the 
moderator’s introduction to wade into the finer points of the controversy. Finally, they get an 
opportunity to share their insights. Each debater, in turn, ranges over the basic points, skating 
around issues of consent, pain-ridden terminal illness, slippery slopes and constitutional 
protections. Each debater has developed carefully crafted witticisms primed to deflate their 
opponent’s arguments. Those clever barbs are, to the chagrin of the audience, the only original 
part of the debate. The framing of the arguments themselves are not altogether original; they 
repeat the standard talking points from two polarized and predictable sides. Neither advocate has 
the ‘magic bullet’ argument that transforms the way people understand the controversy over 
physician-assisted suicide. There’s no middle ground sought; no bridging moves to bring the two 
disparate points together. At times, the debate descends into nakedly partisan bickering, 
especially as the debaters cross-examine each other. Part of the reason for the debate’s staleness 
is that the debaters rely primarily on evidence from sources that have just recycled the same old 
shopworn arguments. The audience leaves feeling unenriched, with only a sense of the 
circularity of this controversy and the grueling banality of public deliberation. They could have 
stayed home and watched the same arguments delivered by the blowhards on cable television. 
 A city council considers demolishing part of an old neighborhood in order to clear the 
way for a new shopping development. Affected citizens living in this neighborhood have banded 
together and, hoping to influence the city council’s zoning decision, nominated a spokesperson 
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to voice their concerns at the next council meeting. Chief among their objections is what they 
perceive to be a severe alteration of the character of their neighborhood. Residents are justifiably 
attached to the current environs; they are reluctant to embrace new ‘developments’ despite the 
promise that new jobs will accompany these drastic changes. Given an opportunity to speak, the 
spokesperson explains that the residents love their community as it is, fear the monoculture that 
will accompany the re-zoning, and want to preserve the historical buildings that will be 
threatened by the new plan. The council members listen, but decide that the residents’ concerns 
are too ‘emotional.’ When compared to the calculations the city economists have provided 
showing the increase in tax revenue accruing from the new development, the residents’ 
objections seem too inchoate. They vote to re-zone. 
 An energy company decides to build a nuclear power plant in order to meet the rapidly 
increasing electrical power demand in the region they serve. As part of a public relations effort, 
they host a series of town meetings designed to dispel concerns about the safety and efficiency of 
nuclear power. A local environmental group mobilizes to attend the meetings. Though they know 
it’s a long shot, they hope to persuade the energy conglomerate to pursue alternative, renewable 
energy sources instead of nuclear power. After a series of strategy meetings, this hardy group 
had been familiarized with research showing the capacity for solar, wind, and geothermal energy 
to meet the local community’s energy needs. Paired with what they considered disturbing 
evidence about the dangers of nuclear power, the group feels prepared to make their case to the 
energy company. Their hopes are deflated, however, once the conversation gets going in the 
public meeting. The energy company has brought in a core group of scientists to explain nuclear 
power’s advantages over alternative sources. The scientists shoot down each of the citizens’ 
arguments, responding to each claim with a bevy of counter-claims and a greater command of 
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the technical language of energy policy. They reference obscure technical journals, make risk 
assessments couched in abstract terms, and use jargon that whips by so quickly that members of 
the environmental group—educated though they are—have difficulty keeping up. On an 
argumentative plane, the research of this small group is no match for the lived experience and 
trained expertise of the scientists. Unsurprisingly, the energy company resists the citizens’ 
entreaties and goes nuclear. 
 These three allegories—plausible composites of familiar democratic activities—draw 
attention to a trio of challenges for public deliberation. The first example highlights the challenge 
of invention: the debaters parroted arguments known to most, doing little work to move the 
controversy beyond staid predictability. They each fell into well-worn grooves of argumentation, 
rather than inventing novel lines of argument that could set the audience off on a shared quest for 
illumination. The second example underscores the challenge of emotion in public deliberation: 
the neighborhood residents’ concerns were dismissed because they didn’t cohere with the 
‘rational’ criteria set out by the city council. ‘Preserving the character of the neighborhood’ often 
cannot compete with replenishing the city coffers, especially for council members concerned 
with keeping their municipality in the black. The third example suggests the challenge in 
democratically incorporating expert discourse into decision-making. The scientists’ arguments 
trumped citizen objections through technical reasoning. No surprise: society is complex enough 
that specialists tend to have their judgments privileged, often for good reason.  
 These challenges to public deliberation can be located in many historical and 
contemporary controversies. Each challenge might be refigured as a key question for public 
deliberation: How can original arguments be invented to advance public debate on controversial 
issues? How should emotion in public life be integrated into decision-making? Finally, how can 
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experts and non-experts jointly deliberate without specialized discourses automatically winning 
out? These questions are at the very heart of democratic public life, and they are especially 
salient now with the significant changes occurring as digital public culture settles in for the long 
haul. But these queries did not begin with the onset of what can appropriately be called the 
‘network society.’ They are prompts that the study of rhetoric—the art of persuasion—has long 
considered. In many ways, Aristotle’s basic formulation of logos, pathos, and ethos was 
designed to help citizens think through these three challenges in the context of democratic self-
governance. For Aristotle, the rhetorical process begins with invention; a search for the available 
means of persuasion, that logos that could move a persuadable audience. Humans are emotional 
as well as rational creatures, so an understanding of pathos is necessary to understand the 
affective dimensions of language. The rich term ethos identifies the role credibility plays in 
persuasion. Though this Aristotelian triad is often considered simplistic and formulaic, it signals 
that the challenges presented by invention, emotion, and expertism coincide with the genesis of 
democratic practice in classical Greece. 
In fact, I would argue that problems related to invention, emotion, and expertism are 
more or less permanent features of democracy, receiving unique articulations in different 
cultures and different times but recognizable nonetheless for their similarities across multiple 
situations. These challenges identify core tensions in democratic public life. On the one hand, 
there is a strong need for public discourse that is grounded in institutional discourses, impartial in 
its assessments, and reliant on specialized knowledge to guide decision-making. These specific 
norms are undoubtedly necessary to manage the complexity at the heart of contemporary life; 
yet, they are often considered insufficient to meet standards of democratic participation. Were 
these norms sufficient, we would undoubtedly be more satisfied with variants of Plato’s 
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philosopher-kings making decisions on our behalf. We aren’t, and in fact, human history is a 
bloody trail of cautions about institutional, impartial, and expert discourses going awry. One way 
that democratic societies rein in the excesses of institutionalism, impartiality, and expertism is to 
develop methods for citizens, as lay, partial, individuals, can contribute to public decision-
making through iterations of public argument. Democratic public culture requires a negotiation 
of these tensions between institutions and individuals, impartiality and partiality, and expert and 
lay knowledge claims. It is in negotiating these tensions successfully that decisions made in 
democratic societies receive legitimacy, or acknowledgement by citizens that decisions are fair, 
reasonable, and for the public good. 
The promise of rhetoric has always been in satisfactorily, though contingently, balancing 
these tensions. Nothing can ‘solve’ these challenges, for they are essentially insoluble; they can 
only be attended to in a way that gives legitimacy to decisions that are made in the public’s 
name. Consequently, every public culture must find ways to address inventional deficits, 
emotion-laden arguments, and expert claims to authority. How does a contemporary, 
internetworked society address these three challenges? This dissertation probes three moments in 
which new modes of networked advocacy through weblogs prompted “critical junctures” that 
rearranged communication patterns and introduced alternative ways of managing the challenges 
of invention, emotion, and expertism.1 These disruptive inflection points are peppered throughout 
the history of communication and media technologies. Therefore, a central assumption I hold is 
that the contemporary, internetworked world can be better understood through comparison to 
                                                
1  See Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Keleman, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and 
Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics 59 (2007): 241-69 and G. Thomas Goodnight, 
“Counterfactual Argumentation and Rhetorical Advocacy,” in Proceedings of the 3rd Tokyo Conference on 
Argumentation: Argumentation, the Law, and Justice, eds. Takeshi Sukuzi, Takayuki Kato, and Aya Kuhota (Tokyo, 
Japan: Japan Debate Association, 2008): 71-5.  
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two prior socio-political formations that grappled with new information technologies and 
democratization: the era of Athenian democracy in classical Greece around the time that writing 
emerged, and the age of the bourgeois public sphere that arose in Europe during the print 
revolution. In the era of classical Greece, around the 5th and 4th centuries BCE, writing supported 
the activities of the agora, where citizens conversed with each other in a space that supported 
many-to-many communication.2 Later, at the onset of the modern age in the 17th and 18th 
centuries, the circulation of various print publications supported an extended conversation about 
the issues of the day. In contemporary times, the internet, with its rapidly proliferating genres 
and sub-genres of public discourse, is widely seen as supporting the kind of lateral 
communication that sustained democratic public life in earlier historical instantiations. 
The rise of blogging provides an opportunity to scrutinize how networked societies 
accommodate the three challenges to public deliberation I have identified. Blogging is the act of 
publishing to a weblog, an easily updated website usually structured by ‘posts’ that appear in 
reverse chronological order (the most recent post at the top of the webpage). Blogs often feature 
a dedicated forum for comments from readers attached to each post. The “communicative 
intercast” through hyperlinks, trackbacks, comments, and other modes of cross-reference 
between various blogs are referred to as the ‘blogosphere.’3 Though blogs have been around in 
some form or another since the mid 1990s, their popularity and prevalence rapidly increased 
from 2001 to 2006. Blogs have sprung up to support conversations on almost every imaginable 
                                                
2On the material dimensions of public argument, see James Fredal, Rhetorical Action in Ancient Athens: 
Persuasive Artistry from Solon to Demosthenes (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2006), esp. 182-
201; Takis Poulakos, Speaking for the Polis: Isocrates’ Rhetorical Education (Columbia, SC: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1997), esp. 63-77, and Christopher Lyle Johnstone, “Greek Oratorical Setting and the Problem of the 
Pnyx,” in Theory, Text, Context: Issues in Greek Rhetoric and Oratory, ed. C.L. Johnstone (New York: SUNY 
Press, 1996): 87-128.  
3 Axel Bruns and Joanne Jacobs, “Introduction,” The Uses of Blogs (New York: Peter Lang, 2006), 5. 
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topic from electoral races, business, celebrity gossip, music, film reviews, cooking, drinking, 
sports, traveling (among many, many other topics) to less thematically unified meditations on 
everyday life. Various publics are now served by blogs that address issues in their discourse 
communities: lawyers have blogs dissecting Supreme Court decisions, followers of the 
steampunk movement have blogs showing how to make their laptops appear to have come from 
Victorian times, and customers who are irritated with their cable and internet service have blogs 
to document customer service troubles. The flexibility of blogs in form and content means their 
diffusion into society has been quick, with literally millions of active blogs participating in the 
hubbub of democratic public life. 
As with the rise in usage of any new media technology, especially one that is so closely 
affiliated with the internet, there have been celebrations of blogging as a democratizing media 
form and there have been critiques of blogging as, well, a democratizing media form. 
Considerations of invention, emotion, and expertism, and the three tensions in democratic public 
culture that they mark, regularly play out in meta-reflections on blogging. Blogging has been 
conceptualized as a new type of personal empowerment, activating individual citizens’ 
argumentative energies and unique competencies as they link up with fellow interlocutors. But it 
has also been perceived as increasing the noise-to-signal ratio in public communication, 
contributing nonsense, invective, and repetition to an already crowded mediasphere that is 
supposedly better served by the institutional broadcast media. The ease and personalization of 
blogging enables an unequivocal reveling in the partial, subjective, contingent self. That blogs 
are so often personal is what makes them interesting reading. Of course, this has a downside too, 
as bloggers are often perceived as being too emotional, and not committed enough to the 
standards of rational-critical debate institutionalized in the journalistic profession. Some bloggers 
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are recognized experts in their field, contributing running commentary on events that they may 
have studied for decades. But bloggers are also often seen as dilettantes, shallowly treating issues 
that they barely grasp and mangling the truth in their ham-handed postings. 
Blogging is a provocative phenomenon to examine because it signals dramatic changes in 
how citizens build communicative networks of interdependence in ways that try to address the 
three challenges of public deliberation: invention, emotion, and expertism. In many ways, 
blogging is a proxy for the network society, a term that captures the increasing organization of 
society into a network form that constantly intercommunicates through information technologies. 
By studying blogging, we can detect features of a networked imaginary, or the way that citizens 
of network societies imagine their relationships to each other, to institutions, and to democratic 
public culture more generally. One key focal point that I will explore in identifying some 
characteristics of the networked imaginary is attention. Networked societies are inherently 
information-rich, with media swarming from mobile devices, computers, billboards, televisions, 
newspapers, books, radios, films, and more. With all these media constantly intercommunicating 
with each other and making demands upon individual time, citizens must design ways to focus 
attention. Otherwise, we are just awash in a datastream of undifferentiated fragments jostling for 
position in our inherently limited attention spans. While blogging can indeed distract attention 
from topics that deserve more public discourse, there are also some occasions when bloggers 
focused public attention.  
This dissertation examines three such instances when blogging focused public attention. 
From these archetypal episodes of blogging, I explore particular metaphors that capture 
dynamics of public deliberation in a networked society. By critically reading these tropes, I 
develop a ‘grammar of blogging,’ a vocabulary that identifies the unique rhetorical contribution 
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of blogging. This grammar of blogging illustrates how networked societies deal with the three 
challenges of invention, emotion, and expertism that I have pinpointed as crucial to creating 
democratic legitimacy. These three case studies are: 
• Senator Trent Lott’s (R-MS) controversial comments at Senator Strom 
Thurmond’s (R-SC) 100th birthday party. In December 2002, Trent Lott made 
what were widely seen as remarks sympathetic to segregation in a toast to the 
1948 Dixiecrat candidate for president, Strom Thurmond. The institutional media 
initially failed to devote much coverage to the issue, but Lott’s comments roiled 
several prominent bloggers in the nascent blogosphere. These bloggers dug up 
evidence from Trent Lott’s past that painted him as an unapologetic advocate for 
racial discrimination. The institutional media eventually picked up on this 
research, building hydraulic pressure for Lott’s eventual resignation as Senate 
majority leader. One blogger at the center of the affair described his blogging as 
‘flooding the zone,’ implying that bloggers were saturating public discourse by 
working the controversy from almost every imaginable angle. The metaphor of 
‘flooding the zone’ signals the inventional capacities of the blogosphere. 
• Salam Pax’s narration of life in pre-war Iraq. In early 2003, before the U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq, a cosmopolitan Iraqi citizen going by the ‘blog-de-plume’ of 
Salam Pax (‘Peace Peace’ in Arabic and Latin) detailed his experience of living 
on the precipice of war. The visceral, raw posts published by Salam Pax—who 
became the most linked-to blogger ever—gave a highly personal view of the 
invasion. Salam Pax’s blogging produced what might be called ‘ambient 
intimacy,’ a constant cycling of affect into public life. ‘Ambient intimacy’ 
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suggests the extent to which emotion has been successfully reasserted into the 
traditionally rational-critical sphere of public deliberation. 
• RealClimate’s intervention in public discussions about climate science. In late 
2004, a group of climate scientists formed a group blog dedicated to providing 
scientific context for news stories about global warming. These scientists refute 
editorials published by deniers of anthropogenic warming, comment on popular 
culture artifacts that entered into the climate debate, and translate key scientific 
developments related to climate change for a lay audience. The scientists at 
RealClimate participate in ‘shallow quotation’ to transfer highly technical 
scientific claims into public spheres of argumentation. Shallow quotation, perhaps 
best represented by the offset pull-quotes that bloggers use when citing other 
websites, is an apt term to understand how knowledge claims move between 
disparate discourse communities online. 
The three case studies I identify each offer an opportunity to develop a more sophisticated 
vocabulary to describe the activities of citizens in a network society. The development of this 
‘grammar of blogging,’ which includes but is certainly not limited to the tropes of flooding the 
zone, ambient intimacy, and shallow quotation, underlines the rhetoricity of new information 
technologies and presents new avenues to think about rhetorical criticism and production. In 
addition, this grammar identifies the norms and practices that constitute what I call the 
networked imaginary. 
 The balance of this chapter lays out the intellectual and methodological assumptions that 
inform my analysis of blogging’s rhetorical contributions. First, I connect the central concepts of 
public deliberation, social imaginaries, and information technologies. I then explicate two key 
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concepts that receive considerable play in this project: the terms ‘rhetoric’ and ‘network society.’ 
Finally, I outline my method of analysis and principles of case study selection.  
1.2 Public Deliberation, Social Imaginaries, and Information Technology 
Jürgen Habermas’ well-known study of bourgeois public culture in The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere identified the practices of civil society that put newly 
minted democratic institutions in touch with public opinion through the press.4  The onset of 
what can be loosely called ‘modernity,’ a series of cultural, political, and scientific shifts that 
problematized traditional modes of social interdependence in the 17th and 18th centuries, 
demanded new modes of managing increased complexity. The bourgeois public sphere attempted 
to meet this demand by loosely linking series of public spaces and mediated forms that fostered 
discussion and debate about collective public life. Coffeehouses, as one such public space, were 
robust sites of argumentation, contributing to and amplifying the exploding print culture 
consolidated by the spread of the Gutenberg press. It was through this complex process that 
public opinion was forged as a democratic counter-weight to traditional modes of decision-
making. As public opinion congealed around some issue, responsive representatives would, 
theoretically, act accordingly to meet the needs of citizens. Publishers of weeklies and other print 
material would sit in on the rowdy coffeehouse discussions to get a sense of what public opinion 
                                                
4 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Bourgeois Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989). While Öffentlichkeit is more 
faithfully translated as “publicness” or “openness,” suggesting a process whereby ideas are tested in the crucible of 
public argumentation, the word is often translated in English to “public sphere.” John Durham Peters nicely dissects 
the different valences inspired by competing translations of Öffentlichkeit in his “Distrust of Representation: 
Habermas on the Public Sphere,” Media, Culture, and Society 15 (1993), 542-4. I prefer the interpretation that takes 
Öffentlichkeit to be a dynamic process rather than a static space or aggregate of publics. In fact, I believe that a 
number of criticisms leveled at Habermas and public sphere theory lose their traction when the concept represented 
by Öffentlichkeit is de-spatialized. My tendency in this project is to recognize the utility of ‘blogosphere’ as an 
organizing concept for participants in a networked social imaginary; however, I try to avoid overusing the term as a 
sweeping metonymic replacement for the multiplicity of blogs and their practices. 
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was, and would later synthesize that opinion so that elected representatives would know citizen 
interests more directly. Thus, the press was born as a critical mediating layer between the demos 
and the elected, filtering through claims and counter-claims to set the agenda for public debate, 
process competing arguments, and, ultimately facilitate appropriate decisions by governing 
bodies. 
Historically, this is a crucial stage in displacing the divine right of royalty, who ruled 
through the raw exercise of power. The monarchs that had dominated European history until the 
Enlightenment had engaged in ‘representative publicity,’ parading themselves before the public 
rather than for the public in order to secure legitimacy for their decisions. In contrast to this top-
down approach, public opinion offered a bottom-up orientation toward managing a society’s 
affairs. Public opinion, during the early modern-liberal age, was constructed as the key to 
democratic governance. Moreover, public opinion laid claim to be reasoned and self-reflexive, 
unlike prior guides to decision-making that privileged power or money over the many. In order 
to form public opinion, as opposed to multiple privately-held opinions, Habermas argues that the 
bourgeois developed what amounted to a new genre of public communication: rational-critical 
debate. For democracy to work, citizens could not simply assert ill-formed opinions in public 
discussions. They would have to have well-supported reasons to back them up and be willing to 
submit them to the public scrutiny of their peers, who were becoming increasingly well-versed in 
norms and standards of argumentation. In the self-conception of the bourgeois, this process of 
rational-critical debate would theoretically out poor reasoning and malformed opinions, 
producing judgments that were enlightened and well justified. 
This process of debate and discussion, with attached norms of accessibility, transparency, 
and reason, forms the basis for what Habermas identifies as the productive kernel at the heart of 
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an otherwise deeply exclusionary and flawed ideology: critical publicity. Through critical 
publicity, citizens of a democracy could keep watch on the state and other institutions, aided by 
the vehicles of the print media. Newspapers and pamphlets would direct the antiseptic light of 
publicity’s sunshine on the illegitimate exercises of raw power and support space outside the 
penumbra of the state for public opinion to coalesce. These early print media promised to spur 
argumentation practices between citizens grounded in the transcendent norms of rational-critical 
debate and thus sustain democratic governance. 
The publication of Habermas’ Structural Transformation authorized a round of theorizing 
about democratic deliberation rivaled perhaps only by Dewey’s The Public and Its Problems 
nearly a century before. The cottage industry of Habermasian extenders and critics (of which I 
am a proud bungalow renter) is incredibly far ranging; however, a particularly efficient synthesis 
of this diverse work is found in James Bohman’s Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, 
and Democracy. It is to Bohman that I turn now to suss out the key features of public 
deliberation. Though Bohman's work is grounded in a philosophical tradition, his emphasis on 
argument, dialogue, and persuasion is compatible with rhetorical approaches to deliberation. 
 Bohman defines public deliberation as “a dialogical process of exchanging reasons for 
the purpose of resolving problematic situations that cannot be settled without interpersonal 
coordination and cooperation.”5 Scrutinizing this definition with an eye toward the rhetorical 
implications of the main components illustrates some key assumptions I hold in my analysis of 
the deliberative potential of the blogosphere: 
                                                
5 James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1996), 27. 
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• ‘Dialogical process.’ Deliberation is a process, not a product. While there may very well 
be a byproduct of deliberation (like a decision, a vote, or a record of what was said by 
whom), deliberation is essentially processual. This process is intrinsically dialogical, 
modeled on conversation between multiple interlocutors. A monological process brooks 
no competition, whereas a dialogical process assumes that the convergence of multiple 
perspectives produces a whole greater than the sum of its parts. At the very least, such a 
process tends to create democratic legitimacy. A presupposition of dialogue is that it 
expands the horizons of participants, as they see how other people reason and reflexively 
evolve their own beliefs. The process of argumentation thus changes the participants even 
as they try to change each other.6 
• ‘Exchanging reasons.’ Citizens exchange reasons through all types of media: the voice is 
the medium most often used for face-to-face communication, but various print, broadcast, 
and electronic media are used to extend voice in situations when face-to-face dialogue is 
an impossibility. ‘Reason’ should not be restricted to the domain of philosophical logic, 
with its elegant p’s and q’s organized into proofs. I take an expansive view of reason as 
justification, which can occur through stories, songs, images, fiction, analogy, metaphor 
and a host of other communicative activities. A rhetorical approach to reasoning 
incorporates virtually any symbolic form that can possibly have persuasive impact on an 
audience. This isn’t to say that all reasons are weighted equally; in fact, it is self-
reflexivity about the quality of reasoning that makes public deliberation so dynamic, as 
participants argue for privileging certain views and marginalizing others. And, needless 
                                                
6 See Wayne Brockriede, “Arguers as Lovers,” Philosophy and Rhetoric (Winter 1972): 1-11. 
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to say, different reasons are persuasive to different audiences, who might even react to 
the same reason differently on two different occasions. 
• ‘Resolving problematic situations.’ Deliberation is not usually called for where people 
agree. Rather, deliberation is used to resolve controversies in a fashion satisfactory to the 
parties involved. Controversies can close, at least temporarily, through compromise or 
through the transformation of the problem that opens up new avenues for resolution 
acceptable to all affected parties.7 
• ‘Cannot be settled without interpersonal coordination and cooperation.’ Deliberation is an 
alternative to the raw exercise of power. In order to gain legitimacy, a decision must have 
the consent of those affected. The consent of the governed is the bedrock of democratic 
governance, and as more interlocutors are absorbed into processes of deliberation, the 
chances that they will recognize the results as legitimate are generally increased. While 
controversies are often seen as intractable and based on incommensurable differences, the 
fact that deliberation occurs at all presupposes certain commonalities—that differences 
should be worked out through talk instead of fists, that various stakeholders should have 
an opportunity to voice their opinions, and that there should be some good faith effort to 
understand alternative viewpoints. 
This conception of public deliberation is rich enough to ground a framework that explains how 
democratic citizens participate in public life. To be clear, public deliberation is no panacea; yet, 
to adapt Winston Churchill’s famous quote about democracy, public deliberation is probably the 
                                                
7 As David Mathews explains, deliberation is intimately involved with revealing citizen choice and helping 
people find common ground to work with and through their differences; see Politics for People: Finding a 
Responsible Public Voice (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1994). 
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worst form of conflict resolution except all those other forms that have been tried from time to 
time. 
Bohman’s model of public deliberation is amenable to a rhetorical conception of 
argumentation. His focus on reason giving provides an opening for a richer understanding of the 
actually existing processes of disagreement and resolution. This conception of dialogical 
deliberation is an alternative to two other prominent models of public deliberation, 
proceduralism and precommitment.8 In proceduralist accounts of public deliberation, certain 
norms are taken to be sacrosanct and deliberative processes are designed to live up to them. A 
proceduralist model of deliberation, for example, might insist on turn taking for interlocutors in 
order to guarantee that each person has an opportunity to contribute equally. While this enshrines 
a norm of formal equality, this model doesn’t guarantee that each participant’s reasoning will be 
equally effective. Interlocutors of superior rhetorical skill easily game proceduralist norms. 
Alternatively, in the precommitment model, a “binding set of rules and a defined public agenda” 
might guide deliberation.9 Precommitment models might take substantive goals and design 
deliberation to facilitate the achievement of those goals. A society might precommit itself to 
living sustainably, and thus develop methods for deliberation that help meet those defined 
goals—perhaps by excluding corporate polluters from participating in the conversation. One 
significant problem with precommitment models is that complex societies have constantly 
evolving agendas, and the needs of one age are often not the needs of the next. Precommitment 
models thus constrain flexibility.  
                                                
8 See Bohman’s critique, Public Deliberation, 47-53.  
9 Bohman, Public Deliberation, 24.  
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Dialogical deliberation, as an alternative to procedural and precommittment models, 
relies heavily on the critical publicity theorized by Habermas. As Bohman explains,  
publicity constitutes and governs the social space necessary for democratic 
deliberation: the public sphere. Publicity works on three levels: it creates the 
social space for deliberation, it governs processes of deliberation and the reasons 
produced in them, and it provides a standard by which to judge agreements.10 
Social space is a crucial prerequisite for deliberation. Public spaces provide fora for citizens to 
communicate with each other, learn about collective needs and desires, and sort good arguments 
from bad. In the era of the classical Greeks, these publicity functions were performed primarily 
by the agora, a bustling intersection of people in the city marketplace. For much of modern 
history, “third places,” or meeting sites between work and home like pubs, coffeehouses, and 
town squares, were the social spaces for public deliberation.11 More contemporarily, the 
broadcast mass media, and now the internet, constitute public fora for deliberation across space 
and time. 
This first level of publicity is necessary for the second level of publicity, which governs 
the quality of reason giving in deliberation. In essence, the notion of public reason suggests that 
an argument must be couched in terms acceptable to a general audience and be capable of 
withstanding critical scrutiny. Public reasoning can be seen historically as a mode of decision-
making that emerged as a preferable alternative to monarchical whim. By contrast, 
democratically elected leaders must respond with justifications that satisfactorily entail why 
                                                
10 Bohman, Public Deliberation, 37-8. 
11 Sociologist Ray Oldenburg develops the idea and importance of these third places in The Great Good 
Place: Cafes, Coffee Shops, Community Centers, Beauty Parlors, General Stores, Bars, Hangouts, and How They 
Get You Through the Day (New York: Paragon House, 1989).  
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certain actions were taken. And, of course, we demand reasons in our day-to-day formation of 
opinions. Some reasons withstand scrutiny better than others, just as some audiences prefer 
certain reasons to others. A religious community could justify a certain policy by appealing to a 
text they consider holy. While such a justification might be persuasive to those within that 
religious system, that reasoning will likely struggle in pluralist societies that don’t adhere 
universally to the same belief system.  
Public reason invites critique and counter-argument. The quality of public reason must be 
judged on criteria that are developed by the dialogue partners themselves. This element of public 
reasoning is referred to as self-reflexivity. Public reason can bend back on itself, by examining 
whether or not certain reasons are themselves being used reasonably. The print revolution 
considerably aided this process of self-reflexivity, as the circulation of newspapers, for example, 
increased meta-communication about the reasonableness of various opinions. The digital 
revolution, which has similarly increased the amount of ‘talk about talk,’ might productively be 
conceptualized as adding further instruments to the toolkit of self-reflexivity about public 
reasoning. 
Finally, the third level of publicity generates methods for open and transparent decision-
making. Decisions that incorporate public debate and register votes publicly are more 
accountable to democratic pressures. Congress, the deliberating body in the United States, does 
just this by hosting floor debates and tallying votes that can then be evaluated by constituencies. 
The public nature of this process lends the system a legitimacy that it would not obtain were 
decisions to be made in private. In fact, the closest antonym to publicity is secrecy, and decisions 
that are made in secret—even if they are meritorious by some standards—often fail precisely 
19 
because they have no legitimacy.12 The generic suspicion of politicians as people looking to line 
their own pockets identifies the importance of public decision-making. When politicians make 
decisions based on private, special interests rather than public, general interests, this suspicion is 
ratified and some sanction is normally brought to bear against the offender. It is for this reason 
that the mass media have traditionally been theorized as watchdogs of democratic decision-
making, for only the press has historically had the resources and capacities to publicize 
undemocratic uses of private reasoning to a populace that cannot keep track of all the goings-on 
of their elected leaders. 
These three levels of publicity are perhaps best understood in the context of Bohman’s 
primary defense of public deliberation: 
the best defense of public deliberation is that it is more likely to improve the 
epistemic quality of the justifications for political decisions. When deliberation is 
carried out in an open public forum, the quality of reasons is likely to improve. In 
such a forum, public opinion is more likely to be formed on the basis of all 
relevant perspectives, interests, and information and less likely to exclude 
legitimate interests, relevant knowledge, or appropriate dissenting opinions.13 
Robust public deliberation endeavors to draw in various competing perspectives in an effort to 
make the best possible judgment given the imperfections inevitable to knowledge claims made 
by deeply human actors. Public reasoning is an instrumentality specifically designed to 
                                                
12 Gordon R. Mitchell’s Strategic Deception: Rhetoric, Science, and Politics in Missile Defense Advocacy 
(East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2000) explores the relationship between secrecy, public 
deliberation, and legitimacy; especially see Chapter 5. 
13 Bohman, Public Deliberation, 27. 
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accommodate democratic practice in complex societies; it was at play in the Greek agora, in the 
bourgeois public sphere, and now in the dialogic space generated by the internet. 
All of this may sound like a very idealized normative vision of democratic legitimacy that 
works better in theory than in practice. And in many ways it is. As the bourgeois eventually 
found out, their idealization of rational-critical argumentation norms was imperfect in universally 
generating the consensus necessary to legitimate decision-making. Habermas' critics invariably 
make this point: the reality of public deliberation in the bourgeois public sphere rarely, if ever, 
lives up to the idealization. A culture that valorized the status of one’s argument rather than the 
status of one’s standing explicitly excluded non-white and non-male participants. Rational-
critical debate was probably often neither rational nor critical. Authority in the bourgeois public 
sphere likely crept back into public deliberation through implicit credibility assessments of 
fellow interlocutors. While critics of Habermas productively puncture the fantasy that the 
bourgeois public sphere smoothed the way for the seamless translation of public opinion into 
democratic decision-making, these criticisms occasionally miss the point that Habermas 
obliquely makes: despite the practical difficulties in institutionalizing the norms necessary to 
make publicity work, the very idea of these norms was an animating force in theorizing 
democratic governance during the modern age.14 Charles Taylor’s conceptual development of the 
social imaginary more forcefully illustrates how these useful fictions of bourgeois public culture 
were crucial in consolidating their political power.15 
                                                
14 Following this line of argument, critics have begun undermining the claim that the blogosphere is a 
public sphere based on the criticism that the ideals of the public sphere, like open access and bracketing of status, 
are not realized through blogging. See Andrew Baioll, “Weblogs and the Public Sphere,” in Into the Blogosphere: 
Rhetoric, Community, and the Culture of Weblogs, eds. L.J. Gurak, S. Antonijevic, L. Johnson, C. Ratliff, & J. 
Reyman (2004), http://blog.lib.umn.edu/blogosphere/weblogs_and_the_public_sphere.html. 
15 The idea of a social imaginary is a useful supplement to Habermasian theory and one that addresses a 
lacuna both in the original formulation of the bourgeois public sphere and in rhetorical theory. See Meili Steele, 
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For Taylor, the term social imaginary captures “the ways people imagine their social 
existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, 
the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that 
underlie these expectations.”16  Taylor identifies three primary features of the modern western 
social imaginary activated in part by the printing revolution and the rise of the bourgeois public 
sphere: the market, the public sphere, and the sovereign people.  The newspaper and the novel, 
two relatively new modes of public communication made possible by the spread of printing 
technology, were instrumental in the gradual development of the modern social imaginary. 
Newspapers spread economic information, while the novel circulated ideas about fellow citizens. 
Both modes of communication produced new ways to imagine inter-relating with others across 
time and space.  With better information about, say, commodity prices, merchants might shop 
around for the best deal rather than barter for their neighbor’s goods. Thus, the idea of a market 
guiding economic practice emerged to supplant traditional modes of economic interdependence. 
Similarly, as literary criticism grew, citizens began to cultivate skill sets applicable to debates 
about the public good. The concepts of the public sphere and the sovereign rule of the people 
would be alien to earlier generations of Europeans, habituated into believing that dynastic 
authority channeled divine will and that the people existed to serve the throne. Yet, the shifting 
social imaginary naturalized these new practices of modernity in a way that enabled a transition 
from premodern social arrangements. A social imaginary functions to do just this—to adapt 
people to changing practices of inter-relation. If, as Taylor explains, “the social imaginary is that 
                                                
“Hiding from History: Habermas’ Elision of Public Imagination,” Constellations (September 2005): 409-36 and 
Joshua Gunn, “Refiguring Fantasy: Imagination and its Decline in U.S. Rhetorical Studies,” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech (February 2003): 41-59. 
16 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 23. 
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common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of 
legitimacy,”17 then each agent is socially embedded in a “certain matrix” that is difficult to 
“imagine oneself outside” of.18  Our sense of self, and our sense of society, is both funded and 
constrained by these shared imaginations. The modern social imaginary, as a historical 
phenomenon, shifted public imagination toward innovative ways of managing new political, 
social, and economic relations accompanying modernity. 
 The idea of a social imaginary is an evocative concept because “the way ordinary people 
‘imagine’ their surroundings…is often not expressed in theoretical terms, but is carried in 
images, stories, and legends.”19  I would add that the social imaginary is also captured in 
metaphors; Adam Smith’s invisible hand, for example, entailed a bevy of assumptions and 
prescriptions for the burgeoning capitalist economies of modern Europe. These suppliers to the 
social imaginary are repositories of social knowledge and, with their circulation throughout a 
public, forge common ground across different segments of society.20 While a society is always 
more than the sum of its stories, and stories often misrepresent, they are nonetheless inseparable 
from a society’s sense of itself. By examining the stock that provides the basis for the more 
complex stew of the social imaginary, we can better understand how the norms and practices of 
different ages emerged.  
                                                
17 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, 23. 
18 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, 55. 
19 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, 23. 
20 Thomas Farrell identifies social knowledge as an understanding of the norms and values of the lifeworld 
in Norms of Rhetorical Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 255. Shared social knowledge is the 
starting point for finding common ground; it becomes public knowledge through rhetoric. See Lloyd Bitzer, 
“Rhetoric and Public Knowledge,” in Rhetoric, Philosophy, and Literature, ed. Don Burks (West Lafayette, IN: 
Purdue University Press, 1978): 67-92. 
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 It is important to note that social imaginaries are neither static nor singular. Taylor 
acknowledges that any culture’s social imaginary is under constant revision, noting that there are 
often critical inflection points that dramatically revise public imagination. A particular culture’s 
social imaginary is often destabilized through the rise of new communication practices, which in 
turn are partially spawned by the incorporation of new media technologies. Marshall McLuhan’s 
declaration that “the use of any kind of medium…alters the pattern of interdependence among 
people” identifies how new media spur amendments, and sometimes wholesale alterations, to a 
culture’s social imaginary.21 This claim is not as radical as it may seem, nor does it have to be 
technologically determinist. Rather, it highlights how new media forms displace old 
intermediaries and spawn pioneering ones.22 
How so? Political scientist Bruce Bimber’s Information and American Democracy links 
four information regimes in the United States, each with their own dominant media form, to 
changes in patterns of deliberation and, though he doesn’t use the term explicitly, the modernist 
social imaginary. The first information regime replaced the “weakly coupled networks” of post-
                                                
21 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (Critical Edition) (Corte Madera, CA: 
Gingko Press, 2003 [1964]), 127.   
22 I draw from Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin’s definition of new media as those media that re-
mediate functionalities previously provided by other media; see their Remediation: Understanding New Media 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000). A middle ground between technological determinism and social constructionist 
theories of technology is in the concept of ‘affordances’ explicated by Ian Hutchby in “Technologies, Texts and 
Affordances,” Sociology—the Journal of the British Sociological Association 35 (2001): 441-456. An affordance 
signals the potentiality inherent in any technology—potentiality that is activated by socially-situated actors. Lucas 
Graves has extended the concept of affordances to the blogosphere, exploring how technological developments 
intertwined with sociocultural patterns to produce a complex blogging ecology that serves different, sometimes 
overlapping, publics. See his “The Affordances of Blogging: A Case Study in Culture and Technological Effects,” 
Journal of Communication Inquiry 31 (October 2007): 331-46. For Graves, blogging affords participants the 
opportunity to apply open source methods to news (by drawing on collective knowledge to fact-check narrative 
accounts), fixity (through the use of archived permalinks), and juxtaposition (in connecting disparate links into a 
coherent narrative). 
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colonial America.23 It was marked by the development of the United States’ postal service and 
newspaper culture by the 1830s, which eventually produced national political parties.24 
Newspapers, which had been primarily focused on updating the bourgeois on mercantile issues, 
began to serve as instruments for national parties to communicate with citizens and mobilize 
feelings of national belonging.  
With industrialization and urbanization at the turn of the twentieth century came the 
second information regime, which produced interest group pluralism.25 As complexity and 
specialization increased, “neither the parties or the newspapers could continue to satisfy on their 
own the bulk of demands by political actors for political information and communication under 
these new conditions.”26 The growth of associations and lobbyists tasked with channeling 
constituent support into political pressure was a direct response to the specialization required to 
have political impact. The telephone and direct mail are two information technologies mastered 
by interest group politics during this time. By the 1950s, though, the second information regime 
was already giving way to the third, which centered on the ‘mass audience’ created by widely 
diffused broadcast media technology.27 Television, for example, reduced the power of national 
political parties by dramatizing the personality-centered campaign.28 It also gave new 
opportunities for interest groups to persuade groups of citizen through wide-reaching televised 
advertisements. Eventually, the broadcast media splintered into increasingly specialized 
                                                
23 Bruce Bimber, Information and American Democracy: Technology in the Evolution of Political Power 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 49. 
24 Bimber, Information and American Democracy, 47-61. 
25 Bimber, Information and American Democracy, 62-75. 
26 Bimber, Information and American Democracy, 69. 
27 Bimber, Information and American Democracy, 75-88. 
28 Bimber, Information and American Democracy, 76-7. 
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channels, a trend which gained speed with the advent of computer- and internet-mediated 
communication. 
Bimber suggests that the co-evolution of information technology and political 
organization up until the advent of the internet required increasingly centralized institutions to 
manage communication flows. The growth of the internet as a medium of communication has, 
however, challenged the traditional reliance on institutions to coordinate public life. Thus, we are 
at the beginning stages of a fourth information regime, one driven largely by internet-related 
media. For Bimber, the internet’s most radical contribution to public deliberation has been the 
creation of information-intensive environments. Information-intensiveness has five primary 
effects in circulating political knowledge by 
• increasing the number of low-cost channels to spread information from political 
organizations; 
• allowing elites and organizations to gain access to low cost information, creating 
a greater tailoring of political messages (or ‘narrowcasting’); 
• providing fora for citizens to engage in many-to-many, lateral communication; 
• accelerating the circulation of news in a massively interlinked, global circuit; 
• archiving information on a scale and with accessibility never before seen.29 
Taken alone, any one of these would be a significant development. Together, though, these five 
changing elements underline the dramatically different circulation of political information in a 
digitized, networked society. The fourth information regime, I believe, points to not a mere 
revision of the modernist social imaginary but to the birth of a new, networked imaginary. 
                                                
29 Bimber, Information and American Democracy, 90-1. 
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 These changes in information regimes can be read as responses to increases in 
complexity. Bimber explains the shift from the first information regime to the second 
information regime as a natural response to changing patterns of interdependence occurring as a 
result of industrialization. He writes, “as human relationships grew far more complex, they 
required new, more complex patterns of communication to sustain them. These new patterns had 
to accommodate social reality: a multiplication of relationships, interdependence, and 
heterogeneity.”30 Industrialization further expanded the types of relationships one navigated, 
expanding social networks from traditionalist, rural arrangements to the heterotopias of city life. 
Trust relationships were necessarily renegotiated as interdependence among different parts of 
society increased. Encounters with different people—not just the stranger come to town—
became a way of life. With even more increased complexity, interest groups, now understood 
more broadly as ‘issue publics,’ were formed to manage the exigencies of public life. A similar 
transformation can be seen now, as industrialization gives way to information in networked 
societies. The shift in complexity isn’t from rural to urban living arrangements as in 
industrialization, but from local to global scales of interrelationship. This shift isn’t from the 
sporadic, irregular news updates to the daily punctuation of the newspaper, but the movement 
from this daily punctuation to a continuous and instantaneous news cycle. And in some ways, the 
shift reverses the key trend of modernist societies: from centralized attention structures with 
layers of institutionalization to decentralized ones that rely on modes of post-publishing 
circulation to command publics’ attention.  
Now, we live in a hypercomplex society, and digital media have introduced a whole set 
of constantly proliferating political intermediaries—bloggers, wikipedians, social bookmarkers, 
                                                
30 Bimber, Information and American Democracy, 65. 
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and video artists—as participants in public deliberation.31 As I have already noted, increased 
public deliberation is no cure-all for the body politic, and blogging produces rumor, innuendo, 
and debasement in addition to what I will identify as more productive democratic practices. But, 
broadly speaking, a key development in the networked imaginary is the role of bloggers as new 
political intermediaries with unique skills in focusing the attention of publics in a networked 
society. As Bimber writes, “a set of technological changes becomes revolutionary when new 
opportunities or constraints associated with political intermediation make possible altered 
distributions of power,” and it is the effort of this dissertation to make the case that blogging 
represents an important signifier of this power redistribution in contemporary societies.32 
 Just how dramatic is the shift to digital public culture? Are we talking about a minor 
revision of the modernist social imaginary, with the internet promising to fulfill the modern 
project? Or is this a dramatic alteration, one that promises to transform nearly every aspect of 
human life? It is of course too early to tell, but we might start to get a sense of the gravity of 
change by examining how the tacit assumptions and vocabularies underlying modernity are 
giving way to new conceptualizations of public life. The signature achievement for modernity, 
according to Taylor was to coin ‘citizen,’ ‘market,’ and ‘popular sovereignty;’ but, as political 
theorist Benjamin Barber is quick to point out, modernist political theorizing adopted a 
vocabulary grounded in materiality which is now surrendering to metaphors grounded in the 
virtual. The Newtonian preconceptual frame of modernity, as Barber calls it, asserts that space is 
limited, that individuals concatenate off each other like billiard balls, that citizens are individual 
parts plugged into a greater whole, that property is a meaningful extension of the self, and that 
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boundaries and sanctions must be applied to leverage coordination.33 While materiality 
metaphors might be applicable for industrial conglomerates seeking to maximize profit by 
competing with rivals over scarce goods, they struggle to capture realities about public goods 
like democratic practice. The physicality of this vocabulary, argues Barber, means that “liberal 
theory cannot be expected to give an adequate account of human interdependency, mutualism, 
cooperation, fellowship, fraternity, community, and citizenship.”34 Human interaction is richer 
than any material or spatial metaphor can capture. My point isn’t to deny the materiality of 
human relations, but to understand them as only one part of a dialectical interplay with virtual—
that is to say, imagined—processes of communication and cooperation.  
Today, metaphors of the virtual rival more material metaphors in frequency and 
descriptive power: virtual reality, cyberspace, and information superhighway all hint at the 
alternative conceptual models now used to think about human relations.35 If the metaphor of the 
material snuck in the back door of political thought during modernity, I would suggest that 
metaphors of the virtual similarly shape contemporary political theory and practice. These 
metaphors ultimately have genesis in actual practices, some of which this dissertation 
investigates. To explore these linkages, each of the case studies suggests how new practices 
initiated by blogging illuminate a feature of the new networked imaginary.  And while none of 
the changes are as dramatic, perhaps, as the invention of the concepts of citizen, market, and 
public sphere, they are micro-revolutions in the rhetorical imaginary that adumbrate broader 
shifts to come. The ‘rhetorical imaginary’ is composed of the conceptual terms through which 
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citizens identify meaningful communicative activities. Taylor explains the process by which 
social (and, theoretically, rhetorical) imaginaries transform: 
For the most part, people take up, improvise, or are inducted into new practices. 
These are made sense of by the new outlook, the one first articulated in the 
theory; this outlook is the context that gives sense to the practices. Hence the new 
understanding comes to be accessible to the participants in a way it wasn’t before. 
It begins to define the contours of their world and can eventually come to count as 
the taken-for-granted shape of things, too obvious to mention.36 
As the three case studies detail, bloggers practiced their trade under the radar for years, but 
eventually made big splashes in the general media around specific news stories. These blogging 
practices were ultimately theorized, as practitioners, commentators, and speculators attempted to 
make sense of this new phenomenon. As blogging became routinized, blogs’ capacity to flood 
the zone, provide ambient intimacy, and translate technical discourses became the new common 
sense of the networked social imaginary.  
 Patrice Flichy charts how new digital practices, and the meta-reflection on those practices 
by popularizers, politicians, science fiction writers, and other opinion leaders during the 1990s 
introduced a cyber-imaginaire that is similar in function to Taylor’s social imaginary. For Flichy,   
linked to no specific project and intended for no particular public, [the cyber-
imaginaire] is a complete imaginary construction encompassing all aspects of the 
new digital society: individual life, relations between mind and body, micro- and 
macrosocial management of society, and production and distribution of wealth. 
Although all these components of the cyber-imaginaire were never combined in a 
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single discourse, a synthesis would reveal something similar to the great utopias 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in which the functioning of a different 
world was described.37 
Flichy’s charting of the cyber-imaginaire is useful in understanding how the internet insinuated 
itself into public imagination throughout the 1990’s.  However, Flichy’s analysis does not extend 
to the social networking revolution that actualized the interactive possibilities of the internet and 
introduced a more dramatic shift in the social imaginary. It is this latter evolution, from 2001-
2006, that I explore in order to understand the contours of the new social imaginary. Before I 
embark on this project, though, I will elaborate on two guiding concepts: rhetoric and the 
network society. 
1.3 Rhetoric (and Attention) 
Computer-mediated communication’s close association with cybernetics has occasionally 
overemphasized the process of communication as an informational exchange rather than a 
rhetorical one. Early in the development of cybernetics, Warren Weaver and Claude Shannon 
theorized communication as the transmission of information, subject to noise and other 
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disruptions.38 This mathematical extension of the basic sender-receiver model has a lot of allure, 
quite obviously for technicians trying to get binary 1’s and 0’s lined up, but also for theorists of 
computer-mediated communication hoping to improve human communication. Shannon and 
Weaver’s informationism lives on, albeit in slightly more sophisticated form. For example, a 
prominent critique of blogging, that blogs only reduce the signal-to-noise ratio in public 
communication, is grounded in quasi-mathematical assumptions about how meaning is made and 
circulated. In this section, I expand upon an alternative conception of communication as not mere 
information exchange but as a rhetorical process involved with focusing attention. 
 This isn’t to discount the way in which blogs perform basic informational tasks. Bloggers 
produce information about their own lives, about their political opinions, about their hobbies. 
They dissect and add to other sources of information through various hyperlinking practices. 
Blogs provide a source of information about other citizens, about the government, about 
corporations, about publics and their problems. They provide new ways of organizing and 
presenting information. Blogs do in fact take up a number of information tasks in contemporary 
democracies. 
But there is a danger to this view, ‘informationism,’ that sees all communication as 
information exchange. Informationism is an ideology that suggests the circulation of information 
will necessarily entail alterations in the behaviors of individuals and institutions. Informationists 
believe that if we could just get a more ideal distribution and circulation of information, then we 
would make better decisions about our collective life together. There’s something to 
informationism: when we learn new things, we do often change our behavior. But such a view of 
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blogging as merely rearranging information would be incredibly impoverished. Though the 
content of internetworked technologies are ultimately reducible to digital strings of 1’s and 0’s, 
the making of meaning is far more complex. Information is never ‘just’ information, and the 
circulation of raw data by itself doesn’t rearrange human relationships. Interpretation is always 
an interlude between data and its publication. A blogger can write about an event they witnessed, 
but they can never do so as a neutral observer. Once they start using symbols, they are caught in 
a web of mixed and shaded meanings, complexities involved in naming and description, and the 
possibility that potential audiences will impose their own reading strategies. In other words, 
information is never just information because it is caught up in a web of rhetorical meaning. 
An alternative to informationism emerges in rhetorician Richard Lanham’s critique of 
what he calls the C-B-S model of communication. The C-B-S model represents what are often 
taken to be communicative ideals: clarity, brevity, and sincerity.39 These three criteria are 
assumed as normative ideals to which individual speech acts should aspire. We should be clear, 
speak plainly, and articulate our ideas with an elegant simplicity. We should be brief, to the 
point, and not use speech merely as a way to exercise our vocal chords. We should also be 
sincere, by saying what we mean and meaning what we say. Clarity, brevity, and sincerity are 
taken to be especially important for public communication, which is often marked by 
obfuscation, long-windedness, and outright deception. This is the communicative model of 
informationism, which approaches disputes with the assumption that if participants in a 
controversy would only adhere to telling the truth, simply and clearly, that we might be able to 
resolve issues satisfactorily.  
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But how well do these criteria really perform as normative ideals of public 
communication? To be frank, these norms hardly pass the smell-test, especially in 
hypercomplex, networked societies. Certainly, some level of clarity is desirable in order to 
encourage intelligible discourse. At the same time, standards of clarity have radically morphed 
for different publics. What is clear language to the specialist might not be so clear to the lay 
person; even different groups of lay people have varying assumptions, histories, and 
interpretations that make misunderstanding more the norm of communication than an 
aberration.40 And while brevity is often the soul of wit, it fails to be a satisfactory normative 
expectation when deadly serious issues facing deliberating publics must be comprehensively 
explained. Most people don’t want brief medical diagnoses from their doctors about what’s 
ailing them; they demand to know as much as they can in order to make informed decisions, and 
similar demands for extended analysis and back-and-forth communication adhere in numerous 
other contexts. It’s similarly difficult to imagine how sincerity could obtain as a feasible norm in 
societies where trust relationships have supplanted the intimate relationships of earlier times. Of 
course, the sincerity test is problematic to begin with—how do you gauge another’s intent?—and 
assumes an outmoded and overly romantic vision of authenticity.  
The C-B-S model doesn’t provide a very good account of communication in our 
contemporary times (if it ever did). But there’s something else problematic about that model of 
communication: it strips most of what is interesting about communication away. There is a subtle 
richness to communication that is denuded by a model that sees communication only as an 
efficient way of coordinating two or more people. This vibrancy is captured by rhetorical 
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conceptions of public communication, which can serve as an alternative to the C-B-S model. 
Rhetoric is, as the legendary rhetorical critic Kenneth Burke explains, the “use of language as a 
symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols.”41 We use 
all sorts of symbolic means to bend each other toward particular beliefs or courses of action: 
printed text, images, yelps, music, poetry, and painting, through many media like letters, 
newspapers, television, radio, and the internet. Burke finds rhetoric such an interesting lens on 
the world because “rhetoric is par excellence the region of the Scramble, of insult and injury, 
bickering, squabbling, malice and the lie, cloaked malice and the subsidized lie;” yet, alongside 
these “malign inclinations” are “benign elements” grounded in compassion for others.42 It is this 
mix of rhetoric’s corruptibility and correctability, to borrow a phrase from Thomas Farrell, 
which makes the study of rhetoric so central to understanding the ever-present features of the 
human Scramble, now being partially played out on the field of blogosphere.43 
The study of persuasion has deep roots in classical Greek thought, especially from the era 
of Athenian democracy that saw Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, and others record their thoughts on 
the democratic arts. In those times, rhetorical arts were considered crucial to participation in 
public life. Democratic citizens were to use persuasion rather than violence to get their way in 
the resolution of judicial cases and in deliberations about policy. Rhetoricians taught Athenians 
how to argue so that they could defend themselves in a trial, make a case in front of the 
Assembly, or deliver a memorable oration at a festival or commemoration. Though rhetoricians 
were prominent at the time, so were their critics. Most prominent amongst these was Plato, who 
considered rhetoric a pharmakon, or drug, that intoxicated the masses rather than enlightened 
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them. Variations of the Platonic critique of rhetoric stretch to the present day, with rhetoric 
opposed to philosophy’s ‘real knowing’ and conflated with shallow speech not backed up by 
deeds. Rhetoric is also associated with propaganda—see Hitler, Adolf—and deception; it is, in a 
word, trickery.44 
But recent developments have set the stage for a rhetorical renaissance of sorts. Lanham 
argues that all the talk about the ‘information economy’ or ‘knowledge economy’ provides an 
opening to think about rhetoric through the lens of attention, revaluing rhetoric as a useful area 
of inquiry capable of equipping citizens with the necessary tools to get by in a networked 
society. He begins his case with an analogy: 
Economics, as we all remember from Introduction to Economics, studies the 
allocation of scarce resources. Normally we would think that the phrase 
‘information economy,’ which we hear everywhere nowadays, makes some sense. 
It is no longer the physical stuff that is in short supply, we are told, but 
information about it. So, we live in an ‘information economy.’ But information is 
not in short supply in the new information economy. We’re drowning in it. What 
we lack is the human attention needed to make sense of it all. It will be easier to 
find our place in the new regime if we think of it as an economics of attention. 
Attention is the commodity in short supply.45 
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This setup allows Lanham to suggest that rhetoric is best conceived as an “economics of 
attention” because “it tells us how to allocate our central scarce resource, to invite people to 
attend to what we would like them to attend to.”46 Lanham situates the industrial age as 
concerned primarily with producing ‘stuff,’ the material products that were later sold to 
consumers. Anything that didn’t have to do with stuff was dismissed as being ‘fluff.’ Rhetoric 
was one of those fluffy things; it was style, not substance. 
But with the shifting economy in networked societies, the stuff itself isn’t as valuable as 
the fluff used to describe the stuff. Richard Florida’s The Creative Class marks this shift by 
describing a host of contemporary industries that don’t make any material thing—except 
symbols.47 Graphic designers, computer programmers, middle managers, and, of course, 
university professors are professions linked by their primary emphasis on symbolic crafting. In 
the United States, with the decline in agricultural and manufacturing sectors, the creative class is 
increasingly central. For ‘fluffers,’ “‘capital’ in this new economy [is located] in the literary and 
artistic imagination, the powers that take the biogrammar we inherit and spin from it new 
patterns for how to live and to think about how we live.”48 If there is a cinematic marker that 
identifies when fluff overtakes stuff in the social imaginary, it is the 1989 film Say Anything. In 
that film, John Cusack’s character Lloyd, in response to a question about what he wants to do 
with his life, tells his girlfriend’s father: “I don't want to buy anything, sell anything or process 
anything. I don't want to buy anything sold, bought or processed, sell anything bought, sold or 
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processed or process anything sold, bought or processed as a career.”49 Lloyd didn’t want to deal 
with stuff. The sequel would have had Lloyd firmly settled in a career managing fluff. 
Of course, Lanham’s whole point is that fluff isn’t really that fluffy. In fact, fluff is 
crucially important to managing the complexity of an information-saturated world. Whereas 
traditional economics dealt with managing scarce material resources, an economics of attention 
would direct study at a new scarce resource, namely attention. Why is attention so important for 
Lanham? Because, as he explains, “the kitchen that cooks the raw data into useful ‘information’ 
is human attention.”50 Raw data, or ‘clean information’ is more or less worthless without the 
interpretive assistance provided by human attention that makes sense of phenomena. For 
Lanham,  
Clean information is unnatural and unuseful. Information always comes charged 
with emotion of some kind, full of purpose. That is why we have acquired it. The 
only way to make it useful is to filter it. Filtering thus becomes central. And here 
is where style comes in. We keep striving for ‘pure information,’ but the more 
information we have, the more we need filters, and one of the most powerful 
filters we have is the filter of style … the utopia of perfect information brings 
with it the return of stylistic filtration, of, as it has traditionally been called in 
Western culture, rhetoric.51 
Rhetoric focuses attention through style, converting ‘clean information’ into something like 
prudential knowledge. Wisdom, not just information, is necessary to make good decisions. 
Wisdom entails knowing how to read situations in context, seeing similarities and dissimilarities 
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that enable one to make an informed judgment about best actions. The Greek isomorphism 
between good speaking and good thinking underlines this historical connection between rhetoric 
and wisdom, and Lanham speculates that this relationship is renewed with digital culture. 
A rhetorical approach to blogging is useful because it directs us to how blogging uses 
symbolic inducement to focus attention and thus alter attitudes and actions. In other words, 
acknowledging how rhetoric shapes realities allows us to take seriously how bloggers might 
influence attention economies. If rhetoric can help illuminate features of blogging, it is at least 
partially because blogging has invigorated rhetorical practice. An accidental consequence of 
blogging’s surge into public prominence is the parallel uptick in the prevalence of the language 
of persuasion. Jerome Armstrong, the founder of the progressive strategy blog MyDD, argues 
“the holy grail that everybody is looking for right now is ‘how can you use the Internet for 
persuasion.’”52 Bloggers talk about premises and inferences, what sorts of evidence warrant what 
sorts of conclusions, the credibility of various advocates, and other terms related to 
argumentation. Some bloggers go so far as to suggest that blogging uniquely adds to traditional 
techniques of public argumentation. Markos Moulitsas Zúniga of the blog community dailyKos 
identifies one such addition: “when bloggers make an argument, we can add a link to support our 
premises.”53 The process of hyperlinking, by which a blogger directs attention to another source 
which can then be scrutinized by the reader, hints at some of the wrinkles that blogging 
introduces into argumentation. A speaker at a rally might make a claim, but the proof offered in 
that moment to the audience might be inadequate to persuade them. Hyperlinking introduces an 
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instantaneous reference to other types of proof, which often reveals more substance to the 
argument being made. The hyperlink is central to directing attention from one web page to 
another; indeed, “the hyperlinked environment can be thought of as a virtual marketplace in 
which the purveyors of content compete with one another for the attention of the public.”54 
 In this context, the term ‘blogosphere’ takes on added salience. The blogosphere, as an 
organizing concept for bloggers, signals that blogging occupies a space in the democratic 
imagination previously reserved for agencies of the public sphere like pubs, coffeehouses, the 
town square, and municipal meetings. If the ‘-sphere’ language has origins in Habermasian 
thought, ‘blogo-’ is deeply rooted in a rhetorical history. As one of the key popularizers of the 
term blogosphere writes, “the root word is logos, from the Greek meaning…human reasoning 
about the cosmos.”55 Implicitly, then, rhetoric lies at the root of how many bloggers depict their 
activities. One goal of this dissertation is to make this connection more explicit; to use the 
rhetorical tradition to illuminate features of blogging and to use blogging to reveal qualities of 
contemporary rhetoric. Such an approach also promises to shed light on the overlapping 
relationships between rhetoric, argumentation, and deliberation. 
Aaron Barlow has centered argumentation as similarly important to bloggers’ self-
conception. He writes,  
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Argument (as more than a spectator sport) … wakes in people desires that lead to 
their direct participation in both the public sphere and political life. Without their 
argumentative side, the blogs would eventually sink into the mire that the 
commercial news media has found itself stuck in. Without their anger and 
passion, the blogs would be no more than another new avenue for the same old, 
same old of the commercial press.56 
Since rhetoric works as a conceptual pillar for this dissertation, I explore in each case study how 
rhetorical theory can complement theories of public deliberation. The three challenges I 
identified—invention, emotion, and expertism—are figured as rhetorical challenges with which 
the pre-blogosphere mediascape struggled. Though the blogosphere cannot claim to have 
dissolved the tensions introduced by each of these challenges, there are unique features of 
blogging that address the rhetorical deficiencies of modernist theories of public deliberation.  
1.4 The Network Society 
 ‘Network society’ is a signifier—a rhetorical shortcut—for the complex social, political, 
and economic changes emerging from the fusion of globalization, new information technologies, 
and shifting norms of public culture. Alternatively represented by the terms ‘information age’ or 
‘knowledge economy,’ the idea of a network society captures a more accurate sociological 
account of contemporary life. In many ways, the communicative process of blogging is a 
synecdoche for the network society; studying this representative part informs our knowledge of 
the whole. This project tracks the refiguration of public deliberation as the modernist social 
imaginary blends into a networked one. In doing so, I follow Ronald Greene’s suggestion that 
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communication scholars must “register the ways that the network society disrupts the preferred 
temporality of rhetorical deliberation” in an era of “instantaneous and continuous 24/7/365 
circulation of discourse.”57 
The changes from modernist societies to networked ones are obviously more complex 
than can be fully captured here. In fact, they are in some part unknowable, since social 
imaginaries are so abstract, accreted from loosely related practices, and sedimented in opaque 
layers that deciphering clear transition points is difficult. However, Manuel Castells’ work on the 
network society provides a largely satisfying account. For Castells, the network society emerged 
from three developments.58 First, there was the crisis in industrialism and the concomitant spread 
of globalization in the post-World War II years. As the manufacturing base in the successfully 
industrialized nation-states eroded, a service economy increasingly based in symbolic dexterity 
took shape. The flows of global capital and labor incidentally broadened cultural interactions 
between populations that had been more or less cordoned off from each other by national 
borders. A ‘global economy’ itself developed as a network of industrial firms manufacturing 
goods in one place, delivering them to another, with intermediaries in perhaps yet another place 
facilitating movement across the network.  
Changes in economic relations intersected with cultural shifts emerging from new social 
movements. The new social movements of the 1960s and 70s could be read as outbreaks of 
dissatisfaction with dominant modernist sensibilities. In May of 1968, student movements in 
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France decided they weren’t satisfied with a future defined by a grey flannel suit and life as an 
‘Organization (wo)Man.’ Their ability to temporarily stop French society drew heightened 
attention to movements revaluing the norms, styles, and values of historically marginalized 
groups. As Castells remarks,  
these social movements were cultural; that is, oriented towards a transformation 
of the values of society. And the key values that were put forwards, and that 
ultimately created a new culture around the world, were three: the value of 
freedom and individual autonomy vis-à-vis the institutions of society and the 
power of corporations; the value of cultural diversity and the affirmation of the 
rights of minorities, ultimately expressed in human rights; and the value of 
ecological solidarity; that is, the reunification of the interest of the human species 
as a common good, in opposition to the industrial values of material growth and 
consumption at all costs.59 
With these new social movements, the grand narratives of modernity were critiqued as dangerous 
constructions rather than useful fictions. It was in the wake of these movements that artistic and 
intellectual currents labeled ‘postmodernism’ flourished.60 Postmodern critique drew attention to 
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metadiscourse of philosophy that appeals to some grand narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics 
of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth. For example, the rule of 
consensus between sender and addressee of a statement with truth-value is deemed acceptable if it is cast in terms of 
a possible unanimity between rational minds: this is the Enlightenment narrative, in which the hero of knowledge 
works toward a good ethico-political end-universal peace” (xxiii-xxiv). Postmodernism refers to the general 
“incredulity towards metanarratives” (xxiv). This decline in the salience of metanarratives is directly related to “the 
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the inadequacies of the modernist conceptual apparatus to explain society to itself, much less 
provide a normative baseline for how society should be organized.61 The flourishing of 
postmodernism in the latter third of the twentieth century signified a destabilization of the 
modernist social imaginary, creating systemic flux that allowed another social imaginary to put 
down roots. 
 Of course, one can’t be ‘post-’ forever. At some point social organization takes on 
affirmative qualities rather than just being signified with respect to prior organizational forms. I 
would argue that the network society is this affirmative description, and its development was 
greatly aided by the advancement of communication networks in the 1970s. This advancement 
was driven by a revolution in information technology that rivaled the invention of the alphabet or 
the printing press. The development of the microprocessor in 1971 miniaturized the computer 
and other electronic devices. The development of the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
Network (ARPANET), under the auspices of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA), coincided with the microprocessor. About 25 years later, the internet rapidly diffused 
into everyday life, becoming a significant mode of interpersonal relationship, commercial 
                                                
effect of the blossoming of techniques and technologies since the Second World War” (37) and “the redeployment 
of advanced liberal-capitalism” (38). Technology and globalization are thus implicated in the denial of any 
particular language game a metaprescriptive force; that is, no language game can claim to trump others, as in prior 
eras. Discourse communities are simply too splintered for the kinds of legitimation that occurred in prior eras to 
operate, leading to Lyotard’s primary critique of Habermas’ theories of consensus and legitimation. This splintering 
of discourse communities is obvious, for Lyotard, in the sciences, which have “added suburbs” to the old town 
through hyper-specialization (41). Consequently, the sciences (and presumably other deliberative affairs) undergo 
two changes: “a multiplication in methods of argumentation and a rising complexity level in the process of 
establishing proof” (41). Leah Lievrouw’s “New Media and the ‘Pluralization of Lifeworlds’: A Role for 
Information in Social Differentiation,” identifies how a similar process occurs beyond the sciences in multiplying 
lifeworld practices through digital media; see New Media and Society (February 2001): 7-28.  
61 John Thompson’s The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of Media (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995) 
explains the connection between print media and the onset of the modern age and the challenge of new global 
communications technology to the modern system. See also David Harvey’s The Condition of Postmodernity: An 
Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989) on the time-space compression of 
modernity as compared to postmodernity. 
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enterprise, and political organization. This new technology interacted dialectically with the 
public culture of the time, changing it even as the culture influenced how the internet was 
adopted.  
  As Castells acknowledges, networked forms of organization have been ever-present 
within human society (gossip networks, for example, have existed since time immemorial). 
However, “beyond a certain threshold of size, complexity, and volume of exchange, they 
[networks] become less efficient than vertically organized command and control structures, 
under the conditions of pre-electronic communication technology.”62 Modernist societies thus 
tended to funnel networks into structurally differentiated, vertical, and institutionalized systems 
of knowledge and organization. These vertical hierarchies formed effective attention structures 
capable of addressing many of the problems of these rapidly complexifying societies: 
parliamentary structures, for example, are centralized bodies of deliberation ideally designed to 
focus attention on problems in the lifeworld. Similarly, the tendency of firms in capitalist 
societies during the modern period to centralize, monopolize, and conglomerate was an efficient 
way for private industry to manage the informational tasks accompanying production and 
distribution. And for all the critiques of capitalized industry, it’s hard to deny that they haven’t 
been successful in producing and circulating their goods and services on a global scale due in 
part to their hierarchical organization.  
But the development of sophisticated electronic communication renewed the power of 
networks to fulfill some of the functions previously played by modernist organizational 
schematics. Castells relates that, “as a historical trend, dominant functions and processes in the 
information age are increasingly organized around networks. Networks constitute the new social 
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morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of networking logic substantially modifies the 
operation and outcomes in processes of production, experience, power, and culture.”63 But what, 
exactly, is a network? Castells answers: 
A network is a set of interconnected nodes. A node is the point at which the curve 
intersects itself. What a node is, concretely speaking, depends on the kind of 
concrete networks of which we speak … [nodes] are television systems, 
entertainment studios, computer graphics milieux, news teams, and mobile 
devices generating, transmitting, and receiving signals, in the global network of 
the new media at the roots of cultural expression and public opinion in the 
information age.64 
For Castells, stock market exchanges and global political councils like the United Nations are 
nodes. Nodes are sites where communication is produced, circulated, and received, which means 
that cell phones, computers, and websites are all potentially nodes in the communicative network 
of society. Each node functions as a potential relay for information, obviating the need for a 
center. To use a simple but now familiar example, music aficionados used to have to go to places 
called ‘record stores’ in order to purchase music. In contrast to that centralized distribution 
structure, music fans can now download music from peer-to-peer networks. By snatching small 
bits from many hosts, the need for a record store is greatly diminished (to the dismay of some 
and the joy of others).  
Not all nodes are created equally, though. Nodes become increasingly important to the 
extent that they can perform certain information tasks. As Castells suggests,  
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nodes may be of varying relevance for the network. Nodes increase their 
importance for the network by absorbing more relevant information, and 
processing it more efficiently. The relative importance of a node does not stem 
from its specific features but from its ability to contribute to the network’s goals. 
However, all nodes of a network are necessary for the network’s performance. 
When nodes become redundant or useless, networks tend to reconfigure 
themselves, deleting some nodes, and adding new ones.65 
If this sounds like a description of the blogosphere, where reputations rise and fall based on the 
speed, frequency, and quality of contribution, it’s because blogs self-organize into crisscrossing 
networks. Castells’ emphasis on nodes underlines the value of network forms of organization. 
Networks have become the optimal organizational form because of their scalability, 
survivability, and flexibility. These are three unique advantages of network forms enabled by 
digital communication technology. Castells captures these features by highlighting what’s so 
new about new digital technologies: “their self-expanding processing and communicating 
capacity in terms of their volume, complexity, and speed; their ability to recombine on the basis 
of digitization and recurrent communication; their distributing flexibility through interactive, 
digitized networking.”66 
Each of these features can be refracted through a blog-centric prism. First, digital 
networks are scalable. The blogosphere has taken advantage of certain capacities—more or less 
free storage space, hyperlinking, and broadband technologies—to radically expand and innovate 
in ways unforeseen by early bloggers. Bloggers contribute to a greater volume of 
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communication: it seems undeniable that there is now more communication about more things 
than at any prior point in human history, partially because blogs enable personal publication. 
Blogs also represent networks of varying complexity, from the simple, personal blog aimed at 
one’s immediate friends and family to more densely connected publics. In addition, the speed of 
blogging enables worldwide communications in real-time, encouraging bloggers to be part of 
rapid-response networks that coalesce around unfolding events.  
Second, digital networks are survivable. We could call this the ‘DARPA effect,’ after the 
original intention on the part of the Department of Defense to have a survivable communications 
network after a nuclear attack. Though there’s no real equivalent to a nuclear attack on the 
blogosphere, blogs are able to survive and circumvent other threats, such as censorship by the 
state. In China, for example, state censors block blogs that push the envelope too far. But it 
doesn’t take long for even lazy bloggers to reconfigure their blogs to circumvent their watchers 
and there simply aren’t enough censors to track every blog.67 Here’s another example of the 
drastic mismatch between modernist sensibilities and networked logics: blocking information 
flows is only temporarily successful in an era of survivable and adaptable networks. 
Finally, digital networks are flexible. The interactivity provided by blogs offers 
individuals a platform by which to contribute to the self-reflexivity of the network. Blogs are 
flexible enough to meet a wide variety of needs and fulfill multiple functions for networked 
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citizens. Moreover, their flexibility is enhanced through the process of digitization, which allows 
all sorts of media to converge through the medium of the internet. While blogging began as 
primarily a text-based activity (in this way, bloggers could be considered ‘throwback publics’ 
invigorated by a refamiliarization with textuality) it is now a decidedly multimodal 
communication form, integrating images, audio, and videos. This flexibility in terms of rhetorical 
production is matched by flexibility in linking practices. Bloggers can move up and down a 
ladder of influence as linking and citation practices change over time. Some bloggers hit the ‘A-
list’ because of a certain diligence, or a specific area of expertise, or simply because they are 
hilarious. The general point is that the blogosphere is a constantly shifting arena capable of 
fulfilling many evolving needs in a networked society. 
These features of networks, I argue, are beginning to constitute a networked imaginary 
that plays a similar role to the modern social imaginary in linking citizen interactions in 
contemporary societies. In some ways, the idea of a network society or a social imaginary directs 
attention to the sociology of human relations. I want to redirect focus, instead, to networked 
sensibilities, which highlight the norms by which citizens imagine their relations with others. By 
sensibilities, I mean to include the habits of thinking, patterns of interaction, structures of 
institutions, desired norms of deliberation, acceptable grounds for critique, and circulation of 
ideas that are emerging in networked societies. It is these sensibilities that contribute to the 
development of a social imaginary, so it’s worth investigating the nature of these sensibilities in 
different eras. Since the networked age is slowly supplanting modernist sensibilities, sketching 
out the basic features of what is being replaced will return conceptual dividends. 
Perhaps the most drastic shift in orientation from modernist to networked sensibilities is 
the move from ‘dichotomization’ to ‘relationality.’ Modernist sensibilities were founded on 
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various dichotomies: culture/nature, reason/emotion, mind/body, public/private, and, to many a 
rhetorician’s dismay, action/speech. These dichotomies structured public deliberation during the 
modern age, as, for example, emotion was marginalized in favor of abstract rationality, and there 
is plenty of residual attachment to these strict divisions even in a network society. If modernist 
sensibilities are founded on dichotomies, networked sensibilities might be said to emerge from 
oscillatio, the rhetorical figure that Lanham associates most closely with the new attention 
economy and digital media.68 For Lanham, oscillatio captures the essential movement of 
electronic text: one oscillates between looking at and through the text. The hyperlink 
demonstrates this process. As one reads a blog post, for example, one can look at a hyperlinked 
fragment as part of a sentence. However, one can also look through the hyperlink by clicking on 
it and following the redirection. Rather than brusquely dichotomized, networked sensibilities are 
essentially relational. The categories of nature/culture, reason/emotion, mind/body, 
public/private, and action/speech are more intertwined than in modernity: sometimes in tension, 
sometimes situated along a spectrum, but always connected to each other. 
 But what exactly constitutes a networked sensibility, and how might it be put on a 
continuum of sensibilities arising in prior ages? Tom Pettitt’s identification of the ‘Gutenberg 
Parenthesis’ directs our attention to some aspects of premodernist and modernist sensibilities, 
through which an understanding of networked sensibilities can be sophisticated. He suggests that 
culture making can be divided into three rough eras, with the rise of the printing press and 
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modernity providing an interval, or parenthesis, with specific norms attached to creative (and I 
might add rhetorical) production (see Table 1).69 
Pre-Parenthetical Gutenberg Parenthesis Post-Parenthetical 
Re-creative Original Sampling 
Collective Individual Remixing 
Contextual Autonomous Borrowing 
Unstable Stable Reshaping 
Traditional Canonical Appropriating 
Performance Composition Recontextualizing 
Table 1. Pettit’s ‘Gutenberg Parenthesis.’ 
 
Before the Gutenberg printing press, culture was primarily invested in re-creating 
received canonical works through live performances. In the Athens of the rhetoricians’ times, 
music was an integral part of religious festivals. During the summer festival Panathenaia, a 
“grand singing procession” wound through the city streets as a collective performance of 
traditional songs for the specific purpose of giving glory to the gods.70 In contrast, the modern 
period offset by the Gutenberg Parenthesis wrought a system of culture-making that relied on the 
individually crafted, original, authentic, text: the novel was and is still considered by many to be 
the apogee of this cultural formation. Composing a novel is a solitary affair, but in the end one 
has produced a stable text that might eventually be considered canonical. According to Pettitt, 
digital media has produced what he calls a set of post-parenthetical norms. These norms are 
centered on, essentially, the manipulation of artifacts originally created by others. Blogging is a 
significant part of this post-parenthetical culture, since bloggers freely appropriate and borrow 
from multiple sources, while adding in elements that reshape and recontextualize the original 
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forum/mit5/papers/pettitt_plenary_gutenberg.pdf. Pettitt draws from a research consortium on the Gutenberg 
Parenthesis at the University of Southern Denmark, online at http://www.sdu.dk/Om_SDU/ 
Institutter_centre/Ilkm_litteratur_kultur_og_medier/Forskning/Forskningsprojekter/Gutenberg_projekt.aspx. 
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artifact. All of this borrowing and appropriating smacks of stealing to the industries looking to 
profit from their so-called intellectual property rights (another modernist sensibility). By 
integrating news items from, say, the New York Times website, bloggers recontextualize the story 
from their own perspective. A blogger’s post might then be further ‘remixed’ by other bloggers, 
creating a circuit of relays by which the original news item is perhaps unrecognizable, perhaps 
even uncited, but certainly present as a palimpsest underneath layers of hyperlinks.  
Covering the full range of modernist sensibilities would be impossible, but the work of 
two rhetoricians, Michael Calvin McGee and Robert Hariman, illuminates a few key features 
that draw distinctions between modernist sensibilities and networked ones. The first distinction 
concerns the nature of text and context and the second distinction takes up the issue of style. By 
exploring these two themes, we can start to see the discontinuities between modernist and 
networked sensibilities that will be explored in the balance of the dissertation. 
 McGee’s “Text, Context, and Fragmentation,” concerns the nature of text construction 
and the role of the rhetorical critic. He identifies what he sees as a major shift in the way that 
rhetoricians must think about the very processes of text construction and interpretation, 
suggesting that the heterogenization of American public culture makes “interpretation the 
primary task of speakers and writers and text construction the primary task of audiences, readers, 
and critics.”71 According to McGee,  
in the not-too-distant past, all discourses were what some social theorists call 
‘totalizations’ … That is, all structures of a text were homogeneous. Education 
was restricted to a scant minority, and as a result the content of an education was 
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so homogeneous that an orator could utter two or three lines in Latin, identified 
only with the words ‘as Tully said,’ in complete confidence that any 
reader/audience/critic would be able to identify the source of the words—and 
even recite the next several lines from Cicero's De Oratore! Except for everyday 
conversation, all discourse within a particular language community was produced 
from the same resources. Further, all discourse found its influence on the same 
small class of people who comprised the political nation. And it was the same 
small class that received the benefits of a homogenized education. There was little 
cultural diversity, no question that there was in every state a well defined 
dominant race, dominant class, dominant gender, dominant history, and dominant 
ethnicity.72 
This homogenous public culture has virtually disappeared, and so have these textual 
totalizations’ status as a finished artifact to be taken up by a homogenous public. In 
contemporary culture, we are left with “discursive fragments of context.”73 Texts have become 
absorbed into contexts. “We have instead,” McGee theorizes, “fragments of ‘information’ that 
constitute our context. The unity and structural integrity we used to put in our texts as they 
faithfully represented nature is now presumed to be in us ourselves.”74 
 McGee’s explanation for the root causes of this shift from textual wholes to contextual 
fragments intersects with Castells’ explanation of the rise of the network society. He suggests 
that in a more information-impoverished time in human history, it was possible to address 
comprehensively any particular problem through a well-crafted speech. But the “communication 
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revolution” 
was accompanied by a knowledge explosion. The result is that today no single 
finished text could possibly comprehend all perspectives on even a single human 
problem, let alone the complex of problems we index in the phrase ‘issues of the 
day.’ The only way to ‘say it all’ in our fractured culture is to provide 
readers/audiences with dense, truncated fragments which cue them to produce a 
finished discourse in their minds. In short, text construction is now something 
done more by the consumers than by the producers of discourse.75 
McGee might as well be describing blogging. What does a blogger do if not produce dense 
(hyperlinked), truncated (pithy), fragments (posts) of public discourse that are assembled in a 
bricolage by their readers? Blog readers, in turn, attempt to create some sort of narrative 
synthesis amongst all these different fragments as they weave these posts together in an effort to 
make sense of it all. 
With McGee, we have the beginnings of an account of how production, circulation, and 
reception of public communication has shifted from modernist to networked sensibilities. Robert 
Hariman provides a supplemental account of modernist style and representation in Political 
Style: The Artistry of Power, where he maps out a realist style by analyzing Machiavelli’s The 
Prince. Hariman focuses on how Machiavelli’s realist style was grounded in the devaluation of 
speech; instead of speech collecting and distributing power as had been the norm before the 
Gutenberg parenthesis, modernist sensibilities perceive “political power [as] an autonomous 
material force.”76 Machiavelli’s devaluation of speech—and ornamentation specifically—
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interlocked with a system of thinking that assumed language could directly apprehend reality.77 
This realist style produced an “abstract world and sovereign self” that depended on strategic 
thinking and deference to authority.78 
If realism was the dominant style of modernity, it is because it had a particular 
representational consciousness.  The onset of print culture begat an attitude that, through the 
rigorous application of reason, humans could see clearly through their social worlds to the 
seemingly transparent reality underneath. Print could objectively fix the nature of the world. 
Hariman suggests that the shift from modern to postmodern culture is undergirded by “a tectonic 
shift from representational to allegorical consciousness.”79 The crisis in representation that 
plagues postmodern cultures is acute because “modernity’s powerful development of 
technologies for recording and communicating reality has caused modern norms of 
representation to buckle under the pressure of the endless reproduction of signs.”80 Consequently, 
representational discourses lose their persuasiveness as their self-professed ability to reflect 
reality is recognized for the trick that it is. Allegorical discourses—which in some respects 
characterize the fragments of context that McGee identifies as permeating postmodern culture—
take their place. Allegory, as Hariman explains, is “a figural presentation that organizes multiple 
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interpretations regarding collective experience.”81 How we now understand the social world is 
grounded in a series of disconnected allegorical tales: the spoiled teens on My Super Sweet 16 
stand in for class-privileged brats everywhere; a George W. Bush malapropism signifies the 
mistakes of his administration; a shuttle launch figures as American technological mastery. This 
allegorical consciousness produces a much more diverse set of reception practices. No longer do 
McGee’s imagined audiences complete Ciceronian texts; they are too busy absorbing 
supplemental allegories to piece together a more rounded picture of their lifeworlds. 
If broadcast technologies and early internet sub-media produced and circulated an endless 
stream of signs about the social world, blogging and other affiliated personal publication 
technologies compound this trend almost beyond comprehension. In fact, bloggers might be at 
the vanguard of this allegorical consciousness given their tendency to dissect specific events as 
they unfold, fitting them into broader trends and patterns. This shift from a representational 
consciousness to an allegorical one overlaps with assessments of how blogging relates to the 
three challenges of invention, emotion, and expertism in public deliberation. How can blogging 
claim to contribute to the invention of productive arguments if it has abandoned truth claims 
grounded in the objectivity and neutrality of representational practice? How can blogging 
constructively contribute to public deliberation if it is overly invested in emotional discourse 
grounded in personal experience rather than the representational norms of rational-critical 
debate? Why should non-specialists contribute their unskilled viewpoints in technical decision-
making when experts are perfectly capable of making decisions for them? These questions direct 
this dissertation to articulate how networked sensibilities challenge current theories of public 
deliberation that are based in sacred modernist sensibilities. 
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Though the term ‘network society’ is heuristically powerful in reconceptualizing 
contemporary public deliberation, it risks over-generalizing the complex phenomena reshaping 
political, social, and economic life. Before detailing my method and principles of case study 
selection, I would like to register some necessary caveats about networked societies, and their 
extensions into networked imaginaries and sensibilities.  
Caveat #1: Networked sensibilities are situated between unifying underlying logics and 
multiplying cultural practices. It would be inaccurate, and potentially dangerous, to assert one 
unified and totalizing version of the network society. Just as there are multiple modernities, as 
Dilip Gaonkar notes, there are culturally specific instantiations of networked societies.82 Yet, for 
all the variety that might exist amongst different cultural formations, there are also striking 
parallels across networked societies. While modernity had to grapple with industrialization, the 
secularization of value, and the spread of science as an influential discourse across cultural 
boundaries, so do networked societies today similarly accommodate globalization, diversity, and 
information technology.83 This project is necessarily focused on a primarily American context, 
though I certainly do not argue for a reading of the blogosphere that privileges the American 
experience over others. However, I suspect, and hope that future research confirms, that the 
‘grammar’ I develop is portable to other contexts with the usual necessary alterations. 
Caveat #2: The network society does not account for much of the world that remains un-
networked by information technology. Indeed, the digital divide still looms as a marker of major 
inequalities within and between certain nation-states. To some extent, these inequalities were 
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born during the modern era, especially through the vehicles of colonization, and demand serious 
redress (if it is, indeed, desirable for the entire globe to be internetworked). We should be careful 
not to paper over the serious access inequities that persist into the 21st century. In fact, the 
heavily networked societies have profited in part because they’ve been able to offload the nastier 
parts of modernity like resource extraction onto less-densely networked countries. But, as the 
science fiction writer William Gibson said in an oft-quoted passage, “the future is here, it’s just 
not evenly distributed.”84 The general trend is toward cheaper computing devices able to interact 
with the internet, and, barring an apocalyptic tragedy, it seems difficult to imagine a world where 
current trends are reversed. Even with a persistent digital divide, though, it’s fair to refer to 
network societies because, as Castells argues, “everybody is affected by the processes that take 
place in the global networks of this dominant social structure. This is because the core activities 
that shape and control human life in every corner of the planet are organized in these global 
networks.”85 Consequently, theorizing public deliberation in networked societies is a crucial 
element in understanding the very possibilities for global justice. 
Caveat #3: Networked sensibilities hybridize, not supplant, modernist sensibilities. It would be 
an error of the first degree to assume that networked logics would sweep away more than four 
hundred years of modern history. The basic elements of the modernist social imaginary—
citizenship, the nation-state, markets, and democracy—are probably here to stay. This isn’t to 
say that they won’t face significant challenges and have to refashion themselves in order to be 
serviceable for contemporary public life. Indeed, these legacies of modernity will, and to a 
certain extent already have, hybridize by incorporating networked sensibilities. The nation-
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state’s power, for example, has been radically reduced by transnational flows of capital. 
Ultimately, the nation-state will have to address this issue or its tax base will erode more 
dramatically; calls for global regulation of finance or a tax on international financial speculations 
represent possible hybridized futures. The current relationship between newspapers, that most 
modernist of media, and blogs, the exemplar of the new digitally networked media, shows 
another hybrid path: the traditional news article published in the morning paper is now paired 
with regularly updated blogs available around the clock on many major newspaper websites. 
Caveat #4: There are substantial counter-trends to the networked society. The most obvious of 
these counter-trends are fundamentalisms of all stripes. Many fundamentalists aren’t even 
satisfied with rolling back society to modern times, for nothing less than a total rollback to pre-
modern value structures will satisfy them. While terrorist networks like al-Qaeda are often 
identified as prime examples of pre-modern fundamentalism, certain strands of evangelical 
Christianity and orthodox Judaism can also be understood as counter-trends to the network 
society. Fundamentalism isn’t just an adjective to apply to religion, though. Market 
fundamentalism, as represented by the Chicago School and Milton Friedman, is similarly under 
threat as certain networks defy the supposedly ironclad logic of capitalism. Despite their best 
efforts, I suspect that fundamentalists will increasingly lose traction in contemporary public life 
precisely because their sensibilities no longer match up with individual senses of the lifeworld. 
1.5 Method of Analysis and Case Study Selection 
I have three scholarly goals for this dissertation. First, I want to make a contribution to 
the literature on the ‘history of the internet.’ Recent histories of the internet are particularly 
valuable because they capture dynamic changes before faded memories and broken hyperlinks 
frustrate documentation. In documenting the rise of new deliberative practices facilitated by 
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networked technologies, I hope to provide an admittedly narrow snapshot of the networked 
imaginary. This historical imperative is particularly important with the fast-paced, and unevenly 
archived, nature of the internet which begets and turns over small discourse communities at a 
rapidly punctuated pace. By investigating case studies in-depth, I want to provide a record of 
what happened, and how onlookers reacted at the time, to novel deliberation practices. Second, I 
want to make a theoretical contribution to understanding the basic processes of deliberation in a 
networked era. What kinds of continuities and discontinuities occur as digital, networked 
technologies overtake analog, broadcast media? What sorts of theoretical claims can be made 
about blogs practicing deliberative rhetoric? Finally, I want to begin making some critical 
overtures in thinking about blogging. One task of rhetorical scholarship is to make a society’s 
communication patterns more transparent to itself. By doing so, we encourage self-reflexivity 
about the norms of communicative action. In developing a critical vocabulary for thinking about 
blogging, I hope to draw attention to modes of public deliberation that deserve further critical 
work. 
My primary research question is ‘how do blogs focus attention during public 
deliberation’? It is not a given that blogging always focuses attention. Certainly, some blogs 
misdirect attention. However, in at least some instances, blogs, like any media, do focus 
attention. I take the presence of blog-borne arguments in the general interest media as a proxy by 
which to measure this attention-focusing capacity. By looking at key moments in the 
development of the blogosphere, I try to understand processes of public argument 
retrospectively, in order to draw conclusions about patterns of internetworked deliberation. From 
my central research question flow several related queries: What are the argumentative practices 
that bloggers engage in to influence public deliberation? In what ways can a rhetorical 
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perspective illuminate the activity of blogging? Finally, how does blogging represent a shift from 
modernist sensibilities?  
In order to answer these questions, I examine three key moments in the development of 
blogging: blogs active in the Trent Lott affair, Salam Pax’s blog, and the climate blog 
RealClimate. These inflection points mark moments where public discourse emanating from 
blogs spurred on public discourse coming from other media streams. It is these junctures that 
have been constituted as turning points in the blogosphere’s history. The three case studies I 
tackle here are critical discourse moments, or instances where society reconsiders traditional 
ways of knowing and being.86 They are moments where publics come together to participate in 
the co-construction of public discourse. In that process, new practices of blogging gain higher 
visibility, working their way into the nascent networked sensibility. As citation in the general 
interest broadcast media suggests, bloggers can at certain times function as super-charged 
opinion leaders for various publics endlessly assembling themselves through their circulation in 
hypertextually mediated environments.  
Media theorist Geert Lovink captures the problem of studying blogs succinctly by 
observing “how can you do research when your object is in a state of hyper-growth and 
permanent transformation? This is the case with the blogosphere.”87 Blogging admits of so many 
                                                
86 See James Bohman, Public Deliberation, chapter 5. There is a risk involved with studying these critical 
discourse moments; namely, that emphasizing these ‘great moments in blogging’ at the expense of more quotidian 
blogging replicates the focus on ‘great speeches’ rather than the communicative practices of everyday life. To some 
degree, the real significance of blogging isn’t in the meta-deliberative moments but in the regularized banality of 
everyday blogging. I’ll admit of this possibility while maintaining that the study of these critical discourse moments 
is important because of the potential impact that blogging does have on circuits of public deliberation. In addition, 
these inflection points have invited a lot of follow-on meta-discourse which have encouraged reflection on the 
norms of blogging and thus impacted the networked imaginary in more detectable ways. In the end, my hope is that 
by looking at the ‘extremes’ of blogged public discourse, we might learn more about the mean. 
87 Geert Lovink, Zero Comments: Blogging and Critical Internet Culture (New York: Routledge, 2007), 
xxiii. 
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uses that attempting to capture the phenomenon is like taking pictures of ghosts; what appears 
there one instant is gone the next. There’s no method to capture exact pathways of influence (not 
that such a method exists in broadcast media). Even hyperlink analysis, which aims at 
deciphering how text fragments circulate between internetworked blogs, can only claim to 
generate an image of the blogosphere at a given moment.88 Pair this with the continuing growth 
of increasingly narrow genres of blogging, and the popularization of certain bloggers throughout 
the last several years, and we have an object of study that is defined by flux. In fact, the very 
thing that makes blogging so interesting as an object of study—flexibility—defies efforts at 
categorization and generalization. How, then, to say anything about the blogosphere that isn’t 
immediately post-dated by another rapid evolution in blogging practices? It is with this in mind 
that I pursue a research approach grounded in developing a grammar of the blogosphere, which I 
hope will kindle insights into the key rhetorical practices of blogging. 
Rather than trying to deduce rhetorical features of blogs from a wide variety of 
deliberative outbreaks, I focus on specific episodes relatively early in the history of blogging to 
reveal how blogs contribute to public argument. I examine blog-borne discourse that circulated 
widely during times of public controversy and see what kinds of unique rhetorical phenomena 
are happening in and between different blogs.89 The tradition of rhetoric and public argument 
informing my work sees value in examining these controversies to tease out their underlying 
                                                
88 For an overview of hyperlink analysis, see Han Woo Park, “Hyperlink Network Analysis: A New 
Method for the Study of Social Structure of the Web,” Connections 1 (2003) and Han Woo Park and Mike Thelwall, 
“Hyperlink Analysis of the World Wide Web: A Review,” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication (July 
2003), http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol8/issue4/park.html; to see hyperlink analysis in action, see Han Woo Park, Chun-
Sik Kim, and George Barnett, “Socio-communicational Structure among Political Actors on the Web in South 
Korea,” New Media and Society 3 (2004): 403-423. 
89 This approach is a contrast to the “blogflops” approach of D. Travers Scott in his “Tempests of the 
Blogosphere: Presidential Campaign Stories that Failed to Ignite Mainstream Media,” in Digital Media and 
Democracy, ed. Megan Boler (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008): 271-300.   
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logics, patterns, topics, and lines of argument. From these underlying patterns emerge concepts 
that aid historical, theoretical, and critical understanding. Examining public controversies 
illuminates us historically, as we chart continuities and interruptions in traditional patterns of 
deliberation. Theoretically, this type of study helps us understand why certain techniques 
worked, and how they might be adapted to current use. Critically, we can begin to judge whether 
or not certain techniques advance what we hold to be just or desirable. Thinking about blogging 
and public deliberation along these lines enriches understanding of democratic theory and 
practice. 
In studying blogs as rhetorical phenomena, I draw heavily from the rhetorical theorist and 
critic Kenneth Burke. At first blush, Burke and blogs seem to be an unlikely mix (after all, Burke 
used an outhouse to the very end). But Burke’s system of dramatism, which offers multiple ways 
of thinking about human relations, offers powerful analytic tools by which to scrutinize the 
blogosphere. My method establishes a relay between three concepts in the Burkean canon: the 
concepts of grammar, representative anecdote, and metaphor. Essentially, I want to develop a 
grammar of the blogosphere, or a vocabulary that captures the underlying logics of blogging in a 
networked society and I do so by studying the dominant metaphors operating within 
representative anecdotes.  
In A Grammar of Motives, Kenneth Burke outlines an answer to the question “What is 
involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it?”90 I want to ask a 
related question in the context of blogging: “What is involved, when we talk about blogging and 
what blogging does?” For Burke, “any complete statement about motives will offer some kind of 
answers to these five questions: what was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who 
                                                
90 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969 [1945]), xv. 
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did it (agent), how he [sic] did it (agency), and why (purpose).”91 These basic elements can be 
used in various combinations to explain how people describe their social worlds—it is a 
grammar that, in certain combinations, tells us something about the substance of a thing. For 
Burke, we cannot claim to know the thing itself, but by amalgamating the fundamental units of 
the grammar, we can come to know different parts of the thing.  
It is this interpretive play that makes language and sociality such a rewarding area of 
inquiry. Language contains alchemical possibilities for Burke: from a “great central moltenness, 
where all is merged” come various distinctions made by interlocutors. A rhetor might cast a 
social problem in terms of how the scene drove an actor to do one thing or another; alternatively, 
one might suggest that the very same actor’s choice to do one thing was forged in relation to a 
particular purpose. For Burke, there is a plurality of ways to perceive and make sense of a 
situation utilizing the basic elements of the grammar. Being able to switch around ways of seeing 
something of substance is the cardinal virtue in the Burkean system. Language makes it easy to 
play with these ways of perceiving substance because, in Gottfried Benn’s clever formulation, 
words “need only to open their wings, and millennia fall out of their flight.”92 Symbols, far from 
being direct representations of reality, are invested with layers of history, ideology, common 
sense, and feelings. In the Burkean system, these elements of a grammar—the act, scene, agency, 
agent and purpose—are central generating principles that “provide us with a kind of simplicity 
that can be developed into considerable complexity, and yet can be discovered beneath its 
elaborations.”93 With these five terms (later six, adding attitude), Burke develops a system he 
                                                
91 Burke, Grammar of Motives, xv, emphasis in original. 
92 Quoted in Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, trans. Michael Eldred (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1988), xxvii. 
93 Burke, Grammar of Motives, xvi. 
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calls dramatism, which effectively “treats language and thought as modes of action.”94 Such an 
approach jibes with Lanham’s description of rhetoric as an attention economy; for Lanham, 
rhetoric’s attention focusing capacities are also modes of action.  
 Burke’s grammar rejects the notion that human relations can be somehow reduced to 
unambiguous equations represented by clear and transparent symbols, as in the field of symbolic 
logic or the movement of logical positivism.95 This makes Burke suspicious about strong 
causation claims. Such certainty belies the nature of the language-using animal in the Barnyard 
of Human Relations.96 Since human motivation is opaque, and language is inherently slippery, 
ambiguity is the way of (describing) the world. What Burke seeks is “not terms that avoid 
ambiguity, but terms that clearly reveal the strategic spots at which ambiguities necessarily 
arise.”97 Ambiguity is an important element of the work of language for Burke, because “it is in 
the areas of ambiguity that transformations take place; in fact, without such areas, transformation 
would be impossible.”98 It is just this type of ambiguous language that led me to this 
methodological path: when beginning my study, I stumbled on the trope ‘flood the zone’ while 
researching the first case study. Not knowing immediately what it meant, I started to think about 
the potential implications of that term in the context of what I was tracing in my research. This 
terminological ambiguity drew my attention to some interesting phenomena operating in the 
blogosphere; and my contention is that these phenomena highlight certain ‘logics’ of the 
                                                
94 Burke, Grammar of Motives, xxii. As Burke notes, a grammar “reduces the subject synoptically while 
still permitting us to appreciate its scope and complexity” (xxii). A grammar is never ‘finalized’ in the sense that a 
single description ‘correctly’ captures a slice of human motivation; there is an openness to interpretation attached to 
Burke’s comic view of language use that pre-empts the ossification of a single explanation. 
95 Burke, Grammar of Motives, xviii. 
96 As Burke refers to the drama of human relations in Grammar of Motives, xvii. 
97 Burke, Grammar of Motives, xviii, emphasis in original. 
98 Burke, Grammar of Motives, xix. 
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blogosphere (either explicitly or implicitly). They form what I am calling a grammar of the 
blogosphere. This grammar is not exhaustive, nor can it be neatly applied to every blog past, 
present, and future. The point of developing a grammar is not to close the door on thinking about 
blogging but to open a conversation about it. 
 Burke’s playful approach to language might be tricky for those seeking a firmer 
grounding for language, motivation, and human activity. The potential of a Burkeian approach, 
though, is that it elucidates the key link between ambiguity and transformation. Because of the 
fragility of meaning, no one interpretation can dominate within the Burkean system of 
dramatism. Rather, there is an openness to symbol usage that encourages criticism, reflection, 
and modification to fit with the needs of symbol-using animals. Burke recognizes that the 
concepts that equip one generation to make sense of their lives might not suffice for the next 
generation. Different grammars are developed to make sense of different eras; old grammars (old 
relationships between terms) are revised or retrofitted to bring order to the constantly refreshing 
scramble of the Human Barnyard.  
Looking at a grammar of the blogosphere, then, helps us see where modernist 
sensibilities give way to networked ones in the context of public culture making. But it is often 
difficult to detect a grammar clearly, so Burke sketched out tools that help us see how different 
parts are related to each other. Burke’s work is full of such devices, but one particularly useful 
one for my purposes is the representative anecdote. In seeking to explain social reality, rhetors   
seek for vocabularies that will be faithful reflections of reality. To this end, they 
must develop vocabularies that are selections of reality. And any selection of 
reality must, in certain circumstances, function as a deflection of reality. Insofar 
as the vocabulary meets the needs of reflection, we can say it has the necessary 
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scope. In its selectivity, it is a reduction. Its scope and reduction become a 
deflection when the given terminology, or calculus, is not suited to the subject 
matter which it is designed to calculate. Dramatism suggests a procedure to be 
followed in the development of a given calculus, or terminology. It involves the 
search for a ‘representative anecdote,’ to be used as a form in conformity with 
which the vocabulary is constructed.99  
A representative anecdote is a narration of events that captures some essential element of a 
phenomenon. Rhetors utilize representative anecdotes all the time when they reference stories 
that seem to capture a slice of life. Politicians expertly deploy representative anecdotes when 
they identify hard-working, average Americans in their speeches. Representative anecdotes serve 
an allegorical purpose—they condense a variety of social types, feelings, relationships, and more 
into a densely allusive but neatly packaged story. The tradition in rhetorical studies of analyzing 
key public speeches implicitly recognizes these addresses as representative anecdotes in order to 
identify controlling rhetorical figures, hidden assumptions, key arguments, and modes of proof. 
Burke’s example of the behaviorist demonstrates the analytic utility of the representative 
anecdote: ring the bell, and watch the conditioned canines come loping in for a meal. From this 
event, the behaviorist draws certain inferences, such as living things can be conditioned, the 
relationship between stimulus and response is decently obvious, and training produces desired 
reactions. These conclusions faithfully reflect a certain reality, and so the behaviorist takes them 
as a representative anecdote of ‘the way things are.’ They have ‘scope’ inasmuch as they provide 
a plausible account for a phenomenon. At the same time, the conclusions that have been drawn 
‘reduce’ inasmuch as they take a complex phenomenon and turn it into a simplistic cause and 
                                                
99 Burke, Grammar of Motives, 59. 
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effect relationship. This reduction always runs the risk of deflection, as it might miss the mark 
for various reasons that critics of behaviorism would be quick to point out.  
The behaviorist’s conclusions might be invoked in a wide array of settings. They might 
even receive an invitation to share their thoughts on, say, education policy. Communicating the 
insights of their research, the behaviorist uses the central representative anecdote of the trained 
dog, extrapolated to the world of human affairs. Because the explanatory power of the 
representative anecdote operates so cleanly for the behaviorist, its application is nearly endless. 
The representative anecdote becomes a way to understand the social world, and so our 
behaviorist prescribes a series of ringing bells to mark the beginnings, transitions, and endings of 
the school day in order to prepare a workforce that would also be regulated by bells and whistles. 
Representative anecdotes thus organize ways of knowing. These representative anecdotes are 
often focal points around which public argument swirls: the behaviorists’ prescriptions can be 
challenged as inappropriate deflections, they can be countered with alternative representative 
anecdotes, or they can be refashioned as new information comes to light.  
Representative anecdotes can operate at a micro-level, as invocations by individual 
arguers; but they can also operate at a macro-level, as organizing concepts for entire societies. If 
the behaviorist’s testimony seems nonsensical, it’s because our sensibilities have changed. From 
a critical perch, we see such explanations as hopelessly reductive. But for a while in the 
modernist era it seemed perfectly reasonable. Representative anecdotes that capture the 
modernist social imaginary often coincide with metaphors of the mechanism. The opening of the 
modern era is often characterized by one representative anecdote: Descartes poking some poor 
splayed animal, watching the ‘pain-free’ stimulus-response motion in the muscles ratifying his 
mechanistic vision of the world. With only nerve sensations, mind and body fully split, our 
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physical husks are but automatons awaiting proper instruction. Systemically, if we are but to 
react to sensation, then complex societies must develop ways of training to facilitate the public 
good. With this constellation of believable representative anecdotes in place, modern society 
produced discipline at the same time it produced feelings of emancipation, as Foucault 
documented in a necessary counterpoint to Habermas’ defense of publicity.100 Behaviorism, as 
another representative anecdote that captures the modernist sensibility, operates as a sort of 
bookend to Descartes’ inauguration of modernity. Its ultimate failure to coordinate public life 
could be read as the beginning of the end for modernist sensibilities. 
Representative anecdotes have clear utility for the rhetor trying to invent persuasive 
discourse. But for the scholar, representative anecdotes are similarly valuable, for they offer 
insights into the relationships between things. In other words, representative anecdotes shed light 
on certain grammars by illuminating how people perceive and interact with the social world. For 
Burke, representative anecdotes are useful because they encourage the development of richer 
vocabularies to describe human motivation. For the behaviorist, the representative anecdote is so 
powerful because it creates a potentially complicated vocabulary of stimulus, response, training, 
and so on. Other representative anecdotes function similarly. Ronald Reagan’s invocation of the 
‘welfare queen,’ or the ‘missile shield,’ became representative anecdotes for social policy and 
Cold War defense postures. As such, they spawned a vocabulary that continues to shape 
perceptions and thus public debate. Representative anecdotes contain in a nutshell “the 
terminological structure that is evolved in conformity with it. Such a terminology is a 
‘conclusion’ that follows from the selection of a given anecdote. Thus the anecdote is in a sense 
                                                
100 See his Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1979 [1975]). 
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a summation, containing implicitly what the system that is developed from it contains 
explicitly.”101 
 Representative anecdotes are often so powerful because they generate metaphors that 
condense the anecdote into a super-charged bundle of discourse. The behaviorists’ representative 
anecdote functions effectively because it can be extended beyond just canine observation—it is 
potentially applicable to the entire social world! Rhetorical critics are especially adept at 
identifying rhetorical figures that sneak into our public discourse. By reading into the rhetorical 
figures associated with each of the case studies I identify, I hope to illuminate something 
essential about the grammar of blogging. Burke’s persistent interest in metaphor is, again, 
helpful in this process. According to Burke, a metaphor can illuminate the “thisness of a that, or 
the thatness of a this.”102 Some metaphors work better than others—they capture, in Burkean 
terms, the underlying grammar of the thing they aim to describe. For internetworked societies, of 
course, the master metaphor to describe economic, social, and political life is the network. 
Increased circulation of the network metaphor signals a shift in the underlying formation of 
social practices. Peeling apart the metaphor, seeing how it came to be, what it signifies, why it 
works, who employs it, and to what ends—these are all part of metaphoric criticism.103 
Examining metaphors is particularly important, because metaphors mark elisions between the 
                                                
101 Burke, Grammar of Motives, 60. 
102 Burke, Grammar of Motives, 503. 
103 Robert Ivie’s metaphoric criticism showcases the utility of this approach. See his “The Metaphor of 
Force in Prowar Discourse: The Case of 1812,” in Critical Questions: Invention, Creativity, and the Criticism of 
Discourse and Media, eds. William Nothstine, Carole Blair, and Gary Copeland (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1994): 259-80 and “Cold War Motives and the Rhetorical Metaphor: A Framework of Criticism,” in Cold War 
Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, Ideology, eds. Martin Medhurst, Robert Ivie, Philip Wander, and Robert Scott (East 
Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1997): 71-80. 
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literal and figurative. “Today’s metaphor,” as F.C.T. Moore puts it, “is tomorrow’s literal sense,” 
naturalized in language as a new commonplace.104 
 The particular metaphors I examine in this dissertation are provocative because they 
expand the rhetorical imaginary. All social imaginaries are undergirded by rhetorical 
imaginaries—the conceptual terms that structure how people think about their interrelations. The 
idea of a ‘citizen,’ for example, which was so central to modernist sensibilities, is essentially a 
rhetorical invention. It collects a series of practices into a more congealed form and through a 
process of naming creates a meaningful concept that organizes social life. While the three tropes 
I investigate here might not punch as hard as the idea of citizen, they do add a significant 
element to our understanding of networked sensibilities. 
By examining representative anecdotes about blogging, I want to move ‘toward’ a 
grammar of blogging that develops a vocabulary capable of capturing changes in contemporary 
public deliberation and culture. The idea of ‘toward’ animated Burke’s work, from the title of his 
first work of fiction, Towards a Better Life to Attitudes Toward History. Following this same line 
of thought, this dissertation begins moving toward a grammar of blogging by studying the 
representative anecdotes about blogging. This complex grammar is represented by the tropes 
‘flood the zone,’ ‘ambient intimacy,’ and ‘shallow quotation,’ each of which map on to specific 
representative anecdotes. By drawing out these metaphors in the context of each representative 
anecdote, I isolate the key grammar that can be used to describe the rhetorical activity of the 
blogosphere. 
                                                
104 F.C.T. Moore, “On Taking Metaphor Literally,” in Metaphor: Problems and Perspectives, ed. David 
Miall (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1982), 3.  
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I take the three cases that I have sketched here to be representative anecdotes in part 
because they constitute a type of mythology, an origin tale of how blogging came to be. These 
three blogging episodes recur as representative anecdotes about the birth of the blogosphere. 
These days, when a particular blogger or a particular post circulates into more general media, 
they are often explained through recourse to these representative anecdotes. In the years 
immediately following the Trent Lott imbroglio, blogging was often introduced as the ‘new 
media’ that had recently unseated a major political figure. When bloggers from other countries 
make the news during some major tragedy, they are often associated with Salam Pax’s blogging 
before the Iraq war. RealClimate, too, is prominently featured in stories about the growth of 
science or expert blogs.  
There are a number of blog-driven episodes that are worthy of in-depth study. Instead of 
sweeping a large number of examples into my analysis, I am focusing on just three of the most 
substantive episodes where blogging captured national attention. I used three selection criteria to 
winnow nine critical discourse moments associated with blogs. My selection criteria are 1) 
crossover to general interest media, 2) proximity to the beginning of the growth of the 
blogosphere, and 3) significance in destabilizing norms of the modernist social imaginary: 
• Did the blogging episode garner broad circulation in the general media? I am interested in 
public discourse that begins on blogs but is then amplified by the general interest 
(primarily broadcast) media. This crossover to general media extends the conversation 
beyond the blogosphere and can lay claim to having a bigger impact on revising the 
social imaginary than discourse that remains internal to the blogosphere. Despite the 
growth in blogging, the circulation of general interest media still retains significant 
influence. Moreover, the general media often serves as a proxy for public deliberation 
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occurring throughout society, as it reflects and shapes the agenda for conversation about 
public life. 
• Did the blogging episode occur early in the history of the blogosphere? I focus on early 
episodes of blogging where the rhetorical activity of bloggers captures the public 
imagination by demonstrating novel ways of participating in public discourse. These 
early cases form part of the origin narrative of blogging and are disproportionately used 
as representative anecdotes by the general media to remind audiences of blogging’s 
influence. I would assert that these early cases exposed deliberating citizens to the 
possibilities of blogging, expanding imaginations and encouraging new deliberation 
practices that took advantage of internetworked sensibilities. 
• Does the blogging episode destabilize a different part of the social imaginary? Rather 
than focus on one genre of blogging, I include three different genres in order to produce a 
rounder vocabulary that hints at the changing social imaginary. While I could have 
focused just on, say, ‘citizen journalism’ blogs, my inclusion of a lifestream blog and a 
science blog shows how blogging impacts various elements of public culture.  
Table 2 details the results of the selection criteria applied to nine blog-fueled critical discourse 
moments, which I detail more extensively in Chapter 2. 
Blogging Episode News Stories in US Newspapers Date of Episode or Beginning of Blog 
Juan Cole 21 April 2002 
Pharyngula 12 June 2002 
Trent Lott 97 December 2002 
Salam Pax 206 December 2002 
L.T. Smash 20 April 2003 
Dean Campaign 2437105  Fall 2003 
                                                
105 This is obviously a huge number, but it is a case study I do not include in this dissertation. As this 
project unfolds in the future, I do hope to treat the Dean Campaign’s use of blogging; however, it is an undertaking 
that, as the numbers of articles about the campaign suggest, outstrips the amount of time and space for investigation 
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‘Rathergate’ 45 September 2004 
RealClimate 57 December 2004 
Tsunami  343106 December 2004 
Table 2.. Case study selection criteria applied to nine blog-fueled critical discourse 
moments.107 
Based on these results, the three case studies I have previewed show the most promise for 
analysis. The central rhetorical figures—‘flood the zone,’ ‘ambient intimacy,’ and ‘shallow 
quotation’—anchor each of the case studies. I take these tropes to signify the essential practices 
of bloggers, and by teasing out the genesis of these tropes, I hope to identify these practices more 
clearly and implicate them in the making of a networked imaginary. Each case study, then, draws 
on public discourse produced by bloggers to shape an account of each controversy. My objects of 
study are primarily these fragments of public discourse produced by bloggers; however, I also 
integrate commentary provided by the general broadcast media and the popular press in order to 
demonstrate the (often implicit) absorption of these tropes into the networked social imaginary.108 
For each chapter, I begin with an account of the modernist social imaginary. Then, I outline a 
critique of the modernist social imaginary from a rhetorical perspective. I then detail the 
representative anecdote, focusing on bloggers’ public discourse and reverberations in the broader 
media ecology. As I relate the details of these critical discourse moments, I explicate the 
                                                
I currently have. I should note that the vast majority of articles featuring Dean and blogging mention blogs only in 
passing, as one feature of the internetworked political campaigning that the campaign utilized to gain in popularity. 
106 Tsunami blogging stories replicate the ‘trauma blogging’ of Salam Pax; because Salam Pax was 
blogging in early 2002, I chose to analyze his blog rather than tsunami bloggers.  
107 This search was done using Academic LexisNexis, using the US Newspapers and Wires database, and 
bound by dates between January 1, 2001 and January 1, 2007. The search was last conducted on July 4, 2008. This 
search should be taken as a very rough proxy for representation in public deliberation, as some of the articles might 
only reference the search terms tangentially. In addition, this search only accounts for newspapers, and not televised 
reports. The search terms used were either the name of the blog, or the name of the event and (blog or weblog); for 
example, the Trent Lott search was done with “Lott” and (blog or weblog). LexisNexis is an admittedly crude proxy 
to measure general media attention; however, it is more or less representative and far more stable than other search 
engines like Google (see Iina Hellsten, Loet Leydesdorff, and Paul Wouters, “Multiple Presents: How Search 
Engines Rewrite the Past,” New Media and Society (December 2006): 901-24. 
108 Each website and blog post has been archived using Zotero software and is available upon request. The 
central blog texts that I cite are also available at the Internet Archive, at www.archive.org. 
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controlling metaphor revealed by each case study in order to unpack the grammar of the 
blogosphere. I conclude each chapter by explaining how the case study sheds light on networked 
sensibilities. Chapter 2 provides a history of blogging and situates this project in a broader 
conversation about digital media and public culture. Chapter 3 surveys the Trent Lott 
controversy. Chapter 4 explores Salam Pax’s blogging in pre-war Iraq. Chapter 5 identifies 
RealClimate’s contribution to the debate about climate science. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes 
with some ruminations on public deliberation in a networked society and the implications for 
studying digital media from a rhetorical perspective. 
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CHAPTER 2—BLOGGING AND DIGITAL PUBLIC CULTURE 
2.1 A Short History of Blogging 
As use of the internet spread throughout the 1990s, the web was populated by a series of 
largely static ‘homepages’ that were, in many ways, hybrid concoctions of television and the 
newspaper with a twist of a do-it-yourself ethic.  While these homepages often utilized the 
elemental building block of the internet—the hyperlink—to connect to each other, the 
widespread interactivity predicted by the early proponents of the internet remained, for most of 
the internet-using public, more promise than practice.1 The 1990s were the decade when chat 
rooms and discussion boards became fixtures in public imagination, but the actual number of 
participants was proportionally small relative to the entire U.S. population. Computers were 
expensive, dial-up internet connections slow and screechingly frustrating, and learning the highly 
technical computer-mediated ropes was a daunting prospect. In retrospect, computer-mediated 
communication throughout the 1990s seemed like a prototypical junior high school dance—not 
everyone knew where the party was, the connections weren’t as easy as you had hoped, and there 
seemed to be a lot of waiting around.  
It is onto this stage that blogging appeared in the late 1990s. Blogging might be roughly 
periodized into a ‘protoblogging stage,’ a ‘popularization stage,’ and a ‘consolidation stage.’ 
Periodization is always a rough and somewhat arbitrary procedure; nonetheless, it helps chart  
the blogosphere’s dramatic growth. For the purposes of this dissertation, I take the popularization 
stage to span 2001-2006, with the protoblogging stage preceding and the consolidation stage 
                                                
1 Joe Killoran, “Homepages, Blogs, and the Chronotopic Dimensions of Personal Civic (Dis)Engagement,” 
in Rhetorical Democracy: Discursive Practices of Civic Engagement, eds. Gerard Hauser and Amy Grim (Mahwah, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004), 217. 
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following. The protoblogging stage covers the time when bloggers were blogging without calling 
it such. In the mid-to-late 1990s, as the world wide web became more popular, people began 
making webpages that served as link collections for what they had found interesting on the web. 
Many of these link aggregators were extensions of online communities, or personal harvests of 
the ‘best of the web.’ These proto-bloggers did all the work by hand-coding webpages that were 
then manually uploaded to dedicated servers. According to early blogger Rebecca Blood, at the 
beginning of 1999, there were 23 sites that called themselves weblogs, but the circle of blogs 
shortly thereafter became so large that no one person could follow every weblog.2 Wider 
participation in blogging was limited by spotty internet access and the lack of fluency with 
information technology—not many people knew how to code webpages by hand, had the 
financial wherewithal and technical know-how to upload pages to the web, or could spare the 
time to do so.3 
                                                
2 Rebecca Blood, “Weblogs: A History and Perspective,” in We’ve Got Blog: How Weblogs are Changing 
Our Culture, ed. John Rodzvilla (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishing, 2002), 7. For more on the advent of 
blogging, see David Perlmutter and Misti McDaniel, “The Ascent of Blogging,” Nieman Reports (Fall 2005), 
http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/05-3NRfall/NR56-60Fall05.pdf. 
3 Pippa Norris provides a dramatic study in Digital Divide? Civic Engagement, Information Poverty, and 
the Internet Worldwide (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2001) that gathers the empirical data on 
inequality of access in the early years of blogging. As the price of computers and internetworking fell, the digital 
divide was narrowed if persistent. However, a “second-level digital divide” emerged that could be measured as 
inequities surrounding “the ability to efficiently and effectively find information on the Web” (Eszter Hargittai, 
“Second Level Digital-Divide,” First Monday (April 2002), http://www.firstmonday.org/Issues/issue7_4/hargittai/). 
In some ways, blogging became popular because it helped to close this second digital divide. Rather than having to 
hand-code pages, or use expensive coding software, blog software companies usually offered the basic platform for 
free. Though the WYSIWYG (“What You See Is What You Get”) graphic user interface of blogs greatly simplified 
the process of publication to the web, it still requires a bit of fluency with basic computer operations. Combined with 
the expense of broadband connections provided by privatized telecommunications companies in the United States at 
least, the digital divide continues to present a problem for those that view the internet as a key gateway for civic 
engagement. Broadband access has increased. A 2006 study found 73% of Americans had regular internet access, 
with nearly half of those having broadband access (John Horrigan, “Home Broadband Adoption 2006,” Pew Internet 
and American Life Project, May 28, 2006, http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Broadband_trends2006.pdf). A 
later report in February 2007 fixes the number of Americans with broadband at home at 47% (John Horrigan and 
Aaron Smith, “Home Broadband Adoption 2007,” Pew Internet and American Life Project, June 2007, 
www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Broadband%202007.pdf). Historically marginalized groups have made in-roads, 
though substantial gaps continue. To really consider the inequities involved online, though, one would have to 
explore the “third-level digital divide” that considers the capacity of citizens to produce effective rhetoric in digitally 
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In the summer of 1999, Pyra Labs launched Blogger, a high-profile blogging platform 
that was eventually bought by Google. In the heat of the dot-com boom, a number of other 
internet start-ups generated easy to use blogging platforms, marking the very beginnings of the 
popularization stage. Blog-based discourse communities soon coalesced. Many early adopters 
saw the utility in blogging as a mode of self-expression, a way to form relationships, and a venue 
to participate in conversations about all sorts of phenomena. Like any organic, complex system, 
this web of blogs fractalized out into increasingly specialized discourse communities which 
adeptly absorbed latecomers. In these heady, early days of blogging, millions of blogs were 
created. Many of these blogs were soon to be defunct through negligence. But after the attacks 
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, many American citizens 
turned to the internet to learn and debate about the attacks. Blogging played a prominent role in 
recording eyewitness accounts and in sustaining debate about the consequences of those events.4  
 I find the dissemination stage interesting because the norms of blogging were so 
unsettled. What was appropriate to blog about was up for grabs, and networks of influence had 
not yet hardened. Innovators pushed blogging in new directions that would have been difficult to 
predict. Bloggers began to make rhetorical decisions about how to frame their content, what kind 
of persona to display, who to affiliate with through linking, and how to design their blog 
interface. Many bloggers used their blogs as extensions of their personal communicative 
networks, writing about events in their own lives and giving deeply personal opinions about the 
world around them. For this reason, blogs were often constructed as a public extension of diary 
                                                
mediated environments. Civic engagement requires not just access to the internet, or the ability to find information 
efficiently, but the skill in producing public discourse that intervenes in the public life of their community by taking 
advantage of the unique affordances of internet sub-media. 
4 See Alex Halavais, “The Rise of Do-It-Yourself Journalism After September 11,” in One Year Later: 
September 11 and the Internet, A Pew Internet and American Life Report, eds. Lee Rainee, Susannah Fox, and Mary 
Madden, September 5, 2002, http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_9-11_Report.pdf. 
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or journal writing. Many of these blogs found niche audiences who became devoted readers and 
commenters.  
At the same time, a sub-genre of blogging that commented primarily on unfolding news 
items developed. While these blogs also provided a more personal approach to political issues, 
they served as sites for broader public discussions about the collective challenges bandied about 
in the public sphere. These blogs were practicing deliberative rhetoric, making arguments about 
how we should interpret topics salient to democratic public life. Here are some of the more 
significant deliberative blogging events that occurred (mostly in the United States) around the 
same time as the three case studies I present: 
• Juan Cole’s Informed Comment. A professor of history at the University of 
Michigan, and fluent in Arabic, he often commented on the Middle East policy of 
the United States. As a critic of the war in Iraq, he has often been cited as an 
authority in the general interest press. 
• P.Z. Myer’s Pharyngula. A biologist, P.Z. Myers, started blogging about the 
intelligent design controversy at around the same time that the high-profile 
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District case that tested whether intelligent 
design must be taught as a competing theory in high school biology classrooms. 
• L.T. Smash and military bloggers. During the major combat operations and 
ensuing occupation of Iraq, U.S. soldiers blogged about their experiences, often 
posting pictures and videos. L.T. Smash was a prominent milblogger who 
provided a very personal account of the war. 
• Howard Dean’s primary campaign. Howard Dean appeared to be a long shot for 
the Democratic nomination for President, but his campaign utilized the internet to 
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bring in small donations and, more importantly, connect with citizens through 
blogs hosted by their campaign website. Observers suggested that Dean’s ascent 
as a legitimate candidate was fueled by the blogosphere; of course, the circulation 
of the infamous ‘Dean scream’ that unraveled his campaign was partially aided by 
bloggers as well. 
• Rathergate. After a Dan Rather-led 60 Minutes report on George W. Bush’s 
National Guard service during the Vietnam War, which relied heavily on a series 
of memos written by Bush’s supervisor, a blogger on the Free Republic blog 
produced evidence that the documents were likely forgeries. Eventually, CBS 
retracted the story, issued an apology, and demoted Rather. 
• Tsunami bloggers. The effects of the August 2003 tsunami that struck several 
countries in Southeast Asia was recorded on blogs from people near the affected 
areas. Blogging software had begun to incorporate image and video capabilities, 
which produced riveting first person accounts of the damage by the tsunami. 
By the end of 2004 (a little past the halfway point of the popularization stage) blogs had 
become a significant part of the internet firmament. According to a Pew Internet and American 
Life study,  
• 8 million people had created a blog; 
• 32 million people read blogs regularly; 
• 12% of internet users posted comments on blogs; 
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• Bloggers tended to be male (57%), young (48% under 30), well-off (42% with an 
income higher than $50,000), and well-educated (39% with a college degree).5 
These numbers signal that, just a few years after blogging was ushered into public discourse, the 
blogosphere was already a significant site for communicative exchanges, with a significant 
portion of the American population using blogs. By 2006, the end of the dissemination stage,  
The Pew Internet & American Life Project found that 12 million American adults (8 percent of 
Internet users) keep blogs, 57 million read them, and 175,000 new blogs were created every day.6 
 But how do people use blogs? What sorts of needs are fulfilled from participating in 
blog-driven conversations? Uses and gratifications media research Barbara Kaye found ten major 
reasons that people were attracted to writing, reading, and commenting on blogs.  
• Blogs have unique characteristics tied up with their presentation. Blogs offer a 
wealth of information and commentary, studded with hyperlinks directing readers 
to other parts of the web. Because blogs are not limited by time, as in television 
programs, or space, as in newspapers, they are able to cover topics in-depth and 
provide commentary from a range of perspectives. 
                                                
5 Lee Rainie, “The State of Blogging,” Pew Internet and American Life Project, January 2005, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_blogging_data.pdf. 
6 Amanda Lenhart and Susannah Fox, “Bloggers: A Portrait of the Internet’s New Storytellers,” Pew 
Internet and American Life Project, July 19, 2006, http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/ PIP%20Bloggers%20 
Report%20July%2019%202006.pdf. This study found that the demographics of blogging had become somewhat 
more equitable: men and women blog equally and racial diversity was better represented in the blogosphere than on 
the internet in general. One caveat that should be registered is that not all blogs are populated by humans: the rise of 
“spam blogs,” or “splogs,” created by automated technologies can easily distort the numbers of blogs.  See Dan Li & 
Gina Wacejko, “Splogs and Abandoned Blogs: The Perils of Sampling Bloggers and their Blogs,” Information, 
Communication, and Society (April 2008): 279-96 and Charles Mann, “Spam + Blogs = Trouble,” Wired 
(September 2006): 104-16. 
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• Blogs are personally fulfilling. Blogs are often entertaining and humorous, 
providing a diversion from more mundane activities like work (much to the 
chagrin of employers everywhere). 
• Blogs allow affiliation with others. People use blogs to stay in touch with friends, 
to provide accounts of their lives for distant family members, and to interact with 
new people. Blogs facilitate social networking, allowing people new ways to 
signal and build relationships. 
• Blogs assist in seeking information. Blogs supply a cornucopia of information, 
often organized thematically, and direct readers to other sites with even more 
information. Sometimes this information is highly specialized or grounded in 
personal experience that would otherwise be inaccessible to a broader audience. 
• Blogs provide intellectual and aesthetic fulfillment. Blogs often have scintillating 
writing that draws curious readers. Blogs are also hosts for debate and 
argumentation, either between multiple blogs or in the comments section on a 
single blog. They provide access to a wider range of opinions than might be 
available in a geographically restricted site of argumentative exchange. 
• Blogs provide an alternative to the traditional media. The term ‘mainstream 
media’ quickly became a pejorative term on many blogs. Liberal critiques of 
media institutions often fixate on the conservative biases of publishers and 
advertisers; conservative critiques focus on the liberal bent of editors and 
journalists. Whatever one’s political persuasion, people are drawn to blogging as 
an alternative outlet that can provide viewpoints not available, for whatever 
reason, in the institutional media. 
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• Blogs offer guidance for opinion-formation. Blogs offer a variety of opinions, and 
an opportunity to seek out competing opinions. Many users of blogs find them 
useful vehicles to form their own opinions and compare their reasoning with 
others. 
• Blogs are convenient. Users of blogs see blogging as an effective filtering 
mechanism to bring some sort of organization to their hypercomplex information 
worlds. Reading blogs is either free or very cheap, and requires little more than an 
internet connection to access an abundance of knowledge. Blog posts can also be 
copied, emailed, and recirculated to acquaintances, making them a particularly 
suitable mode to pass around interesting tidbits. 
• Blogs aid in surveilling the political world. People read blogs because it helps 
them keep up with political issues, including the progress of specific legislation 
and updates on elections. Blogs also can produce evidence of where politicians 
stand on an issue. 
• Blogs contribute to fact-checking. Many people see blogs as a helpful corrective 
mechanism to public deliberation by publicizing errors propagated by the press or 
other public figures.7 
These ten uses and gratifications of blogs intersect significantly with traditional features required 
to smooth the progress of public deliberation. The blogosphere is a site for social learning, for 
interacting with other people, for discovering information and forming opinions. The norms that 
                                                
7 Barbara Kaye, “Blog Use Motivations: An Exploratory Study,” in Blogging, Citizenship, and the Future 
of Media, ed. Mark Tremayne (New York: Routledge, 2007), 134-6. The categories I identify here are the broad 
categories Kaye finds; she breaks each category into several further sub-categories that provide a very rounded 
account of how people use blogs. 
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Habermas identifies—namely people’s use of their reflective capacities to argue and justify their 
opinions—are at work to varying degrees in the blogosphere.  
Of course, to say ‘blogs have this use or that use’ is to make gross generalizations. The 
flexibility of blogging as a form of publication admits of many emergent uses. In fact, as blogs 
became more popular from 2001 to 2006, they began internally differentiating themselves, 
tailoring their contributions to public discourse along particular topical themes. Axel Bruns and 
Joanne Jacobs explain how “it makes as little sense to discuss the uses of blogs as it does to 
discuss, say, the uses of television unless we specify clearly what genres and contexts of use we 
aim to address.”8 It makes as little sense to talk about ‘the blogosphere’ as it does to talk about 
‘the internet,’ since both support an increasingly wide range of rhetorical activities.9 The ‘genre-
ification’ of blogging certainly increased the analytical precision of scholarly work on blogs; 
rather than taking blogging as a set of homogenized practices that ‘do’ this or that, current 
research trends aim to appreciate specific blogs in their context and particularity.10 Yet, genre-
                                                
8 Axel Bruns and Joanne Jacobs, Uses of Blogs, 3. 
9 In this way, scholarship on blogging has followed trends in scholarship on the internet in general; namely, 
the necessity of seeing different modes of communication online as situated. For critiques of over-broad theoretical 
work on ‘the internet,’ see David Holmes, “Transformations in the Mediation of Publicness: Communicative 
Interaction in the Network Society,” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication (January 2002), 
http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol7/ issue2/holmes.html and David Silver, “Current Directions and Future Questions,” in 
Cyberactivism: Online Activism in Theory and Practice, eds. Martha McCaughey and Michael D. Ayers (New York: 
Routledge, 2004), 280-1. 
10 For justifications in applying genre theory to blogging, see Carolyn Miller and Dawn Shepard, “Blogging 
as Social Action: A Genre Analysis of the Weblog,” in Into the Blogosphere: Rhetoric, Community, and the Culture 
of Weblogs, eds. L.J. Gurak, S. Antonijevic, L. Johnson, C. Ratliff, & J. Reyman (2004), http://blog.lib.umn.edu/ 
blogosphere/blogging_as_social_action_a_genre_analysis_of_the_weblog.html; Kevin Brooks, Cindy Nichols, and 
Sybil Priebe, “Remediation, Genre, and Motivation: Key Concepts for Teaching with Weblogs,” in Into the 
Blogosphere: Rhetoric, Community, and the Culture of Weblogs, eds. L.J. Gurak, S. Antonijevic, L. Johnson, C. 
Ratliff, & J. Reyman (2004), http://blog.lib.umn.edu/blogosphere/remediation_genre.html; Susan Herring, Lois 
Scheidt, Elijah Wright, and Sabrina Bonus, “Weblogs as a Bridging Genre,” Information Technology and People 18 
(2005): 142-71; and Lena Karlsson, “Acts of Reading Diary Weblogs,” Human IT 8 (2006): 1-59. The connection 
between weblogs and genre has undergone several stages. First, as Miller and Shepard, and Brooks, Nichols and 
Priebe, demonstrate, blogging itself can be seen as a type of genre of online discourse with certain recurring features 
like reverse chronology postings, link-heavy posts, and personal interpretations of unfolding events. Second, 
blogging was categorized into three primary genres: the ‘filter blog’ which collected links from around the web, the 
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ification also poses a challenge to anyone trying to synthesize fairly the implications of blogging 
on society. These generic calcifications occasionally erode, transmogrify, or interpenetrate with 
other genres. Blogging is so expansive and varied that a full understanding of the phenomenon 
requires acknowledging how the various uses of blogs interconnect in networked societies. I 
don’t think that it is a stretch to say that a truly comprehensive study of blogging would be 
impossible for precisely this reason: there are simply too many blogs doing too many things to 
draw conclusions about the phenomenon as a whole.  
Within this broader network of blogs, though, there are blogs that take up questions 
central to collective public life. This focus—which comports with rhetoric’s traditional 
emphases—necessarily privileges ‘the political’ while recognizing that the political is often 
found in the most quotidian of places.11 For this reason, I focus on blogs that contribute to public 
                                                
‘personal blog’ featuring the blogger’s thoughts, and the ‘knowledge log’ which attempted to collect tidbits of social 
knowledge to generate a more comprehensive understanding of some phenomenon (see Susan Herring, L.A. 
Scheidt, S. Bonus, and E. Wright, “Bridging the Gap: A Genre Analysis of Weblogs,” Proceedings of the Thirty-
seventh Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (Los Alamitos: IEEE Press, 2004). Finally, each of 
these three genres have splintered into smaller sub-genres. 
11 I am wary of Herring et al.’s warning that blog scholars have a tendency to privilege the so-called filter 
blogs that participate in conversations about ‘politics’ at the expense of more personal blogs that, while perhaps not 
explicitly ‘political,’ nonetheless engage in a type of politics worthy of study. See Susan Herring, Inna Kouper, Lois 
Ann Scheidt, and Elijah L. Wright, “Women and Children Last: The Discursive Construction of Weblogs,” in Into 
the Blogosphere: Rhetoric, Community, and the Culture of Weblogs, eds. L.J. Gurak, S. Antonijevic, L. Johnson, C. 
Ratliff, & J. Reyman (2004), http://blog.lib.umn.edu/blogosphere/women_and_children.html. In their analysis, they 
find that coverage of blogging in the mass media and in academic scholarship tends to overdetermine blogging as 
punditry rather than as, say, a community-building endeavor. They suggest that this subtle bias tends to privilege 
traditionally masculine topics and male bloggers at the expense of a more well-rounded view of blogging. For 
example, as Stella Minahan and Julie Wolfram Cox document, knitting blogs have supplied guidance for a renewed 
Do-It-Yourself ethic to many young women (and some men) who find social and aesthetic value in meeting together 
for what are called “Stitch’nBitch” sessions; see their “Stitch’nBitch: Cyberfeminism, a Third Place, and the New 
Materiality,” Journal of Material Culture (March 2007): 5-21. Yet, knitting blogs are rarely represented in general 
academic or popular explanations of blogging. Melissa Gregg underlines this point by noting that “within blogging 
culture, the phenomenon of ‘LiveJournal bashing’—mocking the interests of online journal writers—arises from the 
assumption that the personal chat of young people is trivial in comparison to the weighty political content discussed 
on pundit-style blogs;” see “Posting with Passion: Blogs and the Politics of Gender,” in Uses of Blogs, eds. Axel 
Bruns and Joanne Jacobs (New York: Peter Lang, 2006), 155. In the early years of meta-commentary about 
blogging, deliberative blogs written by men were largely the focus of institutional media coverage; it would not be a 
surprise to recognize that the social imaginary thus reflects structural inequities that persist even in a networked 
society. Contemporary scholarship has attempted to theorize gender and blogging more explicitly than the early 
85 
discourse about our collective public life. In the scholarly literature on blogging, these 
deliberative blogs are theorized to have impacted three major areas of American public life: the 
press, by which I especially mean the ‘institutional media’ which has capitalized on broadcast 
technologies; political organizing, the means by which people collaborate to influence governing 
bodies; and culture flows, which broadly refer to how shared senses of culture move through a 
society. 
2.2 Blogging and the Press 
 Blogging was immediately linked to the ‘citizen journalism’ movement represented by 
Indymedia and other (primarily internet-driven) projects.12 The ease of publishing naturally 
                                                
years; see, for example, the special issue of The Scholar and Feminist Online, “Blogging Feminism: (Web)sites of 
Resistance,” (Spring 2007), http://www.barnard.edu/sfonline/blogs/; Dustin Harp and Mark Tremayne, “The 
Gendered Blogosphere: Examining Inequality Using Network and Feminist Theory,” Journalism and Mass 
Communication Quarterly 83 (Summer 2006): 247-64. It is partially for this reason that I include Salam Pax’s blog 
in this study, as it present a hybrid model that combines the linking and analysis of ‘filter blogs’ with the personal 
narrativization of the ‘lifestream blog.’ I want to be careful in suggesting that my current study does not claim to 
represent the entirety of the blogosphere, though I do hope for some ‘portability’ with the conceptual work I do. Of 
course, blogging, and now the academic literature on blogging, is simply too big to draw in all these different types 
of blogs. Consequently, as a researcher, I have to make some hard choices about what to focus on, even at the risk of 
entrenching stereotypes about what a blog is (or can be). Acknowledging these critiques, I think it is eminently 
defensible to study blogs practicing deliberative rhetoric because doing so sheds light on a prominent practice in 
contemporary society. More importantly, I generally follow Aristotle’s adage that deliberative rhetoric admits of the 
best arguments and so deserves special intellectual devotion. It is also my assertion, to be tested in the balance of 
this project, that the most interesting elements in the blogosphere are related to how knowledge, information, and 
opinion are circulated to shape collective public life through more general media. So, though knitting blogs (to take 
a representative example), might be culturally important, their impact on the broader social imaginary is fairly 
limited because more general media have not often taken them up. This might well reflect poorly on the general 
media, and undoubtedly there are structural biases in the general media that are objectionable. However, given the 
influence of the general media in shaping the networked imaginary, it is important to follow the ‘crossover’ blogs in 
order to see features of the social imaginary. Finally, I admit that my own terministic screens play into my focus on 
blogs practicing deliberation. As someone interested in argumentation, rhetoric, democratic theory and practice, 
media criticism, and new technologies, I find consideration of blogs that engage in broad conversations about 
collective public life to be particularly rewarding. 
12 The Independent Media Center, or Indymedia (at http://www.indymedia.org/), is a loose network of 
largely progressive activists intended to utilize new media tools in the service of citizen journalism. Indymedia 
positions itself as an alternative to the corporate institutional media, and is often compared to or seen as a 
predecessor to blogging because of its emphasis on interactive web access; see Victor Pickard, “Assessing the 
Radical Democracy of Indymedia: Discursive, Technical, and Institutional Discourses,” Critical Studies in Media 
Communication (March 2006): 19-38 and “United Yet Autonomous: Indymedia and the Struggle to Sustain a 
Radical Democratic Network,” Media, Culture, and Society (May 2006): 315-336. According to Laura Stengrim, 
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extended to quasi-journalistic activities. Predictably, though, most bloggers weren’t showing up 
to events with a PRESS card stuck in the brim of their fedoras; many instead opted for what 
might be called ‘citizen punditry,’ mimicking the interpretive function of pundits in the press. 
The focus of these pundits could be as narrow or as broad as they desired, allowing both in-depth 
analysis of issues and more surface level monitoring. As one might expect, the emergence of 
these citizen voices—and new places online to gather eyeballs in that zero-sum game for 
attention—justifiably made the institutional media nervous about their own long-term 
sustainability. If bloggers could just poach off the reporting labors of the press, offering media 
consumers a gloss on their journalistic efforts without contributing any revenue to the original 
press organization, then the institutional media had a serious financial problem to manage. 
Consequently, the boundary work between ‘the press’ and ‘the bloggers’ (two amorphous, 
porous identities to begin with) was heated in the years that marked the popularization stage.13 
This boundary work played out on blogs and in the popular press. Journalist Kurt Anderson 
encapsulates a dominant sentiment writing for New York magazine about blogging: 
For now, bloggers are a second-tier journalistic species. They are remoras. The Times 
and CNN and CBS News are the whales and sharks to which Instapundit, Kausfiles, 
and Kos attach themselves for their free rides. (Remoras evolved special sucking 
disks; bloggers have modems.) If the sharks and whales were to go extinct, what 
                                                
Indymedia “rejects modernity’s affinity for centralized power” in the way that the network is organized; see her 
“Negotiating Postmodern Democracy, Political Activism, and Knowledge Production: Indymedia’s Grassroots and 
e-Savvy Answer to Media Oligopoly,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies (December 2005), 290. 
13 This boundary work was chronicled at multiple levels; indeed, this was probably the most central 
question in the early days of blogging. For representative and well-circulated blog posts on the subject, see Rebecca 
Blood, “A Few Thoughts on Journalism and What Blogs Can Do About It,” Rebecca’s Pocket, April 15, 2004, 
http://www.rebeccablood.net/essays/what_is_journalism.html; Jay Rosen, “Brain Food for BloggerCon,” 
PressThink, April 16, 2004, http://journalism.nyu.edu/pubzone/weblogs/pressthink/2004/04/16/con_prelude.html. 
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would the blogging remoras do? Evolve into actual reporters?14 
The bloggers-as-remoras connection actually shows the complexity of the press-blogging 
relationship. Many remoras have a relationship based in commensalism, meaning that they gain 
something from their host, but the host gains little. Bloggers certainly gain from having 
institutional media resources to prompt blog posts and much of the institutional media did not 
perceive much value added by blogged conversations about their reporting. But there is another 
way to look at the bloggers-as-remoras meme. Some remoras have a relationship based in 
mutualism with their hosts, cleaning parasites from their hosts and thus ensuring the smooth 
operation of their biological system. Needless to say, that’s a more uplifting spin to put on that 
particular metaphor from a perspective sympathetic to blogging. 
 John Jordan identifies rhetorics of professionalism as the key axis along which the press, 
with their complex system of accreditation and presumably careful editorial layers, constructed 
bloggers as potentially mendacious sources that contributed primarily to information overload.15 
The irony of professionalism as a demarcating criterion was not lost on bloggers who were 
watching the American ‘paper of record,’ the New York Times, weather the Jayson Blair scandal 
and its own lackluster reporting on the Iraq-weapons of mass destruction connection.16 
                                                
14 Kurt Anderson, “Premodern America,” New York, March 2, 2005, http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/ 
columns/imperialcity/11465/. 
15 Jim Jordan, “Disciplining the Virtual Home Front: Mainstream News and the Web During the War in 
Iraq,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies (September 2007), 287-293. 
16 Jayson Blair was a Times reporter who fabricated and plagiarized numerous articles over a four year 
tenure; when revealed, the scandal rocked the journalism world. See the New York Times’ own account of the Blair 
scandal in Dan Barry, David Barstow, Jonathan Glater, Adam Liptak, and Jacques Steinberg, “Correcting the 
Record: Times Reporter Who Resigned Leaves Long Trail of Deception,” New York Times, May 11, 2003, 
http://query.nytimes. com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9403E1DB123FF932A25756C0A9659C8B63. Maggie Patterson 
and Steve Urbanski have investigated the implications of the Blair scandal for journalism and public trust in “What 
Jayson Blair and Janet Cooke Say About the Press and the Erosion of Public Trust,” Journalism Studies (December 
2006): 828-50. Elizabeth Hindman’s study of how the New York Times’ participated in ‘paradigm repair’ that 
rehabilitated certains norms of journalism is an additional resource to understand this boundary work: “Jayson Blair, 
The New York Times, and Paradigm Repair,” Journal of Communication (June 2005): 225-41. Though the Jayson 
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Ostensibly, for many at the time, the difference between considering bloggers as journalists, as 
opposed to bloggers occasionally committing “random acts of journalism,” was the key point 
that would legitimize or de-legitimize the blogosphere as useful.17  
  This boundary work is almost definitive of historical moments when new media systems 
begin to receive acclaim and rival established media formations. Aaron Barlow, in perhaps the 
best historical treatment of blogging to date, helpfully situates the development of the 
blogosphere as a response to broader changes in the American media ecology. In The Rise of the 
Blogosphere, Barlow traces the evolution of American journalism from early newspapers 
through blogging, showing how each of Bimber’s four information regimes could be 
characterized as laying the groundwork for blogging. In the early American colonies, the postal 
system circulated news of distant events through letters; eventually, the most ‘newsworthy’ of 
                                                
Blair scandal suggested how one person could game a single organization, the press coverage of the link between 
weapons of mass destruction and Iraq suggests problems with the larger organization of newsgathering in the United 
States. As Michael Massing, among many, many others, explains in Now They Tell Us: The American Press and 
Iraq (New York: New York Review of Books, 2004), the press coverage of the Bush Administration’s claims that 
Iraq had or was actively pursuing weapons of mass destruction was too reliant on biased sources close to the 
Administration. Consequently, dissenting views were sidelined or marginalized in what many saw as a press-aided 
rush to war. When no signs of weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq, press credibility took another hit. 
Oliver Boyd-Barrett applies and updates Chomsky and Hermann’s propaganda model of media to illustrate how the 
press in 2003 marched in lockstep with the state’s imperatives; in “Judith Miller, The New York Times, and the 
Propaganda Model,” Journalism Studies (November 2004): 435-49. More generally, the press during the Iraq war 
fell prey to an on-message, focused Administration that had sophisticated tools for strategic political 
communication, as detailed by Sue Lockett John, David Domke, Kevin Coe, and Erica S. Graham, “Going Public, 
Crisis After Crisis: The Bush Administration and the Press from September 11 to Saddam,” Rhetoric and Public 
Affairs (Summer 2007): 195-220 and Deepa Kumar, “Media, War, and Propaganda: Strategies of Information 
Management During the 2003 Iraq War,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 3 (March 2006): 48-69. This 
catalogue (admittedly brief and partial) of press failures is not meant as a global indictment of the institutional 
media. Rather, I am aiming to suggest that the values of ‘good journalism’ are more contextually based than media-
determined; in other words, the values of professionalism might or might not adhere to any particular work of 
journalism independent of institutional affiliation.  
17 Kaye Trammell quoted in Mark Glaser, “Scholars Discover Weblogs Pass Test as Mode of 
Communication,” Online Journalism Review, May 11, 2004, http://www.ojr.org/ojr/glaser/1084325287.php. I’ve 
never been sure what to make of the title of this article; it seems difficult to imagine what blogging is if not some 
species of communication. It does, however, illustrate the precarious nature of blogging within the broader media 
ecology at the time, and the eventual acceptance as a legitimate site of inquiry and conversation. Trammell may well 
have been quoting J.D. Lasica, who came to the term “random acts of journalism” a year earlier; see J.D. Lasica, 
“Random Acts of Journalism,” JD’s Blog: New Media Musings, March 12, 2003, http://www.jdlasica.com/ 
blog/archives/2003_03_12.html. 
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those letters, as determined by the postmaster, would be republished in newspapers to “form a 
network of information transmittal.”18 Publishers eventually became bolder, with pamphlets like 
Thomas Paine’s Common Sense popularizing the sentiments that heretofore had been expressed 
only in private letters with small circulation.19 This kind of advocacy journalism was crucial in 
polarizing the colonists against the ruling English aristocracy. In the debates over the new 
republic, the print media of the time received special protections that were eventually enshrined 
in the Bill of Rights (even as those protections were temporarily eclipsed by the Alien and 
Sedition Acts).20  
 A deeply partisan press emerged during Andrew Jackson’s presidential tenure, but would 
give way around the Civil War to a professional class of journalists steeped in the coagulating 
values of modernity: objectivity, neutrality, and dispassion. Accompanying professionalization 
was commercialization, and the realization of massive press empires represented most 
prominently by William Randolph Hearst. These press empires were able to expand their 
newsgathering facilities and squeeze smaller operations out of business. National press 
organizations consolidated their grasp on the circulation of news with the broadcast era of radio 
and television. Since these chains needed to appeal to the broadest audience possible in order to 
secure scarce advertising revenues, they emphasized objectivity and neutrality, often in ethics 
codes designed for their employees that were used to demarcate their product from more 
‘amateur’ publications.21 
                                                
18 Barlow, Rise of the Blogosphere, 9.  
19 Barlow, Rise of the Blogosphere, 19-21. 
20 Barlow, Rise of the Blogosphere, 49. 
21 Barlow, Rise of the Blogosphere, 96. The role of ‘ethics’ or ‘professional’ codes is usually to provide a 
clear demarcation between the professional and the amateur. This process is particularly at work in medicine and the 
sciences; see, for example, Judy Segal’s Health and the Rhetoric of Medicine (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois 
University, 2005), 32-3 but can be extended to other professional fields.  
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 It was onto this scene that alternative forms of journalism exploded in the 1960s, with 
Thomas Wolfe’s ‘New Journalism’ and Hunter Thompson’s ‘Gonzo Journalism,’ both of which 
unsettled the journalism profession with their unconventional stylistic manner. Later, as the 
internet spread during the 1990s, bulletin boards, homepages, and then blogs served as hosts for 
public debate—in many cases, because the institutionalized press no longer did. Barlow’s 
diagnosis seems about right: 
People want to talk, and they want their expression to be unfettered. But the 
commercial media have slowly and quietly tried to take that ability away, leaving 
most of the population as nothing more than passive consumers, observers of the 
conversations of others. This has led to frustration and feelings of powerlessness that 
had no outlet—until the appearance of blogs.22 
Commercialism and professionalism had limited public debate; for Barlow, “it is the loss of the 
ability of the amateur to have a direct impact on the national debates that has increasingly turned 
people away from both the news media and national politics.”23 With the ease of blogging, the 
barriers to participation in broader public discourse were reduced—with all the attendant risks 
and rewards. Blogging, by recuperating certain norms and practices of prior journalistic 
traditions, provides new ways for citizens to engage with the unfolding events that shape public 
life. 
 While some bemoan boundary work as petty turf warfare, there is a slightly more positive 
view. Revisiting contested norms refreshes the self-reflexivity of press institutions, and bloggers 
that claim to practice some form of citizen journalism or punditry are probably enriched by the 
                                                
22 Barlow, Rise of the Blogosphere, 177. 
23 Barlow, Rise of the Blogosphere, 183. 
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norms and traditions of journalism that they extend and modify.24 By the end of the 
popularization stage, many commentators perceived a rough symbiosis between the established 
press and the blogging newcomers, though there are still occasional flare-ups that identify fault 
lines.25  
 If it is true that blogging has settled into some sort of symbiosis with the press, then what 
types of activities have bloggers adopted vis-à-vis the institutionalized media? Communication 
scholar Stephen Cooper identifies four prominent practices in his Watching the Watchdog: 
Bloggers as the Fifth Estate: 
• Accuracy. Bloggers perform a number of tasks related to accuracy. They fact 
check descriptions by journalists and other bloggers. They ensure that quotations 
are accurate and contextual. They probe the authenticity of documents and other 
forms of proof. They interpret statistics and scientific studies, and they contest the 
validity of memes circulating in the media.26 
• Framing. Bloggers provide differing, sometimes competing, interpretations of 
events. They might dispute a framing that is prevalent in a specific story or set of 
                                                
24 This tentative truce is marked by publications in the popular press by articles like J.D. Lasica’s “Blogs 
and Journalism Needs Each Other,” Nieman Reports (Fall 2003): 70-4 and Jay Rosen, “Bloggers vs. Journalists is 
Over,” PressThink, January 21, 2005, http://journalism.nyu.edu/pubzone/weblogs/pressthink/2005/01/21/ 
berk_essy.html. Rosen’s post might well signify the close of the ‘popularization-dissemination’ stage. This is 
definitely not to paper over continuing conflicts, especially among practitioners. One particularly good example of 
the flare-up that periodically inflames the journalist/blogger boundary work is when Glenn Greenwald, a blogger for 
Salon.com, published an email written to him by CNN reporter John King. King was responding to Greenwald’s 
accusations that he had asked a number of softball questions to John McCain, then in a heated primary battle for the 
Republican nomination. King begins to conclude his email by saying “You clearly know very little about 
journalism. But credibility matters.” See Glenn Greenwald, “CNN’s John King Responds,” Salon, January 16, 2008, 
http://www.salon.com/opinion/ greenwald/2008/01/16/king/.  
25 Jane B. Singer, “Journalists and News Bloggers: Complements, Contradictions, and Challenges,” Uses of 
Blogs, eds. Axel Bruns and Joanne Jacobs (New York: Peter Lang, 2006), 29. 
26 Stephen Cooper, Watching the Watchdogs: Bloggers as the Fifth Estate (Marquette: Marquette Books, 
2007), chapter 2. See also Shannon Bichard, “Building Blogs: A Multi-Dimensional Analysis of the Distribution of 
Frames on the 2004 Presidential Candidate Web Sites,” Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly (Summer 
2006): 329-45. 
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stories, add new facts that recast the story in different light, or recontextualize that 
interpretation within a broader historical scope.27  
• Agenda-setting and gatekeeping. Bloggers regularly question the newsworthiness 
of some item that appears in the press or present an issue that is not receiving 
enough press attention.28 
• Journalistic practices. Finally, bloggers engage in criticism about the very 
process of journalism, from the use of anonymous sources, to personal 
relationships between reporters and the reported, to the use of ‘rowback’ 
processes used to make corrections, and to conflations of fact and opinion in a 
supposedly ‘straight’ news story.29 
These four genres of media criticism cover a fair amount of ground in describing the kinds of 
activities in which bloggers regularly engage. These activities overlap substantially with what 
Axel Bruns has called ‘gatewatching,’ the phenomenon where citizens watch their media 
gatekeepers—becoming, in essence, a ‘fifth estate’ capable of monitoring the fourth estate of the 
press.30  
2.3 Blogging and Political Organizing 
 The press and lobbying activities by citizens are hardly separable. Yet, because information 
technology now forms a critical “backbone for networking and organizing,” one line of inquiry 
                                                
27 Cooper, Watching the Watchdogs, chapter 3. 
28 Cooper, Watching the Watchdogs, chapter 4. 
29 Cooper, Watching the Watchdogs, chapter 5. 
30 Axel Bruns, Gatewatching: Collaborative Online News Production (New York: Peter Lang, 2005). Also 
see his “Gatewatching, Gatecrashing: Futures for Tactical News Media,” in Digital Media and Democracy, ed. 
Megan Boler (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008): 247-270. 
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about blogging focuses squarely on the impacts of blogging on political organizing.31 DailyKos, a 
sprawling blog community founded by Markos Moulitsas Zúniga, was invented in part to 
energize progressives—members of the so-called ‘Democratic wing of the Democratic party.’ 
With a host of interlinked blogs written by members, dailyKos has become a clearinghouse for 
information about specific electoral races, news events, and more general debates about the 
principles that should guide progressive politics in the United States. DailyKos is its own 
complex ecosystem, with a main page of blog entries, supplemented by individual ‘diaries’ kept 
by members. In addition, a complex menu of ‘recent comments’ and ‘recommended posts’ offer 
visitors a pastiche of commentary through which they can meander.32 Many blog posts snip 
paragraphs from various press accounts, creating a collaged portal into the day’s events for 
readers to cull through.33 In fact, dailyKos could suffice as a self-contained (though outwardly 
linking) media universe, with text, audio, and video clips populating the site on nearly every 
topic that animates broader public debate. In many ways, dailyKos could be—and is for many 
people—a one-stop political bazaar, providing essential news, opinion, and conversation.  
 DailyKos claims direct political influence on a number of campaigns, most prominently in 
securing the election of Howard Dean as Democratic National Committee chair.34 Blog 
communities like dailyKos have formed the ‘netroots,’ a term that signifies grassroots 
progressive movements coordinated through online media. The netroots have gained significant 
                                                
31 Janni Aragon, “The ‘Lady’ Revolution in the Age of Technology,” International Journal of Media and 
Cultural Politics 4 (2008), 82. 
32 DailyKos, http://www.dailykos.com/. 
33 David Perlmutter, in Blogwars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), identifies external political roles 
of bloggers as (1) compilers of political information (2) informants about the political marketplace (3) collector of 
information (4) reviser and extender of big media (5) investigative reporter (6) political analyst and critic (7) 
political watchdog and (8) political educator; in Chapter 4. This typology of roles is consistent with the types of 
posts available on sites like dailyKos. 
34 See Markos Moulitsas Zúniga and Jerome Armstrong, Crashing the Gate: Netroots, Grassroots, and the 
Rise of People-Powered Politics (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green, 2006), especially chapter 5. 
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publicity and influence in the Democratic Party and are regularly referenced as opinion leaders 
alongside more traditional party activists and interest groups. Of course, there is a conservative 
analog to the dailyKos, and several other rival sites of all different political persuasions. Blog 
sites of all types have replicated the basic format of dailyKos, in which readers are allowed to 
create their own blogs to be hosted on the site and thus participate intimately in this discourse 
community. What dailyKos and these other sites have effectively done is establish a space for 
discussion and debate about politics, building on the models of political influence that 
MoveOn.org and the Zapatistas initiated in earlier incarnations of cyber-activism.35 
The blogs involved in dailyKos certainly interrelate with many other types of blogs, 
constantly pulling outside posts into their centripetal system of rankings and recommendations. 
But it probably won’t surprise to realize that the blog posts that often become most popular, and 
the bloggers that are consistently rated highly, tend to be those that cohere with the overall 
progressive politics of that group. Upsetting the apple cart rarely wins one friends amongst like-
minded people; even though it’s sometimes good to introduce a little epistemic turbulence into 
ossified belief systems. DailyKos is representative of broader trends directing citizens toward 
engaging with media that exclusively cohere with their pre-formed ideological tendencies.  
In some ways, the potential for blogs like dailyKos to become an intellectually segregated 
discourse community intersects with the dominant metaphor for U.S. politics during the 
                                                
35 For a history of the Zapatistas online activism efforts, see Adrienne Russell, “The Zapatistas Online,” 
International Journal for Communication Studies (October 2001): 399-414 and “Myth and the Zapatista Movement: 
Exploring a Network Identity,” New Media and Society (August 2006): 559-577. John Arquilla and David 
Ronfeldt’s The Zapatista Social Netwar in Mexico (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999) links the Zapatista movement 
to the new swarm politics of networked publics. Some years later, the web-based MoveOn.org emerged as a “hybrid 
mobilization movement” that combines the communicative repertoires of parties, interest groups, and social 
movements; see Andrew Chadwick, “Digital Network Repertoires and Organizational Hybridity,” Political 
Communication (July 2007): 283-301. For an exploration of how MoveOn.org has used online tools for persuasion, 
see Barbara Warnick, Rhetoric Online: Persuasion and Politics on the World Wide Web (New York: Peter Lang, 
2007), esp. Chapter 4.  
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popularization stage: the divide between ‘red states’ and ‘blue states.’ Red states were the 
reliably Republican conservative states, closer to the ‘heartland’ of America; blue states were the 
reliably Democratic liberal states, concentrated on the more urbanized coasts. The red state-blue 
state metaphor became a useful heuristic to signify key cultural cleavages around gay marriage, 
abortion, and national security in discussions during the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections. 
While the metaphor obviously overstated the differences between red states and blue states, it 
signaled the extent to which a common public culture, with shared norms and stories held by 
most Americans, had eroded. No one could conclusively say why the red states and blue states 
seemed to have this dramatic value divergence, but nearly everyone seemed to agree that there 
were substantial disagreements that lent an air of incommensurability to cross-conversation. It 
doesn’t seem too much of a stretch to suggest that part of the differentiation between red and 
blue states, to the extent that it existed, could have been fueled by the growth of media outlets 
like dailyKos that were increasingly polarized along political lines. Blogging, while not the only 
media responsible for this polarization, surely fits into the equation. DailyKos might be the 
representative blog for the blue states, and the analogous, and fittingly named, RedState fulfills 
similar functions for many citizens in the red states.36 The discourse emanating from these 
different sites is often a case study in how like-minded groups go to extremes. 
Legal scholar Cass Sunstein has articulated a powerful explanation of this phenomenon in 
his 2001 book Republic.com. His basic thesis is that by introducing citizens to competing 
viewpoints, the general broadcast media provide a democratic service in building common 
ground and checking extremism. This is a variation on the fear of fragmentation that often asserts 
itself in democracies, which are often torn between sensitivity to diversity and the political need 
                                                
36 Red State, www.redstate.org. 
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for unity.37 Of course, in 2001, when the first edition of Republic.com was published, blogs were 
still beneath the radar of most cultural observers, including Sunstein. However, the tendencies 
Sunstein identifies as prevalent in the pre-blog web are potentially accelerated by the growth of 
blogging. To begin his analysis, Sunstein submits that individuals in information-rich societies 
are on the cusp of creating filters to select the media experiences they want to have, rather than 
sharing similar experiences with more expansive swathes of the public. These filters sound very 
much like blogs that preselect information cohering with already established opinions. Sunstein 
points to personalized news as a harbinger of this total customization:  
[H]aving dispensed with broadcasters, you can choose your own video 
 programming, with movies, game shows, sports, shopping, and news of your 
 choice. You mix and match … perhaps you have no interest at all in ‘news.’   
 Maybe you find ‘news’ impossibly boring. If so, you need not see it at all. Maybe 
 you select programs and stories involving only music and weather … If you 
 are interested in politics, you may want to restrict yourself to certain points of 
 view, by hearing only from people you like … many people restrict themselves to 
 their own preferred points of view—liberals watching and reading mostly or only 
 liberals; moderates, moderates; conservatives, conservatives; neo-Nazis, neo-
 Nazis … when the power to filter is unlimited, people can decide, in advance and 
 with perfect accuracy, what they will and will not encounter.38 
                                                
37 The fragmentation critique receives a comprehensive extension in Bill Bishop’s The Big Sort: Why the 
Clustering of Like-Minded America is Tearing Us Apart (New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 2008).  
38 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 3-5. Sunstein invokes the 
idea of the “Daily Me” to capture the idea of a fully customized newspaper that would structure daily reading. This 
concept is drawn from Nicholas Negroponte, Being Digital (New York: Random House, 1996), 153. 
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For Sunstein, this type of filtering undermines the conditions necessary for democratic practice. 
First, he argues “people should be exposed to materials that they would not have chosen in 
advance … to ensure against fragmentation and extremism, which are predictable outcomes of 
any situation in which like-minded people speak only with themselves.”39 Second, “many or 
most citizens should have a range of common experiences. Without shared experiences, a 
heterogeneous society will have a much more difficult time in addressing social problems … 
Common experiences, emphatically including the common experiences made possible by the 
media, provide a form of social glue.”40 According to this explanation, internetworked media 
encourage enclaved deliberation, a phenomenon where like-minded interlocutors deliberate 
outside of the purview of public critique. This proclivity to listen only to arguments one already 
believes in, and dismiss alternative perspectives as loony, dangerous, or worthless, threatens 
democratic politics that rely on a modicum of civility, a willingness to acknowledge the validity 
of differing perspectives, and the co-development of common ground through public argument. 
 Historically, in Sunstein’s telling, general interest intermediaries like newspapers, 
magazines, radio, and television checked against fragmentation and developed social glue.41 
General interest broadcast media were productions of a twentieth century trying to accommodate 
massification; these organs of mass communication were widely believed to provide centripetal 
force in an increasingly complex world, as both Bimber and Barlow argue in their historical 
analyses of media and democracy.42 Decentering these general interest intermediaries from a 
                                                
39 Sunstein, Republic.com, 8-9. Sunstein’s meditations on group polarization receive further treatment in his 
“Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes,” Yale Law Journal, 110 (October 2000), 71, LexisNexis. 
40 Sunstein, Republic.com, 9. 
41 Sunstein, Republic.com, 11. 
42 For an explication of how mass communication was theorized as a way to accommodate massification, 
see Julian Sorrell Huxley, UNESCO: Its Philosophy and Purpose (New York: Public Affairs Press, 1947) and Louis 
Wirth, “Consensus and Mass Communication,” American Sociological Review (February 1948): 1-15. 
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central role in public life threatens a retreat into ‘balkanized,’ like-minded deliberative enclaves 
that undermine the public commons.43 Homophily (‘birds of a feather flock together’) might be a 
natural feature of social networks, but for Sunstein it is a threat to democratic practice.44 
I believe that the main argument of Republic.com turns largely on how exactly enclaved 
deliberation should be nested in broader deliberative processes. A certain level of enclave 
deliberation is inevitable, particularly in hypercomplex, structurally differentiated societies. 
There is no medium of communication that can host a conversation among all citizens without 
suffering serious problems of scale, and in the absence of a general media form that can do so, 
the growth of enclaves are likely. What, then, is the appropriate role for enclaves? Sunstein 
begins by outlining the dangers of enclaved deliberation before offering a partial recuperation. 
He situates his critique of enclaved deliberation by drawing on persuasive experimental data that 
makes the case that enclaved deliberation pushes like-minded deliberators to extremes due to 
social comparison and limited argument pools.45 Sunstein argues that deliberators’ need for 
acceptance leads them to compare their own views with their peers, and that this form of social 
comparison often squeezes out divergent perspectives. Following Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann’s 
theory of the “spiral of silence,” which theorizes that participants holding minority views often 
                                                
43 Sunstein, Republic.com, 15. For a critique of Sunstein’s use of the balkanization metaphor, see Gordon 
R. Mitchell, Damien Pfister, Georgeta Bradatan, Dejan Colev, Tsvetelina Manolova, Gligor Mitkovski, Ivanichka 
Nestorova, Milena Ristic and Gentiana Sheshi, “Navigating Dangerous Deliberative Waters: Shallow Argument 
Pools, Group Polarization and Public Debate Pedagogy in Southeast Europe," Controversia: An International 
Journal of Debate and Democratic Renewal 4 (2006): 69-84. 
44 Duncan Watts, Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2003), 58. 
45 Sunstein, Republic.com, 68. 
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self-select out of participating in deliberation for fear of social sanction, Sunstein accounts for 
the socio-cultural pressures that influence group argumentation.46  
This socio-cultural explanation is paired with a rhetorical one. Sunstein contends “the 
central factor behind group polarization is the existence of a limited argument pool, one that is 
skewed (speaking purely descriptively) in a particular direction.”47 Sunstein’s explanation of this 
phenomenon is deceptively simple: “any individual’s position on any issue is a function, at least 
in part, of which arguments seem convincing.”48 A citizen’s opinions, then, will be influenced in 
large part by the types of arguments to which they are exposed. Without a point-counterpoint 
balancing act, public communication amongst like-minded people can resemble propaganda 
exercises more than debate. This is why random, unplanned encounters play such an important 
role for Sunstein, because they increase the likelihood of exposure to a variety of arguments that 
are not pre-screened by some sort of ideological litmus test. Sunstein’s commitment to 
unplanned interaction reflects a commitment to the value of dissoi logoi, the principle drawn 
from rhetoric that each controversy has at least two sides, and that better judgments can be made 
if interlocutors are familiar with the best arguments of the other side.49 
The absence of a dissoi logoi process often has deleterious effects for public deliberation 
because it can facilitate unjustified opinion cascades. With limited argument pools, this opinion 
cascade can wreak havoc. Sunstein cites the well-known example of South African President 
                                                
46 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, “The Spiral of Silence: A Theory of Public Opinion,” Journal of 
Communication 24 (1974): 43-51. Noelle-Neumann’s work is one of the first to suggest that “social conventions, 
customs, and norms” be robustly included in theories of public opinion and deliberation (43).  
47 Sunstein, Republic.com, 68. 
48 Sunstein, Republic.com, 67. 
49 For a good introduction to dissoi logoi’s centrality to rhetoric, see Michael Billig’s “Protagoras and the 
Origins of Rhetoric,” in his Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996 [1987]), esp 69-80. 
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Thabo Mbeki stumbling upon a website that questioned the link between HIV and AIDS. After 
making contact with this small, yet vociferous, community of skeptics, Mbeki embarked on a 
series of steps that amplified uncertainty about prevailing AIDS treatments and thereby stalled 
proactive efforts to constrain the spread of the disease in South Africa.50 These opinion cascades 
are particularly dangerous when invisible ‘tipping points’ are crossed, and large publics start 
believing something or acting in a certain way because the avalanche of public opinion entrains 
individual opinions.51 Sunstein contrasts cybercascades that are incubated and propagated from 
enclaved deliberations with James Fishkin’s deliberative opinion polling.52 In a move that 
mirrors Habermas’ explanation of how public opinion congeals through rational-critical debate, 
Sunstein approvingly notes that Fishkin’s polling mechanism encourages more reasoned and 
depolarized decision-making, and thus more acceptable shifts in opinion.53 
 Though the spiral of silence and limited argument pools may reduce the quality of 
judgment by enclaved deliberators, the processes of argument incubation in enclaves cannot be 
so easily dismissed. Sunstein’s read of enclave deliberation is sensitive enough to develop the 
benefits of like-minded people deliberating with each other: 
                                                
50 Sunstein, Republic.com, 83. For more on the rhetorical features of Mbeki’s dissension on HIV/AIDS 
science, see the dissertation written by Marcus Paroske, “The Rhetoric of AIDS Policy in South Africa,” (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Pittsburgh, 2006), especially 51-52. 
51 Sunstein, Republic.com, 83. The idea of a ‘tipping point’ was popularized by Malcolm Gladwell’s book 
of the same name. Gladwell draws this concept from epidemiology, which uses the term to identify when epidemics 
have hit critical mass. See The Tipping Point: How Little Things Make a Big Difference (New York: Little, Brown, 
and Co., 2000). The idea of a tipping point itself seemed to have crossed a tipping point at about the time that blogs 
emerged as agents of public communication, with the concept increasingly bandied about in public discourse.  
52 Fishkin’s deliberative opinion polls attempt to enact deliberative democracy by gathering citizens 
together and running them through structured activities where their preferences are revealed and then negotiated 
through group discussion. As such, it is an explicit check against echo chambers and an effort to ensure a more 
reasoned discussion. See his The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1997).  
53 Sunstein, Republic.com, 86. 
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a special advantage of enclave deliberation is that it promotes the development of 
 positions that would otherwise be invisible, silenced, or squelched in general 
 debate. The efforts of marginalized groups to exclude outsiders, and even of 
 political parties to limit their primaries to party members, might be justified in 
 similar terms. Even if group polarization is at work—perhaps because group 
 polarization is at work—enclaves, emphatically including those produced by new 
 technologies, can provide a wide range of social benefits, not least because they 
 greatly enrich the social ‘argument pool.’54 
If the spiral of silence is at work when heterogeneous publics meet rhetorically, then enclaves 
function as a protected space where arguments are deepened and confidences are developed prior 
to their public testing. As Sunstein puts it, “in light of the inevitable existence of some status-
based hierarchies, it makes sense to be receptive to deliberating enclaves in which members of 
multiple groups may speak with one another and develop their views.”55 Sunstein thus recognizes 
“the civil rights movement, the antislavery movement, and the movement for sex equality” as 
“movements of great value” that emerged from enclaved deliberations.56 
 Sunstein’s approach to enclave deliberation hones in on the capacity of enclaves to 
generate new information or argument formations. That approach could be broadened further to 
acknowledge how enclaves also incubate different rhetorical styles that might be marginalized in 
more general sites of public deliberation. For rhetorical theorists Margaret Zulick and Anne 
                                                
54 Sunstein, Republic.com, 76. 
55 Sunstein, Republic.com, 76-7. 
56 Sunstein, Republic.com, 75. A vivid example of how the civil rights movement was incubated in enclave 
deliberation is described in Robert Branham’s “‘I Was Gone on Debating’: Malcolm X’s Prison Debates and Public 
Confrontations,” Argumentation & Advocacy (Winter 1995): 117-137. Branham explains how Malcolm X used 
prison debates to hone his rhetorical skills, including the development of stock metaphors, before he became a major 
civil rights leader participating in public debates. 
102 
Laffoon, enclaved publics “preserve distinct languages, forms of argument and rhetorical 
traditions in temporarily segregated areas of the public forum” that have the potential to “relocate 
and redirect always decaying representations of ever-changing material conditions, through 
introducing variant understandings that reconfigure a current idiom in a preferred direction.”57 
Enclaves could thus be seen as pockets where unique rhetorical styles are cultivated before their 
rotation into wider arenas of public deliberation, where their rhetorical activities can then 
introduce unique criticisms that alter dominant frames. These communicative pockets incubate 
novel ideas and have potential to productively inform public debate.58 Sunstein’s fear, then, isn’t 
of enclave deliberation itself, but of enclave deliberation that is more-or-less totally insulated 
from public follow-on conversations with interlocutors that have different opinions.59 
While Sunstein’s critique of enclaved deliberation did not originally account for 
blogging, his point was eventually extended to weblogs. Rebecca Blood isolates the dangers of 
enclave deliberation by noting that “a downside of weblogs, and the internet as a whole, is it’s 
easy for these echo chambers to be created. We tend to agree with things we already think, so I 
think people tend to read weblogs that generally reflect their point of view.”60 The echo chamber 
phenomenon can occur on a macro scale, where interlinked blogs featuring like-minded 
commentary feed off each other. But it can also unfold on a micro scale, as when relatively 
                                                
57 Margaret Zulick and Anne Laffoon, “Enclaved Publics as Inventional Resources: An Essay in Generative 
Rhetoric,” in Argument in Controversy: Proceedings of the Seventh SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation, ed. 
Donn Parson (Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association, 1991), 251-2. 
58 Sunstein, Republic.com, 78-9. 
59 Sunstein, Republic.com, 77. On this point, Sunstein argues, “the danger is that through the mechanisms 
of social influence and persuasive arguments, members will move to positions that lack merit but are predictable 
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60 Quoted in L.A. Johnson, “Pittsburgh’s Bloggers Have Found a Home for Rants,” Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette, 12 December 2004, A14. 
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homogeneous interlocutors interact with each other in the comments section of a single blog. As 
prominent blogger Glenn Reynolds explains, 
  bloggers can be captured by their commenters. It's immediate feedback, and  
  it's interesting (it's about you!) and I can imagine it could become addictive. My  
  impression is that often, instead of serving as a corrective to errors, comment  
  sections tend to lure bloggers farther in the direction they already lean.61 
This fear of echo chambers is a regular feature in press coverage and academic treatment of the 
blogging phenomenon.62  
 But the relationship between blogging and enclave deliberation is not so automatic. There 
is some evidence to suggest that the fragmentation thesis is over-stated, given the general overlap 
between the press and blogs.63 Based on Barbara Kaye’s research, at least one reason that 
individuals participate in blogging is to seek out information from news sources that are different 
from their own.64 Other observers argue that the practice of hyperlinking provides a check on 
like-mindedness because when a blogger from one ideological perspective critiques a blogger 
from another, they usually provide a link to the original text that offers readers an opportunity to 
                                                
61 Glenn Reynolds, “I Got an Email the Other Day,” Instapundit, June 28, 2004, http://instapundit.com/ 
archives/016265.php. 
62 For representative examples, see Mark Glaser, “Echochamber.com: Is the Net Polarizing U.S. Political 
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63 See Jae Kook Lee, “The Effect of the Internet on Homogeneity of the Media Agenda: A Test of the 
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review of Sunstein, see Dan Hunter, “Phillipic.com,” California Law Review (March 2002), LexisNexis. 
64 Kaye, “Blog Use Motivations,” 134-6. 
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examine other opinions.65 In addition, the comments sections in some blogs are unmediated, 
allowing diverse opinions to find some space (even if they are sequestered away from the post 
proper). Even if these diversity-inducing features of blogs are insufficient, there are at least some 
times in which the general interest media focuses on the discourse becoming public through 
blogs. In fact, each of the tropes I identify in this case study, flooding the zone, ambient 
intimacy, and shallow quotation describe practices that tend to garner this media attention; 
perhaps ameliorating some of the worst excesses of enclave deliberation. 
Nonetheless, for Sunstein, developing structures for enclaves to oscillate between 
protected space and public argument is crucial for future democratic practice. In 2006, Sunstein 
redoubled his efforts to theorize just such a system in Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce 
Knowledge. In Infotopia, Sunstein considers how new media forms can aggregate information 
that is widely dispersed throughout society.66 ‘Echo chambers’ are to a large degree supplanted in 
this later work by the term ‘information cocoon,’ signaling, perhaps, that Sunstein believes that 
in the five years that elapsed since publication of Republic.com, the opportunities for 
heterogeneous public argument had become increasingly foreclosed. In this latter work, Sunstein 
examines how a mix of prediction markets, wikis, open source software, and blogs can help 
                                                
65 Legal blogger Jack Balkin argues “most bloggers who write about political subjects cannot avoid 
addressing (and, more importantly, linking to) arguments made by people with different views. The reason is that 
much of the blogosphere is devoted to criticizing what other people have to say;” see “What I Learned About 
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2006), 7. 
105 
overcome informational and social pressures, group polarization, and hidden profiles by creating 
incentives for individuals to pool their knowledge.67 
Consequently, Sunstein acknowledges that blogs can operate as “fact-checkers and 
supplemental information sources” as well as allowing “interested readers to find an astounding 
range of opinions and facts.”68 Blogs can occasionally serve, then, as tranches that deepen 
argument pools. However, Sunstein explains, blogs are also “pervaded by the propagation of 
errors, hidden profiles, cascades, and group polarization;” especially “if people are reading blogs 
that conform to their own preexisting beliefs.”69 Sunstein refers to two empirical studies of blogs 
that analyzed the linking habits of bloggers in order to conclude that group polarization was 
indeed occurring between ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ bloggers.70 
 In 2007, Sunstein published Republic.com 2.0, a reconsideration of Republic.com. In a 
new chapter on blogging, Sunstein acknowledges the link made between blogging and 
Habermasian-style deliberative democracy: 
  Habermas has explored the idea of an ‘ideal speech situation,’ in which all  
  participants attempt to seek the truth; do not behave strategically; and accept a  
  norm of equality. Certainly, it can be said that as compared to many alternatives,  
  the blogosphere is both ‘public and inclusive,’ and grants communication rights to 
  countless participants. Perhaps the blogosphere can be said to operate, at least to  
                                                
67 Sunstein, Infotopia, Chapters 2 & 3. 
68 Sunstein, Infotopia, 185-6. 
69 Sunstein, Infotopia, 186,188. 
70 Sunstein, Infotopia, 189-90. 
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  some degree, in this idealized fashion, in a way that will promote the emergence  
  of ‘the better argument.’71  
However, he follows up this hope with a more sober realization that “in view of what we know 
about group polarization, however, it should be clear that this happy view of the blogosphere 
faces a big problem.”72 
 In the end, the promise of blogging for political organizing has a sharp double edge. As 
blog communities like dailyKos and RedState have shown, blogs can be powerful sites to 
activate citizens’ interest in participating in public conversations and organizing support for 
specific programs or candidates. Blogs have become so effective in connecting individuals to 
politics that blogging is now standard for political campaigns.73 Yet, the risks of a highly 
personalized media diet may also create some more lasting problems for the overall tenor of 
democratic politics.  
2.4 Participatory (Deliberative?) Culture 
 At first blush, the very idea of ‘participatory culture’ sounds empowering; at the very 
least, it’s probably more fiscally responsible than the kind of culture that makes one reach for 
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their wallet. One needn’t be a hard-core devotee of the early Frankfurt School to acknowledge 
that the culture industries have an outsized influence on local attention economies, as well as a 
preference for individuals to interact with their products in very particular (read: profitable) 
ways. This isn’t to make any claims about the ‘passivity’ or ‘activity’ of the average media 
consumer; everyone slides along a scale of engagement at various times and places. But theorists 
of participatory culture situate new media technologies, blogging among them, as catalysts for a 
whole new formation of cultural activity. The iconic figure of participatory culture is the mash-
up artist, who freely samples commercial music in a synthesizing process that produces a new 
work of art, which is then widely circulated to global patrons through blogs, peer-to-peer 
networks, and various other digital transmission methods. The key shift represented here is in the 
publicly accessible and globally circulating text; whereas past media eras might have encouraged 
people to talk about what they see on their television, there was a significant scaling problem. No 
one outside of the living room could access what an individual mumbles to their partner (or at 
their television set). Networked cultures give individuals the ability to ‘respond’ to cultural 
artifacts and amplify their efforts with global media that have as much or potentially greater 
scale than the circulation of the initial artifact. Participatory culture doesn’t just return to a 
‘premodern’ version of culture where all cultural activity was essentially ‘amateur’ and where 
virtually everyone participates in some fashion; it couples that capacity with scalable information 
technologies. This new cultural orientation presents intriguing implications for public 
deliberation. 
Henry Jenkins’ work on blogging in the context of participatory culture underlines a few 
critical features of the new participatory culture. Jenkins argues that “new knowledge 
communities will be voluntary, temporary, and tactical affiliations, defined through common 
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intellectual enterprises and emotional investments … they are held together through the mutual 
production and exchange of knowledge.”74 For Jenkins, online fan communities are exemplars of 
these new knowledge communities. Using a bevy of websites, discussion boards, blogs, and 
other new software, fans are “expansive self-organizing groups focused around the collective 
production, debate, and circulation of meanings, interpretations, and fantasies in response to 
various artifacts of contemporary popular culture.”75 Fans go online to co-create interpretations 
of the latest sitcom episode, write fan fiction starring popular characters, and trade bits of trivia 
to demonstrate their commitment. Fans are motivated by epistemaphilia, “not simply a pleasure 
in knowing but a pleasure in exchanging knowledge.”76 Fandom demonstrates the power of 
collective intelligence: it pools knowledge, helps in fixing and multiplying meanings, creates 
affiliative bonds, and appreciates multiple forms of expression. 
Deliberative bloggers function much like fans. As fans, they operate within the same 
three trends encouraging the growth of participatory culture that Jenkins identifies: 
1. new tools and technologies enable consumers to archive, annotate, appropriate, 
and recirculate media content; 
2. a range of subcultures promote Do-It-Yourself (DIY) media production, a 
discourse that shapes how consumers have deployed those technologies; 
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3. economic trends favoring the horizontally integrated media conglomerates 
encourage the flow of images, ideas, and narratives across multiple media 
channels and demand more active modes of spectatorship.77 
Jenkins suggests that, in contradistinction to culture jammers who attempt to block the flows of 
commercial culture, bloggers are important intermediaries that “take knowledge in their own 
hands, enabling successful navigation within and between these emerging knowledge cultures.”78  
 Jenkins outlines a bi-level system of media power, where one set of messages gains 
credibility because of their production by institutions and dissemination through broadcast 
media. The network news, for example, has certain resources and traditions that make them an 
authoritative source for many publics. The same set of messages, though, also gets re-worked 
through grassroots intermediaries, prominently including “bloggers [who] will reframe those 
issues for different publics and ensure that everyone has a chance to be heard.”79 In the 
interaction between these two systems, meta-issues about agenda-setting, representations, 
decorum, and other related tensions become thematized.80  
 Graham Lampa similarly emphasizes the participatory ethos of blogging by suggesting that 
“the most striking feature of the imagined community of blogging is that it enables users to both 
experience a shared base of knowledge and to contribute directly to that cultural 
consciousness.”81 Yet, this type of participation is hardly frictionless, because it rapidly produces 
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information glut. How, then, to make sense of so many personalized takes on topics up for 
deliberation? Lampa identifies two filtering systems that explain how Jenkins’ grassroots 
intermediaries exercise media power. One set of filters operates at the micro-level of individual 
bloggers and another set works at the macro-level of the blogosphere. At the micro-level, 
filtering of memes happens “through the work of individual bloggers who point to posts and 
news articles they find interesting,” while at the macro-level, filtering occurs “through aggregate 
blog indices like Blogdex, Technorati, Daypop, and Popdex.”82 As Lampa explains, micro-
filtering is essentially an exercise in judgment, based on perceived value of individual blog posts 
and overall credibility of the author(s). Macro-filtering utilizes new search technologies to 
organize information based on tags, word frequencies, and search terms. There is a dual 
functionality to this two-tiered filtering system for small-scale intermediaries:  
Small-scale filtering engages bloggers with their readers and other community 
members; by pointing one’s audience to other sites (both traditional media outlets 
and other blogs) via hyperlink, a blogger simultaneously strengthens the ties that bind 
the core of the blogosphere and also reinforces this dominant theme within the 
community. Large-scale filtering in the form of news aggregation serves a purpose 
more akin to traditional national print journalism—providing community members 
with a shared set of world events and issues that further allows individual bloggers to 
imagine themselves as part of a greater whole.83 
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blogosphere.html. 
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With this dual functionality, blog communities can serve publics on a scale ranging from very 
intimate, like friends and family, to global publics with shared interests.84 Blogging thus offers 
the potential to widen the net of people socially producing knowledge, as they dissect the news 
through their blogging endeavors.85 
 At the same time that this bi-level media system has emerged, media technologies are 
undergoing a convergence. For example, networked citizens can access newspaper content on 
their mobile phone, get internet over cable lines, and check email on their television. The 
convergence between old and new media forms produces a stunning array of vehicles to access 
and process bits and bytes of information. For Jenkins, “convergence represents a cultural shift 
as consumers are encouraged to seek out new information and seek connections among dispersed 
media content.”86 There is obvious coincidence between this change in cultural (re)production 
and the way that bloggers have interacted with the press and political organizing, as I have 
explained earlier. Yet, it’s worth underlining the basic cultural processes that fund many of these 
other changes. Doing so underlines the extent to which “open source politics” presents a new 
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paradigm for the organization of public culture and deliberation.87 The idea of open source 
politics is modeled after the open source software movement, represented most prominently by 
the Linux community of software developers. Open source software makes the software code 
freely available to other developers, who can debug it and add additional functionalities. Most of 
this labor is free, like much of the intellectual labor on blogging (especially in the early years, 
when blog advertisements and jobs did not provide a reliable revenue source). Open source 
models are grounded in collaboration, informal peer review, and decentralized circulation; norms 
that are recognized by bloggers as essential to their mode of public communication. 
 Thinking about blogging as an open source movement offers a way to conceptualize the 
information flows that are filtered through the blogosphere. Though it would be a mistake to 
situate blogging as a utopian movement enabling frictionless communication to directly 
empower participants, blogs  
offer spaces for writing that are more collaboratively constructed than other online 
spaces, as bloggers freely link to, comment on, and augment each other’s content. In 
this way, blogs allow for the possibility of developing new cultural practices of 
online communication in relation to previously established modes of ownership, 
authorship, and legitimacy of content and access to information.88 
The collaborative ethos of blogging communities  “is based more on values such as immediacy, 
transparency, interconnectivity, and proximity to the events. As a heterarchy, diverse bloggers 
post, cross-link, blogroll, and trackback to interact in a network, pulling ideas and knowledge 
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from the edges.”89 This intercasting of tightly linked information flows “can create an economy 
of generosity and gift at the expense of jealousy and possessiveness.”90 As communication 
scholar Jenny Edbauer explains, “because this kind of documentation is public, often open to 
comments and citation in other blogs and websites, the ‘research’ grows in social waves. The 
networked nature of blogs puts research into a circulation that becomes linked, put to other uses, 
transformed.”91 Blogging thus introduces a new mode of public communication that inverts what 
has become the traditional model of mass communication. Rather than a single point source 
disseminating information to a public, blogging de-massifies public communication by 
producing a network where multiple nodes feed into argument-processing systems. It is these 
feedback loops, grounded in recommendations, critiques, and linking practices that enhance the 
participatory nature of media. 
 Given the collaborative nature of blogging, norms surrounding participation have been 
revalued. Individuals in any social network gain reputation by becoming trustworthy, evocative, 
or interesting; becoming increasingly central to the network based on the quality of their 
contributions to public dialogue. Deliberative bloggers trade in a particular type of social capital: 
memeworthiness.92 By generating, circulating, and amplifying certain memes, bloggers burnish 
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increasing reputations. This has created an informal system where the perception of quality 
participation is rewarded by the social network. Consequently, “the ethos of personal publishing, 
then, is based on values such as inclusiveness and community, participation and deliberation, 
free and unfiltered expression”—all norms that encourage and draw in participation.93 That these 
are norms usually endorsed by theorists of deliberative democracy following the Habermasian 
vein is one reason that blogging has excited so many scholars interested in deliberation. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The impacts of blogging on the press, political organizing, and participatory culture 
began to take place during the popularization stage. Currently, blogging finds itself in what I 
would call the consolidation stage. Blogging is no longer the province of the few. It has spread in 
popularity. It has been absorbed into other media platforms, like the social networking websites 
MySpace and Facebook. It has been adopted by institutions like the New York Times and 
spawned institutions itself, like the Gawker Media complex of blogs.94 Blogging seems to be 
everywhere. Early blog theorist Clay Shirky once speculated that blogging would eventually just 
blend in with the internet in general: 
weblog technology will be seen as a platform for so many forms of publishing, 
 filtering, aggregation, and syndication that blogging will stop referring to any 
 particularly coherent activity. The term ‘blog’ will fall into the middle distance, as 
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 ‘home page’ and ‘portal’ have, words that used to mean some concrete thing, but 
 which were stretched by use past the point of meaning.95 
Blogging has probably reached that point as of 2008. There are still ‘blogs’ and people who 
consider themselves ‘bloggers,’ but the activity has settled in to a comfortable if ever-changing 
routine. This naturalization of blogging signals its absorption into the networked social 
imaginary. The normalization of blogging did not occur overnight; it happened in fits and starts, 
as I will now detail in the three case studies. 
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CHAPTER 3—FLOOD THE ZONE: BLOGGERS AND THE TRENT LOTT AFFAIR 
3.1 Introduction 
The one-hundredth birthday of Senator Strom Thurmond was celebrated in the Dirksen 
Senate Office Building on December 5, 2002. This commemorative affair featured friends, 
family, and colleagues praising Thurmond’s longevity as senator. Thurmond, who began his 
political career as a stalwart segregationist and ran for President of the United States in 1948 on 
the Dixiecrat ticket, was retiring from the Senate after a long career. As Senate Majority Leader, 
Trent Lott took the stage to share some prepared remarks about Thurmond. The Senator from 
Mississippi soon veered off-script, saying “I want to say this about my state: When Strom 
Thurmond ran for president, we voted for him. We’re proud of it. And if the rest of the country 
had followed our lead, we wouldn’t have had all these problems over all these years either.”1 
These spontaneous comments were met with “an audible gasp and general silence” by the 
audience.2 
Despite the audience’s immediate reaction to Lott’s statement, the epideictic atmosphere 
of the gathering quickly regained steam and Lott’s comments were, if not forgotten, then 
sublimated by the effusiveness with which other speakers praised Thurmond’s accomplishments 
in the Senate. The occasion seemed to overwhelm the offense. The following day, December 6th, 
the major metropolitan newspapers reported on the celebration of Thurmond’s birthday, but 
made no mention of Lott’s remarks. Other news stories dominated the day: Louisiana Senator 
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Mary Landrieu was in a tight re-election race that was pivotal in determining the balance of 
power in the Senate, Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill was in the midst of resigning his post, and 
the tensions over weapons inspections in Iraq were heating up. Ed O’Keefe, a reporter for ABC 
News who attended Thurmond’s birthday party the prior day, had, however, been pushing the 
story about Lott’s comments to his editors. O’Keefe and ABC’s congressional correspondent 
Linda Douglass had been “trolling for reaction” to Lott’s statements from People for the 
American Way and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. They also 
circulated memos to producers at ABC pitching the story for the day’s news cycle.3 
ABC News did broadcast a short story as part of a brief news round-up on their World 
News This Morning program, which aired at 4:30 a.m.4 Later that day, O’Keefe reported Lott’s 
contentious quote on ABC’s The Note, an online column that had run since March 2002. After 
quoting Lott’s comments, O’Keefe reported: 
Maybe Lott was being jocular. But a plain reading of what he said did generate 
some anger: Wade Henderson of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights told 
ABCNEWS’ Douglass: “This was an offensive and blatant attempt to rewrite the 
history of the last 50 years” … “Thurmond ran for president as a Dixiecrat, a 
segregationist. He gave the longest filibuster in history to try to stop passage of 
the Civil Rights Act. In his statement today, Lott also embraced those dubious 
achievements” ... “Lott betrayed his role as the Majority Leader of all 
                                                
3 Quoted in Esther Scott, “‘Big Media’ Meets the ‘Bloggers’: Coverage of Trent Lott’s Remarks at Strom 
Thurmond’s Birthday Party,” Kennedy School of Government Case Program, 2004, 7, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ 
presspol/Research_Publications/Case_Studies/1731_0.pdf. 
4 John Berman, World News This Morning, ABC, December 6, 2002, LexisNexis. 
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Americans.” Donna Brazile, the Democrats’ turnout czarina in Louisiana right 
now, was also said to be outraged.5 
Later that evening, CNN’s Crossfire and PBS’ Washington Week briefly mentioned Lott’s 
comments.6 
The balance of the weekend saw minimal coverage by established news outlets. A 
notable exception was a column run on Saturday, December 7, by veteran Lott-watcher Tom 
Edsall of the Washington Post. Edsall had, in 1998, reported on Lott’s involvement with the 
Council of Conservative Citizens (CCC).7 The Council of Conservative Citizens inherited the 
legacy of the segregationist Citizens’ Councils of the 1950s and 60s, advancing the proposition 
that “the American people and government should remain European in their composition and 
character.”8 Lott’s CCC connection would receive increasing amounts of attention in the coming 
days. Edsall detailed the historical context for Thurmond’s presidential run as a Dixiecrat, 
stitching together a cohesive narrative that extensively situated Lott’s comments for the first time 
in the national broadcast media. The reactions that ABC News correspondents O’Keefe and 
Douglass were looking for to turn Lott’s comments into a story were present in Edsall’s article, 
as he cited outraged responses from former civil rights leader John Lewis and conservative editor 
                                                
5 Ed O’Keefe, “Man Bites Dog,” The Note, December 6, 2002, http://web.archive.org/ 
web/20021220094616/http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/politics/DailyNews/TheNote_Dec6.html. At the time, 
The Note did not support comments and readers were directed to send responses to an ABC email address. This post 
was not time stamped, but according to Mark Halperin, ABC’s political director, the post happened sometime 
between 9 and 11 a.m. (quoted in Esther Scott, “‘Big Media’ Meets the ‘Bloggers’: Coverage of Trent Lott’s 
Remarks at Strom Thurmond’s Birthday Party,” Kennedy School of Government Case Program, 2004, 7, 
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ presspol/Research_Publications/Case_Studies/1731_0.pdf, 9). 
6 Crossfire, CNN, December 6, 2002, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0212/06/cf.00.html; 
Washington Week, PBS, December 6, 2002, http://www.pbs.org/weta/washingtonweek/transcripts/ 
transcript021206.html. 
7 Tom Edsall, “Lott Renounces White ‘Racialist’ Group He Praised in 1992,” Washington Post, December 
16, 1998, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/daily/dec98/lott16.htm. 
8 Sam Francis, “Statement of Principles,” Council of Conservative Citizens website, no date, 
http://cofcc.org/ ?page_id=60. 
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of The Weekly Standard Bill Kristol.9 However, Edsall’s story was buried on page six of the 
Saturday edition of the Washington Post, reducing the attention that the story might have 
garnered on the front page.  
The following day, the story dropped entirely from the national print press, with 
television and radio doing little in the way of follow-up. Yet, almost a week after Lott made his 
comments, the story re-emerged and began to garner significant media attention. After nominal 
early coverage by the standard-bearing print newspapers, the New York Times and the 
Washington Post, both media organizations ramped up the amount of stories they were doing on 
Lott. This is not a common pattern in the broadcast media. Broadcast news, especially in a cable 
and internet-driven 24/7 news cycle, tends to jump on stories when they first break in order to get 
scoops; waiting almost a week to digest Lott’s comments before devoting substantial publicity to 
them deviated from standard journalistic practice to push a story while it was still fresh.10 
Why didn’t the institutional media jump on Lott’s comments earlier? Esther Scott’s 2004 
study of the Lott affair posits three central reasons for why established media organizations 
failed to quickly take the reins on what would eventually be turned into a substantial scandal. 
First, journalists covering the story might have been susceptible to ‘pack journalism.’ Pack 
journalism refers to the tendency for news reporting to become homogenous within and across 
organizations.11 Scott quotes Ed O’Keefe, the reporter who originally posted the item on The 
                                                
9 Tom Edsall, “Lott Decried For Part Of Salute to Thurmond: GOP Senate Leader Hails Colleague's Run 
As Segregationist,” Washington Post, December 7, 2002, A6, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A20730-2002Dec6. Edsall also asked Gordon Baum, CEO of the 
Council of Conservative Citizens for comment on Lott’s remarks; Baum responded “God bless Trent Lott.” 
10 See Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel, Warp Speed: America in the Age of Mixed Media Culture (New 
York: Century Foundation Press, 1999).  
11 Timothy Cook, “The Future of the Institutional Media” in Mediated Politics: Communication in the 
Future of Democracy, eds. W. Lance Bennett and Robert Entman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
185-9. Cook explores the hypothesis that cable television and the internet (what he calls narrowcasting technologies) 
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Note, reflecting “if something is newsworthy … everyone will get it … if they didn’t all get it, 
then it couldn’t possibly be a newsworthy item.”12 In other words, sometimes consensus 
immediately congeals around the newsworthiness of a story, and that consensus occasionally 
parlays hegemonic interpretations of importance into a journalistic common sense. Pack 
journalism is accentuated through a sense of ‘clubbiness’ amongst journalists and between 
journalists and the official government and corporate sources on which they rely for scoops, 
interviews, and other types of access. A variety of groupthink, pack journalism can erode the 
critical faculties theorized as crucial to the monitorial role of the press.  
Secondly, Scott posits that historical ignorance might have slowed uptake of the story. 
She relates a story about Tom Edsall, the veteran Washington Post reporter, who revealed that 
his editors failed to grasp the significance of Lott’s comments. As Edsall notes, “I just think that 
people now see Strom Thurmond as this doddering old guy … and have no knowledge of the 
central role he played in southern politics.”13 Having published two books on race and politics, 
Edsall’s specialization gave him a unique angle on Lott’s comments, but many reporters likely 
did not know all of the intricacies of Thurmond’s role in the 1948 presidential election.14 Could 
this phenomenon be related to the culture of the press itself? Sociologist Michael Schudson 
                                                
have fragmented the mass audience, thus enabling news organizations to cultivate niche audiences and reducing 
pack journalism. He concludes, “the multiplication of different news outlets has not been matched by diversification 
of approaches to journalism. More fully, the homogeneity of the news across different outlets, if anything, has 
probably been strengthened rather than weakened by recent developments” (187). Cook suggests that massive cost-
cutting, the rise of service-oriented (“news you can use”) journalism, and the spatial constraints of newly redesigned 
papers have increased reliance on wire services and major papers like the New York Times. Budget cuts in major 
news organizations have systematically reduced the capacity of the fourth estate’s traditional roles; see Robert 
McChesney, The Problem of the Media: U.S. Communication Politics in the Twenty-First Century (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 2004), 79-82. 
12 Quoted in Scott, Big Media Meets the Bloggers, 8.  
13 Quoted in Scott, Big Media Meets the Bloggers, 11. 
14 See his The New Politics of Inequality (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989), and, with Mary Edsall, Chain 
Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992).  
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defines a reporter as “someone faithful to sources, attuned to the conventional wisdom, serving 
the political culture media institutions, and committed to a narrow range of public, literary 
expression.”15 Schudson himself admits this is a less-than-flattering description of the news 
enterprise; yet, it does articulate how reporters for institutional media are incorporated into 
disciplinary systems that constrain what is possible to know and how to express it. 
Finally, Scott obliquely suggests that the contemporary norms of news culture dampened 
enthusiasm for pursuing the story. The memos circulated by Douglass and O’Keefe received 
some interest by ABC producers, but the news programs “did not have time to include it during 
their broadcasts the next day.”16 Since the Lott story failed to make the cut the day after 
Thurmond’s birthday, it was quickly considered old news. As O’Keefe disclosed, part of the 
problem was that there was “no on-camera reaction” that could interpret Lott’s comments for a 
television audience.17 Roderick Hart argues “television turns faces into arguments,” so the 
absence of an on-camera response made it difficult to convert Lott’s comments into a 
newsworthy controversy.18 Moreover, as Tom Edsall explained later, “for the story to move in 
the press … you’ve got to get a new news peg on it every time.”19 News pegs, or hooks, are 
events deemed worthy of attention by modern news organizations.20 ‘New’ news is central in the 
competition for advertising dollars; neither audiences nor advertisers pay for yesterday’s news.  
                                                
15 In The Power of News (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 105. 
16 Quoted in Scott, Big Media Meets the Bloggers, 8. 
17 Quoted in Scott, Big Media Meets the Bloggers, 10.  
18 See his Seducing America: How Television Charms the Modern Voter (Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications, 1999), 34. 
19 Quoted in Scott, Big Media Meets the Bloggers, 12. 
20 Robert McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times 
(Champagne, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 49-50. 
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Scott’s diagnosis points to some key structural flaws of the traditional broadcast media at 
this point in time in the United States. One key take-away from her explanation is that 
complexity is outstripping the capacity of institutional media to cover, interpret, and publicize 
events in the lifeworld that warrant more extensive deliberation. Pack journalism produces 
reporting that fails to capture the heterogeneity of various complex subsystems, instead being 
directed by informal networks of consensus about newsworthiness. Reporters cannot become 
omnicompetent distillers of every news event they cover; they are too often stretched thin, 
working on deadline, and concerned with the present moment to have the ability to connect all 
the dots on unfolding events. Broadcast media are also constrained by time, space, and the need 
to keep advertisers happy, which subtly slants their gatekeeping function. These three critiques 
of the press are exacerbated by the political economy of the commercial news media in the 
United States.  
With these dynamics operating in the mass media, there was an opening for blogging to 
make a bigger splash in public deliberation. As Scott concludes, blogs were, if not the sole cause 
for pushing the story back into the institutional broadcast media, certainly instrumental in 
generating insights that moved the story forward. This chapter examines three bloggers who 
were active in dissecting Trent Lott’s comments: Josh Marshall, of Talking Points Memo, Glenn 
Reynolds, of Instapundit, and Atrios, of Eschaton. The efforts of these three bloggers were 
amplified by thousands of others linking to key posts that moved the interpretation of Lott’s 
comments along toward an eventual opinion shift that cost the Senate Majority leader his 
position. As bloggers began dissecting the Lott story in the days immediately following his 
comments, Glenn Reynolds made several posts titled FLOOD THE ZONE, which I read here as 
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signifying the blogosphere’s inventional capacities.21 The invention of novel arguments is 
historically a crucial element in meeting the needs of public deliberation, as I explore in the next 
section about invention and circulation in classical Greece and in Habermas’ latest account of 
public deliberation. These inventional capacities of the blogosphere at least partially address the 
deficits created by the current political economy of the mass institutional media. I will then 
explicate the role of bloggers in the Lott controversy, before speculating on how their 
interventions illuminate the challenge that networked sensibilities pose to traditional theories of 
public deliberation. I have also added a coda to this chapter, exploring how the trope ‘flood the 
zone’ implicitly grounds critiques of ‘astroturf’ blogs that violate the norms of the blogosphere. 
3.2 Invention in Classical Greece and Habermas’ Contemporary Public Sphere 
 When Erasmus, the famous Renaissance philosopher, got stuck on a particular sentence 
while writing an essay, he would break the flow of his writing and draft one hundred variations 
on that particular sentence. From those hundred drafts, he was able to experiment with different 
stylistic approaches, different words, and different points of emphasis. This approach was all the 
more effective with really important sentences: it was crucial to have just the right wording in 
order to express his point.22 This strategy develops copiousness, a traditional focus of rhetorical 
invention. When preparing for a speech, classical rhetoricians would encourage their students to 
                                                
21 To be clear, I am not signaling that all blogging contributes to the invention of novel arguments or 
perspectives. Indeed, as Melissa Wall’s research on war-bloggers shows, bloggers are certainly capable of 
reproducing dominant frames; see “Blogging Gulf War II,” Journalism Studies 7 (2006): 111-26. Daniel Brouwer 
and Aaron Hess similarly have identified how military bloggers reproduced ideological articulations of sexuality, 
religion, and nation in their responses to the Westboro Baptist Church’s protests of military funerals in “Making 
Sense of ‘God Hates Fags’ and ‘Thank God for 9/11’: A Thematic Analysis of Milbloggers’ Responses to Reverend 
Fred Phelps and the Westboro Baptist Church,” Western Journal of Communication 71 (January 2007): 69-90. At 
key times during public controversies, though, bloggers can play a role in re-setting frames through their original 
reporting and commenting. 
22 I am indebted to Debra Hawhee’s blog post on this, “Copia=Abundance (Notes on Unofficial),” Blogos, 
Feburary 27, 2007, http://dhawhee.blogs.com/d_hawhee/2007/02/copia_abundance.html. 
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be exhaustive in the generation of potential arguments; with a long list of arguments, they could 
then be choosy about picking the best ones. This is partially what Aristotle suggested when he 
said that rhetoric was the search for the available means of persuasion. The task of invention is to 
turn this copiousness into persuasive discourse. 
 Invention is necessary at this micro-level, with the development of specific rhetorical 
artifacts by individual speakers. But copia is also important at the systemic level, as arguments 
and perspectives filter in from people’s lived experience to shape the administrative decisions 
made in their names. Greek democracy uniquely facilitated the circulation of novel arguments, as 
Josiah Ober’s work on the legacy of Athenian governance illustrates. As he explains, any 
organized collective needs “a culture of voluntary sharing of knowledge, effective knowledge 
circulation, and constant mutual instruction.”23 To form this kind of public culture, the Athenians 
designated 139 ‘demes,’ or self-governing communities, which formed “public assemblies at 
which all the demesmen could gather to debate and decide upon issues of local concern.”24 These 
public assemblies were made up of 2-300 men (women were not allowed to participate publicly). 
The advantages of these demes were two-fold. First, it habituated citizens into patterns of 
participatory decision-making that accounted for the various perspectives present.25 
Second, it brought individual competencies and knowledge to bear on a larger social 
body that could then be applied toward addressing extant problems. As Ober explains, the demes 
were subsequently organized into a master network that was institutionalized in the Council of 
500. Each deme would elect members to the Council of 500, which would draw in all the 
knowledge that they gleaned from their smaller deme network into a broader deliberating body: 
                                                
23 Josiah Ober, Athenian Legacies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 36. 
24 Ober, Athenian Legacies, 36. 
25 Ober, Athenian Legacies, 37. 
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The Council of 500 did not function as a ‘representative legislative body’: the 
members of the council were not legislators (legislation was left to the Assembly) 
and councilors were not expected to serve the interests of their ‘local 
constituencies.’ Rather, the 500 councilors chosen each year by their fellow 
demesmen were the human embodiment of the knowledge resources of the entire 
Athenian polis. Their duty as councilors was to bring local knowledge to the 
center—to participate in open discussions, bringing to bear all the relevant 
information they possessed, in order to best serve the needs of Athens as an 
independent city-state.26 
This created a bi-directional network with potentially substantial benefits. The “specialized 
knowledge resources” of each deme were in theory available to the entire polis, and the polis 
created a social space where demes could learn from each other. Of course, this system could 
work fairly well on the scale of Athenian democracy; for the classical Greeks, the foot and the 
voice were more or less enough to perform these network functions. The scale of Athenian 
democracy was such that each locality had the autonomy to make decisions based on locally-
generated knowledge, “but now with the added assurance that the diverse and vastly greater 
resources and expertise of the entire polis were available as ‘backup’ in cases where local 
solutions proved inadequate.”27 
 As Ober explains, this master network resulted in diverse technical and social knowledge 
being distributed throughout the entire system, enabling the management of a relatively complex 
form of social organization without descending into chaos. The local networks facilitated the 
                                                
26 Ober, Athenian Legacies, 38, emphasis in original. 
27 Ober, Athenian Legacies, 37. 
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deepening of argument pools, to use Sunstein’s term, and the master network brought those local 
knowledge claims into central fora where they could be scrutinized and brought to bear on 
immediate problems. In the relatively small-scale Athenian democracy, these knowledge claims 
could be mediated through competing public speechmaking. However, the social differentiation 
that modern societies experienced as a consequence of industrialization and the growth of 
administrative institutions required mechanisms to manage increasing complexity and integrate 
subjects into an imagined community. For the early Habermas of the Structural Transformation 
era, print news was a primary way of coordinating this social activity, consequently increasing 
the accountability of the system to the lifeworld. 
The diversity of print publications in the bourgeois public sphere facilitated wide-ranging 
conversations on a variety of topics. So-called rational-critical debate occurred on the print pages 
themselves, but the power of the public sphere was really in how those circulated discourses 
received attention by interlocutors in places like coffeehouses, taverns, and public squares. 
Mediated communication, then, historically played a central role in activating the energies of 
publicity.28 Media play an equally crucial role in Habermas’ contemporary theorization of public 
deliberation, most extensively articulated in his 1992 book Between Facts and Norms (translated 
to English in 1996). Habermas writes this latter work before the gravity of the internet’s 
influence on human interdependence was fully realized, making the system he outlines ripe for 
revision given advances in information technology like blogging. Despite this caveat, it’s 
worthwhile to outline the ‘late Habermas’ requirements for public deliberation to achieve 
legitimacy. 
                                                
28 John Durham Peters, “Distrust of Representation,” 549, 566. 
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For Habermas, public deliberation succeeds to the extent that the “network for 
communicating information and points of view (i.e. opinions expressing affirmative or negative 
attitudes)” operates free of artificial restraint; “the streams of communication are, in the process, 
filtered and synthesized in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified 
public opinions.”29 As arguments are introduced and tested in the crucible of public debate, they 
ultimately gain more salience and are picked up by broadcast media capable of focusing public 
argument. “The public sphere,” Habermas writes, “is a warning system with sensors” that 
twitters when citizens express felt needs.30 
This warning system senses issues that should be put on the public’s agenda and 
ultimately sluices public opinion from this periphery to the core parliamentary and administrative 
arms. Habermas draws this sluicing model from Bernard Peters, citing Peters’ claim that “‘the 
legitimacy of decisions depends on processes of opinion- and will-formation at the periphery.’”31 
This sluicing intersects neatly with Habermas’ traditional concern with legitimation processes in 
complex democratic societies. Deliberation isn’t necessarily about creating better outcomes or 
greater inclusivity in decision-making (though it might well do those things); it is mostly about 
creating circumstances where diverse collectives can learn to live with the decisions that are 
made, having publicly debated issues before responsive decision-makers. When sluicing of 
public opinion to the core happens, citizens feel like their concerns are being attended to and thus 
integrate into social systems rather than rebel against those systems. For Habermas, discourse 
                                                
29 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 360. 
30 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 359. 
31 Quoted in Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 356. 
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that emerges spontaneously from the periphery provides an organic warning system that 
outperforms ‘top-down’ approaches that have lost touch with the lifeworld. 
One might now situate blogging as partially constituting the peripheral warning system, 
but Between Facts and Norms fixes modernity’s civil society agents in that role. Habermas 
theorizes that the periphery can be broken into “customers” and “suppliers.”32 The customers 
include “business associations, labor unions, interest groups, and so on; these networks fulfill 
certain coordination functions in more or less opaque social sectors.”33 Habermas distinguishes 
these bargaining groups “from the ‘supplier’ groups, associations, and organizations that, before 
parliaments and through the courts, give voice to social problems, make broad demands, 
articulate public interests or needs, and thus attempt to influence the political process more from 
normative points of view than from the standpoint of particular interests.”34 He argues that the 
spontaneous communication emerging from the supplier groups on the periphery is crucial to 
prevent a deformation of public deliberation occurring from the technocratic impulses of the 
‘customer’ groups. As he explains, the “settled routines” of public deliberation must “remain 
open to renovative impulses from the periphery.”35 As controversies unfold, increased 
communicative activity from the periphery  
is characterized by a consciousness of crisis, a heightened public attention, an 
 intensified search for solutions, in short, by problematization. In cases in which 
 perceptions of problems and problem situations have taken a conflictual turn, the 
 attention span of the citizenry enlarges, indeed in such a way that controversies in 
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33 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 355. 
34 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 355. 
35 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 357. 
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 the broader public sphere primarily ignite around the normative aspects of the 
 problems most at issue.36 
The spontaneous communication that emerges from the periphery introduces a “creative layer” 
that converts unique perspectives from the lifeworld into articulated arguments taken up by the 
public sphere.37 The periphery, though, lacks the structural capacity to immediately translate their 
vibrations across complex societies. Consequently, the mass media plays a central role in 
condensing and circulating the problematizations of social issues that emerge from the edges of 
society. 
To do so, the mass media must adhere to certain normative benchmarks. Habermas draws 
eight normative functions of the mass media from journalism scholars Michael Gurevitch and 
Jay Blumler. These functions include (1) surveilling the lifeworld for issues that influence well-
being of citizens; (2) setting the agenda on key issues; (3) providing platforms for supplier group 
advocacy; (4) hosting dialogue between diverse interlocutors; (5) enhancing accountability 
mechanisms for public officials; (6) encouraging citizen involvement; (7) resisting efforts to 
constrain media freedom; and (8) respecting audiences as cognitively capable agents.38 However, 
Habermas suggests that in many complex liberal societies, the mass media are not exactly up to 
this task.39 The broadcast media, in response to increasing complexity and expenses, have 
                                                
36 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 357. Habermas is specifically referring to the eventual allocation 
of this communicative capital generated from crisis-consciousness to problem-solving ends through parliamentary 
complexes. Such sluicing of public opinion need not be exclusively focused on legislative problem-solving; as the 
case of Trent Lott shows, public opinion can pressure opinion leaders to resolve conflicts on issues of public value 
as well. 
37 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 366. 
38 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 378. 
39 Two central claims support this assertion. First, Habermas discusses television’s reliance on press 
conferences and public relations campaigns as an exemplar of reliance on a professional class of opinion-makers 
that, despite their professed differences, ultimately fall within a narrow “centrist” range (Between Facts and Norms, 
376). Second, Habermas concludes that the “kernel of truth in the theory of the culture industry” is that the mix of 
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centralized channels of communication.40 This sort of streamlining reduces opportunities for 
peripheral voices to break through established routines and re-set the public agenda. A paradox 
thus results in actually existing public deliberation: spontaneous communication from the 
periphery is needed, but is extraordinarily rare given the narrow agenda of corporate-dominated 
broadcast media. To revisit terms from Structural Transformation, it appears that the steering 
media of money and power direct disproportionate influence on contemporary news 
organizations, reducing the ideal flow of public opinion.  
3.3 A Rhetorical Perspective on Invention and the Political Economy of the Mass Media 
 The Iron Law of Oligarchy, developed by sociologist Robert Michels, posits that 
organizations eventually become oligarchic, no matter what their origins, because leaders end up 
having a disproportionate amount of influence.41 As a corollary, I suggest that there is also an 
Iron Law of Informational Oligarchy, which would link the institutionalization of media to a 
reduction in viewpoint diversity over time. As media become more organized, and more 
institutionalized, the range of viewpoints that they discuss tends to shrink, especially as 
commercial pressures introduced by advertisers begin to shape news production. Esther Scott’s 
explanation for why the institutional media failed to pick up the Lott story exemplifies this 
oligarchic tendency: pack journalism, the disciplining of reporters, and de-contextualized, 
‘presentist’ news production could all be seem as the consequence of the oligarchization of news 
coverage. Each of these factors frustrates the ability of spontaneous communication to flow 
                                                
information and entertainment, human interest stories, and episodic treatment of complex issues works to 
“depoliticize public communication” (377). Habermas suggests that media effects research has been inconclusive in 
establishing an empirical model for how mass media agenda setting works, which leaves him with a defense of a 
normative model of agenda-setting. 
40 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 376. 
41 Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern 
Democracy, trans. Eden Paul and Cedar Paul (New York: Hearst’s International, 1915 [1911]).  
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toward the core. This is a place where rhetorical studies and media studies profitably meet: the 
political economy of the mass media reduces the invention and circulation of novel arguments 
into public deliberation. 
 When Ben Bagdikian wrote The Media Monopoly in 1983, he warned against the 50 media 
firms that dominated public discourse in the United States.42 Since then, systems of mass 
communication have become even more centralized in the United States, with five major media 
conglomerates responsible for most mass-mediated communication: Time Warner, Disney, 
Murdoch's News Corporation, Bertelsmann of Germany, and Viacom. Robert McChesney has 
chronicled the political economy of the mass media more than any other communication scholar, 
and it is to his work that I turn to understand how the current structure of the news media narrow 
the inventional possibilities of public deliberation. 
 McChesney identifies three duties that journalism must perform in democratic theory 
(serving as something of a condensation of the 8 functions Habermas identifies): “to act as a 
rigorous watchdog of the powerful and those who wish to be powerful; to ferret out truth from 
lies; and to present a wide range of informed positions on key issues.”43 Public debate can only 
be sustained by introducing a wide range of perspectives, yet, media “concentration accentuates 
the core tendencies of a profit-driven, advertising-supported media system: hyper-
commercialism and denigration of journalism and public service.”44 
 The conglomeration of media industries has been paired with a fundamental restructuring 
of journalism organizations that has reduced the capacity of the institutional media to draw in 
perspectives from the lifeworld. As McChesney writes, “to do effective journalism is expensive, 
                                                
42 Ben Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1983). 
43 Robert McChesney, Problem of the Media, 57. 
44 McChesney, Problem of the Media, 426-7. 
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and corporate managers realize that the surest way to fatten profits is to fire editors and reporters 
and fill the news hole with inexpensive syndicated material and fluff.”45 Journalist salaries are in 
decline, workforce cuts are increasing, foreign bureaus are shuttering their doors, and advertisers 
are increasingly pressuring editors.46 According to McChesney, investigative journalism has all 
but disappeared from the conglomerated news firms.47 If the situation looks dire on the domestic 
front, it is compounded for international affairs. Profit pressures have reduced the incentive for 
robust international news journalism.48 Americans are increasingly reluctant to watch or care 
about international news.49 Journalists rarely have enough knowledge of the subjects they are 
covering to make informed and balanced assessments.50 The ‘soft news’ approach to reporting 
has arguably habituated the public into accepting news as infotainment, which results in shallow 
coverage.51 The growth of cable and satellite television, and of course the internet, was supposed 
to challenge this narrowing of political dialogue. But, as McChesney argues, the instability 
inherent in the contemporary media ecology has perversely encouraged media organizations to 
get even bigger in order to deal with uncertainty.52 
 It is possible, of course, that large conglomerates could fulfill the traditional democratic 
functions of the mass media despite their size. In fact, their scale could direct enormous 
                                                
45 McChesney, “The Political Economy of Global Communication,” in Capitalism and the Information 
Age: The Political Economy of the Global Communication Revolution, eds. Robert McChesney, Ellen Meiksins 
Wood, and John Bellamy Foster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1998), 18. 
46 McChesney, “Political Economy,” 18-9. 
47 McChesney, Problem of the Media, 81. 
48 John Hamilton and Eric Jenner, “The New Foreign Correspondence,” Foreign Affairs 82 
(September/October 2003), 131. 
49 Danny Schecter, Media Wars: News at a Time of Terror (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 14-15. 
50 William Kennedy, The Military and the Media: Why the Press Cannot Be Trusted To Cover a War 
(Westport: Praeger, 1993), 11. 
51 Matthew Baum, Soft News Goes to War: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy in the New Media 
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resources toward investigation. But the norms that have emerged from the political economy of 
the institutional media are unusually resistant to doing so. With the evolution of the press as a 
commercial enterprise, rather than a specifically political one as earlier in United States’ history, 
reporting has become ‘professionalized’ and thus pursues stories under the guise of objectivity 
and neutrality. As a consequence, journalists are often drawn to “relying on official sources” in 
order to “give stories legitimacy.”53 McChesney continues: “under professional standards, 
providing meaningful context and proper background tends to commit the journalist to a definite 
position and thereby generates the controversy professionalism is determined to avoid. Coverage 
instead barrages with facts and official statements.”54 What is produced, in the end, is a series of 
‘informational’ reports that are often too disconnected from each other to achieve the type of 
narrative synthesis required for public opinion to form, much less be felt by deliberating bodies. 
As Christopher Lasch puts it, democracies need “public debate, not information … we do not 
know what we need to know until we ask the right questions, and we can identify the right 
questions only by subjecting our own ideas about the world to the test of public controversy.”55 
Of course, the blogosphere might over-correct for the institutional media by privileging public 
debate over the production of information—it is in the contemporary synthesis of the two that the 
democratic promise of the media might be renewed. 
Objectivity and neutrality might be good professional codes to enshrine in order to 
prevent a collapse into outright propaganda. The problem for the institutional media, however, is 
that “far from being politically neutral, journalism smuggles in values conducive to the 
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commercial aims of owners and advertisers and to the political aims of big business.”56 It is the 
commercialism of the media that erodes the democratic potentiality latent in the press: 
The global commercial media are integral to this depoliticization process. Without 
any necessary forethought and by merely pursuing market dictates, the global 
commercial media are superior at serving up a depoliticized populace that 
privileges personal consumption over social understanding and activity, a mass 
more likely to take orders and less likely to make waves. Hence the global 
commercial media provide a serious journalism aimed at the elite and the upper 
middle classes and shaped to its needs and prejudices, and a tabloid news for the 
balance of the population.57 
At its worst, the professional commercial media have become a megaphone that, in James 
Carey’s assessment, “merely ratifies the judgments of experts delivered from on high. It is, 
above all, a journalism that justifies itself in the public’s name but in which the public plays no 
role, except as an audience; it is a receptacle to be informed by experts and an excuse for the 
practice of publicity.”58 
 There were some hopeful moments early in the internet’s development that suggested that 
this new medium of communication might present an alternative to the hyper-commercialism of 
the institutional media. Indymedia was one such alternative. Yet, as McChesney notes, “the 
indications are that the substantive content of this commercial media in the Internet, or any 
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subsequent digital communication system, will look much like what currently exists. Indeed, 
advertisers and commercialism arguably have more influence over Internet content than 
anywhere else.”59 The history of the blogosphere bears this prediction of creeping corporatism 
out. Though most blogs began as advertisement free zones, corporations eventually picked up on 
the blogosphere as a way to more precisely target desired demographics. With the growth of 
advertising coordinators like BlogAds and AdSense, bloggers can now make money—sometimes 
enough to sustain a full time role as a blogger—from their blogging. Product placement is now 
ubiquitous on blogs, and it is largely an unregulated process.60 The number of bloggers able to 
generate income is still relatively small. However, in the beginning years of the blogosphere, 
these political economy questions were considerably less relevant, as advertisements and 
commercial pressures had not yet fully manifested themselves and blogging was hardly an 
economically sustainable enterprise. 
 One way to situate the political economy of the mass (institutional) media is to say that 
they construct a field, in the Bourdieuian sense, with its own internal dynamics. The journalistic 
field shapes news production in a way that produces a narrower ideological debate, increases the 
dramatization of news, and routinizes certain rules of the game and codes of conduct.61 Though 
fields tend to have a powerful inertia, they are not immune to change. As Bourdieu explains, an 
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increase in the number of source points producing journalism, paired with an increase in readers 
and spectators, will challenge received norms in the journalistic field and enable a transformation 
of the field itself.62 The blogosphere is probably the most imposing field-challenge to journalism 
in its late 20th century incarnation. By introducing a supplemental source of invention to society-
wide public deliberation, blogging partially fulfills the normative agenda-setting functions of the 
mass media that the contemporary political economy of media institutions has largely 
surrendered. 
3.4 Bloggers Flood the Zone 
During the dip in news coverage from the institutional mass media, bloggers were 
digging deeper and deeper into Lott’s past and debating the implications of his seemingly pro-
segregationist comments on their blogs. Three bloggers played an instrumental role in shaping 
this conversation on weblogs: Josh Marshall on Talking Points Memo, Glenn Reynolds on 
Instapundit, and Atrios on Eschaton.63 My account is not exhaustive—the rhetorical activity of 
these bloggers far outpaces the space here to capture each minute detail. However, through my 
thick description of key blogging activities by these three bloggers, I identify how bloggers 
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generated public arguments that transformed discourse and eventually undermined public 
support for Lott.64 
To understand the significance of Lott’s comments, bloggers began interrogating exactly 
what ‘these problems’ referred to in Lott’s remarks. At 1:21 p.m. on December 6th, just a few 
hours after O’Keefe’s report in The Note, the pseudonymous blogger Atrios published the first of 
many missives on the unfolding Lott scandal.65 Atrios linked to The Note story, posting that “the 
problems Lott is referring to are the Civil and Voting Rights Acts” and then updating the same 
post later with “Lott is also likely referring [to] lots of other horrible things like the Brown 
decision as well.”66 A second update linked to a pull quote from Slate contributor Tim Noah, 
excerpting a speech from Thurmond saying “there's not enough troops in the army to force the 
southern people to break down segregation and admit the Nigra race into our theaters, into our 
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swimming pools, into our homes, and into our churches.”67 These links display the rapid 
information-gathering proclivities of bloggers. 
Josh Marshall, a freelance journalist who had operated Talking Points Memo since the 
Bush-Gore recount controversy in November 2000, learned about Lott’s comments from the 
National Journal’s Hotline, which in turn had been cued to the story by Ed O’Keefe’s previous 
entry in The Note.68 Marshall, in conventional reportorial mode, first posted at 3:20 p.m. on 
December 6th, contextualizing Strom Thurmond’s presidential run against Harry Truman in 1948 
as an explicitly segregationist Dixiecrat. He then quoted Lott’s remarks at Thurmond’s birthday 
celebration before concluding “just another example of the hubris now reigning among Capitol 
Hill Republicans.”69 Marshall would eventually receive a lion’s share of the credit for pushing 
the story forward through his investigative reporting. 
Later that day, at 6:02 p.m., Atrios posted two items that demonstrated “what Senator 
Lott was proud of in 1948 Mississippi.”70 First, he posted a reproduction of a Dixiecrat ballot 
from the 1948 election featuring Thurmond. The ballot tellingly says “a vote for Truman … 
means the vicious FEPC—anti-poll tax—anti-lynching and anti-segregation proposals will 
become the law of the land and our way of life in the South will be gone forever.”71 Atrios then 
quoted the Dixiecrat platform from that election: 
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The negro is a native of tropical climate where fruits and nuts are plentiful and 
 where clothing is not required for protection against the weather ... The essentials 
 of society in the jungle are few and do not include the production, transportation 
 and marketing of goods. [Thus] his racial constitution has been fashioned to 
 exclude any idea of voluntary cooperation on his part.72 
The recirculation by Atrios of these two bits of historical knowledge into public deliberation in 
the blogosphere demonstrates the capacity of bloggers to identify points of “specified 
ignorance.”73 Specified ignorance is the Mertonian concept that one must establish what is not 
known in order to figure out what kind of research must be done in order to further knowledge.74 
In this case, in order to draw some normative conclusions from Lott’s comments, Atrios needed 
to establish what exactly ‘these problems’ that Lott referred to were.  
Marshall followed up the Lott story the next morning. In that post, he reiterated the 
problematic nature of Lott’s comments, and then linked to a transcript from CNN’s Inside 
Politics. In what is clearly a slight directed at the priorities of what other media outlets consider 
newsworthy, Marshall concludes that “on Inside Politics the John Kerry hair story made the cut, 
not the Trent Lott segregation story.”75 Atrios, paralleling Josh Marshall, noted a bit later that the 
John Kerry haircut story made CNN’s Inside Politics while the Trent Lott story languished.76 
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 That both Atrios and Josh Marshall were fanning the flames of this story might have been 
unsurprising to those who viewed the two bloggers as leaning to the political left. Their posts 
during this time sound an explicitly anti-Republican tone. Had the criticism of Lott been limited 
to liberal bloggers, perhaps the story might have been dismissed as political ax grinding and 
consequently cordoned off from broader public discourse. However, a prominent conservative 
blogger also joined the conversation about Lott’s reflections on Thurmond’s 1948 candidacy. 
Glenn Reynolds, a University of Tennessee law professor, had been publishing his blog 
Instapundit since August 2001 and was one of the most frequently updated and referred to blogs 
in the nascent community of online bloggers. Reynolds characterizes himself as a libertarian, but 
reads and links to blogs of varying political stripes, as his postings on the unfolding Trent Lott 
controversy show. December 6th, the same date that The Note first published the story and 
Marshall and Atrios began posting, Reynolds posted his first thoughts on Trent Lott when he 
wrote at 9:15 p.m. that “Trent Lott deserves the shit he's getting from Atrios and Josh 
Marshall.”77 Reynolds argued that the contentious remarks were proof that Lott should not be 
Majority Leader and implored readers to peruse the sample Dixiecrat ballot from 1948 hosted on 
Atrios’ blog, saying that it was a “must-read,” thus directing a larger audience to Eschaton.78 The 
process of linking to other bloggers and then commenting on their posts demonstrates a bundling 
process: following Habermas’ formulation, Reynolds’ approving citation of these two opinions, 
while open to subsequent revision, congeals a (micro-) public opinion. What began as a fairly 
                                                
fire for spending $150 on a haircut; a regular feature of criticism on blogs over the following days would underline 
this point about priorities of established media organizations. 
76 Atrios, “I Love Being Right!,” Eschaton, December 7, 2002, 11:23 a.m., http://atrios.blogspot.com/ 
2002_12_01_archive.html#90025159. 
77 Glenn Reynolds, “Trent Lott Deserves the Shit,” Instapundit, December 6, 2002, 9:15 p.m., 
http://www.instapundit.com/archives/005985.php#005985/. 
78 Glenn Reynolds, “Trent Lott Deserves,” Instapundit.  
141 
weak impulse of disapproval eventually propagated across weblogs and, in this process of in-
depth investigation by bloggers, gained a more distinct shape regarding the significance of Lott’s 
comments and the proper endgame. 
Later postings confirm this trend. On December 7th, at 9:50 p.m., Reynolds noted that the 
hubbub about Lott’s comments provided a justifiable pretext for moving into a post-Lott political 
era. Sounding a theme he would return to in subsequent postings, he argued “Lott's a liability for 
the GOP anyway, and this gives them a chance to get rid of him while looking good and doing 
right.”79 Reynolds was articulating a view popular in some Republican circles that Lott was an 
ineffectual manager of the conservative agenda. Indeed, as would become apparent as this 
controversy unfolded, the Bush Administration preferred Tennessee Senator Bill Frist as 
Majority leader because of his perceived pliability and effectiveness at advancing elements of the 
president’s agenda. Though Lott’s eventual ouster might have been the product of naked political 
machinations orchestrated by the Bush administration, his resignation would have been 
unthinkable without the swirl of public arguments surrounding his recent remarks and distant 
past.  
The blogging by Atrios on December 7th had a slightly different valence than Reynolds’ 
blogging during this day. Whereas the posts at Instapundit seemed to be arguing that Lott’s 
comments suggested poor judgment and indicated an inability to build effective conservative 
political coalitions, Atrios continued to plumb the segregationist depths of Lott’s past in six posts 
scattered throughout the day. Initially, he linked to Edsall’s column in that day’s Washington 
Post, highlighting Lott’s past relationship with the Council of Conservative Citizens and linking 
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to the website of the Anti-Defamation League’s profile of that group.80 Atrios even tangled with 
Reynolds. In response to Reynolds’ assertion that “it’s easy to forget how things once were. Lott 
has, apparently,” Atrios argues that this absolves Lott of personal responsibility for his bigotry.81 
The next day, December 8th, would provide a tipping point in coverage on blogs due in 
part to Reynolds’ activity. That day, Reynolds published ten separate posts that cited seventeen 
different websites, blogs, or reader emails he had received. In this flurry of activity, Reynolds 
displayed the ability—and agility—of blogging to aggregate news and opinion by relentlessly 
posting updates on the Trent Lott imbroglio. Linking to different websites that expressed dismay 
or outrage at Lott’s remarks, Reynolds noted “seems the Blogosphere is way ahead on this one. 
Where's everybody else?”82 One of the definitive characteristics of blogging—quick 
interlinking—was on full display, making Reynolds a sort of one-stop-reading portal that 
collated highlights from other online resources. 
The quantity of output by Reynolds on this single day is indicative of the signature 
feature in the emerging social imaginary of a network society: the constant management and 
instantaneous circulation of information and interpretation. Reynolds, in the title of his very first 
post of that day, wrote “FLOOD THE ZONE!”83 Without explanation, Reynolds used the same 
title for three other posts during the Lott controversy, with each post exploring a different facet 
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of Lott’s remarks.84 Flooding the zone amounts to the invocation of a vernacular media theory: in 
a network society, information dominance is crucial in swaying public and elite opinion and best 
achieved through a virtually uninterrupted deluge of bits and bytes. Reynolds later interpreted the 
term ‘flood the zone’ to signify “covering a story to the extent that other outlets can't ignore it.”85 
According to Reynolds, “blogs are good at picking apart a story from lots of different angles at 
once, while big media outlets tend to be more similar in their coverage,” making his use of the 
trope ‘flood the zone’ a useful signifier.86 Reynolds’ ability to link to various other blogs and 
websites, what Lanham calls “hypertext juxtapositions,” creates inventional possibilities as he 
puts different interlocutors in conversation with each other.87 These hypertext juxtapositions 
might be seen as the engine for flooding the zone, enabling the conversational nature of the 
blogosphere to turn over various claims and counter-claims. 
Drawing out the genesis of the flood the zone metaphor illuminates how neatly the 
concept applies to blogging. Flooding the zone, as a concept, is rich enough to support a variety 
of invocations. The term actually has roots in sports strategy: it is one approach to defeating 
zone-based defenses. When an opposing team drops into a zone defense (an arrangement where 
defenders guard an area of the playing field rather than an individual opposing player), an 
efficient offense sends multiple players toward one specific area of the zone. This makes it 
increasingly difficult for the player covering that zone to effectively defend. As offensive players 
swarm the single defensive player, the playmaker can easily pick an open target because a single 
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node can block only so many potential ‘links.’ Flooding the zone increases offensive 
opportunities, which, when translated to the field of public deliberation, might strategically 
enhance the capacity of rhetors to shape public debate. 
Flooding the zone had a particular visibility in the context of journalism at this historical 
juncture. Howell Raines, then editor of the New York Times, was fond of quoting the University 
of Alabama’s legendary football coach Paul ‘Bear’ Bryant to inspire the journalists that worked 
for him.88 Flooding the zone was part of the Bear’s repertoire, adapted by Raines to journalistic 
processes. Raines popularized the practice of flooding the zone on major news stories like the 
Enron collapse and the Columbia shuttle disaster, assigning hordes of New York Times reporters 
to cover the story from every angle.89 According to Raines, “target selection is key … and then 
you have to concentrate your resources at the point of attack … If I’m in a gunfight, I don't want 
to die with any bullets in my pistol. I want to shoot every one.”90 Of course, the problem with 
generic strategies is that anyone can adopt them. Raines himself became the target of zone-
flooding by Mickey Kaus, a blogger for Slate magazine, who on December 5, 2002—the very 
day of Trent Lott’s inauspicious comments—titled a series of blog posts targeting the New York 
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Times’ editor with “Flood the Zone.”91 Reynolds, at this time, linked to Kausfiles regularly, so 
perhaps was emulating Kaus’ communication strategy by also titling several of his posts on Lott 
“Flood the Zone.”92 The concept of ‘flooding the zone’ captures the frenzied pace at which 
bloggers can ‘hunker down on’ a controversy, stitching together various fragments from the web 
in order to create a coherent narrative.93 
Reynolds continued to persistently blog on the implications of Trent Lott’s comments in 
the ensuing days. On December 9th, the day after he first titled a post with the flood the zone 
language, he kept up the pressure on Lott by refuting critics that were trying to explain away 
Lott’s comments and linking to other prominent conservative commentators online.94 Josh 
Marshall didn’t adopt the language of ‘flooding the zone,’ but his approach to the Lott issue was 
strikingly similar. As he later explained, the same basic strategy was implicitly at work in 
                                                
91 Mickey Kaus, “The NYT Buckles: Plus Kausfiles Floods the Zone,” Kausfiles, December 5, 2002, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2074857/. 
92 Reynolds confirmed that he drew the concept from Mickey Kaus in his e-mail message of February 14, 
2008. 
93 Flooding the zone has additional salience as a strategy for public argument through the medium of the 
internet, since search engines often return results based on recency and frequency of links. Google, for example, 
relies on a system called PageRank: “PageRank relies on the uniquely democratic nature of the web by using its vast 
link structure as an indicator of an individual page's value. In essence, Google interprets a link from page A to page 
B as a vote, by page A, for page B.” See Google, “Our Search: Google Technology,” http://www.google.com/ 
technology/. Though at the time, Google did not incorporate blogs into their search results, most general search 
engines do now incorporate results from blogs (and blog-specific search engines have also emerged). Consequently, 
as bloggers flood the zone, their linking practices are picked up as ‘buzz’ and can ‘push’ an issue to bigger 
audiences. This is the principle animating ‘Blog Action Days,’ when bloggers are urged to blog on a particular issue 
in order to increase prominence of that issue in search engines and other aggregators. See http://blogactionday.org/ 
for a representative example. 
94 Reynolds had eight posts on l’affaire Lott on December 9th. A representative post where Reynolds refutes 
critics from other blogs can be found in his response to Wind Rider of Silent Runnings, who said the Thurmond 
party was “reminiscent of somebody’s loudmouthed used car salesman uncle.” A paragraph from Wind Runner’s 
original post was reproduced on Instapundit, where Reynolds responded “Assuming this is true, is that what a 
Senate Majority Leader ought to be like?” This struggle was indicative of the arguments that were roiling 
conservative commentators. See Glenn Reynolds, “Maybe I Should Rethink My Opinion,” Instapundit, December 9, 
2002, 5:12 a.m., http://instapundit.com/archives/006022.php. At the same time Reynolds was resisting more 
charitable interpretations of Lott’s comments, he was consolidating links to conservatives like Jonah Goldberg and 
David Frum of National Review Online in an effort to shape public debate. See Glenn Reynolds, “The National 
Review Online Isn’t Impressed With Trent Lott,” Instapundit, December 9, 2002, 10:46 a.m., http://instapundit.com/ 
archives/006036.php. 
146 
Marshall’s blogging, as he “just started hitting it and basically hitting it and hitting it and hitting 
it.”95 The general concept of flooding the zone had traction not just amongst the blogging elite. 
Reynolds, soon after he published his first ‘flood the zone’ post, posted the feedback of a reader 
who emailed him: “I'm glad that you are ‘flooding the zone’ with this one,” signaling a diffusion 
of this concept into the public grammar.96 
The key here is to understand flooding the zone not as merely an explicitly named 
process, but as a basic operative principle underpinning blogging in general. A blogger does not 
have to call for flooding the zone (though in this case, one did) for it to occur; the basic elements 
of flooding the zone are always in operation when bloggers hone in on an issue and produce 
massive amounts of discourse available for public scrutiny. Flooding the zone is an apt metaphor 
for how the emergent blogosphere operates in collecting and parsing web resources on unfolding 
events—in other words, it captures the process of invention that occurs as bloggers deepen 
argument pools. Flooding the zone is for bloggers what rational-critical debate was for the 
bourgeois public sphere: a way of conceptualizing their participation in public deliberation. 
Responding to lingering criticisms, Trent Lott went on conservative commentator Sean 
Hannity’s radio show on the afternoon of December 9th. Hannity asked Lott about the emerging 
Thurmond entanglement, and Lott responded 
I wanted to honor Strom Thurmond, the man, who was turning 100 years old. He 
 certainly has been a legend in the Senate both in terms of his service and the 
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96 Glenn Reynolds, “Christopher Johnson at the Midwest Conservative Journal Thinks Trent Lott Should 
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 length of his service. It was certainly not intended to endorse his segregationist 
 policies that he might have been advocating or was advocating 54 years ago. But 
 obviously, I am sorry for my words, they were poorly chosen and insensitive and I 
 regret the way it has been interpreted.97 
This was, to date, the most significant apology Lott had issued. Prior calls to his office had 
solicited a curt response from Lott’s press secretary, Ron Bonjean; Lott would become a serial 
apologizer over the following week as he tried to repair the damage his comments had done. The 
apologies, unfortunately for Lott, simply became more grist for bloggers to mill. 
That evening, Marshall posted an extensive interview with Trent Lott conducted by the 
Southern Partisan in 1984. During this interview, Lott said “I think that a lot of the fundamental 
principles that Jefferson Davis believed in are very important to people across the country, and 
they apply to the Republican Party.”98 Twenty-eight minutes later, Marshall linked to Lott’s first 
apology as reported on FoxNews.com, stating that part of the pressure on Lott to apologize was 
“blog-borne.”99 This is one of the first—and for Marshall, one of the only—suggestions that 
blogging was having an impact on the broader public discourse. 
Two more significant pieces of evidence floated down the increasingly flooded zone of 
Lott coverage on December 10th and 11th. On the morning of December 10th, Marshall revealed 
that he had gotten a tip earlier in the day about how Lott’s words at Strom Thurmond’s birthday 
                                                
97 Quoted in “Lott Apologizes for Remark,” FoxNews.com, December 12, 2002, http://www.foxnews.com/ 
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98 Josh Marshall, “I Think That a…,” Talking Points Memo, December 9, 2002, 9:59 p.m., 
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party had echoed comments he made in Mississippi while campaigning for Reagan in 1980.100 He 
noted that he had trouble digging up the exact transcript to confirm Lott’s purported remarks, but 
then linked to an advance story on the New York Times website that confirmed that Lott had said 
“if we had elected this man 30 years ago, we wouldn't be in the mess we are today” in November 
1980.101 Marshall follows up this story by suggesting that Lott was in serious trouble; which 
militated against the “conventional wisdom on the news today … that Lott had pretty much put 
this story to bed with his ‘apology.’”102 
The following day, December 11th, the New York Times ran the Lott story that had been 
previewed on their website the night before. But Marshall was already on to another aspect of the 
story: Lott’s role in the 1983 Bob Jones University tax exemption case. Marshall reported at 
10:55 a.m. that Trent Lott had filed an amicus curiae (“friend of the court”) brief on behalf of 
Bob Jones University, who was suing the Internal Revenue Service for taking away their tax-
exempt status because of the university’s prohibition on interracial dating.103 Just two hours later, 
Marshall followed up on the story, posting “Is TPM your source or is TPM your source? Here's 
the Amicus Brief which Trent Lott submitted on behalf of Bob Jones University in 
                                                
100 Josh Marshall, “Well, There’s the Other…,” Talking Points Memo, December 10, 2002, 10:23 p.m., 
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/000480.php. 
101 Carl Hulse, “Lott’s Praise for Thurmond Echoed His Words of 1980,” New York Times, December 11, 
2002, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9500EED6143AF932A25751C1A9649C8B63. Note that 
Marshall jumps the traditional newspaper cycle here: the unfolding of the argument cannot be deferred until the 
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102 Josh Marshall, “Well, There’s the Other…,” Talking Points Memo, December 10, 2002, 10:23 p.m., 
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/000480.php. 
103 Josh Marshall, “And, of Course, There’s…,” Talking Points Memo, December 11, 10:55 a.m., 
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/000477.php. Marshall linked to the decision in the legal database Findlaw; 
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1981.”104Amicus briefs like this would be fairly difficult for a non-specialist reader to find, but 
Marshall’s journalistic experience guided him to the document. The blog enabled him to publish 
the primary document in full by hosting it on a server where it was available for readers to 
download. In the brief, Lott writes that “racial discrimination does not always violate public 
policy,” a quote that would receive prominent attention in newspaper accounts in the coming 
days.105 Ironically, given the operation of the ‘flood the zone’ metaphor as deployed by Reynolds, 
Marshall concludes this post by writing “drip, drip, drip,” as though each new piece of evidence 
were adding to a stream of public opinion that was inexorably leading to Lott’s ouster.106 
At 5 p.m. the same day, the Associated Press released a story that also covered Lott’s 
amicus briefs in the Bob Jones University case. John Solomon, the reporter of this story, wrote 
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international press in Canada and Australia. This is probably the clearest example of an argument developed in the 
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106 Suggesting that this metaphor was a resonant depiction of the public debate over Lott, Atrios linked to 
this 10:55 a.m. post of Josh Marshall’s and concluded with “drip, drip, drip indeed.” See “Josh Marshall Discovers 
Trent…,” Eschaton, December 11, 2002, 12:05 a.m., http://atrios.blogspot.com/2002_12_08_archive.html# 
390040327.  
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“the old court papers surfaced on a day when Lott tried to quell criticism.”107 Solomon’s choice 
of the passive verb ‘surfaced’ to describe the appearance of Lott’s brief neatly omitted the role 
that Josh Marshall and Talking Points Memo had in helping that particular document see the light 
of day. Marshall, as an experienced journalist who certainly knew the operating code of ‘credit 
where credit is due,’ lambasted the AP later that evening: 
 One other thing. Next time the AP rips off a story we broke at 11 AM and runs it  
  as their own story at 5 PM maybe they could toss in a little attribution? I know it's 
  their rep and all but do they have to be so slimy[?] Dow Jones Newswires caught  
  wind of the Bob Jones Amicus Brief from the story TPM broke too. But they were 
  classy enough to say we'd broken the story.108 
Marshall, as a working journalist, was arguing for an expansion of the basic journalistic norm of 
attribution to blogging. Blogs, of course, were keen on attribution, since the elemental unit of 
blogging, the hyperlink, was so conducive to recognition; such an expansion of norms was thus 
in keeping with the ethos of blogging as well as journalism.109 
While Marshall was widely credited with doing original investigative reporting, Atrios 
was busy situating Lott’s remarks in a larger social and historical context.110 In doing so, Atrios 
                                                
107 John Solomon, “Lott Expresses Regret for Remarks; Court Filing from 1981 Surfaces,” Associated 
Press, December 11, 2002, LexisNexis. 
108 Josh Marshall, “One Other Thing…,” Talking Points Memo, December 11, 2002, 8:47 p.m., 
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/000473.php. 
109 See Henry Farrell, “Norms and Networks,” Crooked Timber, May 30, 2006, http://crookedtimber.org/ 
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was involved intimately with the process of framing. As Stephen Cooper writes, bloggers 
participate in framing by “disputing the frame of a news story, reframing the facts into a 
distinctly different interpretation, or contextualizing a frame in a different way.”111 One way that 
bloggers, and Atrios in particular, facilitate the generation of new frames is through the process 
of rhetorical critique. While bloggers are often lauded for their media criticism, they are also 
often drawn to explore the meanings of words and metaphors in specific rhetorical situations. On 
December 13th, this rhetorical sensitivity was on display at Eschaton. After a number of posts on 
the implications of Lott’s remarks, Atrios unleashed a powerful critique of apologists who were 
claiming Lott was referring to Thurmond’s advocacy of states’ rights and limited government: 
 What I hope comes out of this is the recognition and understanding that when a  
  politician in the south goes on about ‘states’ rights’ they are speaking in code that  
  is well understood by a portion of the electorate -black and white. I don't mean  
  that all supporters of federalism are objectively pro-segregation (Very big of me,  
  no?), just that in certain contexts and from certain people the use of that phrase  
  and related ones is nothing more than a big ‘FUCK YOU’ to the black   
  population. They get it. And, enough of the whites get it too.112 
The following day, Atrios responded to critics elsewhere in the nascent blogosphere that took 
issue with this post. He responds by saying that he doesn’t want to abolish the phrase ‘states’ 
rights,’ but instead was focusing on particular occasions in which those two words signify: “I'm 
just saying that from certain speakers—and to certain audiences—the phrase [states’ rights] is a 
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111 Stephen Cooper, Watching the Watchdogs, 106. 
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code phrase.”113 Interpreting the meaning of ‘states’ rights’ was a central struggle for Lott’s 
critics. An ahistorical defense of states’ rights lent Lott some philosophical backing for his 
commendation of Thurmond, whereas a more complex understanding of that term linked Lott to 
an outright defense of segregationist politics.  
The activities of these three bloggers—exponentially magnified by the reticulate 
conversations occurring between less-trafficked blogs, through other media, and in face-to-face 
contexts—had raised the profile of blogging to a level where blogs were starting to attract praise 
and blame. Virtually all the topoi that would later structure the conflict between ‘journalists’ and 
‘bloggers’ were activated in the meta-discourse surrounding the Lott controversy.114 Already, 
established media outlets were tarred with the epithet ‘mainstream’ and accused of being so 
clubby with Trent Lott that they ignored a major story. In return, developments in the Lott story 
that should have been properly credited to bloggers like Marshall were not, perhaps because 
bloggers were not seen as ‘legitimate’ sources of news and investigation. Bloggers like Marshall 
were not just ignored; they were also undermined as being hopelessly partisan hacks. Marshall 
himself noted—and linked to—an attack on his objectivity by The American Prowler, the online 
arm of the conservative American Spectator.115 Wendy Pleszczynski, the editor of The American 
Prowler, mocked Marshall’s prior postings on the “conservative manipulation of mainstream 
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media” in covering the John Kerry haircut story and continued by saying that Marshall “launched 
his own effort to set off a conveyor belt” to bigger media outlets on the Trent Lott story.116 
Pleszczynski’s article paints Marshall as an unapologetic servant to the Bill and Hillary Clinton 
brand, pushing the Lott story as some sort of partisan payback scheme. This theme that bloggers 
were not objective enough—that they published too quickly, without an editorial check, and 
absent any sort of punitive threat for getting facts wrong—would be oft-echoed by future critics 
of blogging.  
Despite some slight tensions between bloggers and other established journalists, the 
evolution of the Lott story evinced signs of symbiosis. Between Tuesday, December 10th, and 
Wednesday, December 11th, Trent Lott’s Senate office fielded 288 media calls.117 By December 
12th and 13th, the traditional press had caught up with blogs on covering the Trent Lott story. 
Coverage in The New York Times and The Washington Post is indicative of the overall treatment 
of the Lott story. On December 13th, the Lott story started receiving a special section in the 
Times: “Divisive Words,” which centralized coverage of the fallout from Thurmond’s birthday 
party.118 The Washington Post, which had run one front page story and three editorials on Lott 
                                                
116 Wendy Pleszczynski, “The Conason Prize,” The American Prowler, December 10, 2002, 12:04 a.m., 
http://web.archive.org/web/20031212193204/http://www.americanprowler.org/article.asp?art_id=2002_12_9_23_50
_46. The “conveyor belt” metaphor is another interesting way to capture how non-bloggers characterized the 
blogging phenomenon. 
117 As disclosed by Trent Lott in Herding Cats, 253. Lott notes that news programs from “60 Minutes and 
20/20 to Inside Edition and Extra” had news crews headed to Mississippi by the 12th of December to investigate 
Lott’s past. 
118 Joseph Crespino, “The Ways Republicans Talk About Race,” The New York Times, December 13, 2002, 
A39, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A0DE6DE103AF930A25751C1A9649C8B63; Adam 
Clymer, “G.O.P.'s 40 Years of Juggling on Race,” The New York Times, December 13, 2002, A1, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9800E3D6103AF930A25751C1A9649C8B63; Adam Nagourney & 
Carl Hulse, “Bush Rebukes Lott Over Remarks on Thurmond,” The New York Times, December 13, 2002, A1, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9504E2D6103AF930A25751C1A9649C8B63; Peter Applebome, 
“Lott's Walk Near the Incendiary Edge of Southern History,” The New York Times, December 13, 2002, A36, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D01E0D7103AF930A25751C1A9649C8B63. 
154 
the prior day, also picked up their coverage on the 13th with two front page stories, one editorial, 
and two other features on the front pages of the Metro and Style sections.119 
The headlines of these two papers relay the essential progression of the public opinion 
cascade that inexorably led to Lott’s ultimate resignation as Senate Majority Leader: 
• “Lott Apologizes But Won't Yield Leadership Post”120 
• “Sen. Lott Fights to Save Post As Leader; He Calls Remarks ‘Grievous’ Error”121 
• “Lott Faces Continuing Resentment From Conservatives”122 
• “Bid to Oust Lott From Leadership Considered; Some in GOP Look To Bush for 
   Signal”123 
• “No. 2 Republican in Senate Calls for Vote on Lott”124 
• “Bush Won't Resist Leadership Change; President's Agenda Feared in Jeopardy”125 
• “From High-Climbing Senate Warrior to Dangling Man”126 
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• “Lott Says Bush Aides Undermine Bid to Stay; More in GOP Speak Out Against Senate 
 Leader”127 
• “Black Conservatives Abandoning Lott; Remarks Stir Sense of Betrayal, Frustration 
 Among GOP's African Americans”128 
• “National G.O.P. Members Weigh Against Lott in Poll”129 
Lott’s initial reluctance to entertain the possibility of his resignation as Senate Majority Leader 
softened as his popularity eroded over the course of the week from December 13-20. He 
eventually yielded to immense public and elite pressure and stepped down on December 20th. 
These headlines paint a picture of the complex political wranglings at play in the debate over 
Lott’s future. Conservatives were angling to make headway into the traditionally solid 
Democratic voting bloc of black voters in future elections and Lott’s comments failed to frame 
the Republican Party as one committed to racial reconciliation. At the same time, Lott’s 
statements had whipped up a public furor that threatened the overall Bush Administration 
agenda, right after mid-term elections that had given Republicans control of both houses of 
Congress. 
Though the institutional media had picked up on the Lott story, the nascent blogosphere 
continued to roil with public argument on Lott’s future. Reynolds, perhaps experiencing Lott-
fatigue, didn’t blog the Lott story on December 14th or 15th, and then only linked to other 
bloggers that had round-ups of the day’s public debate over Lott’s future. Interestingly, Marshall, 
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while following the Lott story through December 20th, never posted about Lott’s resignation. 
Once Lott resigned, Marshall was immediately on to the next story, investigating soon-to-be 
majority leader Frist’s background and reporting on United States’ foreign policy efforts toward 
North Korea (DPRK). Atrios continued his torrid posting rate on Lott all the way to his 
resignation, using the commentary as a springboard for a host of other issues like media bias at 
The Washington Times and the influence of the Council on National Policy. 
Lott’s removal was ultimately seen as an opportunity for the Bush administration to 
install Bill Frist, a White House favorite, as the new Senate Majority Leader.130 Though Lott’s 
ouster might have been the product of naked political machinations orchestrated by the Bush 
administration, his resignation would have been unthinkable without the swirl of public 
arguments surrounding his recent remarks and distant past. As Eric MacGilvray explains, despite 
the variety of nonpublic reasons political actors may retain, the ability to effectuate decision-
making is limited with “regard to the kinds of evidence and reasoning that are accepted in public 
debate.”131 Thus, the expansion of the pool of arguments regarding Lott’s comments, spurred 
partially by bloggers’ rhetorical activity, became the publicly justifiable reasons invoked to 
marginalize the embroiled senator.  
3.5 The Constitution of the Blogosphere 
Though ‘blogger’ had been a meaningful identity category for practitioners before 
December 2002, the communicative power of the blogosphere gained increased visibility after 
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the Trent Lott affair. As the general media started crediting bloggers with playing a role in public 
deliberation, their identities were constituted for a much wider audience and within the nascent 
networked imaginary. As I have shown, many of the arguments that were incubated on blogs 
eventually migrated to the general interest media. While a definitive causal link between 
blogging and Lott’s downfall is difficult to conclusively prove, the fact that bloggers were 
widely credited for developing key parts of the story was crucial in constituting the blogosphere 
as a potent political force.  
In the circulation of these discourses, bloggers were established as digital opinion leaders 
using their critical faculties to bring new energies to public deliberation.132 Three levels of 
reflexive discourse about the impact of the blogosphere occurred. First, during the controversy, 
two established syndicated columnists began attributing blogs with developing the Lott story. 
Second, after Lott resigned, other actors in the general interest media attempted to make greater 
sense out of the entire blogging phenomenon. Finally, bloggers themselves retrospectively 
considered the influence they had on Lott’s resignation. 
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Early Attributions in the Institutional Media 
As the Lott story began to migrate to the traditional organs of mass communication, 
bloggers received attention from two widely read columnists who were crediting weblogs with 
shaping the Trent Lott story. The first of these was Howard Kurtz, a media critic for the 
Washington Post and CNN. Glenn Reynolds regularly linked to Kurtz, and noted on December 
9th that his Media Notes column failed to feature the Trent Lott story at all.133 Kurtz, however, 
would atone. The following day, December 10th, Kurtz wrote in Media Notes “until this morning, 
most major newspapers hadn't done squat on the story. Which is hard to understand for this 
reason: There were cameras rolling. It's on tape. It was on C-SPAN, for crying out loud … But if 
the establishment press is largely yawning, the situation is very different online.”134 Kurtz went 
on to quote extensively from the blogs of Andrew Sullivan, Josh Marshall, David Frum, Virginia 
Postrel, and The American Prospect on the implications of Lott’s comments. Glenn Reynolds 
dutifully linked to this Media Notes column and appended the commentary that “Howard Kurtz 
is noting the gap between online punditry and establishment media where the Trent Lott affair is 
concerned.”135 
Kurtz is not the only columnist for a major metropolitan newspaper to credit blogs for 
influencing the development of the Lott story during this pivotal week. Paul Krugman, a regular 
columnist in the New York Times, wrote a series of columns that paralleled Kurtz’s ruminations 
in Media Notes. On December 10th, the same day that Kurtz first credited bloggers with 
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animating the Lott story, Krugman’s column focused on Lott’s comments, contextualizing them 
in a pattern that loosely resembled some of the argumentative themes that had already emerged 
online. Initially, Krugman noted Lott’s comments at Thurmond’s birthday party, and then 
referenced his dealings with the Council of Conservative Citizens throughout the 1990s. He 
followed that linkage by explaining, “at first the ‘liberal media’ … largely ignored this story. To 
take the most spectacular demonstration of priorities, last week CNN's ‘Inside Politics’ found 
time to cover Matt Drudge's unconfirmed (and untrue) allegations about the price of John Kerry's 
haircuts.”136 This is an observation that Krugman certainly could have come to independently, but 
it did mirror a comment that both Josh Marshall and Atrios had made on December 7th. 
In fact, Krugman was called out for lifting this sentiment from Josh Marshall without 
attribution by the Wall Street Journal’s ‘Best of the Web Today.’ James Taranto, the writer 
associated with Best of the Web Today, wrote “Krugman's column seems to owe more to the 
work of liberal blogger Joshua Micah Marshall, who's been banging this drum harder than 
anyone. In particular, this Krugman observation seems to be lifted from a three-day-old Marshall 
item,” at which point he quoted Krugman on Inside Politics’ coverage of John Kerry’s haircut.137 
Taranto followed this long pull quote with “Does Krugman have enough class to credit Marshall, 
an enthusiastic Krugman admirer (go figure)? Nah.”138 
The norms here, however, were clearly unstable—does citing an ‘online commentator’ 
cheapen a column in the United States’ ‘paper of record,’ the New York Times? How should 
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Krugman have described Marshall’s activity? Columnists were not in the habit of citing 
conversations in chat rooms, perhaps the closest parallel to blogs at the time. There was, quite 
simply, no clear precedent, as bloggers had rarely been cited in the context of news making 
before the Lott affair.  
Whether or not Krugman should have more fully credited Marshall’s work is less 
important than understanding how the meme crediting Marshall and other bloggers for driving 
developments in the story bounced between blogs and more traditional media. Glenn Reynolds, 
on the morning of December 10th, linked to Krugman’s op-ed. Reynolds later updated this post 
by linking to Taranto’s afternoon posting, explaining “Best of the Web says that Krugman was 
really following Josh Marshall's lead. That's really true—I first found out about Lott's statements 
via Josh's blog, and I think he was the first one on this story.”139 Of course, this narrative of 
events elides the role of ABC’s The Note in first breaking the story, but it does centralize 
bloggers in the process of deepening public engagement with the implications of Lott’s 
comments. 
If Krugman sinned in not crediting Marshall and other bloggers in his December 10th 
column, he performed publication penance on December 13th. His column led with an extensive 
quote from Josh Marshall: 
 ‘Right now we're debating whether the Republican Senate majority leader is a  
  racist who yearns for the days of segregation or just a good ole boy who says a lot 
  of things that make it seem like he's a racist who yearns for the days of   
  segregation.’ So writes Joshua Marshall, whose talkingpointsmemo.com is must  
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  reading for the politically curious, and who, more than anyone else, is responsible  
  for making Trent Lott's offensive remarks the issue they deserve to be.140 
This public recognition of Marshall was pivotal in further raising the profile of bloggers. James 
Taranto of the Wall Street Journal couldn’t resist taking some credit for pushing Krugman to 
disclose Marshall’s role in the controversy. The afternoon of December 13th, Taranto wrote 
Incidentally, we get results. On Tuesday we blasted Krugman for lifting ideas 
 from Josh Marshall's blog and not crediting Marshall. Today's column could not 
 be more generous in acknowledging Krugman's debt to Marshall. In his very first 
 paragraph, Krugman quotes Marshall, calls his blog ‘must reading for the 
 politically curious’ and notes that Marshall, ‘more than anyone else, is 
 responsible for making Trent Lott's offensive remarks the issue they deserve to 
 be.’141 
This public recognition of Marshall was pivotal in further raising the profile of bloggers. 
Marshall eventually commented on Krugman’s column, noting that the attribution had caused a 
traffic spike at Talking Points Memo.142 Marshall, in the same post, also linked to a piece by John 
Podhoretz in the New York Post titled “The Internet’s First Scalp.”143 Podhoretz’s column 
breathlessly begins “there’s nothing more exciting than watching a new medium mature before 
your eyes … The drumbeat that turned this story into a major calamity for Lott, and led directly 
to President Bush's welcome disavowal of Lott's views yesterday, was entirely driven by the 
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Internet blogosphere.”144 Marshall goes on to explain that he believes that the web generally and 
weblogs in particular “kept this story in front of people and forced attention to it long enough 
that it became impossible to ignore.”145 This explanation resembles an agenda-setting theory 
extended to blogging: in the case of Lott, blogs set the agenda that opinion leaders in the 
professional media class amplified.146 
On December 16th, Kurtz would reflect further on the influence of blogs, describing the 
Washington press corps as “largely snoozing, [while] Web writers were leading the charge.147 
While bloggers often quoted and commented on what established pundits had published, the 
circulatory matrix was neatly inverted in this article. Kurtz approvingly quoted Glenn Reynolds 
on why blogs were ahead of other news outlets: “The guy's [Trent Lott] majority leader. 
Reporters, as opposed to bloggers, depend on him for access. The hinterlands are full of bloggers 
who don't care whether Trent Lott is nice to them or not. That makes them different from the 
Washington press.”148 Reynolds’ tidy formulation—accurate or not—does obvious boundary 
work delineating key features between bloggers and reporters. On the one hand, bloggers are 
identified as legitimate agents of communicative power, and, on the other, they distinguish 
themselves from other similarly situated actors to highlight their own unique capacities. This is a 
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classic case of identification and division, a process that constitutes collectives that can then 
carry on “acting-together.”149 
Attribution in the ‘Blogosphere’  
Glenn Reynolds was by far the most exuberant in assessing the ability of blogs to 
influence public debate. In an incident that would serve as an archetype for this type of 
reflection, Reynolds linked to another Paul Krugman’s editorial with the post title “More Proof 
that Paul Krugman Reads Blogs.”150 Krugman had written that the “Internet commentator Atrios, 
who played a key role in bringing Mr. Lott's past to light, now urges us to look into the secretive 
Council for National Policy.”151 Reynolds then updated the post by proclaiming “Krugman's not 
just reading weblogs—he's getting his marching orders from them! All power to the 
blogosphere!”152 Reynolds updates the post a second time by writing “Marc Ambinder of The 
Note wrote this article on the CNP last year. Turns out that ‘the council doesn't really control the 
world.’ Of course not. Everyone knows that the world is controlled by The Power Of The 
Blogosphere.”153 While Reynolds was undeniably writing with tongue firmly planted in cheek, 
the sentiment that bloggers were suddenly an argumentative force to be reckoned with was 
gaining steam. 
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One interesting thread that situated bloggers as generators of communicative power 
centered on the relative anonymity of some blog proprietors. In Habermas’ historical bourgeois 
public sphere, speakers were supposed to bracket their identities in favor of their critical 
faculties. This was a radical move at the time: in the self-conception of the bourgeois public 
sphere, social ranking was not supposed to give one authority.154 Rather, the quality of one’s 
arguments was supposed to be foregrounded in iterative conversations, thus yielding to “the 
authority of the better argument.”155 Anonymity was seen as the paragon of this identity-
bracketing; after all, if the denizens of the coffeehouse could not tell for sure who an editorial 
writer was, then they were ultimately left to debate the merits of the ideas themselves and would 
likely be less swayed by non-communicative power.  To be clear, anonymity does not ensure that 
net speakers are unmarked by class, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, and a whole host of other social 
axes of power.156 Difference is encoded not just in the body and in presentation, but in choices 
related to style and evidence.157 At the same time, claims that anonymity guarantees a greater 
focus on argumentation rather than identity can be a powerful factor in the self-conception of 
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particular communities trying to establish the value of their communicative power. And it is 
precisely the self-conception of bloggers that helped consolidate their identity as ‘average 
citizens’ commenting on public affairs.  
Conversations about anonymity centered primarily on Atrios’ identity. Atrios playfully 
toyed with the speculations about who he was. Reacting to a post by Mickey Kaus of Slate where 
he suggested that Atrios might be Democratic insider Sidney Blumenthal, Atrios wrote “haha, 
Mickey thinks Sidney Blumenthal operates the Mighty Casio. If he only knew the truth…”158 The 
humorous deflection by Atrios sparked serious reflection by other bloggers that emphasized the 
importance of communicative power in grounding the blogosphere’s self-identity. Glenn 
Reynolds discussed this norm implicitly in the context of anonymity: “though I think Atrios’ 
anonymity is a barrier to his/her influence, it's obviously not that big a barrier. (S)he was posting 
a lot of solid stuff on Lott, and, ultimately, that's what matters. Which is the beauty of the 
blogosphere.”159 The Rittenhouse Review wrote “how shocking it must be to realize that a man 
with a full-time job and career aside from his weblog—i.e., Atrios—has done so much to 
outshine the purported ‘professionals’ of our punditocracy.”160 By Chris Anderson’s account 
“one of the cardinal rules of the kool kids is that, if a major story breaks, it MUST have come 
from within the circle of kool kids or their political associates. The idea that just some average 
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schmoe (that's a complement Atrios) could cause this much ruckus is just, well, 
inconceivable.”161 
 Atrios weighed in on this debate by quoting from commenter Digby, who mockingly 
wrote “The avergestoopidciddizun don' unnersand no politicks an cuddnevir see that Sennadur 
Lott sed sumthin bad widdout gittin thuh werd frum Hillry or sumbuddy who is smart … Cuz we 
stooopud ciddizunz cuddent ever no sumthing a big impordant wrider like Mikkey Kaus duzzent 
no. He gitz pade an evrything.”162 This blistering critique of the professional pundit class 
(re)situated citizens as credible surveyors of the political landscape capable of making arguments 
about what values public figures should be held up to.163 The revaluation of citizen participation 
in this representative episode presaged the swell in ‘participatory media.’  
While some bloggers adopted an attitude of ‘blog triumphalism’ after Lott’s downfall, 
triumphalism was in fact checked by the very bloggers who had the most incentive to trumpet 
their influence. Reynolds theorized that, while blogs played an important role in the Lott story, 
the ire of black conservatives would have ultimately pushed Lott’s comments to the front pages 
of newspapers.164 In a column for Tech Central Station, Reynolds cites Slate and The Guardian 
on the influence of blogs in bringing down Trent Lott, but explains that the most significant 
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impact of blogging was “that the professionalization of journalism—a trend underway for most 
of the 20th Century—is now in full reverse gear, and the term ‘correspondent’ may go back to its 
original meaning of ‘one who corresponds’ rather than ‘high-paid face with good hair.’”165 
Atrios, too, tempered assertions that blogs could operate independently as powerful forces 
because of their reliance on general interest media to amplify blog-borne stories.166 
Later Attributions 
Blogging would receive an increasing amount of attention in the press as a unique 
phenomenon after Trent Lott resigned. The primary influence of bloggers was often theorized as 
monitoring the agenda setting of the so-called mainstream media. Bloggers were essentially 
credited with keeping the Lott story alive long enough for other media organizations to pick up 
the reins. The day after Lott’s resignation, Ariana Huffington, who would herself later become a 
blogger, noted that blogs “continued hammering away at the story, and eventually succeeded in 
moving it out of the shadows into the political spotlight.”167 Another commentator suggested that 
by “mixing vocal opinion with historical fact and context, they helped keep the Lott saga on 
simmer until a critical mass of people started paying attention.”168 Bloggers helped “draw 
attention to the remarks.”169 Others argued “outrage in the ever-growing ‘blogosphere’ fanned the 
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flames until newspapers and cable news took up the story.”170 In reconsidering the role of blogs, 
these commentators cited communicative activity stimulated by bloggers that eventually 
marshaled forces of publicity that held Lott to account.   
Popular press accounts regularly use Trent Lott’s downfall as a cognitive short-cut to 
describe the multi-faceted blogging phenomenon. In the year following Lott’s resignation, Lott is 
regularly referenced in descriptions of blogging. Some institutional media outlets even credited 
blogging with affecting their agenda-setting function: 
pundit blogs have been credited with keeping alive two important stories initially 
 downplayed by mainstream media: Trent Lott's racially insensitive remarks at a 
 birthday party, and management responsibility for the Jayson Blair scandal at the 
 New York Times. Bloggers say the constant drumbeat in the ‘blogosphere’ forced 
 Lott's ouster as Senate majority leader.171 
Andrew Sullivan concluded in the Washington Times that “even in its earliest stage, the blogo-
sphere has shown its ability to shape opinion and move the news. It turns out that the blog-
induced resignation of Trent Lott was not a flash in the pan.”172 USA Today reports that blogs are 
“forcing the mainstream news media to follow the stories they're pushing, such as the scandal 
that took down Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott.”173 
Such accounts have even captured the global imagination, as reporters in the Anglo-
American public sphere reported on blogging’s influence through the Lott example. The London 
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Times ran a story that described the influence of blogging and explained “the clearest example of 
the bloggers' ability to take scalps was the forced resignation of Trent Lott.”174 The Irish Times 
similarly weighed in: “US bloggers have already helped to alert the mainstream media to Senator 
Trent Lott's racist comments during a birthday bash.”175 In a survey article on blogging that 
suggests the internet is drawing power from media elites to citizens, a reporter for The Observer 
identifies mounting evidence of influence to “pages like Instapundit, run by University of 
Tennessee law professor Glenn Reynolds, and Talking Points Memo, by political columnist John 
Marshall, [which] forced the issue onto the mainstream media and forced Lott's resignation.”176 
Books about blogging aimed at a general audience consolidated this part of blogger lore. 
Glenn Reynolds, in Army of Davids (his book about how technology reshapes individual and 
institutional capacities), consolidates his own legacy by noting “bloggers have accomplished a 
lot in independent journalism: bringing down Trent Lott and Dan Rather.”177 Cass Sunstein cites 
the Trent Lott affair when he writes “bloggers appear to have influenced the public stage, driving 
media coverage and affecting national perceptions of national questions.”178 Dan Gillmor, a well-
respected journalist and theorist of grassroots media, confirms that “the Lott debacle was, by all 
accounts, a watershed.”179 Blog popularizer David Kline claimed Trent Lott’s resignation was the 
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“first blow for blogger reporting.”180 In his autobiography, Lott blamed blogs for whipping up the 
firestorm of criticism.181 The meme that bloggers were responsible for Trent Lott’s downfall was 
so strong that it actually jumped to the growing Iranian blogosphere! Pejman Yousefzadeh, in an 
article that expressed hope that the blogosphere would aid the liberalization of Iranian society, 
cites the Trent Lott example as a sign of the ability of blogging to effectuate change:  
The Blogosphere has already influenced politics, culture, and society 
immeasurably. It was the first medium to pick up and understand the importance 
of Trent Lott’s infelicitous comments at the 100th birthday of former Senator 
Strom Thurmond…Let’s hope the Blogosphere, and Iranian bloggers in 
particular, have the power to influence meaningful and effective change in Iranian 
culture and society.182 
The transportation of this feeling of political agency across geographical boundaries suggests 
that the meta-talk about blogging and Trent Lott was having an outsized influence on the 
constitution of the blogosphere itself as a global medium of change. As the blogosphere 
continued to churn, the institutional media began to monitor blogs as barometers of public 
opinion, tightening the linkage between actors at the periphery of public discourse and the 
established mass media.183 Yet, theorists of the public sphere like Habermas have thus far 
declined to incorporate blogging into their accounts of public deliberation. In identifying how the 
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Trent Lott case displays the networked sensibilities that shape deliberation, I aim to rectify this 
omission in contemporary scholarship on public deliberation.   
3.6 Toward a Networked Sensibility: Flooding the Zone and Attention  
Habermas has thus far declined to incorporate the developments in information 
technology into his theories of deliberative legitimation processes. As I will explain, he appears 
dedicated to maintaining a prominent role for face-to-face communication in associational 
contexts, later focused by opinion leaders in organs of mass communication. These expectations 
limit the possibility that blogging can contribute productively to public deliberation: the face-to-
face requirement is not usually met in the blogosphere, blogs are often not rooted in civil society 
organizations, and bloggers’ messages are not always distributed through the mass media.  Yet, 
as this case study has shown, when bloggers flood the zone, their contributions to public 
discourse often do focus attention. Habermas is normally sanguine about the ability of civil 
society agents to effectuate change, explaining that “the signals they send out and the impulses 
they give are generally too weak to initiate learning processes or redirect decision making in the 
political system in the short run.”184 The Trent Lott case appears to be a significant counter-
example that suggests arguments from the digitally-connected periphery can boost the otherwise 
weak civil society signal as they bundle opinions through linking practices. Admittedly, media of 
mass communication are still needed to amplify the communicative power generated by 
blogging, but they are no longer as central as they were even ten years ago in focusing public 
debate. 
                                                
184 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 373. 
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Blogging would appear to be exactly the type of perpetual, public conversation that 
Habermas figures as central to the publicity processes that are required for legitimation. In 
developing reasons that stand up to public scrutiny—the disclosure of the 1948 ballot, Lott’s 
defense of racial discrimination in the Bob Jones filing—bloggers appear to be using their unique 
capacities to advance public debate. Could bloggers be seen as agents of communicative power? 
As Habermas writes, communicative power can only supplant other types of power when two 
conditions are met: 
 The illegitimate independence of social and administrative power vis-à-vis  
  democratically generated communicative power is averted to the extent that the  
  periphery has both (a) a specific set of capabilities and (b) sufficient occasion to  
  exercise them. The first assumption, (a), refers to the capacities to ferret out,  
  identify, and effectively thematize latent problems of social integration … The 
  second assumption, (b) is less problematic. As we have seen, the links between  
  decentered, increasingly autonomous social sectors loosen in the course of  
  progressive functional differentiation. There is thus a growing need for integration 
  that renders crises permanent, stimulates the public sphere, and makes accelerated 
  learning processes necessary. The problematic assumption is (a). It places a good  
  part of the normative expectations connected with deliberative politics on the  
  peripheral networks of opinion-formation. The expectations are directed at the  
  capacity to perceive, interpret, and present society-wide problems in a way that is  
  both attention-catching and innovative. The periphery can satisfy these strong  
  expectations only insofar as the networks of noninstitutionalized public   
  communication make possible more or less spontaneous processes of opinion- 
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  formation. Resonant and autonomous public spheres of this sort must in turn be  
  anchored in the voluntary associations of civil society and embedded in liberal  
  patterns of political culture and socialization.185 
This is an interesting passage from Habermas in part because it seems to call for something like 
the blogosphere: a noninstitutionalized, spontaneous layer of actors on the periphery who can 
perceive and interpret problems in ways that capture attention and innovate rhetorically in order 
to advance deliberative legitimation processes. Blogs certainly have unique capacities: the 
resources of the internet, the juxtapositions facilitated by hyperlinks, and the ability to draw in 
peripheral voices based on the quality of their contribution. These capacities often catch the 
attention of opinion leaders and other media outlets, seemingly meeting the (a) criterion of 
thematization outlined here. 
While Habermas argues that this thematization and bundling task is the most problematic 
for integration processes, I would argue that it is his (b) criterion that actually poses more 
problems. For Habermas, agents on the periphery need occasion to exercise their critical 
faculties. The way that Habermas formulates this occasion, though, is artificially limiting. As he 
claims, these “resonant and autonomous” spheres of spontaneous communication must be 
anchored in civil society associations in order to better sluice their opinions into deliberative 
processes. In modernist social organization, this formulation has more weight. Habermas’ 
supplier groups, the non-governmental organizations and other agents of civil society, have 
traditionally needed the occasion provided to them by the mass media in order to have their 
opinions registered. But is this the case in today’s internetworked society? 
                                                
185 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 358. 
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Even well after blogging received widespread critical attention in the general media and 
in academic circles, Habermas continues to foreground the role of the mass media, associations, 
and intellectuals at the expense of self-organized actors operating in new media. In a speech 
accepting the Bruno Kreisky prize in 2005, Habermas claims that the internet has ushered in a 
“welcome increase in egalitarianism ... [which] is being paid for by the decentralisation of access 
to unedited contributions. In this medium the contributions of intellectuals lose the power to 
create a focus.”186 This is a somewhat ironic formulation for a theorist famous for revaluing 
citizen participation. The increase in participation fueled by the internet actually, in Habermas’ 
telling, creates information glut that makes it difficult to glean the wheat from the chaff. The 
presumption is that average citizens cannot focus public attention; yet, as the Trent Lott case 
shows, when bloggers flood the zone on an issue they have power rivaling traditional 
intellectuals in bringing certain issues to the forefront of the public agenda. 
In a keynote address to the International Communication Association in 2006 (later 
published in Communication Theory), Habermas continues to insist on the centrality of the 
organs of mass communication to focus public debate through elite proxies.187 He outlines two 
conditions for mediated communication to fulfill the normative demands of public deliberation: 
media independence and communicative reflexivity.188 To the extent that the media is 
                                                
186 Quoted and translated by Axel Bruns, ““Habermas and/against the Internet,” Snurblog, February 18, 
2007, http://snurb.info/node/621. 
187 These elites are a) special interest lobbyists, b) general interest advocates, c) experts with professional or 
scientific knowledge, d) moral entrepreneurs, and e) intellectuals. A charitable reader might incorporate bloggers 
under the umbrella of one or both of the final categories, though Habermas clearly situates these elites within 
associational organs of civil society. The keynote address was later published as Jürgen Habermas, “Political 
Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative 
Theory on Empirical Research,” Communication Theory (November 2006), 416. 
188 Habermas, “Political Communication,” 420-423. Habermas identifies the political economy of the mass 
media as constraining the modes of rational-critical debate that would be more possible under conditions of greater 
independence. As far as communicative reflexivity goes, Habermas partially accepts what he terms the videomalaise 
hypothesis that greater exposure to electronic communication increases apathy and cynicism about political 
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increasingly dependent on political and economic imperatives, and communicative reflexivity 
has been limited by the infotainment orientation of the mass media, Habermas perceives slim 
prospects for effective legitimation processes. 
But shouldn’t the internet change a good deal of this, by creating more independent 
media forms and enhanced communicative reflexivity? In a footnote to his ICA address, 
Habermas explicitly limits the influence of internetworked communication: 
  The Internet has certainly reactivated the grassroots of an egalitarian public of writers 
  and readers. However, computer-mediated communication in the web can claim 
  unequivocal democratic merits only for a special context: It can undermine the 
  censorship of authoritarian regimes that try to control and repress public opinion. In 
  the context of liberal regimes, the rise of millions of fragmented chat rooms across 
  the world tend instead to lead to the fragmentation of large but politically focused 
  mass audiences into a huge number of isolated issue publics. Within established  
  national public spheres, the online debates of web users only promote political  
  communication, when news groups crystallize around the focal points of the quality  
  press, for example, national newspapers and political magazines.189 
In this footnote, Habermas explains that such a critical role was performed by the bloggers at 
Bildblog.de, who sent a bill for 2088 euros to Bild.T-Online for corrections and fact-checking 
services. This was a media prank designed to draw attention to the critical deficits of the 
                                                
communication. Part of this videomalaise comes from the personality driven politics and market-orientation that are 
prominent features of much western mass communication. In other words, the political economy of the mass media 
has systematically reduced the communicative reflexivity of civil society as much as it has stunted its own critical 
faculties. 
189 Habermas, “Political Communication,” 423.  
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institutional media, but it is telling that Habermas takes this as representative of what the 
blogosphere can contribute to public deliberation. 
There are a number of limitations to Habermas’ critique of the internet in public 
deliberation. First, the internet is, quite obviously, more than a series of chat rooms. While chat 
rooms were, along with email, a key element of the 1990s-era internet, the features of chat rooms 
do not define the entirety of what internet sub-media have to offer, as the growth of blogging, 
wikis, podcasting and other ‘Web 2.0’ tools have shown.190 Habermas’ claim that the internet’s 
democratic merit lies in the evasion of censorship by authoritarian regimes is certainly 
defensible.191 However, to limit the internet’s efficacy in liberal regimes ignores the growing 
body of literature that suggests internetworked communication does, at least occasionally, 
activate change in advanced liberal democracies as well.192 In addition, Habermas clearly 
                                                
190 However, if chat rooms are perceived as the primary deliberative feature of the internet, it might be 
understandable why Habermas is frustrated by their inability to contribute to public deliberation. Harry Weger and 
Mark Aakhus suggest some key design flaws that frustrate public argument in chat rooms; see their “Arguing in 
Internet Chat Rooms: Argumentative Adaptations to Chat Room Design and Some Consequences for Public 
Deliberation at a Distance,” Argumentation and Advocacy (Summer 2003): 23-38. First, they note that 
conversational coherence is difficult to maintain, with a scrolling transcript hosting multiple threads all on the same 
screen (27). Contrast this with the tendency of blogs to focus on a single theme per post. In addition, their study 
suggests that chat rooms limit the number of characters a contributor can post at a single time, resulting in severely 
under-developed arguments (29). Blogs, of course, are (virtually) unlimited in the amount of text that can be posted 
while also enabling images, audio, and video clips. Finally, they suggest that flaming—the use of ad hominem 
attacks—undermines the civil community needed to advance public deliberation (31). Blogging might not fare better 
than chat rooms on this count; though that is an issue I will leave to further empirical work.   
191 The spread of low cost, widely accessible information technology certainly threatens the information 
control that most authoritarian regimes require to repress citizen acquisition of information, formation of opinion, 
and political coordination. This connection follows Habermas’ historical linkage of civil society with rich public 
debate conducted in part through the media. Other scholars have picked up on this thread with various information 
technologies that were ‘new’ at the time: the VCR and satellite television have been credited for undermining 
socialist control in Poland in Miklos Sukosd, “From Propaganda to ‘Oeffentichleit’ in Eastern Europe: Four Models 
of Public Space Under State Socialism,” Praxis International (April/July 1990), 50. Of course, nothing is automatic 
when it comes to complex relationships between communication media and democratization; Shanthi Kalathil and 
Taylor Boas argue that the internet will not necessarily contribute to democratizing pressures in their study of eight 
authoritarian countries. See their Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian 
Regimes (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003). 
192 See the numerous examples in Bruce Bimber’s Information and American Democracy, especially 
Chapter 4. A ‘cyber-realist’ paradigm, as developed by Peter Muhlberger, acknowledges that internetworked 
technological advances can empower individuals and groups to organize and put pressure on different institutions in 
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forecloses the capacity of online communication coming from blogs in developing angles on 
unfolding events that push public deliberation along. Instead, he suggests that internet-mediated 
communication only plays a role by responding to political communication that emerges from 
the focalizing institutional media. In other words, for Habermas, the internet can only succeed in 
vitalizing practices of publicity to the extent that it replicates the historical bourgeois public 
sphere discussing the daily newspaper. But, as the Trent Lott case shows, sometimes the flow of 
deliberation is reversed, with bloggers breaking stories or inventing novel arguments that are 
later absorbed into the institutional media. 
Finally, as Axel Bruns notes in response to Habermas’ fragmentation critique, “to speak 
of them [participants in online communities] as fragmented and isolated ignores or rejects the 
reality that especially online, individual publics are multiply connected both implicitly through 
shared membership and explicitly through a network of hyperlinks connecting postings right 
across the boundaries of individual fora.”193 The criticism that online communities are uniquely 
susceptible to fragmentation ignores the possibilities that coalitional politics, encouraged by the 
lateral network form of the world wide web, serve as a centripetal force during outbreaks of 
deliberation. That bloggers can generate argumentative enthusiasm around certain events 
suggests that their activity not be seen as ‘mere fragmentation,’ but rather as a type of 
differentiation within society that emerged in order to accommodate hypercomplexity. The Trent 
Lott case bears this point out. Though Marshall, Atrios, and Reynolds come from differing 
political perspectives, the intercastings between these dispersed discourse communities increase 
                                                
society. See his “Testing Cyber-realism,” Democracy Online: The Prospects for Political Renewal Through the 
Internet, ed. Peter Shane (New York: Routledge, 2004): 225-238. 
193 Axel Bruns, “Habermas and/against the Internet.” 
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as the zone was flooded with blogged argumentation. It was this collective thematization that put 
hydraulic pressure on the institutional media to eventually pick up the story. 
Perhaps Habermas underestimates internetworked communication because he perceives it 
as too mediated—that is, in Habermas’ view, the internet may very well supplant face-to-face 
interaction.194 Habermas concludes that the current “lack of face-to-face interaction between 
present participants in a shared practice of collective decision-making” short-circuits public 
deliberation.195 This privileging of face-to-face interaction is both impossible in large, complex 
societies and inelegantly privileges dialogue over dissemination.196 The predilection for face-to-
face interaction as the crucial constituent for communicatively generated power is perhaps a 
holdover from Hannah Arendt’s conception of power, from which Habermas draws much of his 
own theory of communicative power.197 For Arendt, the ‘space of appearance,’ in which mutual 
recognition occurs between interlocutors, enables concerted activity. The space of appearance is 
where ‘we’ become visible and recognizable to each other as interlocutors. This space of 
appearance, however, “disappears not only with the dispersal of men [sic] … but with the 
disappearance or arrest of the activities [of speech] themselves.”198 In the classical Greek polis, 
and in other historical eras, this space of appearance has occurred primarily face-to-face. 
                                                
194 Habermas’ privileging of face-to-face communication is a curious predilection. In the bourgeois public 
sphere, print media similarly elided face-to-face communication (the reader rarely interacted with the editor). 
Perhaps Habermas sees the face-to-face communication that occurred in the bourgeois coffeehouses and other public 
spaces as recuperating a positive social functionality. In that case, then, Habermas ought to at least admit the 
possibility that communication over the internet spurs similar follow-on conversations with face-to-face 
interlocutors, an empirical question that ought not be pre-empted by uncomplicated assertions about the presence or 
absence of others in material space.  
195 Habermas, “Political Communication in Media Society,” 414. 
196 On this latter point, see John Durham Peters, Speaking Into the Air: A History of the Idea of 
Communication (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001) in which he argues that the privileging of dialogue 
over dissemination has deleterious effects on how communication is theorized. 
197 See Habermas, “Communications Concept of Power,” 3-24. 
198 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1998 [1958]), 199. 
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Habermas appears wedded to this Arendtian conception of communicative power. I don’t 
think that it is too much of a stretch, though, to suggest that blogging has simply supplemented 
this traditional space of appearance between interlocutors with a networked form of many-to-
many communication. Michael Froomkin identifies the ability of the internet in general “to 
create as many ‘new spaces and new institutional forms’ as one desires.”199 As a new space for 
deliberation, blogging establishes a space of appearance between interlocutors by publicizing a 
multitude of perspectives, opinions, and arguments supported by iterations of lateral citizen-to-
citizen deliberation.  
With networked communications technology, the space of appearance becomes more 
permanent. The internet, an archived, searchable, ‘always-on,’ and interconnected medium, lends 
constancy to the presence of co-deliberators. A blog post itself creates a type of presence for an 
argument in the way that it records an opinion, which can then be responded to by other 
interlocutors and referred to in future episodes of public deliberation.200  Contrast the 
internetworked space of appearance with the space of appearance presented by broadcast media: 
the ‘one-to many’ model of communication doesn’t make citizens’ contributions visible to each 
other, which often causes critics to argue that the broadcast model undermines democracy. It 
isn’t so much that broadcast media necessarily stupefy democratic dialogue; the vernacular 
                                                
199 Michael Froomkin, “Technologies for Democracy,” Democracy Online: The Prospects for Political 
Renewal Through the Internet, ed. Peter Shane (New York: Routledge, 2004), 8. 
200 The concept of presence is central to Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theory of 
argumentation. They suggest that the task of the arguer is to “make present, by verbal magic alone, what is actually 
absent but what he [sic] considers important to his [sic] argument or, by making them present, to enhance the value 
of some of the elements of which one has actually been made conscious;” see The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on 
Argumentation (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), 116. Their conception of presence is 
focused on how arguers use rhetorical strategies to fill “the whole field of consciousness with this presence” (118). 
While their use of presence operates at what might be seen as a micro-level of argumentation between two arguers, I 
would argue that the general concept of presence is easily extended to a more systems-level by acknowledging how 
certain rhetorical strategies make certain arguments more visible within the broader realm of public deliberation. 
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conversations that spin-off from these media artifacts are undeniable and can productively shape 
public opinion.201 But because citizens are rarely given opportunities in the broadcast media to 
cultivate and refine their voices (except through letters to the editor, or the occasional ‘person on 
the street interviews’), the space of appearance for members of a particular imagined community 
appears narrowed.  
Put another way, blogging—and its conception as a ‘blogosphere’—offers supplemental 
ways of imagining the space of appearance between interlocutors. At any point, internet users 
can ‘drop in on’ blog-driven conversations that are ongoing (synchronous participation) or 
temporarily closed (diachronic participation).202 As participants, they gain explicit knowledge 
that they can invoke in immediate follow-on conversations and generate a store of tacit 
knowledge that can be rolled out when needed. In so doing, they act as participants in an 
attention economy that constitutes them as a public, even if that constitution is only momentary. 
As blogging increased in popularity and the numbers of bloggers increased, new ways of 
representing this space of appearance began to emerge. Search engines specific to blogs arose 
(e.g. Technorati), tag clouds that measured intensity and frequency of blogged about topics 
emerged, and institutional media began to identify ‘blogs that link to this article’ on their 
websites. Each of these ways of managing the output of the blogosphere is, in essence, a 
response to the vast quantity of published resources that result from bloggers flooding the zone 
on particular issues. Whereas the space of appearance has historically been limited by material 
co-presence of others in more-or-less concentric circles of social networking, now the space of 
                                                
201 As Gerard Hauser explains in Vernacular Voices: The Rhetoric of Public Spheres (Columbia, SC: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1999). 
202 Robert MacDougall, in “Identity, Electronic Ethos, and Blogs: A Technologic Analysis of Symbolic 
Exchange on the New News Medium,” American Behavioral Scientist, 49 (2005), explains that “with blogs, we get 
the sense of real-time or near real-time personal accounting of local and world events but without the in situ 
embodiment we typically associate with real-time or synchronous experience” (591).  
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appearance can be constituted across a wide array of times and spaces in a way that preserves 
lateral dialogue between citizens.203 
This networked space of appearance, in the Lott case, allowed deliberators to generate 
communicative power that ultimately dislodged Trent Lott from his perch at the top of the 
Senate. But how was it able to do so given the political economy of the American press, which 
prevents Habermas’ criteria of media independence from being met? As journalism scholars 
Lewis Friedland, Thomas Hove, and Hernando Rojas speculate, “perhaps under conditions of 
systematically increased communicative reflexivity, the unattainable ideal of independence is 
loosened,” because “the new networked media system radically, even exponentially, increases 
the possibilities for reflexivity at every level of society.”204 As they explain,  
perhaps for the first time in history, the informal public sphere has a medium that 
in principle allows for large-scale expression of mass opinion in forms that 
systematically affect the institutional media system. These systematic effects can 
occur through new networked forms of media like the following: political 
blogging; distributed forms of information gathering, production, and publishing 
(e.g. wikis, open source journalism), email lists; and individuals’ store-and-
forward uses of email. We might say that networked communication has begun to 
surround the traditional media system.205 
                                                
203 The importance of many-to-many communication is made by Benjamin Barber, who notes that “true 
public voice emerges only from lateral conversation” in A Place for Us: How to Make Society Civil and Democracy 
Strong, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 120. 
204 Lewis Friedland, Thomas Hove, and Hernando Rojas, “The Networked Public Sphere,” Javnost-The 
Public 13 (2006), 18, emphasis in original. 
205 Friedland, Hove, and Rojas, “The Networked Public Sphere,” 19, emphasis in original. 
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The Trent Lott case illustrates a very early instantiation of this enveloping process by networked 
media. As blogs monitored the institutional media’s agenda-setting processes and introduced 
original arguments into the deliberative fold, public attention eventually forced the issue back 
into the pages of major newspapers and other mass media. Perhaps Dewey’s “shadowy and 
formless” public has, with a new space of appearance that supports many-to-many 
communication, a way to prevent its regular eclipse.206 
The trope of flooding the zone signals how communicative ties between agents on the 
periphery increase the capacity of the blogosphere to focus attention of specific areas. In this 
case, the strong lateral ties between bloggers created a multi-layered field of argument that the 
institutional media eventually drew upon. Habermas misses this because his narrow conception 
of core-periphery actors imposes a modernist political formulation onto a network society; 
consequently his model of public deliberation loses explanatory power. Blogging, as 
representative of different networked communication technologies, increases communicative 
power on the periphery that traditional models fail to capture. What internetworked media do is 
enhance the communicative reflexivity of actors in civil society, spawning arguments that then 
flow along an increasingly dense set of feedback loops to other networked media, broadcast 
media, elites, and administrative organizations. 
 This new, mediated space of appearance in networked societies creates what might be 
called ‘argument publics.’ An argument public exhibits an “information-driven structure” rather 
than an event-driven one, meaning that bloggers parse the significance of seemingly small bits of 
information as it becomes public rather than waiting for a newsworthy event like the institutional 
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media.207 This feature can occasionally correct for the inability of the mass media to set an 
agenda for public discussion based on thematized problems emerging from the lifeworld. If issue 
publics emerged with the rise of broadcast media in the mid- to late-twentieth century in part 
because of the technologies of direct mail, telephone calling, and advertisements (as Bimber 
details), then it only make sense that a more ‘micro-media’ would produce more ‘micro-publics’ 
dedicated to fulfilling more niche functions for public deliberation. A conception that online 
deliberators are isolated issue publics, as Habermas does in his ICA address, misconceives 
bloggers’ roles. Of course they appear isolated if they are taken to be issue publics—bloggers 
aren’t often organized enough to create the kinds of lobbying pressure that we have come to 
associate with issue publics. But this doesn’t mean that their contributions to the deliberative 
process are moot. Argument publics could be theorized as picking up the deliberative slack left 
hanging by an institutional media system that is constrained by a particular political economy. 
This development suggests that scholars ought to reorient their approaches in studying 
networked communication to understand how bloggers develop arguments, keep track of key 
developments in unfolding controversies, and bundle various perspectives into public opinions 
that eventually are absorbed into the institutional media.  
In this case study, I have tried to illustrate the operation of a very early argument public 
in the case of Trent Lott, but much more work could be done to draw out features of these new 
online argument publics. What types of controversies are networked argument publics most 
likely to have dramatic influence on? How have argument publics matured in the intervening 
years since Trent Lott’s resignation? Has the new online political economy reduced the 
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inventional capacities of argument publics in the blogosphere? What are other constraints that 
limit the communicative reflexivity of networked argument publics? I have only hinted at the 
possibilities of thinking about networked media as argument publics; future research could 
sketch a much broader area of inquiry that resembles the program that political science 
developed to study the rise and influence of issue publics. Scholars of rhetoric and 
argumentation, though, will be particularly suited to study argument publics because the study of 
persuasion, in the blogosphere and through information technologies not yet invented, is at home 
in the area of inquiry represented by communication. 
3.7 Coda: Flooding the Zone as a Critical Resource (Response to Jodi Dean) 
 I have situated the trope of flooding the zone as a signifier of the blogosphere’s 
inventional capacities, and suggested that it aids the overall communicative reflexivity of the 
networked public sphere. As a coda to this chapter, I will identify how this trope has been 
utilized as a critical tool to demarcate spontaneous communication arising at the periphery of a 
networked society from public relations efforts that orchestrate ‘flooding the zone’ operations 
through internetworked media. Far from suggesting that flooding the zone is a permanent and 
undeniable benefit flowing from the blogosphere, in this section I want to illustrate how it has 
occasionally been co-opted by institutional actors aiming to distort public debate. Bloggers have 
been quick to pounce on attempts at artificially flooding the zone, confirming Habermas’ thesis 
of the dual orientation of public sphere actors. This dual orientation involves efforts by civil 
society actors to “directly influence the political system,” while also being preoccupied with 
“enlarging civil society and the public sphere as well as with confirming their own identities and 
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capacities to act.”208 It is in the criticism of so-called astroturf blogs that bloggers have identified 
artificial cases of flooding the zone and have thus delegitimized efforts at reintroducing non-
commercial steering media into public debate. These critical interventions expose where 
“publicity attempts to hide itself, pretending to come from the people, for example, through what 
have come to be called ‘astroturf’ groups, that is, organizations that purport to be ‘grassroots’ but 
that are actually funded and operated by hidden organizations.”209 
 I would like to situate this section as a partial response to Jodi Dean’s critique of 
internetworked deliberation as articulated in her essay on the genesis of communicative 
capitalism. There is much to agree with Dean on in her assessment of utopian internet discourses 
and the related fantasies of participation that have gelled over the past twenty years. However, I 
think that she overstates the extent to which internetworked communication technologies have 
established a system where circulation is fetishized above all else, as bloggers’ critiques of 
astroturf blogs illustrate. Dean writes that communicative capitalism “designates that form of late 
capitalism in which values heralded as central to democracy take material form in networked 
communications technologies. Ideals of access, inclusion, discussion and participation come to 
be realized in and through expansions, intensifications and interconnections of global 
telecommunications.”210 Yet, instead of creating more desirable patterns of deliberation, 
communicative capitalism initiates a cycle of response and counter-response, participating in a 
                                                
208 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 370. Habermas points to Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato’s theory 
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209 Barlow, Rise of the Blogosphere, 177. 
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circulation of argumentation that becomes self-referential and ultimately divorced from politics 
as such. 
 Dean cites the Bush Administration as participating in exactly this type of circulation 
game. During criticism of the Administration’s plan for invading Iraq, Dean argues that Bush 
and senior administration officials were able to excuse themselves from attending to the public 
debate occurring at various national and global levels by simply acknowledging that competing 
discourses were in fact circulating. She argues that  
today, the circulation of content in the dense, intensive networks of global 
communications relieves top-level actors (corporate, institutional and 
governmental) from the obligation to respond. Rather than responding to 
messages sent by activists and critics, they counter with their own contributions to 
the circulating flow of communications, hoping that sufficient volume (whether in 
terms of number of contributions or the spectacular nature of a contribution) will 
give their contributions dominance or stickiness. Instead of engaged debates, 
instead of contestations employing common terms, points of reference or 
demarcated frontiers, we confront a multiplication of resistances and assertions so 
extensive that it hinders the formation of strong counterhegemonies. The 
proliferation, distribution, acceleration and intensification of communicative 
access and opportunity, far from enhancing democratic governance or resistance, 
results in precisely the opposite—the post-political formation of communicative 
capitalism.211 
Instead of blaming the Bush Administration’s ideological rigidity or patterns of groupthink for 
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their disengagement with critics, Dean blames communicative capitalism. The signature feature 
of communicative capitalism could be characterized as flooding the zone—as she puts it, the 
creation of an overwhelming volume of spectacular claims thrown up against the wall like a plate 
of spaghetti, with the hope that a few noodles will stick. Rather than engaging in a line-by-line 
refutation of their opponents’ arguments, the Bush Administration, like all agents in 
communicative capitalism, simply contributed more memes to the circulatory matrix, which in 
Dean’s telling overwhelmed the ability for opposition to form.  
 Consequently, argumentative abundance simply merges with the rest of the datastream, and 
each argument becomes valued, by participants, because it is a contribution to the circulatory 
matrix rather than as an aid to understanding and solidarity building. As she explains,  
  the exchange value of messages overtakes their use value. So, a message is no longer 
  primarily a message from a sender to a receiver. Uncoupled from contexts of action 
  and application—as on the Web or in print and broadcast media—the message is 
  simply part of a circulating data stream. Its particular content is irrelevant. Who sent 
  it is irrelevant. Who receives it is irrelevant. That it need be responded to is  
  irrelevant. The only thing that is relevant is circulation, the addition to the pool. Any 
  particular contribution remains secondary to the fact of circulation.212 
Though I think that Dean overstates the case here a bit, there is something to her critique of those 
                                                
212 Dean, “Communicative Capitalism,” 58. She explicitly contrasts her position with Habermas: 
“Communication in communicative capitalism, then, is not, as Habermas would suggest, action oriented toward 
reaching understanding (Habermas 1984). In Habermas’s model of communicative action, the use value of a 
message depends on its orientation. In sending a message, a sender intends for it to be received and understood. Any 
acceptance or rejection of the message depends on this understanding. Understanding is thus a necessary part of the 
communicative exchange. In communicative capitalism, however, the use value of a message is less important than 
its exchange value, its contribution to a larger pool, flow or circulation of content. A contribution need not be 
understood; it need only be repeated, reproduced, forwarded. Circulation is the context, the condition for the 
acceptance or rejection of a contribution” (58-9). 
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that would defend ‘mere contribution’ as isomorphic with sufficient political action. As Dean 
explains, there is a “registration effect” that makes people believe that “their contribution to 
circulating content is a kind of communicative action. They believe that they are active, maybe 
even that they are making a difference simply by clicking on a button, adding their name to a 
petition or commenting on a blog.”213 Whether or not users of blogs end their political 
participation at the shores of the URL is a question for empirical research, and one that I think 
Dean makes some unsupported generalizations about. However, her general claim about how 
circulation has overshot understanding in networked societies bears scrutiny, especially since it 
appears that administrative power has caught up with the lifeworld in figuring out how to flood 
the zone in order to manipulate public deliberation. 
 The clearest example of how administrative institutions have latched onto the strategy of 
flooding the zone is in the military information management efforts in the wake of 9/11 and 
during the war in Iraq. After 9/11, the Pentagon created the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI), 
whose “stated purpose was simple: to flood targeted areas with information.”214 The press soon 
excoriated the OSI for being a propaganda machine, eventually causing the office to be shut 
down. Though the office was shut down, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld later noted that the 
same goals were being pursued under different auspices.215 During the war in Iraq, the same 
strategy of flooding the zone took center stage as Department of Defense outlets produced 
overwhelming amounts of information designed to emphasize how well the military operations 
                                                
213 Dean, “Communicative Capitalism,” 60. Dean relies on Slavoj Zizek’s term “interpassivity” here to 
explain how this belief replaces political activity with a fetish object, in this case, blogs and other networked 
communication technologies. Zizek formulates interpassivity in The Plague of Fantasies (London: Verso, 1997). 
214 Dennis Murphy and James White, “Propaganda: Can a Word Decide a War?,” Parameters (Autumn 
2007), 23. 
215 See “Secretary Rumsfeld Media Availability En Route to Chile,” U.S. Department of Defense News 
Transcript, November 18, 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3296. 
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and subsequent occupation was going. As Torie Clark relates in her memoir of her years as 
Pentagon communications chief, flooding the zone was a key element in the Pentagon’s efforts 
to influence perceptions of the war.216 More recently, a study written for the Joint Special 
Operations University contemplates Pentagon efforts to get involved in the blogosphere. As the 
report’s authors explain, “sometimes numbers can be effective; hiring a block of bloggers to 
verbally attack a specific person or promote a specific message may be worth considering;” 
alternatively, they suggest, certain branches might consider supporting home-grown blogs that 
appear independent but actually funnel on-message talking points from the Pentagon.217 Though 
this report does not prove that the Pentagon is currently undertaking these specific steps to 
influence public argument in the blogosphere, the Department of Defense has set up a Bloggers 
Roundtable which provides “source material” and access to military officials in live chats.218 
Flooding the zone has not just been taken up as a strategy to control the perception of 
U.S. military operations. It is on the cusp of becoming the new networked gospel for public 
relations firms working on political campaigns. In the wake of the George Allen campaign 
incident, where his derisive use of the racial epithet ‘macaca’ was caught on tape, posted to 
YouTube, and widely circulated (contributing to his electoral defeat), campaign strategists are 
developing tools to flood the zone in a way that frustrates spontaneous communication 
coalescing on the periphery. One campaign strategist recently recommended that the Allen 
                                                
216 Torie Clark, Lipstick on a Pig: Winning In the No-Spin Era By Someone Who Knows the Game (New 
York: Free Press, 2006), especially chapter 2, “Flood the Zone.” 
217 James Kinniburgh and Dorothy Denning, “Blogs and Military Information Strategy,” JSOU Report 
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218 See DoDLive: Bloggers Roundtable, http://www.defenselink.mil/blogger/index.aspx. See also 
“Pentagon to Rework Public Relations Operation,” Washington Post, October 31, 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/30/AR2006103001336.html. 
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campaign should have flooded the zone in order to overwhelm curious searchers looking for the 
‘macaca video’:     
To flood the zone, upload dozens and dozens of random videos which have  
 absolutely nothing to do with the clip you’re trying to make ‘disappear.’ The real  
 strength of the clips you’re uploading isn’t to respond directly to the video, but to  
 confuse the YouTube user and make it impossible for them to find the video  
 they’re looking for. The one thing every campaign can count on is that any web  
 user has a slight case of undiagnosed ADD (attention deficit disorder). If they  
 don’t find what they’re looking for seconds after the search has begun, they’ll tire, 
 and give up the search.219 
This strategy is increasingly widespread, with public relations firms like Advantage Consulting 
now offering services to “flood the zone” with their specially trained “blog warriors” in order to 
“put your talking points on the blogosphere 24/7,” because “today’s blog attacks can be 
tomorrow’s news” (see Figure 1).  
Some attempts at artificially inducing an opinion cascade by ‘blog warriors’ such as those 
advertised by Advantage Consultants have been ferreted out by intrepid bloggers. In contrast to 
Dean’s claim that contributions are valued qua contribution as participating in the circulation of 
public discourse, these astroturfing efforts have been exposed as artificial and illegitimate uses of 
the blogosphere’s communicative power. Astroturfing has a long history in American politics, 
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but it is receiving a unique wrinkle in the new media environment that makes identities easier to 
conceal.220 There are a number of instances where this process has occurred on blogs: 
• Wal-Mart created a blog called “Working Families for Wal-Mart,” which positioned 
itself as a grassroots advocacy group designed to rebut critics of Wal-Mart. It was, in fact, 
a joint effort between Wal-Mart and their public relations firm Edelman to counter the 
bad press Wal-Mart had been receiving online.221 The blog, at www.forwalmart.com, has 
now been taken down. 
• In the 2004 election cycle, bloggers got on the payroll of a few high profile races (and 
probably many others).  Markos Moulitsas Zuniga and Jerome Armstrong were paid by 
Howard Dean’s campaign while writing blog posts that praised his politics. While 
initially they did not disclose that they were on the payroll of Dean, they eventually did 
and have continued consulting with various other candidates—though the suspicion of 
quid pro quo persists.222 
• John Thune, in a heated race with Tom Daschle for a Senate seat in South Dakota, hired 
two bloggers to critique negative press and create positive buzz for his campaign. Neither 
blogger disclosed they were on the payroll of the Republican nominee, though Thune’s 
campaign account eventually revealed that the bloggers were being paid.223 This 
revelation created a tempest in the blogosphere condemning this tactic as chicanery. 
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223 David Paul Kuhn, “Blogs: New Medium, Old Politics,” CBS, December 8, 2004, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/12/08/politics/main659955.shtml. 
192 
• Sockpuppeting, the phenomena where someone adopts an online identity not their own to 
post comments on blogs, is another instance of flooding the zone. One of the most 
famous instances of sockpuppeting in the blogosphere is when Lee Siegel, a writer for 
The New Republic, was caught using the alias ‘sprezzatura’ to post comments on his own 
blog that defended himself against criticism. Siegel was suspended and his blog was shut 
down.224 
What do these instances reveal about the nature of circulation and communicative capitalism? 
Well, in at least some instances, bloggers were able to identify artificial opinion cascades and 
delegitimize the rhetorical efforts of astroturfing, at some expense to the credibility of the 
organizations that were attempting to influence public debate. Certainly, bloggers have not been 
able to catch all instances of astroturfing, lending some credence to Dean’s claim that circulation 
obviates the need for response and engagement. However, when astroturf blogs are found out, 
the amount of criticism lodged against them can be seen as a process whereby bloggers attempt 
to protect the norms which underline the value of their participation in public deliberation in the 
first place: namely, as coalescers of spontaneous communication coming from peripheral nodes 
of society. So, contra Dean, sometimes the ‘artificial’ addition of public discourse fails, as it is 
outed as an attempt to manipulate the democratic process. In these cases, communicative 
reflexivity works to undermines the ‘mere circulation’ of information and reassert the priority of 
communication coming from the lifeworld. 
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The expansion of the rhetorical imaginary with ‘flood the zone,’ then, captures both the 
potential and the threat of communication in a network society. As an addition to the vocabulary 
of the network society, it can be used as a normative benchmark by which to distinguish actual 
processes of spontaneous communication from artificial attempts by institutions to overwhelm 
communicative power with money. In this way, communicative capitalism’s absorption of all 
argument into the mere circulation of competing information memes can be resisted, if 
imperfectly. 
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Figure 1. Advertisement for Advantage Consultants, http://www.advantageconsultants.org.
195 
CHAPTER 4—AMBIENT INTIMACY: SALAM PAX AND AFFECT IN PUBLIC LIFE 
4.1 Introduction 
On September 8, 2004, during the heat of the presidential campaign between George W. 
Bush and John Kerry, the newsmagazine 60 Minutes televised a segment that called into question 
Bush’s service in the National Guard during the 1970s. The Killian Memos, as they came to be 
called, were a collection of six documents that purported to show Bush’s failure to submit to a 
physical examination and the subsequent pressure on Bush’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel 
Jerry Killian, to give Bush a pass because he was from a well-connected family. In an election 
where national security credentials were paramount, these allegations could have been incredibly 
damaging for Bush’s re-election bid. However, the Killian memos were debunked in part by a 
blogger named Buckhead at the Free Republic, a conservative hub for commentary. Buckhead 
asserted: 
every single one of these memos to file is in a proportionally spaced font, 
probably Palatino or Times New Roman. In 1972 people used typewriters for this 
sort of thing, and typewriters used monospaced fonts. The use of proportionally 
spaced fonts did not come into common use for office memos until the 
introduction of laser printers, word processing software, and personal computers. 
They were not widespread until the mid to late 90's. Before then, you needed 
typesetting equipment, and that wasn't used for personal memos to file. Even the 
Wang systems that were dominant in the mid 80's used monospaced fonts. I am 
196 
saying these documents are forgeries, run through a copier for 15 generations to 
make them look old.1 
Buckhead’s claim quickly spread to other conservative blogs, like Little Green Footballs and 
Powerline. Eventually, other national media picked it up and CBS soon had a serious 
controversy on its hands about the veracity of the memos.  
As the media circus about these memos began, former Vice-President of CBS News 
Jonathan Klein went on The O’Reilly Factor to defend CBS and the traditional broadcast media 
against the rowdy critics online. Echoing what had become a regular way to mark off the 
blogosphere from the institutional media, he said “you couldn't have a starker contrast between 
the multiple layers of check and balances [at '60 Minutes'] and a guy sitting in his living room in 
his pajamas writing.”2 Condensed in this one sentence is a widespread caricature of blogging as 
irresponsible, because there is no editorial control, and amateurish, because it can be done by 
anyone. This figure of the blogger, recirculated in various iterations throughout all types of 
media, not-so-subtly suggests that bloggers are unhinged and thus untrustworthy; unprofessional 
and thus unworthy. It neatly cohered with the stereotypical image of the computer geek pounding 
away at the keyboard out of frustration. This stereotype of the ‘pajamahadeen’ introducing chaos 
to an otherwise stable system offers an entry point to consider the ways in which public 
discourse has traditionally been figured as an enterprise grounded in a particular vision of 
                                                
1 Buckhead, comment in response to “Documents Suggest Special Treatment for Bush in Guard [post 47],” 
Free Republic, September 8, 2004, 11:59 p.m., http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/fnews/1210662/ 
posts?page=47#47. 
2 Quoted in Jonathan Last, “What Blogs Hath Wrought,” The Weekly Standard, September 27, 2004, 
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rational-critical argumentation—and the ways in which blogging represents a contestation of this 
dominant paradigm.3    
  In this chapter, I want to try to make sense of how blogging produces identification 
between global strangers. If the Trent Lott affair showed how blogs activate certain faculties of 
critical public reason, then the case study of Salam Pax, a blogger living in Baghdad before the 
war in Iraq, illustrates how blogging circulates affect into public life, creating intimate 
relationships and imagined communities. This chapter argues that Salam Pax’s rhetorical 
interventions contest the dominant conceptualization of citizenship as an impartial, reason-driven 
enterprise; in fact, it was his use of highly partial, emotionally charged rhetoric that drew 
attention to the complexities of life in Iraq during late 2002 and early 2003. While the structure 
of feeling that dominated modernist sensibilities was grounded in the objective, dispassionate, 
impartial norms of public reason, networked societies embrace a sensibility that features emotion 
much more prominently. Consequently, norms of subjectivity, passion, and partiality have been 
revalued in public deliberation.4 Salam Pax provides a test case for this claim because he was an 
oft-cited participant in public deliberation about the 2003 war in Iraq whose argumentation style 
violated strict norms of rational-critical debate but was consequential nonetheless. 
                                                
3 This is a term coined by Jim Geraghty at the National Review Online in response to Klein’s comments. 
See “A Communique to the Pajamahadeen,” September 22, 2004, http://www.nationalreview.com/kerry/ 
kerry200409221122.asp. 
4 This claim is one way to read theorists like Walter Ong in Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the 
Word (New York: Methuen, 1982) and Eric Havelock in The Muse Learns to Write: Reflections on Orality and 
Literacy from Antiquity to the Present (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986) who suggest that electronic 
expressiveness reintroduces features of speech into modes of electronic writing. See Sharmila Pixy Ferris, “Writing 
Electronically: The Effects of Computers on Traditional Writing,” Journal of Electronic Publishing 8 (2002), 
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=jep; view=text;rgn=main;idno=3336451.0008.104. In the context of 
the internet and blogging, recent scholarship has underlined the  revaluation of personal testimony and emotion. See 
Christopher Flook, “The Emotional Revolution Through Digital Media: The Internet as a Virtual Social Reality,” 
The Review of Communication (Jan.-Apr. 2006): 52-61 and Matthew Hughey, “Virtual (Br)others and (Re)sisters,” 
Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 37 (October 2008): 528-60. 
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Who is Salam Pax? The answer to that question is complex. We do not know his real 
name. Salam Pax, a pseudonym that plays on the Arabic and Latin word for ‘peace,’ began his 
blog, Where is Raed?, as a way to stay in touch with his friend Raed who was studying abroad.5 
Though we do not know his ‘real’ identity, we actually know a lot about Salam Pax because of 
his blogged self-revelations. At the time, he worked in an architecture design firm. He previously 
spent a considerable amount of time living overseas. He liked red wine. His musical tastes were 
eclectic. His English was impeccable, equaled by his command of popular culture and wry 
humor. Early blog posts focus on complaints about his job and social engagements with friends 
and family, but as war clouds gathered, Pax would concentrate an increasing amount of energy 
relating tidbits about life in pre-war Iraq.6 Where is Raed? was, for a time, the only English-
language blog coming from inside Iraq that narrated life under the specter of invasion.  
Salam Pax’s weblog became the most-linked to blog in the then brief history of the 
blogosphere.7  Popularity in the blogosphere translated to mass media coverage of his blog in 
print media, including stories in the New Yorker, the New York Times, and the Washington Post. 
Salam Pax became the “virtual personification of Iraq,” contributing to his meteoric rise in the 
blogosphere.8  He was famously called the Anne Frank of the war9 and its Elvis.10 Eventually, 
Salam Pax netted a book deal and a fortnightly column in The Guardian. The persona cultivated 
                                                
5 Salam Pax, Dear Raed, http://www.dearraed.blogspot.com. 
6 Stanley Miller, “Words of War: Internet Journals Offer Glimpses From Iraq,” Milwaukee Journal-
Sentinel, April 1, 2003, LexisNexis. 
7 As reported by Leo Hickman, “Baghdad Calling,” The Guardian, March 24, 2003, http://lifeandhealth. 
guardian.co.uk/experts/leohickman/story/0,,1659959,00.html. 
8 Elizabeth Wynhausen, “Salam Pax Succumbs to Unbearable Weight of Blogging,” Australian, May 20 
2004, 17. 
9 Nick Denton,  “Salam,” May 30, 2003, http://www.nickdenton.org/archives/005924.html#005924. 
10 Peter Maass, “How Do I Know Baghdad’s Famous Blogger Exists?  He Worked For Me,” Slate, June 2, 
2003, http://slate.msn.com/id/2083847/.   
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by Salam’s writing coincided with “a deep dissatisfaction with Big Media, a hunger for 
connection and community, and a yearning for political passion and for the writer's voice.”11 
‘Voice,’ in the meta-commentary about blogging, is an oft-used term that codes the presence of 
emotion. I want to briefly identify some invocations of voice and emotion in the commentary 
about Salam Pax to underline the distinctions between public deliberation in a networked society 
and the rational-critical debate preferred by Habermas’ bourgeois public sphere. 
Salam Pax’s blogging was often put in the context of the dramatic changes that an 
internetworked society was having on global communication. Bloggers were now providing first-
hand, immediate, and regular updates on life in a war zone to a global public. Howard Kurtz, the 
Washington Post columnist who credited blogs with pushing the Trent Lott story, wrote  
for all the saturation coverage of the invasion of Iraq, this has become the first 
true Internet war, with journalists, analysts, soldiers, a British lawmaker, an Iraqi 
exile and a Baghdad resident using the medium's lightning speed to cut through 
the fog of war. The result is idiosyncratic, passionate and often profane, with the 
sort of intimacy and attitude that are all but impossible in newspapers and on 
television … The strength of this new form of communication is the sheer variety 
of voices.12 
What makes this assertion by Kurtz interesting is not necessarily the masses of newly awakened 
voices online, but the ability of those blogging voices to convey intimacy and attitude.13 In this 
                                                
11 Matt Welch, “The New Amateur Journalists Weigh In,” Columbia Journalism Review 
(September/October 2003), http://www.cjr.org/issues/2003/5/blog-welch.asp. 
12 Howard Kurtz, “‘Webloggers,’ Signing on as War Correspondents,” Washington Post, March 23, 2003, 
LexisNexis.  
13 Kaye Trammell and Ana Keshelashvili suggest that blogging’s ability to reveal the ‘backstage’ of 
relationships and thought processes is a crucial animating element in the blogosphere; see their “Examining the New 
Influencers: A Self-Presentation Study of A-List blogs,” Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 82 
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passage, Salam Pax functions as a condensation point for understandings about how digital 
information technology re-introduces intimate-emotional norms into public dialogue.  
The salience of ‘voice’ became increasingly prevalent in press accounts of what was 
starting to be called ‘warblogging.’ From January to March 2003, the drumbeat for war in Iraq 
was getting increasingly loud—in part because warbloggers were advancing and dissecting 
claims about the virtues and pitfalls of invading Iraq. Blogs were seen as “a forum for fresh 
voices and viewpoints” that can be “powerful tools in two ways: as one-stop clearinghouses of 
information and links, and—in the case of blogs emanating from a war zone—as unfiltered, up-
to-the-minute sources of firsthand observation.”14 Like new media in prior war zones, blogs were 
“providing a different voice to coverage of the war against Iraq.”15 This association with voice 
captured the popular imagination as well: “bloggers are often eloquent in the way that those who 
are not self-consciously polished often are—raw, uncensored, and energized by the sound of 
their newly awakened voices.”16 Scholars like Henry Jenkins and David Thorburn have also 
employed the language of voices by noting that “the current diversification of communication 
channels … is politically important because it expands the range of voices that can be heard in a 
national debate, ensuring that no one voice can speak with unquestioned authority.”17  
The invocation of voice in the coverage by the press during this time often pointed to the 
use of emotion-laden language or intimate communication styles that differ from the traditional 
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MIT Press, 2003), 2. 
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rational-critical norms of public debate. As one journalist covering the Salam Pax phenomenon 
noted, 
What politics there are tend to come in ironic asides or earnest explanations 
perhaps born of that most credible of youthful emotions, defeated idealism. 
‘Peace and Security. Ha,’ Pax wrote in an entry dated Oct. 23, quoting a U.S.-
British draft of a U.N. resolution. ‘Bomb us already, stop pussyfooting.’ (Several 
days later, after another Internet writer, from Indiana, had interpreted this remark 
as favorable to ‘prospective liberation,’ Pax provided a helpful link to 
dictionary.com's entry for ‘sarcasm.’)18 
As this summary explanation of Salam Pax’s blog signals, bloggers are often constructed as 
injecting passion and emotion into public writing. Salam Pax’s blog offered “a personal account 
of the war from the Iraqi capital, unencumbered by reporting restrictions.”19 According to press 
accounts, “the blog has put a personal face on the war”20 through Salam’s “idiosyncratic personal 
descriptions of Baghdad.”21 Salam Pax himself, in an interview after the major combat 
operations, noted the intimate interpretations that are blogging’s forte: “people always ask 
whether blogging will be the next journalism, but what's good about blogs is that they are a 
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LexisNexis. 
19 Peter Thal Larsen, “Bloggers Take the War on Iraq on a Journey into Cyberspace,” Financial Times, 
April 2, 2003, LexisNexis. 
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personal view of things. You put blogs around the news. You have news which is supposed to be 
impartial, and then you get different views of the same event from blogs.”22 
The association of blogging with diary writing and youth during the time of Salam Pax’s 
blog emphasized the partiality and subjectivity of blogs. For one commentator at the time, “blogs 
are cyber reality shows, widely read diaries that publicly detail the social drama and fluctuating 
emotions of young lives. They are often scoured for personal mention, and they spare no 
language or feelings.”23 Early adopters of blogs used them “to do what they once did through 
personal diaries, phone conversations and hangout sessions: cementing friendships with 
classmates, seeking new friends, venting, testing social limits, getting support and getting all 
emo (‘highly emotional’ in blog-speak).”24 Press accounts regularly noted that “the defining 
characteristic of blogging is its highly personal nature.”25 The press also situated blogs as highly 
subjective sites for self-expression: “like a journal, ‘blogs’ tend to be highly personal, running 
the gamut from short musings to angst-filled rants.”26 Consequently, “online journals have a bad 
reputation: emotional train wrecks and narcissistic ramblings plastered on the Web for all to 
see.”27 
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It should be unsurprising that young people use blogs to amplify and make sense of their 
emotional lives. However, the danger according to some critics of blogging is that these 
expressions of youthful exuberance ultimately habituate citizens into hyper-emotional patterns of 
public discourse. These criticisms replicate the standard bifurcation of reason and emotion that 
have structured modernist sensibilities. To wit, some say that “the way we argue now has been 
shaped by cable news and Weblogs; it's all ‘gotcha’ commentary and attributions of bad faith. 
No emotion can be too angry and no exaggeration too incredible.”28 Sometimes this sentiment is 
articulated in comparison to the more ‘objective’ modes of journalism: 
The blogs and the ‘citizen journalism’ are all opinion, emotion, and reaction, not 
news. Someone still has to tell people what is going on. It takes skills to do that. It 
requires the ability to quickly analyze mounds of data to figure out what is most 
important; to focus on an event, not one's own reaction to it; and to tell a story in a 
clear, concise and powerful way. In other words, it requires journalists who have 
honed their craft through practice and training.29 
The self-conception of objectivity and careful crafting that animates journalism is thus 
constructed as a normative ideal for ‘news.’ Real objectivity, of course, is as impossible to 
sustain as it is critical to mainstream journalistic self-fashioning.30 While objectivity is a 
founding value of journalism, partiality, emotion, and intimacy are more acceptable norms in the 
blogosphere, as the following account makes clear: 
                                                
28 Alan Wolfe, “The New Pamphleteers,” New York Times, July 11, 2004, LexisNexis. 
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If anything, the finest bloggers are much more transparent about their biases. 
Many mainstream journalists and columnists convince themselves and readers 
that they are simply disinterested and objective observers of events, without 
political affiliations or motives. In reality, of course, they are often political hacks 
with an axe to grind. Bloggers are no different, but they will acknowledge past 
associations and inherent biases. Such moves increase reader respect and 
contribute to the development of a democratic media ideal. It does, of course, take 
time to find blogs that you trust, whose sources are impeccable and traceable. The 
violence of emotion on display in the blogosphere is sometimes akin to being 
punched in the head at a World Wrestling Federation final and then going back 
the next day for more. It's a blood sport with a surprisingly addictive personality.31 
The partiality of blogging serves as a counter-point to the so-called objectivity of institutional 
media. These dueling orientations of objectivity and partiality need not be pitted against each 
other. In fact, each might be seen as performing a valuable democratic service. As Robert 
Hariman and John Lucaites articulate, “print media virtues of disembodied assertion, systematic 
organization of ideas, and dispassionate tone,” while effective in performing some democratic 
functions, are often “insufficient to motivate collective action.”32 The partiality and passion 
present on blogs, on the other hand, might move people to participate more fully in democratic 
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public life.33 Kris Cohen has marked this shift from the purported objectivity of print media by 
noting “blogs appear to be shifting the balance of personality and impersonality in the operation 
of publics and in the production of public subjects—which is to suggest that blogs are shifting 
the grounds for selfhood tout court.”34 
What does all this invocation of voice mean? Rhetorician Eric King Watts situates voice 
as a trope that signifies civic agency, a process whereby citizens are able to constitute themselves 
and others as deliberating agents in a democratic society.35 He explains that acknowledgements 
of voice are  
a particular type of speech phenomenon that pronounces the ethical problems and 
obligations incumbent in community building and arouses in persons and groups 
the frustrations, sufferings, and joys of such commitments. Rhetorical ‘voice’ is 
not a unitary thing that inhabits texts of persons either singly or collectively. It is 
itself a happening that is invigorated by a public awareness of the ethical and 
emotional concerns of discourse. Saying that persons or groups have ‘voice’ does 
not offer it as a unidirectional, primordial and autonomous projection out of the 
body, nor does it become a semiotic project. Rather, speakers can be endowed 
with ‘voice’ as a function of a public acknowledgement of the ethics of speaking 
                                                
33 This coheres with Diane Mutz’s conclusions in Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative Versus 
Participatory Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) that hearing multiperspectival accounts 
of political controversies can stunt political participation, whereas partisan communication networks motivate 
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34 Kris Cohen, “A Welcome for Blogs,” Continuum: Journal of Media and Culture Studies (June 2006): 
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and the emotions of others. This recognition is often intertextual and mediated. 
‘Voice,’ then, is the sound of specific experiential encounters in civic life.36 
This is a rich conceptualization of voice. First, it is important to note that voice is a function of 
acknowledgement, not vocalization. ‘Voice’ “announces the value and beauty of ‘otherness’” 
and accretes prominence as it circulates through public culture.37 Occasionally, a particular voice 
will perform a rhetorical interruption that “prompts a reappraisal of where they are culturally, 
what they are doing, and where they are going.”38 In this way, certain voices orient focus, or 
following Richard Lanham, commandeer attention economies for a certain interval. Salam Pax’s 
voice, extended through his blogging, became a touchstone for heated public debate because his 
voice represented such a unique global encounter.  
 Conceptualizing civic encounters through recourse to the metaphor of ‘voice’ is 
especially appropriate given the relatively disembodied communication enabled by blogging at 
the time of the military conflict in Iraq. Though we should be careful in underplaying the 
material and embodied features of blog encounters, Eric King Watts and Ananda Mitra suggest 
that communication scholars might profitably configure cyberspace as “a discursive space 
produced by the creative work of people whose spatial locations are ambiguous and 
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2001), 185, emphasis in original. Watts explicitly notes the applicability of thinking about voice in the context of 
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provisional.”39 If cyberspace is essentially a discursive realm, in which people engage in a wide-
variety of sense-making and interpretation, then online interlocutors can use “their voices … [to] 
create cyberspace where speaking agents can comfortably dwell, and create their ethos or 
‘dwelling space,’ which they inhabit and from where they can address the public sphere.”40 
Specifically, in the context of blogs, Mitra explains that “individuals are able to voice themselves 
through a blog and that voice has the potential of being heard by the entire community of people 
who are on the web.”41As web-users filter through the multiplicity of voices online, one standard 
of judgment used to steer attention is based on “how eloquently the voice can address the 
reader’s emotion and create a ‘proper feeling’ about the issue.”42  
This link between voice, eloquence, and emotion signals how the concept of voice is 
tightly weaved within a series of emotional registers that are present in public life. When a public 
recognizes a ‘voice,’ as Watts notes, it is often because passions are aroused. The experience of 
hearing great rhetors—an Elizabeth Cady Stanton or John F. Kennedy or Martin Luther King, 
live or on a recording—often stimulates emotional responses in listeners. As people start to 
attend to a particular voice, they are often moved (often differently!) by the affective experiences 
of encounter. One reason that rhetorical studies has maintained such an interest in voice is 
because doing so acknowledges the role of affect and emotion in public culture. As rhetoricians 
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from classical Greece onwards have noted, public persuasion cannot be explained through 
recourse to rational-critical argument alone. Yet, a central conceit of the modernist social 
imaginary is the effective cordoning off of emotion from the public realm. 
One way to understand the meta-talk about Salam Pax, voice, and emotion, then, is by 
positing a shift in the underlying structure of feeling between modernist societies and networked 
ones. Raymond Williams describes the structure of feeling as “the felt sense of the quality of life 
at a particular place and time: a sense of the ways in which the particular activities combined into 
a way of thinking and living.”43 The idea of a structure of feeling, in other words, attempts to 
capture the emotional and affective investments of a time. Examining the official doctrines, 
institutional histories, or documents of an era cannot reveal structures of feeling.44 A structure of 
feeling can be better understood by looking at ‘unofficial’ media forms produced in more 
personal contexts. As cultural studies scholars Jennifer Harding and Deirdre Pribram explain, 
“the constitution of feeling and its part in the creation of subjectivity within contemporary power 
relations can be traced through an examination of journals, diaries, and other forms of personal 
writing.”45 I would count blogs like Dear Raed amongst these forms of personal writing, and 
follow Trish Roberts-Miller’s suggestion that one major impact of blogging is to “facilitate the 
expressive public sphere” that represents an evolution in the traditional role of the public 
sphere.46  
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I plan on analyzing blogging’s challenge to the traditional rational-critical public sphere 
by analyzing Salam Pax’s enactment of cynicism and melancholy, two affects often theorized in 
the popular press as indicative of blogging’s emotional range. Two scholarly books on blogging 
have echoed this popular connection. Geert Lovink’s Zero Comments: Blogging and Critical 
Internet Culture theorizes that cynicism is the dominant affect of the blogosphere. For Lovink, a 
professor of new media at the University of Amsterdam and media activist, bloggers are cynics 
that empty out traditional meaning structures, filling public space with unmoored critique 
instead. Michael Keren’s Blogosphere, on the other hand, posits that melancholy is the dominant 
affect of bloggers. According to Keren, a political science professor at the University of Calgary, 
bloggers are verbal fetishists disengaged from social structures that mediate real change and thus 
reinforce atomistic forms of political engagement. Lovink and Keren’s critiques are perhaps 
necessary to balance the blog triumphalism that often accompanies theorizing blogging; 
moreover, they are right to direct scholarly debate to the emotional implications of this new 
media form. And their diagnosis is at least partially on point. Cynicism and melancholy are 
indeed emotions that are present on Salam Pax’s blog, and are certainly present on blogs in 
general. 
Their twin critiques, though, situate emotionally resonant blogging as debilitating for 
public deliberation. Lovink and Keren can profitably be read as adherents to that particular 
structure of feeling that obtained in modernity. But if the structure of feeling has shifted in a 
network society, they essentially are attempting to import norms of deliberation that were 
successful in one public culture into another—but those round pegs simply won’t fit in to 
contemporary square holes. However, the characterizations made by Lovink and Keren are 
useful condensations of more pointed critiques that often emerge in various media and so are 
210 
worthy of serious scrutiny to better understand how the emotions present in the blogosphere fit 
into public deliberation. That blogging is driven by essentially cynical actors trying to gain fame, 
attention, and possibly a living has become a commonplace in public discourse about blogging. 
Likewise, the image of social isolates living in their parents’ basement and experiencing life 
vicariously ‘online’ regularly recurs as a caricature of the blogger. As I will show, Lovink’s 
assessment of blogging as dominated by cynicism has some merit, as does Keren’s excursus on 
the melancholic blogger. Yet, it seems to me, that both Lovink and Keren greatly oversimplify 
the affective registers that prevail in the blogosphere. I find it hard to believe that a single affect 
predominates in a single medium; rather, bloggers (like everyone else) are constantly articulating 
different feeling-states, which emerge in different voices, at various points.47 Bloggers might 
well reflect the prevalent cynicism and melancholy of the dominant culture, but they never do so 
exclusively because the translation of subjective human experience is simply too rich and varied.  
What I intend to do, instead of merely suggesting the wide range of emotional 
expressiveness available on blogs, is to recuperate both cynicism and melancholy from a 
rhetorical perspective by situating them as two voices that emerge from Salam Pax’s blogging. 
Rather than assuming that certain emotions entail specific social and political consequence, I 
argue that cynicism and melancholy ought to be seen as having specific rhetorical effects. I 
recognize that cynicism and melancholy are prominent affective orientations on the blogosphere, 
but I don’t see them as necessarily undermining deliberation. Rather, they draw attention to 
                                                
47 Two clever information visualization art projects illustrate the dynamic range of affects present in the 
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problems in the lifeworld that deserve more complex thematization. Critics that see emotion-
laden discourse as troubling for public deliberation often have an idealized and impossible model 
of deliberation that artificially splits reason off from emotion. I would rather work to think about 
how emotion can be drawn into the circuit of communicative rationality to reflect the richness of 
human experience. Instead of seeing cynicism and melancholy as complex emotion-
constellations that deform public discourse, I suggest that we see them as rhetorical interventions 
that function to draw attention to strangers in the lifeworld. I argue that the ultimate effect of the 
constant cycling of affect into public life through blogs is a production of ‘ambient intimacy.’ 
Ambient intimacy adds to the grammar of the blogosphere by capturing how stranger sociability 
facilitates the formation and transformation of (potentially global) publics over time. 
Before examining Lovink and Keren’s critiques, it is important to situate voice, emotion, 
and intimacy in the context of the public and private distinction in classical Greece and the 
bourgeois public sphere. By examining the structures of feeling in these two different 
deliberative cultures, I hope to distill the key shifts from modernist imaginaries to networked 
ones. From there, I examine Lovink’s critique and then Keren’s. In each case, I try to recuperate 
emotion from a rhetorical vantage point in order to identify ways in which certain functions of 
public deliberation might be fulfilled. I then delve into the ways in which these tensions 
illuminate features of the networked imaginary and conclude with a section developing the 
concept of ambient intimacy. 
4.2 Emotion in Classical Greece and the Bourgeois Public Sphere  
Lines demarcating public life from private life have, historically, fluctuated to 
accommodate the broader needs of a particular society. Shifts in the relationship between public 
and private occur because of changing socio-cultural standards of appropriateness, alterations in 
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social and economic relations, and new technologies that blur the traditional lines between public 
and private. What is usually at stake in the divide between public and private is nothing less than 
the very nature of social order.48 Democratic public culture is highly invested in this public-
private boundary work, primarily because democratic legitimacy traditionally finds purchase in 
an appropriate relationship between the public and private. Private concerns ought to find some 
public redress, though not all private concerns merit a public hearing. Moreover, private life can 
habituate individuals into democratic norms and serve as a practice site for later public 
interventions; alternatively, it can affirm authoritarian and anti-democratic practices. Publicity 
and privacy are also tightly coupled with reason and emotion, respectively. Publicity has 
traditionally been associated with the public use of reason, and privacy has traditionally 
protected a sphere of intimate-emotional communication.  
 In ancient Greece, during the heyday of Aristotle, the idealized relationship between the 
oikos and the polis provided one suitable-for-the-times relationship between private and public. 
The oikos was the household, a foundational unit where much of the (re)productive work took 
place. The three basic relationships in the oikos were master and slave, husband and wife, and 
father and children. This unapologetically patriarchal organization structured society 
meaningfully, despite what we now consider to be untenable orientations toward various types of 
servitude. The male head of the oikos was seen as the natural ‘monarchical’ head because virtues 
were distributed more generously in him. Women, slaves, and children had some degree of 
virtue, but they should “partake” in them “only in such manner and degree as is required by each 
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for the fulfillment of his duty” (1260a.8).49 The oikos was charged with habituating its members 
into this kind of appropriate conduct:  
inasmuch as every family is a part of a state, and these relationships are the parts 
of a family, and the virtue of the part must have regard to the virtue of the whole, 
women and children must be trained by education with an eye to the constitution, 
if the virtues of either of them are supposed to make any difference in the virtues 
of the state. And they must make a difference: for the children grow up to be 
citizens, and half the free persons in a state are women (1260b.15-16).50 
This is an early instantiation of the commonplace ‘the children are our future’: private life must 
prepare the future citizen for public deeds through moral training in the professed values of the 
time. Of course, only men could hold public office, and do public speaking, in the official zones 
of deliberation. As classicist Brendan Nagle describes, “oikoi were expected to internalize and 
reproduce in their own micro-environments the ideology that characterized the constitution or 
politeia of their individual cities.”51 The over-arching ideology of the Greek polis was, in many 
ways, founded on the bifurcation of reason and emotion represented by the differing views of 
Plato and Aristotle. 
 The divide between Plato and Aristotle on emotion is, of course, almost definitive of the 
debate about properly public and properly private uses of reasoning. These themes are so 
familiar they need only a sketch: Plato believed the hoi polloi were motivated more by 
unreasoned pathe than elegant logos. For this reason, poets had no place in a Republic, for they 
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University Press, 2006), 6. 
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played to the emotions of the lowest common denominator. The rhetoricians fared little better, 
for what they taught was sophistry rather than real knowledge. Emotional appeals cheapen both 
speaker and listener and distract from more proper ways to govern. Aristotle, in contrast, tried to 
recuperate emotion by linking it to cognitive processes. According to him, felt emotions direct 
cognition. Feeling unsafe on a dark street at night isn’t absurd—it’s a feeling that signals one 
should take some precautions. To move people cognitively requires capturing them emotionally. 
Thus, appealing to doxa (public opinions, commonplaces, and shared feelings) was essential to 
the activity of persuasion.52 Reason and emotion, in Aristotle’s formulation, were not necessarily 
at odds, especially given rhetoric’s capacity to challenge and enlarge received doxa. Aristotle’s 
teachings presume “a contoured world of emotional investments” that charge language and 
identity with meaning.53 This complementarity was both more realistic, in that it taught students 
how to think about persuasion according to how people were actually moved, and richer, in that 
it offered substantial resources for persuasion.  
 Participants in the bourgeois public sphere eventually eroded this complementarity so 
central to Aristotelian teachings. Despite the early recognition of emotion in persuasion by 
modernist political theorists, the norms of publicity squeezed emotion into a new world: the 
intimate realm.54 Emotion received a modernist treatment as passive states that could be analyzed 
                                                
52 For an overview of the relationship between rhetoric and emotion, see Michael Hyde, “Emotion and 
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through scientific method.55 This intellectual development interlocked with a sociological one. 
As Habermas explains, it was during the modern age that the categories of public (the literary 
and ‘political’), private (economic), and intimate (conjugal family) began to have greater traction 
as organizing principles for social order and, more importantly for our purposes, norms of 
deliberation. In the same way that the oikos prepared ancient Greeks to participate in the polis, 
the intimate sphere was considered to be a place where public selves might be better cultivated.56 
Yet, the intimate sphere’s cultivation of feeling and emotion was not, in the self-conception of 
the bourgeois at the time, to spill over into rational-critical debate except as the general facilitator 
of humanist principles like love and freedom which would theoretically provide a telos for public 
deliberation.  
 Put another way, the bourgeois public sphere reconfigured the Greek oikos-polis legacy 
to fit their own needs, absorbing this “ideological template” into more specifically modern ways 
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of organizing self-governance.57 As Habermas explains, the development of reason was 
historically necessary to legitimize self-governance: 
the bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private 
people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated 
from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate 
over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly 
relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor. The medium of this 
political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people’s 
public use of their reason.58 
The public sphere forged private opinions into public ones through layered episodes of shared 
discourse. This process was set in motion by an orientation toward a common humanity aided by 
the intimate sphere through engagement with literature and the arts, letter writing, and other 
literary achievements. Thus, “the literary precursor of the public sphere … provided the training 
ground for a critical public reflection still preoccupied with itself—a process of self-clarification 
of private people focusing on the genuine experiences of their novel privateness.”59 As Lauren 
Berlant interprets this process, “persons were to be prepared for their critical social function in 
what Habermas calls the intimate spheres of domesticity, where they would learn (say, from 
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novels and newspapers) to experience their internal lives theatrically, as though oriented toward 
an audience.”60 This audience-centeredness would play an increasingly important role as ever-
more heterogeneous publics began to meet and persuade each other on a large scale. 
 The letter played an especially important role in this development. Through letter writing, 
“the individual unfolded himself in his subjectivity,” perceiving themselves as independent from 
economic activities and thus capable of “entering into ‘purely human’ relations” with their 
fellow bourgeois (the gendered pronouns underline the masculinized self-conception of 
autonomous, unified subjectivity).61 The development of the letter throughout the history of the 
postal service marks the depth of this transformation of intimacy. At first, the postal service 
primarily circulated letters that conveyed basic happenings and ‘goings-ons.’ Later, “scholarly 
communication and familial courtesy” dominated letters.62 But as the bourgeois self-conception 
consolidated, letter writing became a site for emotional outpourings. For the bourgeois, letters 
were an “‘imprint of the soul,’ a ‘visit of the soul;’ letters were to be written in the heart’s blood, 
they practically were to be wept.”63 There is probably no better synoptic condensation of the 
sentimentality characteristic of this sphere of the bourgeois. 
 While the intimate sphere was idealized to create fellow-feeling, the public sphere 
demanded norms of reasoned argumentation. The modernist social imaginary thus carefully 
divided public from private. As a consequence, citizens toggled between two mutually 
reinforcing subjectivities: 
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as a privatized individual, the bourgeois was two things in one: owner of goods 
and persons and one human being among others, i.e. bourgeois and homme. This 
ambivalence of the private sphere was also a feature of the public sphere, 
depending on whether privatized individuals in their capacity as human beings 
communicated through critical debate in the world of letters, about experiences of 
their subjectivity or whether private people in their capacity as owners of 
commodities communicated through rational-critical debate in the public realm, 
concerning the regulation of their private sphere. The circles of persons who made 
up the two forms of public were not even completely congruent. Women and 
dependents were factually and legally excluded from the political public sphere, 
whereas female readers as well as apprentices and servants often took a more 
active part in the literary public sphere than the owners of private property and 
family heads themselves. Yet in the educated classes the one form of public 
sphere was considered to be identical with the other; in the self-understanding of 
public opinion the public sphere appeared as one and indivisible. As soon as 
privatized individuals in their capacity as human beings ceased to communicate 
merely about their subjectivity but rather in their capacity as property-owners 
desired to influence public power in their common interest, the humanity of the 
literary public sphere served to increase the effectiveness of the public sphere in 
the political realm.64 
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the modern subject: “by day, colonizer, at night, colonized; by occupation, valorizer and administrator, during 
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giver of orders, ideologically a discussant; outwardly a follower of the reality principle, inwardly a subject oriented 
toward pleasure; functionally an agent of capital, intentionally a democrat; with respect to the system a functionary 
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So, while the public and private self might be split in practice, in theory they were seen as 
interlocking. The intimate reading and writing self generated a critical consciousness concerned 
with norms of public reason that cohered with the public self’s prurient interest in rational-
critical debate. Initially, then, the significant overlap between property ownership, a status 
cultivated publicly, and common humanity, a status cultivated privately, converged quite nicely 
for the bourgeois public sphere. Securing the private self would best be done through the public 
acquisition of property, and a private self that practiced self-reflexive criticism bolstered the 
public self. This overlap, Habermas explains, is responsible for the increase in effectiveness of 
publicity at the time.  
 As this modern social imaginary was articulated in the context of the late-18th century 
post-revolution United States, norms of impartiality and equality were “reflected, among other 
places, in the phenomenal growth of newspapers and periodicals and their circulation throughout 
the republic. A society permeated by relations of personalized hierarchy had gone over fully to 
one based on impersonal equality.”65 This was equality in theory, of course, since many were 
excluded from participation or serious consideration in public deliberation. But the feeling of 
belonging to a new nation was greatly aided by this sense that citizens were one among equals. 
This particular social imaginary situated good citizens as ones that preferred abstraction over 
particularity; reason over passion; general interest over self-interest; objectivity over 
subjectivity.66 While this preference for rational-critical debate might have increased the salience 
                                                
of reification, with respect to the Lebenswelt (lifeworld), someone who achieves self-realization;” in Critique of 
Cynical Reason, 113. 
65 Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, 152. 
66 It is important to recognize that these deliberative ideals were emerging at the same time that vigorous 
expansion in scientific inquiry was taking place; the ideals in public deliberation were largely seen as coeval with 
the ideals of scientific exploration. Steven Shapin’s A Social History of Truth (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1994) illuminates these norms of scientific discussion within English gentle culture of the 17th century. While 
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of bourgeois political power at the time, it had the intended effect of marginalizing emotion to 
the private sphere. There, it was associated strongly with women, non-whites, and the poor, who 
were seen by definition as unreasonable creatures (or worse) when they attempted to participate 
in public deliberation. 
 As the era of local print circulation gave way to national broadcast media, these values of 
the bourgeois public sphere—abstraction, disinterestedness, objectivity—found a new instrument 
in public opinion polls. George Gallup and Saul Rae, in The Pulse of Democracy, situated public 
opinion polls as a logical and necessary response to the increased complexity that characterized 
“the speed-up of the twentieth century.”67 To those who said that democracy is unworkable given 
the new circumstances of social, political, and economic life, Gallup and Rae responded that new 
techniques were simply necessary to hear public opinion—and that this was a crucial element of 
democratic governance, since “we must listen to what the people themselves have to say, for 
public opinion can only be of service to democracy if it is heard.”68 Public opinion polls were 
thus a radically democratic way to keep the administrative apparatus in touch with public 
opinion.  
New polling techniques were supposed to be the height of impartiality: a news 
organization would poll a representative sample of the public in order to get a feeling for the 
otherwise elusive ‘general will.’ A simple question, impartially asked, would presumably get a 
                                                
valuable for scientific inquiry, when applied to public political life these norms tend to operate as ill-executed ideals 
that occlude the artistry necessary for collective democratic life. That said, the convergence between the political 
and the scientific during the heyday of the bourgeois public sphere served a historically relevant purpose in adding 
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York: Simon and Schuster, 1968 [1940]), 11.  
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good sense of the cleavages in opinion that a broader public might hold. Of course, asking 
impartial questions often sorely tests pollsters, and sampling approaches are certainly not perfect. 
Today, public opinion polls have become something of a punching bag for scholars in rhetoric 
and deliberation. They are justifiably critiqued for being non-deliberative, methodologically 
flawed, and failing to account for intensity with which an opinion is held.69 For a time, though, 
they were widely seen as a usefully method to aggregate public opinion in a way that could truly 
serve democratic needs (even now, there is residual attachment to this idea with the invocation of 
public opinion polls.)  
 At this point, I should note that the particular incarnations of private and public in the 
classical Greek polis and, later, the bourgeois public sphere and American contexts, served 
useful functions for their societies and were, each in their own way, appropriately radical to their 
times if lacking for ours. In ancient Greece, the birth of democracy involved the demos in 
governance though it restrained public participation to the head of the oikos; the bourgeois public 
sphere expanded the norms of participation still further, and the American experiment in self-
governance has gradually expanded the franchise and other civil rights to better fulfill the 
promise of inclusivity in the modernist social imaginary. From a rhetorical perspective, though, 
the rigidification of public and private, with their associated norms of reason or emotion, has had 
problematic consequences. Since communication always plays out on a social field, the historical 
restriction of the public use of reason to propertied white men has privileged their 
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communicative norms. The new social movements that swept advanced liberal capitalist 
societies in the 1960s and 70s represented a challenge to these communicative norms—one that 
would begin to reverse the historical trend of undervaluing emotion in public deliberation. 
4.3 A Rhetorical Perspective on Emotion and ‘Rational-Critical Debate’ 
There is a paradox at the center of the bourgeois public sphere that a rhetorical 
perspective draws out. Traditional norms of rational-critical debate require emotions be put into a 
cognitive frame in order to be assessed for their contribution; yet, emotion can never be fully 
cognized, nor can it be cordoned off from the activity of persuasion itself. Benjamin Barber puts 
the point eloquently: “through words we convey information, articulate interests, and pursue 
arguments, but it is through tone, color, volume, and inflection that we feel, affect, and touch 
each other … [but] in politics, noncognitive speech is less appreciated, perhaps once again 
because formal rationality and liberal democracy have forged so close a partnership.”70 At the 
very heart of persuasion is a response to feeling, yet the preferred focus of liberal political 
cultures on rationality provides inadequate tools to understand how publics move from one belief 
to another. This paradox isn’t just a contradiction that collapses inward. Rather, it creates a 
situation that results in constant policing of the content of public deliberation. In order for the 
fiction of rational-critical debate to remain lionized, gatekeepers are forced to discipline emotion 
out of public deliberation.  
In the modernist social imaginary, the norms of public reason disallow arguments 
grounded in emotion to hold sway—emotions are viewed as simply too partial, subjective, and 
undebatable to be taken up in public deliberation. Impartiality is a key part of the modernist 
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structure of feeling. But, as Iris Marion Young argues, impartiality is a fiction that allows agents 
to sneak in their emotional investments under the mantle of objectivity while excluding 
difference: 
the ideal of impartiality in moral theory expresses a logic of identity that seeks to 
reduce differences to unity. The stances of detachment and dispassion that 
supposedly produce impartiality are attained only by abstracting from the 
particularities of situation, feeling, affiliation, and point of view. These 
particularities still operate, however, in the actual context of action … It is, 
moreover, an impossible ideal, because the particularities of context and 
affiliation cannot and should not be removed from moral reasoning. Finally, the 
ideal of impartiality serves ideological functions. It masks the ways in which the 
particular perspectives of dominant groups claim universality, and helps justify 
hierarchical decisionmaking structures.71 
Young’s critique of impartiality overlaps with some basic assumptions about rhetorical activity. 
All rhetorical actors are situated; as Burke would say, they are in a scene, for some purpose, 
acting with some agency. A central presumption of rhetoric is that one cannot de-situate oneself 
because one is always ensnared in a set of influential relationships. Moreover, it is impossible to 
strip oneself of all partiality because language is always imbued with emotional coloration—to 
do so is to become a computer program rather than a human. Accounts of public argument that 
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deny a role for emotion are bound to lose explanatory force, which, I argue, is exactly what is 
wrong with Lovink and Keren’s assessment of the blogosphere. 
Historically, though, this preference for impartiality and reason might well have been a 
needed over-correction at the time of the bourgeois public sphere; after all, they had suffered for 
far too long under the indecipherable whims of various monarchs and aristocratic overlords.72 
Yet, as the modernist social imaginary congealed over centuries, the split between reason and 
emotion impoverished rhetoric in the public sphere. How so? As Marie Fleming explains, the 
development of the public use of reason came at the same time that significant transformations in 
gender relations were occurring. Though the modernist social imaginary professed to be 
cultivating intimate ties based in the common humanity of all people, bourgeois intimacy was in 
reality “a camouflage for male domination.”73 Though women learned the norms of public reason 
through letter writing and literature, they were still excluded from rational-critical debate in the 
early bourgeois public sphere. This historical fact exposes the internal inconsistency of the 
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bourgeois public sphere that was supposed to be premised on inclusivity. Cheryl Glenn extends 
this analysis by noting “for the past twenty-five hundred years in Western culture, the ideal 
woman has been disciplined by cultural codes that require a closed mouth (silence), a closed 
body (chastity), and an enclosed life (domestic confinement).”74 Men, usually propertied and 
white/European, have historically been the only ones able to participate in the polis and 
deliberate about civic affairs. Women, on the other hand, have been confined to the domestic-
intimate sphere. This is certainly not to say that women did not participate in rhetorical activities 
of various types and impacts, nor is it to assume that they never received entry into public arenas. 
But the sharp lines between what was appropriate behavior in public and private served to 
rationalize their exclusion and justify their regulation by more privileged actors in society. 
This general historical trajectory was complicated in the American context. In the 
antebellum years, the social sanction of speaking to promiscuous (that is, mixed-gender) 
audiences played on the historical assumption that women were able to persuade only by 
seduction rather than by rational argument.75 This view was consolidated by religious teachings 
that asserted women should serve in the intimate sphere rather than lead in the public one. After 
the American Civil War, the ideological pressures of ‘the cult of domesticity’ and ‘true 
womanhood’ took root. As Karlyn Kohrs Campbell explains, “no ‘true woman’ could be a public 
persuader” and women who did speak in public “entered the public sphere and thereby lost their 
claim to purity and piety.”76 These ideological impulses were one way that the male professional 
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classes patrolled the rhetorical spaces to which women in the proto-feminist movement were 
beginning to demand access to. Nan Johnson has detailed the process by which, as women 
asserted their rights and desires to join in public deliberation during the post-bellum era, they 
were turned instead to private rhetorical activities in order to preserve public space as a domain 
for male voices. Instead of access to a public podium, women were sent to the parlor with an 
elocution manual. This preserved the cult of womanhood and traditional performances of 
femininity in ways that maintained most of the patriarchal social order.77  
 As a consequence of this historical development, the modernist imaginary silently 
equated publicity with masculinity and privacy with femininity. The norms of publicity, like 
impartiality, disinterestedness, and objectivity, became slowly articulated with masculine 
communication styles.78 The preference for certain ways of speaking and knowing subtly but 
powerfully empowered those acculturated to privileged codes of speech, consolidating inequities 
that were supposedly bracketed by the bourgeois public sphere.79 The rhetorical implications are 
serious and still reverberate today: cultural norms of publicity silence those on the periphery, and 
not just along axes of gendered power, but also along lines of ethnicity, nationality, class, and 
sexual orientation. 
As I explained in Chapter 1, Manuel Castells theorizes one cause for the shift from 
modernity to a network society is the impact of new social movements. The gradual erosion of 
the strict public-private divide in the latter twentieth century is one consequence of these 
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movements. In succeeding waves of feminist activity, the norms that explicitly forbade women’s 
public speech were worn down by the lapping of critique on the patriarchal shoreline. In fact, a 
core animating principle of feminism(s), amongst other new social movements, was a 
reconsideration of the traditional norms dividing public from private.80 The phrase ‘the personal 
is political’ for the feminist movement(s) of the late 1960s encapsulates the dominant challenge 
to the modernist social imaginary. This slogan emerged from an effort by mid-century feminists 
to politicize inequities borne largely out of the public eye.81 Consciousness-raising sessions were 
efforts to recognize serial links between women suffering from inequities largely felt in private 
but resulting from decisions made in public. From wage gaps to abuse issues to unfair 
educational practices, what earlier generations perceived as ‘private issues’ were eventually 
recognized as being properly ‘public.’ Feminist movement activists succeeded in politicizing 
many of these formerly ‘non-political’ issues, making the public-private divide more permeable 
and articulating a different relationship between the two that broadened the reach of social 
justice. Along with the politicization of previously ‘private’ issues were a set of revaluations of 
women’s public communication capacities. Though it would be a stretch to say that women, or 
any historically marginalized group, are on equal deliberative ground in a public arena 
dominated by masculine norms and codes, the patrolling of rhetorical space that was so 
indicative of the nineteenth century is far less tenable in the twenty-first. That such patrolling 
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maneuvers are quickly called out signals a loosening up of traditional norms that had previously 
restricted public deliberation to Reason instead of just reasons. 
I have focused my critique of rational-critical debate and impartiality on the traditional 
Habermasian model of public deliberation. Yet, I think the central critique articulated here 
extends to theorists of public deliberation working outside a Habermasian vein. In fact, I read the 
critiques lodged by Geert Lovink and Michael Keren as following an Enlightenment tradition of 
cordoning emotion off from their own preferred modes of public deliberation. Though they 
might both be loathe to admit it, I think that their critiques rely on the assumption that the 
structure of feeling associated with modernity—culturally contingent feelings like objectivity, 
dispassion, impartiality—is preferable to the structure of feeling emerging within the network 
society. As I will show, their approaches are, in fact, specifically anti-rhetorical, leaving little 
space for non-materialist accounts of political activity. After surveying their critiques, I aim to 
recuperate the productivity of emotion in public deliberation by re-reading cynicism and 
melancholy within a rhetorical frame. This read, I believe, illustrates that emotion does not 
automatically deform public deliberation, but rather focuses the attention of publics as they 
choose amongst rival discourses. 
4.4 Salam Pax and Cynicism 
In popular parlance, cynicism usually connotes bitterness, negativity, and scorn. But there 
is a longer, more sophisticated history of cynicism that captures a philosophy and attitude toward 
the world that does not rely on ‘mere negation.’ If cynicism can be said to have a beginning as a 
loosely organized orientation to the world, then that beginning is in the Greece of the classical 
rhetoricians. Diogenes of Sinope often represents the Cynics as the itinerant philosopher who 
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challenged the high theory of Plato with what Peter Sloterdijk has termed “‘dirty’ materialism.”82 
Rather than working out a complex system of the true, good, and just, Diogenes celebrated the 
pleasures of the body. To wit: in response to Plato’s “subtle theory of eros,” Diogenes 
masturbated in the public square.83 In another famous anecdote, Diogenes farts in response to 
Platonic high theory. This kind of dirty materialism as an argument strategy was built upon a 
cheeky repudiation of the overly-intellectualized idealism of Plato; rather than play along with 
what he perceived as the rationalization of societal convention and custom, Diogenes of Sinope 
adopted the ‘dog philosophy’ of cynicism and embraced embodied pleasures.84 Instead of 
following social norms and standards of decorum, Cynics would live like the animals they were: 
in the moment, pursuing pleasures, scrounging up food and shelter. They were, above all, to be 
true to themselves. Their rhetorical interventions received decidedly mixed reviews. On the one 
hand, there was obvious interest and excitement by Athenians in following the idiosyncratic 
meanderings of Diogenes: what would he say next? But the Cynics’ lack of desire to speak in a 
manner that followed the culturally acceptable norms of speech narrowed their potential 
audience and their ultimate effectiveness. 
Communication scholar Ted Windt found features of the Cynics in the counter-cultural 
protest movements of the 1960s.85 These protest movements, like Diogenes, resisted the 
conformity that appeared guaranteed by the organizational culture of mid-twentieth century 
America. One effect of the protest movements was to (re)introduce non-traditional forms of 
public address into the public sphere. Highly formalized modes of speech that, say, 
                                                
82 Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, 104-5. 
83 Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, 101. 
84 Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, 104.  
85 Theodore Windt, Presidents and Protesters: Political Rhetoric in the 1960s (Tuscaloosa, AL: University 
of Alabama Press, 1990). 
230 
Congressional testimony relies upon, controlled the argumentative terrain too tightly; part of 
what protesters were saying was that their concerns about social justice and public life could not 
be neatly translated into a dominant idiom.86  
Are bloggers 21st century cynics? Geert Lovink’s Zero Comments: Blogging and Critical 
Internet Culture begins unambiguously with a long epigraph that prefaces his linkage between 
blogging and cynicism: 
Blogging is a form of vanity publishing. You can dress it up in fancy terms, call it 
‘paradigm shifting’ or a ‘disruptive technology,’ the truth is that blogs consist of 
senseless teenage waffle. Adopting the blogger lifestyle is the literary equivalent 
of attaching tinselly-sprinkles to the handlebars of your bicycle. In the world of 
blogging ‘0 Comments’ is an unambiguous statistic that means absolutely nobody 
cares. The awful truth about blogging is that there are far more people who write 
blogs than actually read blogs.87 
Now, to be fair, Lovink’s argument is slightly more sophisticated then this long passage from a 
blogger suggests (I’ll let the irony of Lovink’s tendency to cite bloggers speak for itself). Lovink 
contests what he perceives to be the current vogue in academic scholarship about blogs to focus 
on genres and sub-genres; rather, he claims blogging involves “a techno-affect that cannot be 
reduced to the character of the individual blogger.”88 I take Lovink to mean that there is an 
associative web of emotional/affective investments that has accompanied the dissemination of 
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blogging as a mode of public communication.89 This techno-affect, for Lovink, is strongly 
influenced by cynicism. 
For Lovink, the techno-affect of cynicism is produced through a combination of cultural 
and technological practices. Lovink argues “the path to understanding blogs lies somewhere 
between an analysis of software functionalities and the early adopter culture that invented and 
shaped the blogosphere.”90 This is Lovink’s way to chart a middle path between technological 
determinism and technological naiveté; the interplay between technology and blogging culture 
generated a series of permutations that produced discrete practices with their own complex 
meanings. In general, Lovink argues that blogging is a mode of public communication that 
“appeals to a wide register of emotions and affects as it mobilizes and legitimizes the personal.”91 
Presumably, here, he is picking up on blogging’s different emotional norms when compared to 
the twentieth century broadcast media. Specifically, though, Lovink argues that blogging 
absorbed a broader cultural cynicism: 
It would be a mistake to collectively denounce bloggers as cynics. Cynicism, in 
this context, is not a character trait but a techno-social condition. The argument is 
not that bloggers are predominantly cynics by nature or conviction, or vulgar 
exhibitionists who lack understatement. It is the general culture that has become 
cynical. What is important to note is the Zeitgeist into which blogging as a mass 
practice emerged. Internet cynicism in this case would be a cultural spin-off from 
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blogging software, hardwired in a specific era. This techno-attitude results from 
procedures such as login, link, edit, create, browse, read, submit, tag, and reply.92 
‘Internet cynicism’ is thusly positioned as the most recent instantiation of cynicism in public 
culture, with blogging being its ‘killer app.’  
What does Lovink mean when he claims that the basic procedures of blogging produce a 
‘techno-attitude’ of cynicism? It might have something to do with the overlap between the 
language of blogging and the language of critique. The basic process of blogging often involves 
linking to other content and reacting to it; these reactions are often critical, registering a 
disagreement with the primary source and appending additional commentary. Comments are 
often structured as ‘replies’ that suggest a back-and-forth over an issue (contrast the language of 
‘reply’ with a potential alternative that could have been adopted; something like ‘interact’ or 
‘extend’ or ‘provide feedback.’) As Lovink claims, this process of critique quickly descends into 
a kind of spectacular show of one-upping. Of course, claiming that critique is all blogs do is 
obviously overstating the case. Blogs gained a foothold in today’s contemporary media ecology 
in part because they were able to fill in gaps in the public record and provide corrective 
mechanisms to press accounts. However, despite their flexibility to move in and out of cynical 
attitudes, it is not uncommon to see bloggers embrace cynicism: one blogger, in response to the 
suggestion that they “‘Stop Being Cynical’” responded “Do I have to? I'm a blogger, I thought it 
was in the job description.”93 
Lovink identifies the orientation of bloggers to be primarily critical, not ‘productive’ in 
the sense that they do not generate affirmative positions based on original investigations. 
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According to Lovink, “bloggers rarely add new facts to a news story. They find bugs in products 
and news reports, but rarely unmask spin, let alone come up with well-researched reports.”94 
Later, Lovink claims “what bloggers often lack is an ability to do thorough research and 
investigative journalism.”95 This claim is far too sweeping, as I have attempted to show in 
Chapter 2 on how bloggers flooded the zone in the Trent Lott case. More tellingly, it presumes a 
narrow interpretation of research and investigation: can revelations of private experience ever 
become more than confession for Lovink? Does sharing elements of private life ever count as 
appropriate for consideration in public realms? For Lovink, the only real result of criticism 
produced by blogs is to create a “dense cloud of impressions”96 and “broad associations, a 
people’s hermeneutics of news events. The computable comments of the millions can be made 
searchable and visually displayed, for instance, as buzz clouds.”97 For Lovink, blogs are more 
Monet than Rembrandt. 
Part of Lovink’s connection of blogging to cynicism is because of the nascent political 
economy of new digital technologies. ‘New Economy’ gurus latched onto blogging as a type of 
micro-public relations tool that could be employed in helping businesses develop ‘relationships’ 
with customers.98 During the dissemination stage, blogging was becoming for a select few 
individuals an economically viable form of employment and a site of branding and economic 
exchange for commercial institutions. As more attention was directed at the blogosphere, there 
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was increasing pressure on individual bloggers to distinguish themselves from the hordes of 
people rushing lemming-like into the new media form. The predictable result was a rash of “How 
to Cash in on Blogging” artifacts: books, articles, and of course entire blogs that explained that 
the way to gain an audience for your blog was to incorporate punchy headlines, short entries full 
of passion, and keyword-heavy (thus search engine-friendly) words. As Lovink puts it, “the ideal 
blog post is defined by zippy public relations technique.”99 Of course, making fun of the ways in 
which the commercial imperative dumbs down communication is grasping at pretty low hanging 
fruit. Lovink’s critique might have been tailored to for-profit blogging rather than sweeping all 
blogging under the public relations rug. Yet, he elides the differences between all blogs by 
arguing that “instead of focusing on the quality of the content, and the culture of writing, diary 
keeping, and reflection, blogs have become more of a rat race for maximum attention, measured 
in links and friends.”100 And without a doubt, some blogs must surely be open to this criticism. At 
the same time, quality and quantity are not automatically opposed, and some bloggers are more 
than happy to blog on even with zero comments. 
 To retrace Lovink’s steps: blogs have evolved within a general culture of cynicism, their 
general approach to public discourse is grounded in critique which often has a cynical edge, and 
they have been infected with the urge to gather eyeballs rather than cultivate the self. This is a 
plausible, if over-reaching, explanation of the activity of many blogs. But Lovink goes a step 
further in arguing that blogs have a sort of teleological purpose in dismantling old meaning 
structures through ‘creative nihilism’: 
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Blogs bring on decay. Each new blog is supposed to add to the fall of the media 
system that once dominated the 20th century. This process is not one of sudden 
explosion. The erosion of the mass media cannot be traced easily in figures of 
stagnant sales and the declining readership of newspapers. In many parts of the 
world television viewership is still on the rise. What is declining is the ‘Belief in 
the Message.’ That is the nihilist moment, and blogs facilitate this culture as no 
platform has ever done before. Sold by the positivists as citizen media 
commentary, blogs assist users in their crossing from truth to nothingness. The 
printed and broadcasted message has lost its aura. News is consumed as a 
commodity with entertainment value. Instead of lamenting the ideological color 
of the news, as previous generations have done, we blog as a sign of the regained 
power of the spirit. As a micro-heroic, Nietzschean act of the pajama people, 
blogging grows out of a nihilism of strength, not out of the weakness of 
pessimism. Instead of repeatedly presenting blog entries as self-promotion, we 
should interpret them as decadent artifacts that remotely dismantle the mighty and 
seductive power of the broadcast media.101 
This passage underlines the central problematic of Lovink’s pan-blogosphere theorizing. While it 
might be true that some blogs are created with the intention to undermine the existing media 
system, it’s a bit of a stretch to suggest that all blogs have this explicit purpose. If blogs are 
supposed to have a teleological impulse toward dismantling Big Media, then what are we to 
make of the fact that the New York Times now hosts numerous in-house blogs to complement 
traditional reporting? To assert that bloggers do not focus on the ideological leanings of news 
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sources is similarly hasty; in fact, many blogs are fervently dedicated to exposing the ‘liberal’ or 
‘conservative’ bias in the news. 
 More revealing is Lovink’s argument that blogs undermine the ‘Belief in the Message.’ 
He argues that blogging’s “creative nihilism … openly questions the hegemony of the mass 
media.”102 Lovink defines nihilism as “not the absence of meaning but a recognition of the 
plurality of meanings.”103 Since bloggers can present multiperspectival accounts, they “zero out 
centralized meaning structures and focus on personal experiences, not, primarily, news media.”104 
And so the personal and subjective becomes opposed to the public and objective. The traditional 
institutional media have lost their aura of authority. “Questioning the message is no longer a 
subversive act of an engaged citizenry,” Lovink explains, “but an a priori attitude, even before 
the TV or PC has been switched on.”105 Uh-oh: the hermeneutic of suspicion has permeated 
culture writ large! If we are suspicious of everything, how are we supposed to find any common 
ground? If the newspaper and other broadcast media can no longer forge imagined communities, 
where meanings are circulated in a discernable, clear fashion, how are we to imagine 
collectivities or coordinate collective action? Without the aura of authority, what use are 
newspapers at all? What is the work of the broadcast media in an age of bloggable reproduction? 
 I don’t believe it is a stretch to argue that these ‘centralized meaning structures’ were 
largely useful fictions that, even though they might have organized increasing amounts of human 
life since the invention of the printing press, were never as centralized or meaningful as Lovink 
assumes. For Habermas’ bourgeois public sphere, the development of centralized meaning 
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structures like the newspaper that were essential to the self-conception of early moderns. But 
with the decline in the saliency of organizing grand narratives associated with the postmodern 
condition, it is difficult to imagine how these traditional centralized meaning structures could 
adequately ground public life today. Mix in the increase in complexity at every level of society, 
and I think there is a fairly persuasive argument for why the centralized meaning media simply 
can no longer serve the purpose they once did. 
Now, up to this point, Lovink’s analysis might be taken as a genealogical investigation of 
the shifting cultural grounds for deliberation. However, it is difficult to escape the normative 
valuations throughout his assessment of blogging. Specifically, Lovink grounds his own critique 
of blogging in an idealized vision of dialogue: “the pushy tone is what makes blogs so 
rhetorically poor. What lacks in the software architecture is the very existence of an equal 
dialogue partner.”106 In Lovink’s assessment, blogs are so singularly focused on gathering 
attention that they end up favoring the spectacular over the deliberate. This postulation of an 
equal partner as a necessity of ‘good’ public discourse betrays a commitment to a particular 
vision of the bourgeois public sphere premised on perfectly even dialogical grounds. Lovink 
summarizes the shallowness of blogging discourse by noting that “knowledge” is no longer 
needed; “a link will do.”107 In the quick circulation of blog posts, swimming with everything else 
in the complex data stream, “the art of homemade rhetoric and the roughness of instant 
interpretation are what matter to bloggers.”108  
 And here we get to the real point: the problem with blogging is that it is so … rhetorical. 
Blogs aren’t really interested in sustaining conversations—they’re really about pushing their 
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own opinion on others through over-wrought bloviations. Bloggers get so invested in their 
‘homemade rhetoric’ that they sacrifice any true knowing. Rather than engaging the real, Lovink 
states that the “tendency to remain on the surface, touch a topic, point to an article without giving 
a proper opinion about it apart from it being worth mentioning, is widespread and is foundational 
to blogging. How many of the postings … are Socratic questioning?”109 Once again, dialectic is 
made the enemy of rhetoric. Needless to say, if the Socratic method is the gold standard, then 
most communication is severely lacking. 
 Though I disagree with some of Lovink’s propositions concerning the affective nature of 
the blogosphere, I do agree that cynicism is one regular emotional state on display in various 
blogs. It is not a permanent, determined feature of blogging as much as it is a particular voice, or 
a related set of rhetorical features. Conceiving of cynicism as a voice offers a more subtle 
reading of the types of discourse that play out through the internet. I think that it might be more 
compelling to situate a cynical voice as something that bloggers can adopt in particular situations 
for particular effects. Indeed, these effects are probably not the same as might be produced by 
Socratic questioning, but they might still be seen as drawing on a particular stylistic resource in 
order to draw attention to a particular issue. In this way, the emotional content of a particular 
discourse serves a function in hypercomplex societies. The case of Salam Pax, and the meta-
commentary that accompanied reflection on his blogging, indicates this rhetorical function of 
cynicism. 
 To draw out this rhetorical conception of cynicism, I draw on Ted Windt’s work on the 
Cynics. Because the Cynics were so critical of social convention, they split along two rhetorical 
paths. The first path led to “withdrawal and silence;” whereas the second path sought to redeem 
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fellow citizens through diatribes that “dramatize[d] their criticism of society.”110 For Windt, the 
diatribe contests some basic notions about public speech-making. Whereas conventional public 
speeches then and now appeal to common assumptions, beliefs, and logical forms in an attempt 
to forge bonds of identification with an audience, practitioners of the diatribe reject these 
strategies as kowtowing too much to societal norms. In contrast, “the diatribe … is moral 
dramaturgy intended to assault sensibilities, to turn thought upside-down, to turn social mores 
inside-out, to commit in language the very barbarisms one condemns in society.”111 Diatribes are 
often long monologues, invoke fables and fabulations, are populated with jokes and ridicule, and 
trade in absurdities and inversions. And they are intensely personal—diatribes often speak from 
personal experience in order to engage in sense-making of the world. The central topoi of 
cynicism is the opposition between nature and social convention; the ur-Cynic Diogenes was an 
“absolute humanist” who resisted the tempering of the human spirit by social customs and 
institutions.112  
 The diatribe finds its way, in one form or another, into virtually every medium (talk radio 
and cable news offer plenty of examples). It is not surprising, then, that the diatribe found a 
home in the blogosphere. With push-button publishing of personal pet peeves so easily available, 
some bloggers quickly identified with the diatribe as form. Of course, not all blogging is ranting; 
but bloggers do selectively engage in the genre of the diatribe. Sometimes, bloggers explicitly 
cue their audience that a diatribe (or a rant) is coming. Readers are, presumably, supposed to take 
those posts with a grain of interpretive salt.  
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On Monday, March 16, 2003—four days before military operations were to commence—
Salam Pax’s blog explicitly used this cueing strategy. RANT, capitalized and bold, begins the 
post. “No one inside Iraq is for war (note I said ‘war,’ not a ‘change of regime’),” begins the 
post.113 In the first sentence, Salam Pax has situated himself clearly. He is no patsy of Saddam 
Hussein. His parenthetical explanation is a gentle rebuke to some proponents of the war who 
suggested that questioning the rationale for war necessarily meant an endorsement of Saddam 
Hussein’s brutal rule. He continues: 
No human being in his right mind will ask you to give him the beating of his 
life—unless you are a member of Fight Club, that is—and if you do hear Iraqis (in 
Iraq, not expat) saying ‘Come on, bomb us!’ it is the exasperation and ten years of 
sanctions and hardship talking. There is no person inside Iraq who will be 
jumping up and down asking for the bombs to drop. We are not suicidal, you 
know—not all of us in any case.114 
Three allusions operate in concert with the central point Salam is making about how no one in 
Iraq wants war. First, the reference to the late 1990s film Fight Club operates as a brutal analogy 
that, given the popularity of the film and the likely readership of the blog, is about as close to a 
global commonplace as can exist. It functions as an allegory, in Hariman’s sense, that doesn’t 
operate on an overly cognitive level. Rather, it functions as an enthymeme that relies on an 
audience’s knowledge and emotional response to the film for its intelligibility. Second, the 
parenthetical aside distinguishes Iraqi expatriates from citizens living in Iraq, suggesting that 
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Iraqi emigrees who argue for invasion speak from a point of privilege as ones who don’t have to 
live through the bombing. The figures of Ahmed Chalabi, the plugged-in Iraqi expat supporting 
intervention, and Salam Pax, billed as an ‘ordinary Iraqi’ on his book cover, could not be more 
different—and that difference, Salam argues, should shape the way readers interpret the 
credibility of advocates for war. He is there, on the ground, taping his windows shut so that 
incoming bombs don’t shatter glass into his family’s home while some deep-pocketed 
neoconservatives at a fancy Washington, D.C. fundraiser were feting Chalabi.115 Finally, the last 
sentence is a not so subtle nudge to those that stereotype all ‘Arabs’ as ‘terrorists.’ These 
allusions provide qualifications to the central claim being advanced by Salam Pax, that humans 
do not want violence visited upon themselves or their community.  
 With this setup, Salam moves into the body of the rant, a simmering exposition of the 
history of Iraq and the failures of the international community after the First Gulf war in the 
early 1990s. He explains his judgments in very personal terms: 
I think that the coming war is not justified (and it is very near now, we hear the 
war drums loud and clear—if you don’t, then take those earplugs off!). The 
excuses for it have been stretched to their limits they will almost snap. A decision 
has been made sometime ago that ‘regime change’ in Baghdad is needed and 
excuses for the forceful change have to be made. I do think war could have been 
avoided. Not by running back and forth the last two months, that’s silly. But the 
whole issue of Iraq should have been dealt with differently since the first day after 
Gulf War I.116 
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Salam articulates a widely held view among opponents of the war that the pretexts for invasion 
were flimsy justifications for a decision that had been made immediately after the events of 
September 11, 2001. War was being waged not for human rights but to pursue some hidden 
imperative (for oil, for empire, for revenge; among many other possibilities). This paragraph 
begins a complex analysis of post-Gulf War Iraq, blaming the “international community” for the 
sanctions regime that led Hussein to consolidate power and stall democratic movements.117 This 
type of historical analysis is important, and certainly relevant; yet, it is not clear what Salam Pax 
hopes to achieve by this excursus. After all, knowing ‘how we got here’ was unlikely to silence 
war’s drumbeat. No audience has the power to turn back time and right the wrongs of the last 
decades. In the context of a rant, though, this decision makes perfect sense: Salam Pax is not 
attempting to propose a course of action, he is aiming to shock his readers and introduce 
perspectives that had been under-represented in public debate about the war. 
 This is precisely the purpose of the diatribe. As Windt explains, the primary goal of the 
diatribe is simply to shock in order to focus attention. This attention is not for self-
aggrandizement but is “the first step towards rearranging perspectives.”118 Salam Pax highlights 
the hypocrisy that he perceives in an attempt to further shock: 
What is bringing on this rant is the question that has been bugging me for days 
now: how could ‘support democracy in Iraq’ come to mean ‘bomb the hell out of 
Iraq’? Why did it end up that democracy won’t happen unless we go to war? 
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Nobody minded an un-democratic Iraq for a very long time. Now people have 
decided to bomb us into democracy? Well, thank you! How thoughtful.119 
The first question, about how ‘supporting democracy’ had become equated with ‘bomb Iraq’ in 
public discourse, invokes the double-talk made famous by another famous cynic, George Orwell. 
Salam draws attention to what he perceives as the ultimate in Orwellianism: democracy, a 
method for sustaining peace, has been transposed into war, an agency of violence. The harm 
involved in this dramatic transposition is, for Salam Pax, compounded by the international 
community’s hypocrisy. Salam asserts that the international community propped up Hussein for 
years in order to counterbalance Iran’s regional power with no concern for the internal 
democracy of Iraq.120 In his view, democracy promotion was not an actionable reason for 
intervention over the past decades, so Iraqis were rightfully suspicious about why now was a 
good time for military action to depose Hussein. If cynicism can be said to have a flashpoint, 
then it is hypocrisy. A cynic cannot stand when others say one thing and do another, preferring 
one to just do what one will do and, like a dog, make no apologies for it. For Salam Pax, the 
invocation of human rights and democracy as rationales for war smack of double-standards; the 
international community doesn’t wage war on every nation-state that abuses a citizenry, so 
human rights rhetoric must be a mask for other, likely more pernicious, intentions. 
 It’s worth highlighting how Salam Pax punctures this identified hypocrisy in order to 
suggest something about rhetorical style in the blogosphere.  Salam wrote “now people have 
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decided to bomb us into democracy? Well, thank you! How thoughtful.” Bitter irony, a hint of 
sarcasm; the tonality of this concluding sentence cannot be described by recourse to these 
traditional descriptions of the sound of cynicism. This tonality, which seems to appear on blogs 
across a wide spectrum of genres, is best described as ‘snark.’ Snark, a portmanteau that 
collapses snide and remark, is often used to characterize quick quips that puncture an argument 
or offer a dismissive aside. Lovink cites the online Urban Dictionary for a definition of snarky 
language: “contains quips or comments containing sarcastic or satirical witticisms intended as 
blunt irony. Usually delivered in a manner that is somewhat abrupt and out of context and 
intended to stun and amuse.”121 The term has become particularly attached to blogging 
communities, as it captures the sometimes terse and pointed nature of some blog commentary.122 
The opposite of snark, Lovink argues, is emo (shorthand for ‘emotional’), a style that is closely 
related to melancholy and which I will turn to in the next section. Snark is the specific rhetorical 
style enacted while blogging in a cynical voice. 
 This particular rant by Salam continues with an explanation of the problems that inhered 
in the international community’s approach to post-Gulf War I Iraq. In suggesting “the situation 
in Iraq could have been solved in other ways,” he identifies the semi-autonomous region of 
northern Iraq as an exemplar that could have been replicated in southern Iraq.123 He also gives a 
lengthy indictment of economic sanctions as tools of foreign policy. Salam argues that “sanctions 
made the Iraqi people hostages in the hands of this regime; tightened an already tight noose 
around our necks. A whole nation, a proud and learned nation, was devastated not by war, but by 
                                                
121 Lovink, Zero Comments, 35. For more on snark, see Vanessa Grigoriadis, “Everybody Sucks: Gawker 
and the Rage of the Creative Underclass,” New York, October 15, 2007, http://nymag.com/news/features/39319/. 
122 Lovink suggests that snark is the result of “the lack of time of the writer, who soon must give his or her 
attention to work tasks” (36).  
123 Salam Pax, Clandestine Diary, 120. 
245 
sanctions.”124 Ostensibly, the sanctions were supposed to prevent Saddam Hussein’s regime from 
acquiring commercial products (like fertilizers or pesticides) that could be adapted to military 
ends. To this general claim, Salam delivers the following rejoinder: 
And can anyone tell me what the sanctions really did about weapons? Get real. 
There are always willing nations who will help; there are always organizations 
which will find his money sweet. Oil-for-Food? Smart Sanctions? Get a clue. 
Who do you think is getting all those contracts to supply the people with ‘food’? 
Who do you think is heaping money in bank accounts abroad? It is his people, his 
family, and the people who play his game.125 
In this passage, another theme of cynicism becomes manifest. Institutions, for the cynic, are self-
serving creatures more interested in their own perpetuation than in cultivating individuals.126 Any 
cynic would find fertile material in dissecting institutional prerogatives and profit stakes in the 
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controversial Oil-for-Food program.127 In this case, Salam constructs the sanctions program as an 
enormous shell game, which, given the scandals that had emerged with the Oil-for-Food 
program, was in many ways an apt description. Though the Oil-for-Food program was set up by 
the United Nations to provide some relief from economic sanctions (the program allowed Iraqi 
oil to be sold in order to raise revenue that could in turn be used to ease the humanitarian crisis in 
Iraq), Salam sees it as just another way that Saddam Hussein, the he who is not named in this 
excerpt, was able to game the system. The skepticism that Salam Pax and other Iraqis had about 
their impending ‘liberation’ is more understandable with this backdrop: past interventions by the 
international community had only tightened Hussein’s authoritarian grip. 
 Despite Salam Pax’s reasons for being doubtful about the impending U.S. invasion, 
critics of military intervention were caught in a difficult rhetorical situation. Those that argued 
against intervention were often painted as supporters of Hussein’s regime. The onus was on these 
opponents of war to suggest how to resolve the ‘Hussein problem.’ Salam Pax navigates this 
difficult rhetorical situation by blogging “do support democracy in Iraq, but don’t equate it with 
war. What will happen is something that could/should have been avoided. Don’t expect me to 
wear a ‘I ! Bush’ T-shirt.”128 Salam pithily severs the purported tie between democracy and 
military intervention, providing an opening for critics of the impending war to disaggregate their 
disdain for war from support for Hussein.129  
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 Salam winds up this blog post by writing “to end this rant, a word about Islamic 
fundis/wahabisim/qaeda and all that.”130 He concludes:  
Do you know when the sight of women veiled from top to bottom became 
common in cities in Iraq? Do you know when the question of segregation between 
boys and girls became red hot? When tribal law replaced THE LAW? When 
‘Wahabi’ became part of our vocabulary? It only happened after the Gulf War. I 
think it was Cheney or Albright who said they will bomb Iraq back to the Stone 
Age … Well, you did. Iraqis have never accepted religious extremism in their 
lives. They still don’t. Wahabis in their short dishdasha are still looked upon as 
sheep who have strayed from the herd. But they are spreading … They call it al 
hamla al imania (‘the religious campaign’). Of course, it was supported by the 
Government: pumping them with words like ‘poor in this life, rich in heaven’ kept 
the people quiet. Or the other side of the coin is getting paid by Wahabi 
organizations. Come pray and get paid—no joke, dead serious. If the government 
can’t give you a job, run to the nearest mosque and they will pay and support you. 
This never happened before. It’s outrageous. But what are people supposed to do? 
Their government is denied funds to pay proper wages and what they get is 
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loud enough for everyone to hear—no need for booths or secrecy” (15). The original performance here has a deadly 
seriousness about it, given the possible retaliation Salam might have faced had he voted ‘wrongly.’ Yet, when retold 
in the context of this blog post, the tale becomes an exemplar of the ridiculousness of the election itself; a 
commentary on the fraudulent excuse for democracy that Iraq had become. 
130 Salam Pax, Clandestine Diary, 121. 
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funneled into their pockets. So please stop telling me about the fundis—never 
knew what they are never would have seen them in my streets. END RANT.131 
With those concluding words, Salam presumably clicked on the ‘publish’ button and circulated 
his diatribe into the world. Compacted into this one blog post were a powerful mélange of 
cynically valenced arguments about cultural realities, social performances, historical events, and 
personal affliction.  
Salam Pax’s diatribe certainly creates a complex moral dramaturgy that focused global 
attention. But beyond gathering attention, and opening up a space for the subsequent 
rearrangement of perspectives that Windt identified as a counterpart to shock, “the diatribe 
diminishes in usefulness. People demand serious remedies, seriously treated. Moral dramaturgy 
must give way to conventional rhetorical forms.”132 As a genealogy of events, Salam’s diatribe 
might have provided helpful context, but it did little to suggest what we should do now that we 
are here. From one direction, I think it is reasonable to see how Lovink’s critique of cynicism 
fits in here: Salam’s personalized history of Iraq might be accused of being pushy, idiosyncratic, 
naïve, and self-promotional. But we should also recognize how his cynicism draws attention to 
hypocrisy, the inadequacies of institutional reasoning, and humanist values of nonviolence. 
What, then, can be said about the effect of all this cynical rhetoric? Obviously, adducing 
effect is too difficult to conclusively articulate. One consequence of the network society’s 
production of multiple publics, each playing their own language game and with their own 
idiosyncratic reading strategies, is to problematize this kind of reception claim. However, the 
traditional role of the diatribe suggests some possibilities that seem to be confirmed in the 
                                                
131 Salam Pax, Clandestine Diary, 121-2. 
132 Windt, “Diatribe,” 8-9. 
249 
institutional press commentary about Salam’s blog. Windt argues that the diatribe functions for 
rhetoric much the same way that satire functions for literature,  
to reduce conventional beliefs to the ridiculous, thereby making those who 
support orthodoxy seem contemptible, hypocritical, or stupid. Each seeks 
laughter, but not for its own sake. Rather, laughter serves as a cleansing force to 
purge pre-conceptions about ideas, to redeem ignored causes, to deflate 
pomposity, to challenge conventional assumptions, to confront the human 
consequences of ideas and policies.133  
Effective diatribes illuminate the ridiculousness of social convention, the absurdity of certain 
beliefs, and the contours of power. As Sloterdijk suggests, cynics “provoke a climate of satirical 
loosening up in which the powerful, together with their ideologists of domination, let go 
affectively—precisely under the onslaught of the critical affront.”134 Rhetorical interventions by 
cynics, then, produce an open affective space that enables alternative, sublimated, or under-
appreciated feelings to find voice.  
 Indeed, if the coverage of Salam Pax’s blog in the print news media is any sign, then it 
seems that Salam Pax was at least partially successful in loosening up the rhetorical atmosphere.  
His writing was lauded for the “strength of its voice, the fluency of its wit and the even-handed 
scabrousness of its political invective.”135 Salam Pax was “amusing, cynical, worldly and 
passionate, it's perhaps the best example of the power the Internet wields: in this media culture 
dominated by massive corporate news organizations, the reporting convention of one-to-many 
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can be subverted by a personal, global conversation.”136 Some commentators picked up on the 
fact that the blog showed “Pax didn't fit into the stereotype of the Iraqi … He seemed just like us. 
He was gifted in English, wrote freely about his CD collection (including an obsession with 
David Bowie and Coldplay), was as critical of Saddam's regime as he was about the US-led 
invasion … [and] writes with a disarmingly jaunty campness of style.”137 Salam’s accounts of the 
war were “riveting”138 and a fresh alternative to the “sanitized network TV coverage.”139 His 
posts were described as “fascinating and haunting in their detail.”140 Dear Raed, most of all, was 
described as a collection of “compelling musings” that drew an ever-increasing audience to the 
blog.141 The blog “gained a cult following before the war as increasing numbers of internet 
readers turned to him for a fresh and revealing perspective of life in Baghdad.”142  
Salam Pax’s cynical cheekiness apparently drew attention to the deadly realities of war. 
As one commentator noted, “beneath the jokey tone … is an underlying fear that is one of the 
great strengths of the diary. Pax lets us know exactly what it was like waiting for the bombs to 
drop.”143 It would be too easy—and too easy to provide counter-examples—to argue that the 
visceral, personal nature of Salam Pax’s blogging totally transformed public discourse about the 
war. Of course it didn’t. What it did do was draw attention to another aspect of the war in Iraq—
not the political wranglings between the Bush Administration and the Hussein regime and the 
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United Nations and other allies; not the military technologies and strategies; not the economic 
motives and oil resources potentially up for grabs. Instead, the blog represented one person’s 
struggle to make sense out of the ongoing chaos. It was an allegory that demonstrated the costs 
of war.  
Perhaps the cynicism displayed by Salam Pax did divest centralized meaning structures 
of their import; perhaps it did multiply perspectives beyond manageability (especially as a wave 
of Iraqi bloggers followed in his wake). But, as I hope to have shown here, if one looks at 
cynicism as a particularly stylized voice that emerges in specific rhetorical situations with 
focused rhetorical effects, one might recuperate cynicism from Lovink’s critique. The cynical 
voice allowed Salam Pax to tack between critiques of the Bush Administration’s case for war 
and Saddam Hussein’s authoritarian rule. This even-handedness opened a space for more 
complex considerations about war and peace. What Salam’s cynical voice did was to provide a 
counter-narrative to the impending war and draw attention to the daily struggles of Iraqis. While 
mere attention is no guarantee for the rearranging of perspectives that Windt identifies as being 
the ultimate effect of cynical rhetoric, it is certainly a necessary beginning to any such process. 
4.5 Salam Pax and Melancholy 
Lovink’s claim that the blogosphere is structured by cynicism is paralleled by Michael 
Keren’s study of the melancholic tendencies of bloggers. Like cynicism, melancholy is a 
contested term. It either invokes a sense of quiet self-reflection or a debilitating grief. In popular 
discourse, melancholy is often associated with sadness, pensiveness, gravity, and sobriety. Also 
like cynicism, melancholy has a long tradition that finds a unique articulation in classical Greek 
culture and has since moved through world cultures. Unlike cynicism, though, melancholy has 
been undertheorized for its rhetorical features as a voice. Little study has been done on the 
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purpose, form, topoi, styles, representative figures, and effects of melancholic rhetoric in the 
field of communication.144 This section sketches a brief history of melancholy, explains Michael 
Keren’s linkage of melancholy to the intercastings of the blogosphere, and interprets the 
melancholic voice emerging from Salam Pax’s blog. 
Melancholy, as a complex constellation of affective responses, has regularly been 
theorized in western culture since the Greeks of classical times. Aristotle (or a close follower of 
Aristotle’s—precise authorship is disputed), noted in the Problemata Physica: 
Why is it that all those who have become eminent in philosophy or politics or 
poetry or the arts are clearly of an atrabilious temperament, and some of them to 
such an extent as to be affected by diseases caused by black bile, as is said to have 
happened to Heracles among the heroes?145  
‘Black bile’ literally translates as ‘melancholia;’ it was one of the four humors along with yellow 
bile, phlegm, and blood that dominated ancient through medieval medicine. Each humor was 
produced by a particular body part and the ancient ideal was to achieve balance between all four. 
Yet, Aristotle, in this passage, connects the excess of black bile—or melancholia—to excellence 
in philosophy, politics, and other arts. For the writer of the Problemata, melancholics appear to 
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be particularly adept at translating their quiet interior moments into incisive perceptions. This 
observation coheres with the persistent stereotype that true artists carry within them some very 
dark corners that are necessary requirements for their brilliance (the so-called ‘Woody Allen 
gene’).146 While humoral theory appears awfully antiquated now, it presented a plausible 
explanation for different personalities and health until the advent of ‘modern’ medicine proved it 
untenable. Though humoral theory was displaced, melancholy, conceived as an occasionally 
helpful reflective state, continued to find prominence in texts and public thought in different 
historical eras and intellectual movements. Despite the presence of the lament in various 
literatures and social rituals throughout various cultures, however, melancholy never cultivated a 
collective of thinkers to do for melancholy what the Cynics did for cynicism, perhaps explaining 
its underappreciated history as a unique affective orientation. 
 In cultures impacted by classical Greek thought, melancholy was largely considered a 
‘necessary’ emotion that, when balanced with other matured affective responses, produced a 
balanced person at the mean of emotional life. The regular presence of melancholic attitudes was 
no threat to human affairs. In fact, melancholy was largely conceived as an emotion that 
deepened the sense of one’s self and one’s social world—it functioned, as Emily Brady and Arto 
Haapala note, as an educative emotion because “as an emotion, melancholy's most distinctive 
aspect is that it involves reflection. Rather than being an immediate response to some object that 
is present to perception, melancholy most often involves reflection on or contemplation of a 
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memory of a person, place, event, or state of affairs.”147 It is with this spirit that Keats referred to 
melancholy as “the wakeful anguish of the soul” in “Ode on Melancholy” in 1819.148  
The wakeful anguish of Keats’ melancholy signals the key tension of melancholy: 
alertness to the world pitted against the anxiety of knowing. Social creatures want to know 
what’s happening in the world, but knowledge is only power if it doesn’t prevent one from 
getting out of bed. Put another way, wakeful anguish involves an oscillation between intensified 
perception of social realities and political quietism. “Melancholy,” philosopher Max Pensky 
explains, “is a source of critical reflection that, in its ancient dialectic, empowers the subject with 
a mode of insight into the structure of the real at the same time as it consigns the subject to 
mournfulness, misery, and despair.”149 Melancholy thereby produces “heightening or 
intensification of a certain power of spiritual perception or insight into the nature of the 
world.”150 In this understanding of melancholy, melancholics gain more sophisticated insights to 
their social world by developing a more nuanced vocabulary to communicate their reflections. 
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This isn’t to fetishize melancholy, especially as it slides down the spectrum toward depression. 
Rather, it is to situate melancholy as a reflection-inducing mood that, by encouraging fullness of 
preoccupation with an object, encourages the development of an increasingly evocative 
rhetorical palette.151 
This process between interior thought and exterior publication, this “dialectical vigor” of 
melancholy, is characterized by 
the representation of the simultaneity of otherwise rigorous heterogenous 
properties of the human experience of the world, characterized above all by the 
combination of properly transcendental insights into a realm of ultimate reality 
with the most immanent and ‘creaturely’ preoccupations with the physical or 
private … The melancholic’s sadness is at once private and also derived from the 
objective status of the cognized world; conversely, the cognized world is at once 
objectively present and also synthesized under the sign of infinite sadness.152   
The melancholic faces a problem inherent in the art of rhetoric: every attempt at representation 
oversimplifies a rich lifeworld but is simultaneously necessary in order to generate any 
contingent truths to coordinate human action.153 
 Though the dialectical vigor of melancholy was historically recognized, in more 
contemporary times it has fallen on hard times. In the early part of the twentieth century, Freud 
effectively pathologized melancholy, most prominently in his 1915 essay ‘Mourning and 
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Melancholia.’ For Freud, melancholia was to be understood in contradistinction to mourning, a 
natural process characterized by “the reaction to the loss of a loved person, or to the loss of some 
abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one’s country, liberty, and ideal, and so on. 
In some people the same influences produce melancholia instead of mourning and we 
consequently suspect them of a pathological disposition.”154 For Freud, mourning is work that the 
ego must do to detach itself from the loss in order to continue on with life; melancholy is 
produced when the detachment process persists beyond a reasonable time. Freud explains that  
the distinguishing mental features of melancholia are a profoundly painful 
dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity to love, 
inhibition of all activity, and a lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a degree 
that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-revilings, and culminates in a 
delusional expectation of punishment.155 
Freud centers the phenomenon of melancholy squarely on the “disturbance of self-regard” which 
is absent in mourning—mourning otherwise contains these same enumerated features.156 This 
Freudian interpretation set late modern public culture down a crooked path that has found a 
terminus in the medicalization of melancholy by mood-management pharmaceuticals. 
Lost in the post-Freudian consideration of melancholy was an appreciation for its 
dialectical nature. Rhetoric produced from a melancholic standpoint has consequently been 
undervalued. Recent efforts to counter the Freudian line on melancholy have been led by 
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performance studies scholars like José Muñoz. Muñoz has attempted to de-pathologize Freud’s 
view of melancholy, proposing “a view of melancholia not as a pathology or as a self-absorbed 
mood that inhibits activism, but rather as a mechanism that helps us (re)construct identity and 
take our dead into battles we must wage in their names—and in our names.”157 In this view, 
feelings of melancholy encourage reflection on self and collective identities, paths taken and not, 
and differing perspectives on social reality. Muñoz’s attempt to recuperate melancholy returns to 
a more robust theorization of melancholy as a possible source for identification and critical 
memory.  
Michael Keren’s Blogosphere: The New Political Arena extends the Freudian 
pathologization of melancholy into the blogosphere. He begins with a series of instances when 
blogging apparently had “direct political impact,” including the Trent Lott affair and Salam 
Pax’s rhetorical interventions.158 Keren is after four key questions: (1) what is the impact of 
virtual personas filtering through the daily news for relatively small audiences? (2) can blogs 
function as watchdogs given the absence of traditional journalistic standards? (3) does the 
blurring of public and private influence global discourse patterns and (4) how are the value 
structures in the blogosphere different from offline communities? The framing of the research 
questions guides Keren down what I think are ultimately unsupportable paths (for example, the 
distinction between offline/online communities is no longer a particularly tenable way to 
conceive of politics mediated through the internet.) Keren has a very particular model of politics 
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in mind—a politics seemingly grounded, as I will show, in a structuralist vision of sociopolitical 
organization that envisions something like citizens bowling together before taking to the streets 
in protest. This is a narrow and historically contingent approach to politics that has been 
supplemented by the modes of political participation accompanying internetworked 
communication. 
 Despite what I perceive to be a series of wrong-headed assumptions that ground Keren’s 
work, his method of analysis is well-suited to the blogosphere. Keren argues that blogging can be 
seen as a natural evolution of “life writing,” a genre that can be subdivided into 
“autobiographies, memoirs, confessions, spiritual quests, meditations, personal essays, travelogs, 
autobiographical short-stories and novels; portraits, complaints, conceptual writings, works of 
humor and family histories.”159 Such a wide range of generic forms effectively, if inexhaustively, 
captures the plurality of writings that appear on blogs. This approach holds promise because 
bloggers so often celebrate their own life writing as an emancipatory process of self-revelation 
and connection with others.160 The link between life-writing and emancipation has roots in 
Habermas’ conception of the bourgeois public sphere caught up in the world of letters; Keren 
notes that blogs might connect individuals to the “public arena” in the same way that salons and 
coffeehouses did.161 
 It is here that Keren begins to sound a cautionary note. The similarities between blogging 
and the bourgeois public sphere do not necessarily flow down to the norms and practices of each: 
the blogosphere is “the arena in which new political modes, norms, and forms of action and 
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inaction are emerging.”162 These modes, norms, and forms, Keren suggests, are grounded in a 
melancholic attitude that short-circuits what he considers to be fruitful democratic politics. Keren 
writes “this new arena can be characterized by a unique combination of the fresh voice of 
emancipation and a deep sense of withdrawal and rejection.”163 Rather than the kind of 
enlightenment that the break with Church doctrine represented for the bourgeois public sphere, 
the emancipation provided by blogging ushers in a kind of melancholy. 
 Melancholy, for Keren, is the “‘unappeasable attachment to an ungrievable loss.’”164 
Keren follows the Freudian tradition of melancholy theorizing, emphasizing the “fall in self-
esteem” produced by either real or imagined lacks.165 He cites Freud’s description of 
melancholics as shameless talkers about their own condition: 
Shame before others, which would characterize this condition above everything, 
is lacking in him [sic], or at least there is little sign of it. One could almost say 
that the opposite trait of insistent talking about himself and pleasure in the 
consequent exposure of himself predominates in the melancholic.166 
Personal disclosures, then, become signals of melancholy. Keren goes on to argue that 
“melancholy is not only a psychological condition but can also be seen as a form of social 
withdrawal stemming from the loss of a solid normative base, especially the solid base provided 
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by the universalized ‘I’ of the enlightenment.”167 Here is the boldest articulation of a modernist 
sensibility by Keren: only from the position of the unified liberal subject can one begin to 
envision collective political action. 
 Though melancholy has traditionally been situated within a dialectical movement 
between withdrawal and insight, Keren suggests that the networked citizen severs this dialectical 
connection. As he explains, this “critical insight [into the real] is not, as in the case of the 
enlightened person, constructive and active but destructive and passive.”168 Keren implicates 
blogging in the peculiar downward spiral of melancholy: 
The politics of blogosphere is melancholic not because it lacks joy, triumph and 
exultation but because when these emotions, like any other feelings, thoughts, or 
activities are present, their relation to real life is incidental. Blogosphere involves 
journalism without journalists, affection without substance, community without 
social base, politics without commitment. It replaces action by talk, truth by 
chatter, obligation by gesture, and reality by illusion. Millions of individuals write 
their lives while giving up on them, if only because of the long hours they spend 
at their computers … Bloggers assert an individuality that gets lost in the need for 
approval by others, for it requires quite an effort to get one’s blog posted on other 
bloggers’ lists of favorites. They speak the truth without clear standards about 
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what speaking truth on the Internet means, do good and refrain from evil in virtual 
reality, and often turn into political activists without leaving home.169 
Keren crystallizes several prominent critiques of blogging in this short passage: bloggers are 
‘virtual,’ not ‘real’; the lack of institutional structure makes blogging a token of real change; 
blogs are hot air, not concerned with the tough reality of action; bloggers type away their lives 
rather than living them; they are self-promotional sycophants and armchair activists.170 Much like 
Lovink’s critique of blogging as not living up to Socratic norms, Keren’s indictment of blogging 
can also be applied to virtually every other form of human communication. Hours spent 
watching television (even if it is the ‘news’), talking on the phone (even if it is about ‘politics’), 
or listening to the radio (even if it is ‘public’), may appear wasted when perceived as a strict 
tradeoff with twentieth century modes of social protest. But those kinds of talk might have other 
positive repercussions, say, in strengthening the social fabric of a group or in clarifying one’s 
own beliefs. Keren’s zero-sum approach to blogging ignores the fact that social networking, 
often produced through multiple layers of mediation, sometimes does and sometimes does not 
trade off with other types of political engagement. Public communication emanating from the 
blogosphere, like other mediated communication, produces a variety of different and complex 
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affective and cognitive effects that engage people in a multiplicity of ways and to a variety of 
ends. 
 The type of politics that Keren prefers becomes evident as he continues:  
This notion of civil society stands in contrast to melancholic politics as it emerges 
in the blogosphere. The latter is filled with nicknames rather than people, a 
fetishism of ideas rather than a presentation of interests, solipsistic discourse 
rather than an orderly exchange, and a lack of clear frameworks of social 
obligation and political responsibility.171  
The end result? “Political passivity,” “fake communal relations,” “verbal fetishism.”172 For 
Keren, blogging is the new false consciousness. In response to those that situate internet-fueled 
public discourse as a site for public deliberation, Keren writes “society is not a ‘great debate’ but 
a concrete network of relations steered by political elites, bureaucratic routines, economic 
interests, and cultural industries. None of these is significantly affected by online or offline 
discourse.”173 And so Keren finally comes clean: politics is neatly sealed off from discourse. It is 
a hermetically-sealed field of power relations that requires exclusive attention to materialist 
practice and eschews discourse as the result of some sort of superstructural epiphenomena that 
does not—can not—impact the structural phenomena of ‘politics’ itself.  
 While I obviously hold little sympathy for Keren’s narrow interpretation of political 
activity, Keren’s linkage of melancholy and the blogosphere can be partially recuperated through 
a more complex interpretation of melancholy that captures the dialectical movement within this 
particular emotion-formation. In many ways, Keren’s diagnosis of melancholy in the 
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blogosphere is an apt analysis of Salam Pax’s blog; there are certainly some melancholic 
moments (though if any blogger ever had a good excuse to be melancholic, it was Salam Pax). 
He was literally waiting for the most powerful military the world had ever seen to attack his 
country with the promise of ‘shock and awe.’ However, I read these melancholic moments as 
employing a particular voice, united by shared rhetorical features that function to draw attention 
to the grim realities of warfare as experienced by those civilians in war zones. What are the 
rhetorical features of a melancholic voice? If the diatribe is the natural form to express cynicism, 
then what is the conventional form for melancholic rhetoric? What are the central topoi of 
melancholic rhetoric? Are there recurring rhetorical techniques utilized by a melancholic voice? 
What is the purpose of adopting a melancholic voice? Does it have a particular style? Finally, 
what effect does it have on audiences?  
First, the form that melancholic rhetoric most often takes is the lament. In the classical 
Greek tradition, ritual laments were the traditional forms of speech dedicated to gods and fallen 
heroes, destroyed cities, and the dead.174 They were often formal, collective, and unified speech 
acts that aided mourners in their transition through the cycle of grief while solidifying a society’s 
collective memory. Contemporary laments reflect the post-parenthetical norms of networked 
culture. Salam Pax’s laments are comparatively informal, individually produced, and dispersed 
throughout his blog posts. His lamentations are not done for a necessarily ritual purpose; they 
are, if anything, lamentations of the everyday.175 Despite these contrasts in form, there is some 
continuity in the essential topoi and function of the premodern and the networked lament.  
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Some of the most melancholic moments occur when Salam Pax describes the daily 
hardships endured by Iraqis. Occasionally he writes a passage that underlines the dramatic 
conditions in Iraq: 
For how much would you sell your kidney? Salah sold his for $250. His fiancée 
sold hers as well, for the same price. They’ve been engaged for a while and they 
needed the $500 (that’s equivalent to a million Iraqi dinars) to build two extra 
rooms in his parents’ house for them to live in. I know this because a relative of 
mine was the buyer. Breathe in. Change the subject.176 
Though the economic and medical hardships of Iraqi citizens, caused in part by the international 
sanctions regime, were well documented, Salam Pax’s blog reveals a particularly personal side to 
these affronts to human dignity. And the closer war came, the more melancholic Salam became. 
In November, Salam writes “my favorite headline until now is from Reuters: WORLD SEES 
CHANCE FOR PEACE; IRAQ MUM ON UN VOTE. Funny, the world sees peace, while I have 
to prepare a bomb shelter in my house. If you need me, I’m hiding under my bed until this is 
over.”177 Later that month, he makes his concern for the future of Iraq clearer, invoking images of 
a future Baghdad: “I worry about what will happen during the attacks and I worry more about 
what will happen afterwards. I take walks in parts of the old city and I can’t stop thinking ‘Will 
this be still there this time next year?’ You are right; on an emotional level I cannot and will not 
accept a war on Iraq.”178 Pax makes no cognitive defense of his reaction here, he explicitly 
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acknowledges that his affective reaction is his only justification and assumes that his audience 
might understand why that was enough explanation.  
Like the diatribe, which is intended to shock the sensibilities of listeners in order to 
facilitate the rearranging of perspective, these laments are jolting. They confirm what many 
readers of the blog might have imagined life was like in Iraq during this time, and undoubtedly 
reveal to others the difficulties of preparing for invasion. One purpose of melancholic rhetoric is 
to provide a concrete counter-narrative to the abstract discourses that often dominate the public 
sphere during wartime. This was a role of the lament in ancient Greece. Ritual lamentation by 
women was “seen as a potential threat to the orderly functioning of the male public sphere and as 
undermining the heroic male code of military glory” by reminding the society of the all-to-real 
human costs of violence.179 Salam Pax’s blog functions as a counterpoint to the militaristic 
justifications for war by sharing with readers intimate details of the travails of life in Iraq. The 
lament thus serves a role roughly analogous to ancient laments. Contemporary broadcast news 
often reports war as a “clinical game” that focuses on abstract numbers and new weaponry, 
whereas “personal accounts insist that their readers make those painfully banal but crucial 
connections” about human costs of war.180 Indeed, much individually produced web-based 
discourse counters the “seamless narrative carapace” constructed by governments and corporate 
news by introducing conflicting accounts, which force “news consumers [to] become aware of 
the language that is employed to construct” stories about war.181  
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 One way in which Salam Pax’s blog provided a counter-narrative about the impending 
war was by following the traditional topoi of the lamentation. Linda Austin has identified these 
topoi as “exclamations of ineffability and the ubi sunt, often together. As the ubi sunt catalogs 
the losses, the ineffability (or inexpressibility) topos inscribes our confrontation with the idea of 
death and absence. Both may register shock and grief through a language of trauma.”182 An 
exclamation of inexpressibility is a fairly intuitive topos, captured in the post-9/11 trope of 
‘words fail us,’ a phrase now seemingly trotted out for every major disaster. In the passage 
above, when Salam concludes the story of his cousin selling a kidney on the black market with 
‘breathe in, change the subject,’ he is performing a certain inexpressibility of injustice. In 
another post, he explicitly states his expressive inabilities to his friend Raed: 
Raed, I’m sorry but David Bowie’s song ‘I’m Afraid of Americans’ is stuck in my 
head and I can’t think of anything else to write. Actually … there is a lot to write 
about, but it doesn’t matter … Light a candle for me will you, Raed? Keeping 
myself together takes effort the last two days … and do you know what else I read 
in the New York Times? The American troops they are studying how the Israeli 
army fought in Jenin. Jenin. Remember how Jenin looked like after the siege? 
How comforting is that? Excuse me, but I need to listen to some angry-boy-music 
and bang my head against a wall and bleed; it will make me feel better, I’m sure. 
Have I told you already that I hate the world? P.S. Raed, don’t even think about 
coming to Baghdad the next couple of days/weeks. You might not be able to go 
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back to Jordan. Besides, I don’t want you here the next couple of days. I am 
planning on spending them in a drunken haze. I do not want you near me.183  
Here, that unique melancholy which is the product of living on the precipice of war is on full 
display. Inexpressibility is present at two levels. First, Salam Pax disparages his own attempts at 
blogging by noting that he can’t think of anything to blog about, and that writing would be 
meaningless anyways. Secondly, he invokes Jenin as the apparent analog to Iraq’s future, 
invoking the macabre visual evidence that he and Raed likely shared after that siege. Rather than 
explicitly articulating the details of Jenin, he lets the argument operate enthymematically with his 
intended audience of Raed and his imagined global audience, who were only an internet search 
away from understanding the unspoken premise.  
The second topoi of the lament, the ubi sunt, is a term that has fallen out of fashion but 
has significance in this context. The ubi sunt is an often-nostalgic recollection of another time, 
sometimes in a series of rhetorical questions that catalog the disappearance of valued people, 
artifacts, or moments. While the traditional ubi sunt prefaced a longer, more in–depth 
lamentation, it is much more distributed in Salam Pax’s blog. In fact, the entire blog could be 
perceived as a running catalog of injustices, missed opportunities, and imagined alternatives.  
 There are, however, some blog posts that perform the ubi sunt in a more conventional 
manner. When the comments function on his blog was still active, a commenter responded to one 
of Salam Pax’s posts by writing “now SHUT THE F--- UP and learn to appreciate us a 
little!!!”184 Salam responds: 
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  OK. Let us all have five minutes of silence to do some appreciation. 
  I appreciate the dropping of tons of bombs on my country. 
  I appreciate the depleted uranium used in those bombs. 
I appreciate the whole policy of dual containment, which kept the region 
constantly on the boil because it was convenient for the US. 
I appreciate the support the US government shows to all the oppressive 
governments in the region only to dump them after they have done what was 
needed of them. 
  I appreciate the US role in the sanctions committee. 
I appreciate its effort in making me look for surgical gloves and anaesthetic on the 
black market, just to get a tooth pulled out—because these supplies are always 
being vetoed by the sanctions committee. 
I appreciate the policies of a country which has spent a lot of time and effort to 
sustain economic sanctions that punished the Iraqi people, while it had no effect 
on Saddam and his power base, turning us into hostages in a political deadlock 
between the Iraqi government and the US government. 
I appreciate the role these sanctions had in making a country full of riches so 
poor. 
I appreciate watching my professors having to sell their whole personal libraries 
to survive, and seeing their books being bought by UN staff who take them home 
as souvenirs. 
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I have so much appreciation it is flowing out of my ears.185  
The level of detail here is extraordinary, and comes as a fusillade of injustices experienced 
personally. The rhetorical effect is amplified because of the ubi sunt formula that piles on plaint 
after plaint in response to the original prod by a commenter. 
A rhetorical technique undergirding the two central topoi of the lament is allusion. As 
classicist Margaret Alexiou explains, “part of the artistic economy in the language of folk 
tradition is the allusive method, by which a fact or idea is expressed indirectly but concretely 
through symbols.”186 In Greek culture, the allusions were usually to widely recognized natural 
phenomenon. Thus, in the ritual laments of the Greeks, there would often be references to light, 
trees, water, and nature’s cycles as complex symbolic referents that captured the passage of life 
into death.187 These allusions ground the mourning process in everyday phenomena, gaining 
persuasive power because they drew on common experiences of the natural world. Though 
allusions to these natural phenomena still abound today in melancholic rhetoric, allusion in 
highly mediatized societies just as often refers to the cultural artifacts of late capitalism like film, 
music, and virally transmitted links on the internet. In other words, contemporary melancholic 
rhetoric, like rhetoric in general, draws on a breathtaking array of shared media experiences to 
stitch together broadly allusive claims that characterize the social world. Put more simply, 
rhetors in a network society connect with their audiences and forge common ground by drawing 
on a loosely shared store of popular media. This is a strategy used to full effect by Salam Pax, 
who regularly references global popular culture artifacts in his blog posts. 
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His obsession with David Bowie songs was matched only by his interest in the band 
Coldplay. On October 3rd he blogs that he is “spiralling down fast. I have been listening to 
Coldplay’s ‘Politik’ non-stop since 9 a.m. Either the world is not worth commenting on or I am 
just plain lazy.”188 Such a (temporary) withdrawal from even talking about the world is a 
signature move of the melancholic—precisely the type of disengagement that Keren so roundly 
critiques. Yet, this post presages a series of pop culture references that frame many of Salam 
Pax’s posts, and should not be dismissed as ‘mere withdrawal’ so quickly.189 While it is 
problematic to interpret Salam’s choice of music as some sort of revelation about his inner 
thoughts, neither is it totally appropriate to dismiss as meaningless the revelation of his obsession 
with a single track. In fact, Salam will regularly interpret lyrics, explaining their significance to 
him.190 Given the revelations about Salam’s working life, this blog post spurs imagination of 
Salam sitting in front of an old computer at an architecture or design firm, with these lyrics 
looped in a repetitive cycle: 
Look at the earth from outer space 
Everyone must find a place 
Give me time and give me space 
Give me real, dont give me fake 
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Give me strength, reserve control 
Give me heart and give me soul 
Give me time, give us a kiss 
Tell me your own politik 
And open up your eyes 
Open up your eyes 
Open up your eyes 
Just open up your eyes.191  
Time, space; real, fake; strength, control; heart, soul: there may not be more traditionally 
animating concerns for melancholics. The chorus, ‘open up your eyes,’ is a wink that might 
suggest the melancholics’ superior perceptive capacities and others’ inability to ‘see’ what was 
going on around them. Salam Pax’s lyrical obsessions underline Steven Himmer’s claim that 
“every weblog can be considered literary in the sense that it calls attention not only to what we 
read, but also to the unique way we read it.”192 Obviously, we’ll never know what these lyrics 
‘meant’ to Salam Pax, but as a cited artifact within the blog, they do shed some insight into his 
personal attention economy. 
 This particular passage might be characterized as ‘emo,’ which I noted earlier was 
situated as the opposite of snark by Geert Lovink.193 Emo stands for ‘emotional’ or ‘emotive;’ 
“‘I’m sad’ is the most common definition associated with emo.”194 Emo represents not just being 
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in touch with emotions, but being in touch with the sensitive, melancholic side of one’s 
emotional life. Emo is a style strongly associated with a particular genre of music, which is often 
“moody, melodic and marked by an obsession with doomed relationships.”195 The caricatures of 
emo overlap significantly with the caricatures of blogging: both are often ridiculed as the 
province of lonely, over-privileged teenagers that have nothing better to do than wallow in their 
own self-indulgent emotions. But emo might also be characterized as a rhetorical style that, like 
snark, finds a unique outlet on blogs because of the ease of publishing. 
Emo style continues to contour Salam’s posts as the war begins. On Friday, March 21, 
2003, a news story broke from al-Jazeera claiming that nine B-52 bombers had left airfields in 
Britain and were apparently heading to Iraq; this was seen as the beginning of military hostilities 
after George W. Bush had issued an ultimatum for Hussein to leave the country four days earlier 
(Hussein stayed past the deadline).196 As the bombers were flying in, Salam’s family gathered 
around a map of Iraq, trying to “figure out what is going on in the south” of Iraq.197 The closer 
the United States moved to initiating military action, Salam Pax’s blog became more 
prominent—actually forcing Google to create a mirror site to aid visitors and prevent the site 
from crashing.198 With increased attention from institutional media and the rest of the nascent 
blogosphere, increased queries about his identity increased. He must have started to get a series 
of emails asking if he was ‘for real,’ because three hours later, he posts “please stop sending e-
mails asking if I am for real. Don’t believe it? Then don’t read it. I am not anybody’s propaganda 
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ploy—well, except my own. Two more hours until the B-52s get to Iraq.”199 After this post, three 
days passed before Salam Pax posted again—the war had begun, and his internet connection was 
no more.  
Eventually, Salam Pax began posting again; though somewhat erratically and often with 
the help of an intermediary, Diana, a blogger herself who had become a friend of Salam Pax 
because of his blogging endeavors. His family had weathered the military storm of the first few 
days, and, as was reported on the blog, were safe if perpetually anxious. Trapped in the house, 
Salam and family watch movies: 
In the oh-the-irony-of-it-all section of my life I can add the unbelievable bad luck 
that when I wanted to watch a movie, because I got sick of all the news, the only 
movie I had which I have not seen a hundred times is The American President. No 
joke. A friend gave me that video months ago and I never watched it. I did last 
night. The American ‘presidential palace’ looks quite good. But Michael Douglas 
is a sad ass president.200 
Later, he writes “I am still trying to ignore the 24-hour, non-stop TV bombardment. News just 
ups me level of paranoia. I’m living in my headphones or watching silly videos. Ice Age has 
become a house favourite.”201 Whiling away the time while watching movies made in America 
was a persistent—if ironic—pastime. Salam’s retreat to the house during the heat of the military 
campaign is understandable since it probably wasn’t safe to be outside. But a later admission 
seems to confirm Keren’s suspicion that bloggers are apolitical melancholics: 
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I confess to the sin of being an escapist. When reality hurts, I block it out—unless 
it comes right up to me and knocks me cold. My mother, after going out once 
after Baghdad was taken by the US army, decided she is not going out again—not 
until I promise it looks kind of normal and OK. So I guess the Ostrich manoeuvre 
runs in the family.202 
The ostrich move didn’t last long, as Salam ultimately joined the Campaign for Innocent Victims 
in Conflict (CIVIC), trying to assess the damage on the ground. He continued to blog about his 
experiences with CIVIC, as well as some translation jobs he did for journalists in the area. 
Toward the end of major combat operations, The Guardian newspaper offered him a fortnightly 
column that he began writing shortly thereafter. His blogging began to slow down, until it 
stopped completely. 
 I have argued that Salam Pax canalized a melancholic voice that accompanied his cynical 
voice. The form his melancholic rhetoric took was the lament, the topoi included claims of 
inexpressibility and a cataloguing of injustice, a dominant rhetorical technique was allusion, and 
his style could be characterized as emo. But what were the effects of this melancholic voice? Did 
a melancholic tone, with its characteristic dialectical vigor, actually establish better insights into 
the real? Were withdrawal and reflection aids to more penetrating observations? Of course the 
answer could never be as simple as that. But the meta-commentary that emerged in the press 
does seem to indicate that his popularity as a blogger was because he had captured something 
compelling about the conflict. This portal into the daily life of Iraqis provided “better insight” 
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than the mass media.203 One journalist said that there is “an authority to this witness that no 
foreign correspondent can match.”204 His blogging “made hearts flutter with his idiosyncratic 
personal descriptions of Baghdad before and after the war.”205 The power of his accounts meant 
that “suddenly this two-finger typist was linked all over the blogging world, written up in 
mainstream media and used as an official information source. He was the ‘insider’ describing his 
country’s descent into chaos.”206 As compared to other media accounts of the war, Salam Pax’s 
blog provided “personal insight that bypassed the sanitizing Cuisinart of big-media news 
editing.”207 Blogging is an appealing medium especially during times of war because the 
“proximity to events, spurious or not, is very attractive to audiences trying to acquire an honest 
feel of the story and the sense of temporal immediacy amplifies it.”208 It was Salam Pax’s 
proximity, paired with his melancholic voice, which drew attention to his blogging. Melancholic 
rhetoric might be seen as particularly attention gathering because it performs a loss of agency 
and voice that signals an interruption in one’s normal encounter with the other. Both melancholy 
and cynicism, as familiar constellations of emotion, function to provide openings for 
identification between global strangers in a network society. It is to expanding upon that claim 
that I now turn. 
4.6 Toward a Networked Sensibility: Affect in Public Life 
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Both Lovink and Keren pick up on how blogs amplify affect, but their respective 
commitments to a modernist version of public deliberation denuded of rhetorical action limit 
their ability to see the emotions of cynicism and melancholy as anything but debilitating. Their 
orientation toward blogging is understandable, but it imports the residue of a particular, 
historically contingent model of public deliberation that simply does not obtain in today’s 
network societies. Is there even a public and private sphere in networked societies?209 If 
modernist societies were organized vertically, with the private sphere providing a large 
pyramidal base from which the public sphere at the top drew, how does the shift to a horizontally 
organized network society challenge traditional conceptions of public and private? What is the 
effect of this reorganization, and how can we theorize what appears to be a renewed presence of 
emotion in democratic public life?  
If metaphysical senses of passion ruled the premodern world, and presumably stable and 
analyzable emotions dominated the modern one, networked sensibilities are more in tune with a 
self-understanding of non-cognitive reactions through the concept of affect. Communication 
scholar Eric Shouse usefully distinguishes feeling, emotion, and affect:  
A feeling is a sensation that has been checked against previous experiences and 
labelled [sic]. It is personal and biographical because every person has a distinct 
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set of previous sensations from which to draw when interpreting and labelling 
[sic] their feelings … An emotion is the projection/display of a feeling. Unlike 
feelings, the display of emotion can be either genuine or feigned … An affect is a 
non-conscious experience of intensity; it is a moment of unformed and 
unstructured potential … affect is the most abstract because affect cannot be fully 
realised in language, and because affect is always prior to and/or outside of 
consciousness.210 
These analytical distinctions introduce a little more crispness to thinking about ‘emotion’ in 
public deliberation. An affect is a bodily reaction to experience. A feeling is what happens when 
an affect begins to be cognized; it is situated in line with similar feelings. An emotion is the 
rhetorical expression of that feeling, based on socially constructed labels that attempt to capture a 
feeling-state. As Shouse explains, “affect is what makes feelings feel. It is what determines the 
intensity (quantity) of a feeling (quality), as well as the background intensity of our everyday 
lives (the half-sensed, ongoing hum of quantity/quality that we experience when we are not 
really attuned to any experience at all).”211 Strong affective reactions thus have the effect of 
focusing attention on one thing instead of another. 
Consider the explanation of blushing to better understand the relay between affect, 
feeling, and emotion. Someone says “haven’t you been in graduate school forever?” and your 
cheeks involuntarily burn red. You realize that you feel embarrassed for your perpetual 
studenthood (though you might not have realized that before this exchange!). Your conversation 
partner notices the red cheeks, and apologizes for embarrassing you. They don’t know that it’s 
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embarrassment for sure, but because of culturally shared signs of what it means to be 
embarrassed, they can articulate your emotional reaction with some certitude. Traditionally, the 
study of affect has focused exactly on this kind of facial disclosure.212 Yet, affect often leaks out 
into language in one of three ways: paralinguistically, lexically, and attitudinally. Emotions are 
made public paralinguistically by using gestures, expressions, or vocal tone (“Fire! Get out!” she 
said, waving her arms toward the door excitedly.) On blogs, paralinguistic markers of affect 
might include exclamation marks, all-caps, or emoticons.213 Alternatively, affect can be lexically 
encoded in speech (“Now that we are reunited, I feel glee!”). Finally, rhetors have “a vast 
repertoire of linguistic devices to convey subtle attitudinal information to ‘color’ their utterances, 
and these can reflect emotional stance.”214 Word choices, rhetorical figuration, and other 
elements of style can signal affective investments.215 I will momentarily explain how affect (and 
                                                
212 Psychology in particular has been animated by understanding the role of affect in social and political 
interaction; see R.J. Davidson, K.R. Scherer, and H.H. Goldsmith, Handbook of Affective Sciences (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003) and E.V. Demos, Exploring Affect: The Selected Writings of Silvan S. Tomkins 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Much of this research focuses on gestural or facial cues that signal 
affect, as in Paul Ekman, What the Face Reveals (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997) and Emotions 
Revealed: Understanding Faces and Feelings (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2003). 
213 Obviously, these are partial and imperfect ways to channel affect. To wit: an episode of The Simpsons 
originally aired in 2000 saw Homer Simpson create a personal webpage for publishing rumor and innuendo under 
the pseudonym ‘Mister X.’ This parody of proto-blogging shows how personal publication had captured the public 
imagination at the time. In this episode, Comic Book Guy despairingly notes “there is not an emoticon for how I am 
feeling,” perhaps suggesting the more limited affective range present in disembodied communication. See The 
Simpsons, “The Computer Wore Menace Shoes,” episode 254, (originally aired December 3, 2000). 
214 This typology is drawn from Judy Reilly and Laura Seibert, “Language and Emotion,” Handbook of 
Affective Sciences, eds. Richard Davidson, Klaus Scherer, H. Hill Goldsmith (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 
535. 
215 In many ways, affect is a cipher for what Kenneth Burke called ‘attitudes.’ In A Grammar of Motives, 
Burke in an ‘Addendum for the Present Edition,’ notes “I have sometimes added the term ‘attitude’ to the above list 
of five major terms [of the pentad]. Thus, one could also speak of a ‘scene-attitude ratio,’ or of an ‘agent-attitude 
ratio,’ etc. ‘Agency’ would more strictly designate the ‘means’ (quibus auxiliis) employed in the act. And ‘attitude’ 
would designate the manner (quo modo). To build something with a hammer would involve an instrument, or 
‘agency’; to build with diligence would involve an ‘attitude,’ a ‘how’” (443). Earlier in the Grammar, Burke builds 
a theory of attitude with recourse to I.A. Richards conceptualization of attitude as incipient action. Richards writes 
in The Principles of Literary Criticism that “every perception probably includes a response in the form of incipient 
action. We constantly overlook the extent to which all the while we are making preliminary adjustments, getting 
ready to act in one way or another” (quoted in Grammar, 235-6.) Burke reads Richards to say “if we arouse in 
someone an attitude of sympathy towards something, we may be starting him [sic] on the road towards overtly 
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emotion more generally) can be seen in the context of democratic politics generally, but for now 
I would like to explain the utility of thinking affectively about blogging in particular. 
How language is imbued with affect cannot simply be captured through recourse to 
traditional conceptions of feeling or emotion. There is what might be called a ‘tonality’ that 
belies such a direct connection. It’s for this reason that conceptualizing Salam Pax’s cynical and 
melancholic voices as hardening a series of affective reactions on his part is so productive. 
Cynicism and melancholy aren’t just emotions, nor are they simple feelings, but rather a 
constellation of related attitudes that get merged into a voice. This makes theories of affect a 
productive supplement to traditional rhetorical theories. Jenny Edbauer Rice suggests “the notion 
of affect poses an interesting question for rhetorical studies: is discursive deliberation sufficient 
for talking about the constitution of publics? On the one hand, publics are not possible without 
discourse. On the other hand, deliberation generates affects that do not conform neatly to the 
signifying elements of that civic discourse;” she continues by explicitly linking the play of affect 
to the constitution of online publics organized around blogging:  
Comments on these blogs do not always fall into the neat classification of 
‘deliberative.’ Many are epideictic (‘I just want to say I LOVE your honesty’) or 
simply phatic communications (‘Wow …’ ‘Ouch!’). Therefore, in some sense, the 
                                                
sympathetic action with regard to it—hence the rhetoric of advertisers and propagandists who would induce action 
in behalf of their commodities of their causes by the formation of appropriate appetites” (236). There is considerable 
overlap between the way Burke and Richards treated incipient action as a precursor to action-in-the-world and how 
affect is currently theorized as preceding and informing cognized reactions. This link is underlined more when 
Burke relates the idea of incipient action to Aristotelian conception of rhetoric as potentiality (242). Worth 
emphasizing is Burke’s claim that attitudes are formed and re-formed through symbolic action: “this complexity of 
social attitudes comprises the ‘self’ (thus complexly erected atop the purely biological motives, and in particular 
modified by the formative effects of language, of ‘vocal gesture,’ which invites the individual to form himself [sic] 
in keeping with its social directives)” (237). For Burke, attitudes occupy a “region of ambiguous possibilities,” much 
like affect (242). For this reason, he claims “the realm of the incipient, or attitudinal, is the realm of ‘symbolic 
action’ par excellence; for symbolic action has the same ambiguous potentialities of action” (243). It is partially for 
this reason that I take one’s symbol usage to disclose various attitudes and affective investments.  
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talk itself holds together a public even when that talk does not have direct bearing 
on the common affairs being deliberated. Perhaps this is even more obvious in the 
publics oriented around national politics. The idea of being a ‘news junkie’ is 
worth considering. There is an affective investment that goes beyond the content 
of these conversations.216 
To understand how publics are constituted and reconstituted over time requires an assessment 
not only of the signifying properties of rhetoric but of the affective dimensions that facilitate 
identification. Though these affective dimensions of communication have always been present, 
the growth of internetworked technologies introduces new avenues to develop hyper-reflexivity 
about affect. In other words, we can now ‘see’ affect in ways that we didn’t in earlier social 
formations. 
 I am drawing, of course, on sociologist Anthony Giddens’ famous articulation of late 
modernity as a reflexive project, especially as it concerns self-identity. Giddens famously 
described late modernity as an era in which “self-identity becomes a reflexively organized 
endeavour” that plays out on a field of complexly mediated experiences.217 “The reflexive project 
of the self,” Giddens explains, “consists in the sustaining of coherent, yet continuously revised, 
biographical narratives, takes place in the context of multiple choice as filtered through abstract 
systems.”218 Late modernity, for Giddens, is characterized by an increasing pluralism in choice: 
in employment, in commodity consumption, in media usage.219 Especially in contrast to 
                                                
216 Jenny Edbauer Rice, “The New ‘New’: Making a Case for Critical Affect Studies,” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech (May 2008), 211. 
217 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1991), 5. 
218 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, 5. 
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premodern societies grounded in tradition, the exponential growth in (technologically) mediated 
systems of communication increased awareness of differing lifestyles. Giddens notes that the 
globalization of media has “rendered visible” the practices that organized social life in late 
modernity.220 The publication of these different lifestyle practices might be said to, among other 
things, facilitate the civil indifference that fuels stranger sociability in modern societies.221 If the 
publication of various lifestyles through the organs of mass communication increased self-
reflexivity about identity, and blogging has dramatically increased the scale of this publication, 
then we might conclude that self-reflexivity about identity has similarly increased. 
With increased information, individuals in late modernity have magnified resources by 
which to analyze the self’s reactions. As sociologist Nick Crossley has noted, “there are 
extensive networks and technologies for the inspection, confession, governance, and 
transformation of affect. And they are significant.”222 Indeed, a lot of communication goes into 
depth in understanding, explaining, and justifying our affective responses. Crossley attempts, 
successfully in my opinion, to draw emotion into the circuit of Habermas’ communicative 
rationality for just this reason, because emotion can be “judged appropriate or inappropriate and 
argued over.”223 And, as Dana Cloud’s analysis of how American culture is increasingly 
dominated by therapeutic rhetorics shows, those networks of communication about emotion 
continue to thicken.224 
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 But these sociological conditions are inadequate for explaining the accentuated degrees 
of reflexivity currently accompanying emotion-management. Uses of information technologies 
also play in to how the self’s affective states are understood. For Habermas’ bourgeois, the 
letter—itself a unique mode of communication—deepened their sense of subjectivity and their 
relations to others. As Brent Malin has noted, the development of close-up photography created 
“a new capacity (or, perhaps, mandate) for emotional expressiveness,” as the candid encouraged 
people to be shown smiling.225 Nigel Thrift generalizes this phenomenon by arguing “through the 
advent of a whole series of technologies, small spaces and times, upon which affect thrives and 
out of which it is often constituted, have become visible and are able to be enlarged so that they 
can be knowingly operated upon.”226 For Thrift, new technologies take “what was formerly 
invisible or imperceptible,” in this case, affect, and constitute it “as visible and perceptible 
through a new structure of attention which is increasingly likely to pay more than lip-service to 
those actions which go on in small spaces and times.”227  
The photograph freezes a moment in time, allowing viewers to closely examine all the 
captured details; a novel shares the internal thought processes of the protagonist; a film situates 
agents as products of their scenes; a blog post captures how one feels about an object of 
attention. Particular media enable specific types of expressiveness; as extensions of humans, they 
display different parts of our subjectivities. This isn’t to say that all blog posts are affect-
                                                
225 Brent Malin, “Communication With Feeling: Emotion, Publicness, and Embodiment,” Quarterly 
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machines, understandable strictly as emotional sites of self-expression. But it is to acknowledge 
that blogs now constitute a substantial network of communication ties devoted to assessing, 
judging, and relating ever-smaller explanations of their affective judgments. Blogs are perhaps 
the strongest signal that the structure of feeling has shifted from one grounded solely in 
objectivity and dispassion. Let me suggest that there are three basic reasons why blogging is so 
affect-friendly. 
First, blogging is conducive to personalized micro-reactions that publish affect quickly. 
Contrast the emotional norms of the traditional newspaper to that of blogs: there is simply no 
way that a newspaper could aggregate all of the emotional reactions to a particular event. 
Consequently, journalists are forced to cherrypick amongst possible sites of testimony and rely 
on professed norms of objectivity to understand ‘what really happened.’ An editor helps with this 
process of filtering out ‘feelings’ for ‘facts.’ Blogs, in contrast, are not required to aggregate 
others’ emotions—they tend to simply explain their own reactions (thus the ‘subjective tenor’ of 
blogs) or riff off of others’ reactions. Rapidity of publication factors in, as well. The reduction in 
time lapse between (re)cognition of affective response and personal publication means that 
individuals can capture more of their original feeling. Emotions are often like dreams—the 
farther away one gets from the experience itself, the harder it becomes to explain exactly how 
and why one felt. Yet, because publishing blog posts is relatively quick, a blogger or commenter 
often catches their immediate affective reaction and is able to articulate them for a broader 
audience. Time and the translation of affect are often at odds: the more time passes, the more 
one’s affective responses become overly-cognized, such that we often mask our initial affective 
investments in the drapery of post hoc rationalization. Because of the capacity of blogs to publish 
emotional reactions quickly, they have become something like the chroniclers of our affective 
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lives. Paired with the apparent desire by networked citizens to see ever more ‘behind-the-scenes’ 
and craving more information about how other people live, blogging is indeed a substantial 
avenue by which emotional discourse gets funneled into public deliberation.228 
 To extend on this insight: a blogger, over time, constructs a persona that reveals certain 
affective investments. A blog is a personal reaction to events, and so we might expect affective 
coloration to spill over into a blogger’s interpretation. Readers of blogs soon find out about what 
a certain blogger likes and dislikes, how they interpret their social world, and why they justify 
certain behaviors. In addition, regular readers of a particular blog learn about how that blogger’s 
attention economy is partially structured. When a blogger links to another site on the internet, 
they are signaling that they have attended to this particular artifact, and that a reader might also 
want to attend to it. The vocabulary used by search engines to describe the way in which they 
prioritize search results is suggestive here: a link functions as a ‘recommendation,’ which is 
hardly a value-neutral way to explain a hyperlink. Patterns of hyperlinking thus reveal bloggers’ 
attention economies and, implicitly, their affective investments. For this reason, Laura Gurak and 
Smiljana Antonijevic note “unlike chatting, pointed toward ‘hear me out at this moment,’ 
blogging is pointed toward ‘hear me out throughout time.’”229  
                                                
228 Blogging is certainly not the only new media form that indicates a new structure of feeling has taken 
root. Again, Lanham’s figure of oscillatio emerges in a series of media forms for the networked society, where 
participants can look ‘at’ and ‘through’ the text itself. For example, when we watch a DVD, we can view the film 
itself (‘at’), but then we can peruse the director and actor commentaries on the film (‘through’) to see what happened 
behind-the-scenes, how the film crew felt about certain scenes, how the director set up the shot. Reality television is 
similarly situated around this kind of oscillatio: we watch the little competitions (‘at’) and then the private 
interviews with the participants to hear exactly what they were thinking as they were competing (‘through.’) The 
situation comedy The Office uses a similar approach as they integrate interviews with the characters to get insight 
into their personal lives and feelings (‘through’) in between the unfolding of the script (‘at’). This oscillation 
between through and at is exactly how reflexivity about affect/feeling/emotion is built into the media forms with 
high circulation in contemporary networked societies. 
229 Laura Gurak and Smiljana Antonijevic, “The Psychology of Blogging: You, Me, and Everyone in 
Between,” American Behavioral Scientist (September 2008): 65. 
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The second reason blogs are so affect-friendly is because they balance richness and scale. 
The modernist social imaginary installed particular norms of decorum that regulated when and 
how public and private should intersect, but it also relied on analog communication technologies 
that traversed time and space slowly. The slowness of modernist media allowed a natural buffer 
zone between public and private.230 With the speed up represented by contemporary information 
technology, the internet and blogging included, various relays between what has traditionally 
been considered public and private increase in richness and flexibility. New media scholar Felix 
Stalder explains “what makes today’s networks so profoundly different from traditional social 
networks is that, for the first time, they scale well. The resulting relationships among the 
different [network] nodes are rich and specific.”231 In contrast, individuals in modern societies 
arranged concentric rings of social networks that were managed with increasing difficulty the 
further removed from the center. Stalder notes, 
affective, or informal, social relationships have traditionally been organized as 
networks because they rely on this richness of communication and the ability to 
accommodate continuous fluctuations easily. The downside of this richness in 
communication has been that beyond a certain level of complexity the process of 
interdefinition has become unmanageable. It involved just too much 
communication, resulting in a cacophony of voices and a lack of coordination.232  
                                                
230 Celebrity culture is a perfect example of how the slowness (and spatial constraints) of old media impact 
the boundary between public and private. In the past several years, celebrity blogs have provided a publishing 
platform for amateur paparazzi; greatly expanding the range of coverage that contemporary celebrities receive. It is 
not unusual to see blogs devoted to particular celebrities eating meals, walking their dogs, or cuddling mates. Each 
activity has appreciated significance for novelty, and the quick entry of an image or story about a celebrity can whip 
up excitement for the interpretation and circulation of that story.  
231 Felix Stalder, Manuel Castells: The Theory of the Network Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 
181. 
232 Stalder, Manuel Castells, 182. 
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The problem of complexity, especially as it relates to scaling issues, rears its head again. While 
agents in modernist societies were able to manage their close friends, the further removed from 
common experience and common definition, the more fragile the relationships became. Richness 
and flexibility were often at odds: I can communicate with a lot of depth to my co-present 
friends, but it is more difficult to share intimate experiences with more distant family relations 
because, frankly, it just takes too long to explain everything that has happened to me since last 
we spoke. Consequently, the vicissitudes of my life are often reduced to ‘everything’s going ok,’ 
a sentiment that suffices but doesn’t exactly do justice to what’s really happening in a life (even 
when things are really boring). The problems of interdefinition track down not just to diverging 
vocabularies, but to the felt experiences of everyday life. To address this problem, blogging 
produces rich discourse that explains strangers (even those strangers that are related by kinship) 
to each other. 
Contrast the richness-scale tension in networked societies with that same tension in 
modernity. Stalder explains that standardized print documents were the privileged way to 
organize modern institutions because they “offered a reduction in communicative complexity 
which enabled an increase in their scale.”233 Modernist organizations must rely on documentation 
in order to organize and coordinate their societies.234 And this reliance on documentation is 
effective—it authorizes certain people to drive, or be doctors. The documents at the Department 
of Motor Vehicles are simple, direct, and easy to use as long as one doesn’t have any 
circumstance that the paperwork doesn’t account for. Then, the documents become increasingly 
inflexible (or, as the king of modern dread Franz Kafka suggested, disturbing). The simplicity 
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necessary to scale up then becomes an impediment to social coordination, as those who don’t fit 
a bureaucratically defined norm are marked as deviant. 
 Information technology networks, though, address the scale issue in a fashion that befits 
the demands of a network society. Stadler continues: 
Quantitatively speaking, computer-based technologies enable the processing of 
more communication (purposeful flows of information), in less time, across larger 
distances. The traditional tradeoff between richness of communication, enabling 
flexibility and involvement, and reduction of communication, enabling scale and 
focus, has virtually vanished. What used to be the key advantage of integrated 
hierarchies—their ability to increase coordination through formal and rigid 
rules—has turned into a terminal disadvantage, because new technologies 
facilitate coordination without requiring rigidity. Consequently, networks are 
suddenly able to operate on the same scale and with the same degree of 
coordination as hierarchies, while preserving flexibility.235 
What can be seen now is a richer flow of communication taking place between nodes distributed 
throughout all of society. The popularity of so-called social networking sites like Friendster, 
MySpace, and Facebook shows that there is a high demand for media that balance richness and 
scale. A regularly updated MySpace page, for example, may list the proprietor’s favorite books, 
movies, and music, host a blog where daily updates can be published, and show a large portion 
of the social network that they are embedded in. ‘Friends’ from around the world can monitor 
that page for essential updates, no matter how close they are to the person (and padding one’s 
friend list, like padding one’s blogroll, is standard practice). There is a richness of information on 
                                                
235 Stalder, Manuel Castells, 183. 
288 
a standard social networking page that traditional analog culture had trouble producing at such a 
large scale. Thus, a friend of a friend of a friend, who you might never have met but who shares 
similar interests, can link into your social network (scaling up) and have access to the same 
quality of communication as closer nodes (maintaining richness). 
Finally, blogging is conducive to the discussion and dissection of affect because it is a 
site where difference is often encountered, negotiated, affirmed, denied, or deferred. In January 
2004, Salam Pax’s blog came under fire for playing the ‘Western’ cultural game rather than 
participating in the nascent Arabic-language Iraqi blogosphere. Raed, in a rare blog post, came to 
the defense of his friend in a way that reveals the underlying purpose of the blog: 
what I want to say is that we seem to have lost the middle ground. When I met 
Ted Koppel the first time he said that he needed a cultural interpreter. And this is 
exactly what this blog and the rest of the blogs in the Iraqi Blogosphere, in all its 
variety, has been providing. The things the reviewer saw as negatives, ‘irreligious, 
western educated, and has spent half his life outside Iraq,’ are really the basis for 
the common things between us. You and me, we have this dialogue because of 
them. In a world growing apart by the day it is absolutely wonderful to find that 
everybody can go on about the food they like on an Iraqi blog [check out the 
comments] and for a moment forget all the politics. This reminds us that we *do* 
have things in common and not everybody is out to cut the others’ throat. 
I do not feel ashamed of standing in the middle anymore; actually I am proud of 
it. The Iraqi Bloggers show that we *can* talk. You think some of us are too 
ungrateful and critical? Habibi at least we are talking about it, you really have not 
met the people who are really truly unhappy with the whole situation here. BUT 
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… we are still playing the [dominant/subordinate culture] game. We write in 
English to communicate with you, we try to establish links and reference points 
very much relevant to you. The respect I have for Persian Bloggers is immense; 
they were able to create a dialogue among themselves which they sometimes 
share with the rest of the world.236 
This is an interesting meditation on cross-cultural communication in a globalized world; Raed 
and Salam recognize the need for cultural interpreters to make sense of indigenous Iraqi attitudes 
and practices. To maximize their appeal, they consciously made efforts to craft their rhetorical 
strategy in a way that would appeal to English readers in the rest of the world. The rhetorical 
performance of cynicism and melancholy can be seen as a part of this effort as well, since they 
are well-recognized emotion-constellations shared across many differences. Blogs might well 
function as the sites that James Bohman theorizes as necessary for cosmopolitan citizens to 
negotiate different frames of reference.237 
4.7 Ambient Intimacy 
The term ‘ambient intimacy’ has emerged in the blogosphere to describe the spillover of 
the private into public. I believe that it can be extended to capture the presence of affective 
energies now felt in public life. This component of the networked rhetorical imaginary first 
emerged in the context of theorizing Twitter, an application rolled out in the wake of blogging 
that has been called “micro-blogging” or “nano-blogging.”238 Twitter allows a user to post 
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“tweets,” limited to 140 characters, from mobile devices or computers. Tweets can be followed 
on one’s Twitter page, or can be subscribed to through blog aggregators. It is, in fact, very 
similar to blogging but constrained by a much stricter economy of expression. Twitter captured 
the popular imagination as the next step in the evolution toward ever-smaller fragments of public 
discourse. Clive Thompson, a contributing writer for Wired magazine, explains the significance 
of Twitter: 
When I dropped by the main Twitter page, people had posted notes like ‘Doing 
lunch and picking up father-in-law from senior center.’ Or ‘Checking out Ghost 
Whisperer’ or simply ‘Thinking I'm old.’ (Most users are between 18 and 27.) It 
might seem like blogging taken to a supremely banal extreme … They're 
precisely right: Individually, most Twitter messages are stupefyingly trivial. But 
the true value of Twitter—and the similarly mundane Dodgeball, a tool for 
reporting your real-time location to friends—is cumulative. The power is in the 
surprising effects that come from receiving thousands of pings from your posse. 
And this, as it turns out, suggests where the Web is heading.239 
Thompson goes on to suggest that Twitter is “like proprioception, your body’s ability to know 
where your limbs are. That subliminal sense of orientation is crucial for coordination … Twitter 
and other constant-contact media create social proprioception. They give a group of people a 
sense of itself, making possible weird, fascinating feats of coordination.”240 In some ways, the 
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novel and newspaper were early efforts at social proprioception, and blogs are an extension of 
the same tradition that accommodates the complexities of an internetworked society.  
 Blogger Leisa Reichelt coined the term ‘ambient intimacy’ in the context of Twitter, but 
signaled that the concept applies aptly to many forms of social networking software. She writes: 
I’ve been using a term to describe my experience of Twitter (and also Flickr and 
reading blog posts and Upcoming). I call it Ambient Intimacy. Ambient intimacy 
is about being able to keep in touch with people with a level of regularity and 
intimacy that you wouldn’t usually have access to, because time and space 
conspire to make it impossible. Flickr lets me see what friends are eating for 
lunch, how they’ve redecorated their bedroom, their latest haircut. Twitter tells 
me when they’re hungry, what technology is currently frustrating them, who 
they’re having drinks with tonight.241 
For those participating in blogging and other social networking sites, intimacy is shared almost 
semi-permanently. What makes the intimacy that occurs through blogging ambient is that it can 
be experienced both synchronically and diachronically. For example, by participating in an 
unfolding conversation between blogs, either as a blogger, commentator, or reader, one can 
engage in a near-simultaneous back and forth about whatever issue is animating the 
conversation. This synchronic exchange might sharpen one’s own personal beliefs at the same 
time that it reveals the private thoughts of others. Diachronically, one can work backwards 
through a series of blog posts to get a sense of how a particular blogger has ‘evolved.’ The 
process of linking to prior posts emphasizes this diachronic element of intimacy. When a blogger 
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links to a prior post that they have written, elucidating their opinions on some matter or another, 
they are making a diachronic link for their readers. With something like a public record of one’s 
thoughts, beliefs, and activities, bloggers can often build complicated intimate relationships with 
their readership.242 
 Have we seen a similar process before? Arguably. Benedict Anderson’s Imagined 
Communities identifies the ways in which a “consciousness of connectedness” produced strong 
feelings of nation-hood at the dawn of the nation-state.243 This feeling of connectedness resulted 
from representations of the other appearing in the emerging media of the time, newspapers and 
the novel. The increased circulation of newspapers and novels created a sense of belonging for 
groups of national peoples with strong common experiences that were made stronger by 
continual reference to their collective past. The experience of newspaper readers seeing the same 
newspaper which they had just read also being read by fellow citizens at various social gathering 
spots throughout the day “continually reassured [the reader] that the imagined world is visibly 
rooted in everyday life.”244 This useful fiction was paramount for the bourgeois public sphere’s 
self-conception as a public that knew about itself. Being able to see others read the newspaper, or 
a novel, and thus participate in a broader collective conversation, deepened the sense in which 
the bourgeois conceived of their argumentative interventions as strengthening the democratic 
bonds of collective life. 
 An analogous movement is now taking place to accommodate the expansion of social life 
to a global plane. With the increasing decline of the nation-state’s regulatory power and the 
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243 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 56. 
244 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 35-6. 
293 
spread of global information technologies, the internet has emerged as a medium through which 
global publics can intercommunicate. I want to avoid suggesting that there is a ‘global public 
sphere;’ perhaps what can be said now is that there are global publicity practices.245 Salam Pax is 
a key figure in this movement—he might be considered the first real cosmopolitan citizen. Just 
as the novel gave a glimpse into the intimate lives of others in the nation, and thus created a 
sense of social belonging, blogs crack open the intimate lives of others. This sense of intimacy is 
not isomorphic with the intimacy created through the novel. It is not episodic in the same sense 
as the novel, which dispenses intimate moments in clear narrative thrusts. Rather, the intimacy 
created by blogs is ambient, ever present as background noise.  
 This, I believe, is the way to understand Salam Pax’s cynical and melancholic rhetoric. 
The presence of so much affective energies on a blog gives readers a sense of one’s intimate 
emotional investments. This sense of intimacy is not necessarily developed in a clear narrative 
arc; rather, it is a cumulation of feelings built up over time. Over the course of about a year, 
Salam Pax revealed personal preferences for artifacts, values, histories, policies; he ranted about 
policies and lamented about an imagined Iraq. His vivid descriptions of life in pre-war Iraq, 
paired with his account of the bombing of Baghdad and his tours with CIVIC of the war-torn 
areas in Iraq gave an immediate, visceral, sense of what had happened. We might situate the 
                                                
245 The absence of a global institution with binding decision-making power makes the development of a 
‘public sphere’ aimed at influencing it difficult to conceptualize. Yet, global public opinion has manifested itself on 
a number of occasions, most prominently during the February 2003 global anti-war protests targeted at the Bush 
Administration. Internetworked communication was instrumental in coordinating these protests; see Peter Stearns, 
Global Outrage: The Impact of World Opinion on Contemporary History (Oxford: OneWorld Publications, 2005), 
176-8. 
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ambient intimacy created by blogging as the unique type of social presence generated by this 
mode of public address.246 
 This type of social presence might be seen as the harbinger of ever-more sophisticated 
control, as the modulation of affect is used to keep populations in check.247 Yet, there might also 
be a productive element to this ambient intimacy that can be found in the work of political 
scientist George Marcus. Marcus has tried to reconcile emotion and reason in democratic 
cultures, and his efforts are worth recounting here as a partial explanation of the impact of affect 
in democratic public life. Marcus does not privilege either emotion or reason as independent 
processes, but sees them as interlocking counterparts. As he explains, “emotion processes, 
processes that precede conscious awareness, shape what we pay attention to and how we pay 
attention.”248 If people didn’t have affective reactions, it would be difficult to direct attention: 
everything would be equally ‘weighted’ and we would have considerable problems sorting 
through phenomena to address. It is the experience of affect that guides how we interpret the 
social world. “Affective reactions,” psychologist Joseph Forgas suggests, “such as feelings of 
anxiety, confidence, intimacy, pleasure, or discomfort seem to be critical in defining the implicit 
                                                
246 Matthew Lombard and Theresa Ditton,“At the Heart of it All: The Concept of Presence,” Journal of 
Computer Mediated Communication (September 1997), http://www.ascusc.org/jcmc/vol3/issue2/lombard.html. That 
the internet has introduced new forms of parasocial interaction, which Bruce Gronbeck and Danielle Wiese call the 
repersonalization of politics, underlines the claims I am making about new forms of intimacy in a networked public 
sphere; see their “The Repersonalization of Presidential Campaigning in 2004,” American Behavioral Scientist 
(December 2005), 520-34. 
247 As Patricia Ticineto Clough claims in her “Introduction,” in The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social, 
eds. Patricia Ticineto Clough and Jean Halley (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007): 1-33.  
248 George Marcus, The Sentimental Citizen: Emotion in Democratic Politics (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 60. Marcus has been working out a theory of affect and democratic 
politics for some time; see W. Russell Neuman, George Marcus, Ann Crigler, and Michael MacKuen, eds., The 
Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2007); George Marcus, W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen, Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). See also David Redlawsk, ed., Feeling Politics: Emotion in Political 
Information Processing (New York: Palgrave, 2006). 
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structure and complexity of people’s cognitive representations about social encounters.”249 
Emotion and reason are not set in an intractable polar opposition, then; instead, they are 
entwined with each other in a symbiotic double helix. Affective reactions, in a nod to the 
Aristotelian tradition, direct cognitive attention. 
One way that affect directs cognitive attention is through disrupting stereotypes. Walter 
Lippmann’s canonical effort to understand modern societies and their broadcast media relied on 
the role of the stereotype in organizing interactions with others.250 According to Lippmann, 
stereotypes make the world somewhat predictable by giving individuals scripts and routines that 
enabled negotiating daily modern life. Yet, these stereotypes sometimes serve us poorly; certain 
habits of mind congeal in ways that disservice the richness of the social world. This is where 
emotion works a disruptive magic. Outpourings of emotion are picked up by individual’s neural 
surveillance system, shifting attention to the “intrusive stimuli” and inhibiting prior habits of 
mind in order to activate a process of cognition that accounts for the new phenomenon.251 This is 
a clinical way to describe Salam Pax’s meteoric rise in the blogosphere: the outpouring of 
cynical and melancholic (among other) affects on his blog pivoted a global public that 
traditionally received its news about the war from broadcast media toward a new voice. By 
producing anxiety, cynicism and melancholy shift our cognitive efforts from reliance on habit to 
“open consideration of new alternatives.”252 This disruption of traditional attention patterns 
introduced another mode of communicative interdependence between a global public. 
                                                
249 Joseph Forgas, “Affective Influence on Attitudes and Judgments,” Handbook of Affective Sciences, eds. 
Richard Davidson, Klaus Scherer, H. Hill Goldsmith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 598. See also E. 
Virginia Demos, “An Affect Revolution: Silvan Tomkin’s Affect Theory,” in Exploring Affect, 19. 
250 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: MacMillan, 1922), especially Part 3, “Stereotypes.” 
251 Marcus, Sentimental Citizen, 101. 
252 Marcus, Sentimental Citizen, 116.  
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Emotion is consequently what ignites stranger sociability, that particular form of intimacy 
that defines democratic public culture.253 As citizens in democratic public cultures encounter each 
other, their affective ties emerge from the circulation of commodities and texts, bodies and 
personae.254 This circulation generates patterns of identification that strengthen collective public 
life. Here, again, affect expands attention economies toward specific issues:  
Getting people to share in the concerns of others, to take an interest in a problem, 
crisis, or issue that is not part of their intimate lives, depends on making a specific 
connection between the observed grievance and one’s emotional response. Seeing 
a spectacle and making sense of it, however important that understanding is, are 
not by themselves sufficient to recruit people to a cause. They must feel a 
connection.255 
If this is true in a domestic context, it is doubly true in the context of international relations. 
Digital media offer more variety in form and content which in turn hold out the potential to 
invite more non-elite interest in public, and especially foreign, affairs.256  Salam Pax’s recent 
book tour led him to theorize that the role of blogs in producing global intimacy was 
unparalleled: “With blogging in the developing world, you get to feel people are listening to you, 
you can discuss things in a way you otherwise cannot. I mean, look at Chinese and Iranian 
weblogs. Where else could you get such insight into daily life in those countries?”257 Indeed, it is 
                                                
253 As Michael Warner explains in Public and Counterpublics (New York: Zone Books, 2002), 74-76. 
254 This underlines Craig Calhoun’s point that publicity is not just about processing arguments about 
generating social solidarity; in “Imagining Solidarity: Cosmopolitanism, Constitutional Patriotism, and the Public 
Sphere,” Public Culture 14 (2002), 148. 
255 Marcus, Sentimental Citizen, 86. 
256 Hamilton and Jenner, “New Foreign Correspondence,”137-138.  
257 James Norman, “International Internet Sensation Ready To Get Back To His Day Job,” The Age 
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the ambient intimacy that is produced by the relation of everyday life that makes blogging part of 
the contemporary deliberative legitimation processes in a networked public culture. 
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CHAPTER 5—SHALLOW QUOTATION: REALCLIMATE.ORG AS A 
TRANSLATION STATION 
5.1 Introduction 
 With the rapid growth in the blogosphere during the popularization stage came inevitable 
specialization. Each professional field, for example, has sprouted overlapping blogging 
communities that pursue their own disciplinary interests. Scientific communities were no 
exception, as blogs emerged to create an informal peer review process, build social capital, and 
provide an entry point for scientific discussions between scientists and lay publics. In an early 
episode that demonstrates the potential of science blogging, Tim Lambert, a computer scientist at 
the University of New South Wales and blogger at Deltoid, dissected the research of Ross 
McKitrick, a skeptic of human-caused global warming. McKitrick had recently authored a paper 
in the journal Climate Research that purported to show that human economic activity was 
responsible for a minimal amount of climate change; the paper was being touted as a bombshell 
by fellow skeptic Patrick Michaels.1 Lambert, though, had this to say: 
There seems to be some problems with their work. To understand them you need 
to understand the two different ways of measuring angles. 
 
                                                
1 Patrick Michaels, Fred Singer, and David Douglass, “Settling Global Warming Science,” Tech Central 
Station, August 12, 2004, http://web.archive.org/web/20040814021214/http://www.techcentralstation.com/ 
081204D.html. 
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Can you spot the difference? If you do calculations and get degrees and radians 
mixed up, you get the wrong answer. Which is what McKitrick did.2 
The difference between degrees and radians, as Lambert points out, is as crucial as the difference 
between measuring temperature in Fahrenheit versus Celsius. This point was made elegantly 
through visual proof supplied by Lambert, and sparked follow on conversation in comments by 
practicing scientists and other blog readers. 
In this one episode can be seen the promise of blogging about science from a deliberative 
standpoint: a scientist with specialized knowledge explains the shortfall of a research paper in 
clear language, with obvious visual proof. Though the implications are surely more complicated 
then this, I take Lambert’s post as one example of how blogging translates scientific language 
into a more public idiom that can then be absorbed into broader arenas of public deliberation. 
Lambert’s blog is one science blog, ranging over a number of topics all loosely related to 
mathematical issues. In contrast, the group blog RealClimate, sustained by a network of 
scientists in different fields, focuses exclusively on the science behind climate change.  Why start 
a blog on climate science?  The scientists who started RealClimate were frustrated by what they 
perceived as “agenda-driven ‘commentary’ on the Internet and in the opinion columns of 
newspapers crowding out careful analysis,” and their first post identifies their goals: 
Journalists with deadlines and scant knowledge of the field  quite often do not 
 know where to go for this context on papers that are being pushed by some of the 
 partisan think-tanks or other interested parties. This can lead to some quite 
 mainstream outlets inadvertently publishing some very dubious and misleading 
                                                
2 Tim Lambert, “McKitrick Screws Up Again,” Deltoid, August 26th, 2004, http://timlambert.org/2004/ 
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 ideas. RealClimate is a commentary site on climate science by working climate 
 scientists for the interested public and journalists. We aim to provide a quick 
 response to developing stories and provide the context sometimes missing in 
 mainstream commentary.3 
RealClimate originally focused attention on gatekeepers in the institutional media like journalists 
and editors, because “communication efforts are much more likely to succeed if they target the 
people who communicate for a living, rather than the general public directly.” 4 Though the blog 
was initially directed more toward practicing journalists, it has become increasingly used as a 
space for citizens to discuss climate science with an occasionally rotating cast of climate 
scientists.  
The blog purports to be concerned with just the ‘science,’ leaving the ‘politics’ to others. 
RealClimate does avoid endorsing specific policies, like the Kyoto Protocol, or pushing for a 
particular alternative energy, like solar power. A moderated comments system allows the 
scientists to weed out what they deem to be overly political or agonistic posts (a system which 
they concede is sometimes problematic).5 The comments section allows members of the general 
public and fellow scientists to ask questions, indicates spaces where clarifications are needed, 
and provides opportunities to challenge assertions. Despite their avowedly apolitical intentions, 
the blog often gets drawn into public controversies. RealClimate posts migrate into wider spheres 
                                                
3 Group, “Welcome to RealClimate,” RealClimate, December 9, 2004, http://www.realclimate.org/ 
index.php?p=1. 
4 Gavin Schmidt, “A Tale of Three Interviews,” RealClimate, April 9, 2007, http://www.realclimate.org/ 
index.php/archives/2007/04/a-tale-of-three-interviews/. 
5 Group, “One Year On …,” RealClimate, December 28, 2005, http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/ 
archives/2005/12/one-year-on/. The RealClimate bloggers explain that the tendency for comments discussions to 
devolve into name-calling and off-topic issues requires a strong moderating hand. Their preferred style is sobriety, 
which they couch as necessary to counter the instantaneity and permanence of the blogosphere: “It is difficult at 
times to remember that although blogosphere conversations happen very quickly, they stay around forever, and so a 
sober style is most appropriate.” 
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of discourse because they deliver rebuttals to climate change deniers of all stripes, from novelist 
Michael Crichton to the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal. However, posts usually focus 
on issues like “Climate Sensitivity and Aerosol Forcing,” “The Acid Ocean—The Other Problem 
with CO2 Emission,” and “How Much of the Recent CO2 Increase is Due to Human 
Activities?”6 Each post includes numerous links to available scientific literature on the web—
causing one media reviewer of the site to give it the “footnote frenzy” award.7 RealClimate has 
landed on the blogrolls of ‘A-list’ bloggers and received prominent mass media coverage. 
One reason that RealClimate has received so much attention is because one of the 
bloggers, paleoclimatologist Michael Mann, was at the center of a controversy concerning a 
paper that he co-authored in 1998. Mann and his co-authors generated a reconstruction of mean 
temperatures for the North American hemisphere in the last millennium. The results were 
visually arresting: they produced a graph, later called the ‘hockey stick’ for the way that post-
1900 temperatures increase dramatically, establishing a relationship between global warming and 
burning fossil fuels.  
I detail this controversy in some more depth later in this chapter, but for now, I simply 
want to identify how blogging was situated as detracting from the quality of scientific discourse 
during this controversy. Congressman Joseph Barton (R-TX) subpoenaed Mann’s data in 2005 
and in turn formed a committee of supposedly neutral scientists led by Edward Wegman to make 
                                                
6 Gavin Schmidt, “Climate Sensitivity and Aerosol Forcings,” RealClimate, July 6, 2005, 
http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2005/07/climate-sensitivity-and-aerosol-forcings/; David Archer, 
“The Acid Ocean—The Other Problem with CO2 Emission,” RealClimate, July 2, 2005, 
http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2005/07/the-acid-ocean-the-other-problem-with-cosub2sub-
emission/; Group, “How Much of the Recent CO2 Increase is Due to Human Activities?,” RealClimate, June 7, 
2005, http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2005/06/how-much-of-the-recent-cosub2sub-increase-is-due-
to-human-activities/. 
7 Ben Rooney, “Footnote Frenzy,” Daily Telegraph, June 9, 2005, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
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a judgment about the soundness of Mann’s science. The Wegman Report, in addition to a 
number of critiques about Mann’s scientific process, included this barb: 
much of the discussion on the ‘hockey stick’ issue has taken place on competing 
web blogs. Our committee believes that web blogs are not an appropriate way to 
conduct science and thus the blogs give credence to the fact that these global 
warming issues are have [sic] migrated from the realm of rational scientific 
discourse. Unfortunately, the factions involved have become highly and 
passionately polarized.8 
Read one way, the Wegman Report’s dig at science blogs is understandable. Science blogging 
doesn’t adhere to the blind peer review process usually posited as central to scientific validity 
claims. What the Wegman Report misses, though, is that blogs are usually not used to ‘conduct’ 
science but rather to provide a platform for public debate and dissection of scientific claims. The 
logic of this report, however, sticks closely to the modernist normative divide between ‘rational 
scientific discourse’ conducted by experts and ‘passionate’ but partisan discussion by everyone 
else. 
RealClimate is a provocative case study because it grapples with this central tension in 
democratic public life: the negotiation of expert and lay knowledge claims. A common critique 
of modern political liberalism is that it relies too heavily on expert competence at the expense of 
the collective wisdom of the governed. This problem is compounded in a network society 
defined by hypercomplexity. ‘Experts’ become increasingly specialized while ‘citizens’ are 
challenged to familiarize themselves with more complex norms of technical reasoning. This 
                                                
8 Edward Wegman, David Scott, and Yasmin Said, “Ad Hoc Committee Report on the ‘Hockey Stick’ 
Global Climate Reconstruction,” July 14, 2006, http://republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/108/home/ 
07142006_Wegman_Report.pdf, 49. 
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creates a significant challenge, as I shall show in the next section, for democratic politics. While 
science blogs like RealClimate are no panacea, they do provide one space where expert 
discourses get translated into more generic language that is intelligible in the public sphere. As 
an alternative to the ‘deficit model’ or ‘engagement model’ of science communication, 
RealClimate presents what I call a ‘light green public sphere’ model.9 The translation metaphors 
that are often invoked in discussions about RealClimate lead me to posit one additional element 
in the vocabulary of the networked imaginary that I have developed in this dissertation: shallow 
quotation. I draw this term from Charles Willard’s Liberalism and the Problem of Knowledge 
because it signifies how claims cross boundaries like those that have emerged between the public 
and the technical sphere. My analysis of the blog RealClimate is an example of what G. Thomas 
Goodnight calls science and technology controversy studies.10 Like previous chapters, the 
following section lays out the ‘problem of science’ in late modern political thought, and then the 
rhetorical effects of these modernist sensibilities. Following that, I detail how RealClimate 
shallowly quotes science to make it intelligible to non-specialist audiences, and then unpack 
what this means for a networked imaginary.  
 5.2 Science and Expertise in Late Modernity 
 Though the classical Greek and bourgeois public sphere have provided some helpful 
historical analogs in the previous two chapters, they provide slightly less guidance for 
incorporating contemporary forms of expertise into public deliberation. This is because one of 
                                                
9 For an overview of the deficit model and engagement model of public communication of science, see 
Bernard Schiele, “On and About the Deficit Model in an Age of Free Flow,” in Communicating Science in Social 
Contexts: New Models, New Practices, eds. Donghong Cheng, Michael Claessens, Toss Gascoigne, Jenni Metcalfe, 
Bernard Schiele, and Shunke Shi (Amsterdam: Springerlink, 2008): 93-117. 
10 G. Thomas Goodnight, “Science and Technology Controversy: A Rationale for Inquiry,” Argumentation 
and Advocacy (Summer 2005): 26-9.  
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the defining features of late modernity is the growth of the technical expertise required to 
manage the complex subsystems that have arisen. The Greek and European bourgeois 
encouragement of the sciences did, of course, play a crucial role in establishing scientific 
inquiry. As classicist Maurice Clagett explains, Greek public culture grounded the norms of 
Western science by developing the logical forms that were the basis for scientific proof and also 
by initiating the institutional support that birthed sustained scientific inquiry.11 Similarly, Steven 
Shapin has documented how bourgeois conversation norms in seventeenth century English 
gentle culture were instrumental in aiding the dispassionate analysis of early scientific 
experiments.12 These two eras had an intimate relationship with science in part because media 
new to those times expanded the participants in scientific inquiry. Alphabetic writing moved 
science beyond the scribal-priestly class in classical Greece, and print culture circulated 
scientific conversation even further throughout textually-mediated social networks in the 
bourgeois public sphere.  
 Yet, neither of these cultures really provides a normative model to fit the unique space 
that scientific discourses came to occupy in late modern public culture. Decisions now made by 
technical experts are operating on a much different scale. Contemporary experiments don’t 
exactly work through the abstract questions that required Newton to lounge under the apple tree 
and Boyle to stick balloons on boiling beakers. Scientists are now employed by states and 
corporations to develop pharmaceutical drugs, sources of energy, and military weapons; they are 
called on to address the healthfulness of food, the pollution of rivers, and climatic changes. 
These instrumental applications of science have increased the centrality of experts in managing 
                                                
11 Maurice Clagett, Greek Science in Antiquity (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2001 [1955]), 24-31. 
12 Shapin, A Social History of Truth, especially chapters 2 and 3. 
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risks produced, ironically, from some of modernity’s excesses.13 Environmental pollution is the 
most obvious of these excesses, with carbon dioxide-fueled climate change looming as a 
particularly daunting challenge. Scientists are central in the struggle over climate science—but 
even the ‘experts’ aren’t really experts, because “climate science is such a vast undertaking that 
no single scientist, nor any group of scientists can master anything but a small part of it.”14 
Climate science is indicative of the complexities of modern day science: the (modernist) 
disciplinarity of knowledge production is incapable of capturing the full dynamic of climate 
change. Rather, the scientific study of climate links fields across traditional disciplines, making it 
increasingly difficult for both experts and more general publics to make sense of the state of the 
science when it gets called into question.15 
 Despite the inability of Greek and bourgeois public culture to firmly ground a normative 
ideal of ‘science in society’ with enough portability to organize contemporary public life, 
Habermas’ essential insights about democratic deliberation inform contemporary efforts to 
reconcile expert and lay knowledge. Even in complex scientific controversies like climate 
science, Habermas has maintained that there must be some linkage between expert and lay 
discourses in order to facilitate deliberative legitimation processes. Science cannot stand outside 
of democratic politics. This orientation coheres with his decades long project of theorizing the 
debilitating effects of technocracy, which I will partially recount here. In Towards a Rational 
Society, Habermas extends a Deweyan-pragmatist vision of the relationship between science and 
                                                
13 See Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
1992), 19-20 and Nuclear Legacies: Communication, Controversy, and the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex, ed. 
Bryan C. Taylor, William J. Kinsella, Stephen P. Depoe and Maribeth S. Metzler (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 
2007). 
14 Aynsley Kellow, Science and Public Policy: The Virtuous Corruption of Virtual Environmental Science 
(Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007), 47. 
15 See Clark Miller and Paul Edwards, “Introduction,” in Changing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and 
Environmental Governance, eds. Clark Miller and Paul Edwards (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 8-15. 
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the lifeworld.16 John Dewey theorized the interplay of science and deliberation as a two-way 
street: “the subject matter of science is stated in symbol-constellations that are radically unlike 
those familiar to common sense: in what, in effect, is a different language … science takes its 
departure from common sense, but the return road into common sense is devious and blocked by 
existing social conditions.”17 These one-way roads put democratic governance on a path to 
technocratic decision-making uncoupled from the practical needs of a public. Absent public 
input through democratic channels, advancements in science and technology will likely not be 
bent toward the common good. Or worse: it was, after all, technocrats who made the trains run 
on time in Nazi Germany and who built atomic bombs in the United States.18  
Technocratic decision-making might be said to refigure representative publicity.19 In late 
modern culture, scientists have supplanted the king in being trotted out before a public, where 
their claims take on a kind of modernist holiness privileged over other ways of knowing.20 When 
institutions like Congress host debates about science, competing stakeholders march their own 
scientists out in a spectacle amplified by the mass media.21 This spectacle replaces the earlier 
norm by which the individual scientist had “automatic contact” with a broader public through the 
                                                
16 Jürgen Habermas, Towards a Rational Society, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1970 
[1968]), 66-9. 
17 John Dewey, “On Common Sense and Science,” in John Dewey Later Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, 
(Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University, 1990), 12:83. 
18 See Frank Fischer’s critique of technocratic reasoning in Citizens, Experts, and the Environment: The 
Politics of Local Knowledge (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), especially 10-28 and Gordon R. Mitchell, 
"Did Habermas Cede Nature to the Positivists?" Philosophy and Rhetoric 36 (Fall 2003): 1-21. 
19 Or, following Thomas M. Lessl’s configuration, scientific discourse uses a ‘priestly voice’ that speaks 
authoritatively for an elite substratum of society; in “The Priestly Voice,” Quarterly Journal of Speech (May 1989): 
183-97.  
20 Habermas, Rational Society, 67. 
21 Habermas, Rational Society, 75.  
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scientific societies of the bourgeois public sphere.22 Sometimes this spectacle wins consent, but 
other times it simply erodes scientific authority, as “each side presents its own scientists, making 
it hard to maintain the appearance of scientific neutrality.”23 Though scientific experts might be 
able to address some scientific problems, technocratic solutions don’t benefit from the same 
strength of legitimacy that more robust expert-public dialogues lend to the resolution of science 
controversies. 
The later Habermas echoes many of the same themes originally articulated in Toward a 
Rational Society. In Between Facts and Norms, he claims, “if the discourse of experts is not 
coupled with democratic opinion- and will-formation, then the experts’ perceptions of problems 
will prevail at the citizens’ expense.”24 Only by taking into account citizen discourses can the 
political public sphere successfully thematize those problems in the lifeworld that demand 
redress.25 The absence of this interface between scientists and citizens results in “a technocratic 
incapacitation of the public sphere” because there is no effective check on the technocrats who 
would otherwise rule unbound.26  
How, then, can decisions about technical controversies gain legitimacy but maintain 
fidelity to science’s best predictions? Habermas poses two related questions that more 
                                                
22 As Habermas writes, “the bureaucratic encapsulation that arises from the organization of the modern 
research process” presents an additional barrier between science and public deliberation, “for the client at the gates 
of organized research, to whom scientific information is addressed, is now no longer (at least immediately) a public 
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for the sake of its technical application. Formerly the task of literary presentation belonged to scientific reflection 
itself. In the system of large-scale research it is replaced by the memorandum formulated in relation to the contract 
and the research report aimed at technical recommendations” (Rational Society, 76). 
23 John Dryzek, David Downes, Christian Hunold, David Schlosberg, and Hans-Kristian Hernes, Green 
States and Social Movements: Environmentalism in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Norway 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 178-9. 
24 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 351. 
25 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 365. 
26 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 373. 
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specifically broach this problem: “How is it possible to translate technically exploitable 
knowledge into the practical consciousness of the social life-world?” and “How can the power of 
technical control be brought within the range of the consensus of acting and transacting 
citizens?”27 The latter question is answered with a little more ease for Habermas. Technocrats 
must be answerable to citizen needs and critiques—it is this normative orientation that 
legitimized Congressman Barton’s request of Mann’s hockey stick data. In this view, citizens 
should be able to have the opportunity to set the agenda for scientific inquiry by, for example, 
identifying polluted rivers and lobbying for research into potential source points. Citizens and 
their representatives should be able to have oversight powers so that scientific decision-making 
doesn’t run amuck. 
These kinds of democratic constraints on scientific knowledge production have some 
value. But can models of public deliberation that simply give everyone a seat at the table 
sufficiently ground deliberative legitimation processes? It’s true that lay citizens might well be 
better situated to make risk calculations than technocrats working through narrow cost-benefit 
algorithms. However, some scientific controversies frustrate the capacity of citizens to detect and 
understand them, and so their agenda-setting and oversight functions are considerably weakened. 
The controversy over climate change is a textbook example of this problem. Climate science 
relies on data spanning thousands of years, charting apparently imperceptible yet significant 
shifts in the overall climate patterns of the earth. The consequences of climate change are 
similarly fuzzy to detect. Sure, citizens can perceive an increase in hurricanes, the threat of rising 
oceans, or the long-term shifts in the zones of agricultural production; but can they connect those 
phenomena to driving cars and building factories? As skeptics of anthropogenic climate change 
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successfully argued for years, these are all long-term effects with many alternate causes, and 
easy cause and effect relationships are elusive. 
Opportunities for agenda setting must consequently be paired with what might be called 
the interpretive function of experts, which addresses Habermas’ first question concerning the 
translation of specialized knowledge into the practical consciousness of the lifeworld. How is 
this possible? Habermas posits, “conflicts must be decided, interests realized, interpretations 
found—through both action and transaction structured by ordinary language.”28 He thus puts the 
burden on experts to shift from highly technical, specialized language to a more public idiom. 
We might call the spaces where technical language is negotiated into ordinary language 
‘translation stations.’29 There, science and common sense meet (perhaps shaking hands, even as 
they look warily at each others’ tickets). ‘Translation’ ought not be thought of simplistically. As 
anyone who has ever attempted translation can attest, the process of moving from one language 
game to another is fraught with stops and starts, words that shade into each other, culturally 
weighted meanings, inside jokes and cognitive shortcuts. Translation is not smooth and errorless; 
in fact, the intrinsic roughness of any translation often productively sparks continuing 
conversation about the accuracy, appropriateness, and effectiveness of various renditions.  
Can scientific claims make the jump from technical modes of reasoning to more public-
friendly approaches? Habermas says they can, and the institutional mass media has traditionally 
                                                
28 Habermas, Rational Society, 56. 
29 Habermas, Rational Society, 70. There are echoes of Dewey here as well: “the paths of communication 
between common sense and science are as yet largely one-way lanes” (83) and, in what might be an early 
instantiation of the translation station metaphor, that the “present need is for a unified logic that takes account of a 
two-way movement between common sense” (“Common Sense,” 101). The diagnosis made by Habermas years later 
suggests that there has been little evolution in merging the one-way lanes: “[the pragmatistic model] neglects the 
specific logical characteristics and the social preconditions for the reliable translation of scientific information into 
the ordinary language of practice and inversely for a translation from the context of practical questions back into the 
specialized language of technical and strategic recommendations” (Rational Society, 70). 
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served as a key translation station for science as it filters into public debate. Yet, many experts 
resist translating their findings into ordinary language; part of what makes them experts is a 
mastery of the jargon, specialized literature, and complex methodology that defines their area of 
expertise. A quick glimpse at most any peer-reviewed technical journal confirms that 
“semantically closed systems cannot be induced to invent on their own the common language 
necessary for the perception and articulation of the relevant issues and standards of evaluation 
that apply to society as a whole.”30 At the same time, professional journals and conferences are 
translation stations for scientists, who often must read scientific accounts in more ordinary 
language than the technical language of practitioners in a parallel sub-field. Scientists themselves 
need interpreters, especially given the “rising flood of information that the scientific community 
has to deal with.”31  
In fact, ordinary language is the lingua franca required for scientists to communicate with 
each other. As Habermas claims, “given a high degree of division of labor, the lay public often 
provides the shortest path of internal understanding between mutually estranged specialists.”32 
Ordinary language is the “‘ultimate metalanguage’” that “circulates throughout society and can 
be translated into and from every specialized code.”33 Habermas posits that “an ordinary 
language is available” and already in use by the networks of civil society and the state’s 
deliberating bodies.34 While scientists (and philosophers of science) often claim that technical 
language cannot be converted neatly into ordinary language without the massive loss of data, the 
presence of interfield communication conducted in ordinary language between scientists partially 
                                                
30 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 352. 
31 Habermas, Rational Society, 77. 
32 Habermas, Rational Society, 77. 
33 Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, 56.  
34 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 352. 
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belies this critique.35 It is my contention that science blogs have established themselves as 
supplemental translation stations, which, in their own way, deal with the increasingly rising tide 
of science and technology controversies by providing both panoramic and detailed overviews in 
ordinary language. 
G. Thomas Goodnight’s formulation of the private, public, and technical spheres of 
argument is a relevant addition that extends Habermasian insights into the realm of 
argumentation. Goodnight argues that these three spheres ground arguments differently, with 
norms of evidence, reasoning, and presentation wildly divergent.36 According to Goodnight, 
deliberative rhetoric in the public sphere is being squeezed out by private and technical modes of 
reasoning. Either individual citizens assert their own tendentious interpretations or experts’ 
opinions prevail because of their greater authority. The spaces for controversies to be assessed in 
ordinary language are disappearing because, as Goodnight catalogs, mass communication 
strategists have encouraged politicians to dumb down their political rhetoric at the same time that 
the celebration of the personal appears to have triumphed over discussion of the common good.37  
Goodnight is sanguine about the newest communication revolution in reversing this 
trend. “Improvements in broadcast techniques, satellite transmission, and computer processing,” 
he writes, “… seem to be geared to producing either refined information or compelling fantasy 
… What could be a way of sharing in the creation of a future is supplanted by a perpetual swirl 
                                                
35 See the volume edited by Randy Allen Harris, Rhetoric and Incommensurability (West Lafayette, IN: 
Parlor Press, 2005). 
36 G. Thomas Goodnight, “The Personal, Technical, and Public Spheres of Argument: A Speculative 
Inquiry into the Art of Public Deliberation,” in Contemporary Rhetorical Theory: A Reader, eds. John Louis 
Lucaites, Celeste Michelle Condit, and Sally Caudhill (New York: Guilford Press, 1999): 251-264; originally 
published in Argumentation and Advocacy 18 (1982): 214-227. 
37 Goodnight, “Personal, Technical, and Public,” 259. 
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of exciting stimuli. Thus is deliberation replaced by consumption.”38 There’s a lot not to like in 
that assessment—namely, that new media forms invariably squeeze out public deliberation rather 
than reconfiguring how publics deliberate. There is an additional critique I would add: the theory 
of public, private, and technical spheres tends to obscure the interpenetration of these different 
fields of argument. RealClimate, and similar science blogs, might be usefully conceived as 
systematically creating an interstitial ‘public-technical’ sphere that negotiates knowledge claims 
made by publics and experts. As such, science blogs represent a different kind of translation 
station from that provided by the institutional mass media, which fall squarely in the ‘public’ 
field of argument. Examined from a rhetorical perspective, the mass-mediated ‘translation 
stations,’ like newspapers and television, have significant problems that may well prevent a 
renewed appreciation for deliberative rhetoric. It is to these critiques that I turn before explaining 
RealClimate’s potential as a translation station appropriate for a network society. 
5.3 A Rhetorical Perspective on Expertism and the Problem of Authority 
I have set up the need, as far as deliberative legitimacy is concerned, for translation 
between scientific and lay publics. Habermas’ calls for more science-public intercommunication 
has not gone unheeded, especially as scientific and technological controversies have increasingly 
spun into public view. And, in fact, the demands that scientific knowledge be translated into 
ordinary language have occasionally been met. Two regularized sites of public-science 
interaction have been institutionalized utilizing the medium of ordinary language, yet both 
produce certain problems visible from a rhetorical perspective. The first site of this interaction is 
found in authorized venues for public participation in scientific decision-making by democratic 
                                                
38 Goodnight, “Personal, Technical, and Public,” 260. 
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institutions. The second site of this interaction is through the institutional mass media in the form 
of news stories about scientific issues. Though each of these efforts to spread scientific 
discussion in an intelligible fashion occasionally contributes to more robust dialogues about 
science in society, a rhetorical perspective on communication draws out their imperfections as 
sites of translation. 
 
Rituals of Participation in Public Hearings 
 Given the increasing centrality of scientific and technological controversies in late 
modernity, democratic institutions have begun to accommodate demands for enhanced avenues 
incorporating public deliberation. Administrative agencies in the United States often open their 
rulemaking to public comment, in addition to meeting with community members. The results of 
these attempts at incorporating public participation in scientific decision-making have been 
mixed. The inescapable problem of scientific authority in these situations creates a disparity in 
ethos between the scientists, who are often positioned as knowers, and citizens, who are 
regularly situated as learners. Though the medium of conversation between these two 
stakeholders is often ordinary language, asymmetries still persist. As Stephen Turner explains,  
The standard models imply that experts can persuade one another, and can 
persuade non-experts, while non-experts cannot persuade experts. The non-expert 
can at most supply information, which becomes meaningful for the expert only 
when translated into expert terms, which the non-expert cannot do, but the expert 
can. There is, in short, a ‘discursive asymmetry.’ Experts possess the grounds and 
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means of mutual persuasion; non-experts do not. A non-expert can at best 
apprehend, as a consumer expert opinion, that others possess expertise.39 
This discursive asymmetry is bound up in authority. As Turner continues,  
Scientists themselves, presumably, speak both the ‘languages’ of science and 
common sense, and can translate from one to the other as bilinguals. But the 
results of translation, such as ‘this table is composed mostly of empty space,’ do 
not have common sense credibility, because the grounds for the claim cannot be 
expressed in common terms. So translation is not enough. Something more is 
needed, and the usual solution is to characterize these utterances in terms of the 
notion of ‘authority,’ making the problem one of expert authority.40 
Turner has captured the essential problem with translation: when scientific language is translated 
into ordinary language, it loses some of its special claim to authority. In institutional contexts 
where publics and specialists intersect, a non-specialist must trust that a scientist’s claims do in 
fact faithfully reflect scientifically valid results.  
 These translation stations can, indeed, orient scientists toward the needs of the public and 
better acquaint the public with the state of scientific inquiry. However, more likely, traditional 
public participation processes are “ritualistic endeavors”41 that are “designed [or are perceived] to 
                                                
39 Stephen Turner, Liberal Democracy 3.0: Civil Society in an Age of Experts (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 
2003), 48. 
40 Turner, Liberal Democracy 3.0, 50.  
41 Susan Senecah, “The Trinity of Voice: The Role of Practical Theory in Planning and Evaluating the 
Effectiveness of Environmental Participatory Processes,” in Communication and Public Participation in 
Environmental Decision-Making, eds. Stephen Depoe, John Delicath, and Marie-France Aepli Elsenbeer (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 2004), 18. 
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shroud an elitist policy making process in the cloak of democracy.”42 In other words, when the 
Environmental Protection Agency invites the public to a hearing, the meeting often functions as 
a rubber stamp for decisions that have already been made. Experts are able to corral public 
opinion and herd it into more controllable avenues. As Walter Fisher argues, field experts tend to 
dominate these contexts “by the rational superiority of their arguments … The presence of 
‘experts’ in public moral arguments makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the public of 
‘untrained thinkers’ to win an argument or even to judge arguments well.”43 Discursive 
asymmetries aren’t automatic, and systemic tweaks might well reduce the ritualistic elements of 
public hearings while increasing deliberative legitimacy. Yet, as Carol Hager argues, “even in 
the absence of domination by one group or faction, the search for the better argument can 
become a technical search that cuts off political interaction.”44 
 As a translation station, this institutional response to the problem of public-science 
communication cannot avoid the problem of authority in technical communication. Some critics 
of these weak fora have thus suggested  ‘meta-institutional’ efforts that rely not on localized 
participation by a public with particular scientists but on efforts by supposedly neutral third 
parties to make judgments about sound science. Stephen Schneider has recommended the 
development of “science courts” that could make more impartial judgments about science.45 
                                                
42 G.A. Persons, “Defining the Public Interest: Citizen Participation in Metropolitan and State Policy 
Making,” National Civic Review (February 2007), 121; also John Gastil and Laura Black, “Public Deliberation as 
the Organizing Principle of Political Communication Research,” Journal of Public Deliberation 4 (2008), 24. 
43 Walter Fisher, Human Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value, and Action 
(Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1987), 71, emphasis in original. 
44 Carol Hager, Technological Democracy: Bureaucracy and Citizenry in the German Energy Debate (Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 217. 
45 Stephen Schneider, “Is the ‘Citizen-Scientist’ an Oxymoron?,” in Science, Technology, and Democracy, 
ed. Daniel Lee Kleinman (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000), 112-4. Arthur Kantrowitz is widely credited with 
generating the original enthusiasm for a science court-like institution in “Proposal for an Institution for Scientific 
Judgment,” Science (May 12, 1967): 763-4. 
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These courts would theoretically toss out the ‘junk science,’ make careful comparisons of 
competing scientific claims, and issue judgments that could better inform policy decisions. 
However, this meta-institutional effort to make judgments about science replicates traditional 
patterns of scientific decision-making by an elite cadre rather than through deliberative means. 
As a top-down approach, meta-institutional solutions cannot capture the legitimacy that accrues 
through dialogical translation stations. 
 
‘Balance’ and the Institutional Media 
 If public fora are one opportunity for publics and scientists to meet in the medium of 
ordinary language, the mass media have traditionally been another site. The broadcast media that 
consolidated during the twentieth century tasked themselves with reporting on the unfolding 
scientific and technology controversies of the day. However, the journalistic norm of objectivity 
and balance, represented by the convention of reporting on ‘both sides’ of a controversy, has a 
perverse effect when it comes to scientific issues. Some apparent absurdities can result from this 
norm: does balance require journalists to interview card-carrying members of the Flat Earth 
Society whenever they cover geological issues? Must they interview advocates who deny the 
connection between HIV and AIDS when they report on new developments of an AIDS vaccine? 
Indeed, showing ‘both sides’ potentially results in some strange reporting; yet, reporters are 
advised to hedge their bets because the history of science is littered with examples where the 
‘consensus’ position was eventually overturned by what had been a minority perspective. 
Showing both sides, then, serves as a check against ‘false consensus’ and the premature closure 
of scientific controversy. 
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 The root of this tension is in the modeling of the mass media after the format of public 
debate. For a public debate, both (or multiple) sides are supposed to be given equal time in 
advancing their claims. In this way, norms of the bourgeois public sphere about turn-taking 
became institutionalized in the broadcast media. This model of public debate “has the potential 
to allow smaller, less recognized or less powerful groups to compete on an equal footing with 
larger, more familiar, or more powerful groups.”46 One side effect of this norm is to reduce 
political debate from a rich field of subtly differentiated opinions into two polarized sides, which 
in the United States often map directly onto the two dominant political parties. Deborah Tannen 
has amplified this criticism in her assessment of the public debate template. Using the dramatic 
example of Holocaust deniers to prove her point, Tannen maintains that the use of adversarial, 
‘show both sides’ formats has given minority viewpoints unjustifiable publicity.47 This argument 
culture encourages a rush to extreme, polarizing argumentation that exacts an opportunity cost 
for public deliberation. 
 The adversarial format, preserved through the institutional media’s focus on ‘balance’ by 
getting perspectives from ‘both sides,’ is particularly problematic for science controversies 
because it imports norms very different from scientific argumentation. As John Ziman explains, 
scientific evidence is argued over for years through iterations of written argument, a far cry from 
the daily punctuation of the broadcast media.48 Moreover, scientific argument proceeds by 
establishing loose “complexes of evidence” that resist reduction to polarized propositions like ‘is 
                                                
46 Ken Broda-Bahm, Daniela Kempf, and William Driscoll. Argument and Audience: Presenting Debates in 
Public Settings. (New York: The International Debate Education Association, 2004), 25-26. 
47 Deborah Tannen, The Argument Culture: Moving from Debate to Dialogue (New York: Random House, 
1998), 37-8. 
48 John Ziman, “Are Debatable Scientific Questions Debatable?,” Social Epistemology 14 (2000), 190. 
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anthropogenic global warming happening?’49 Scientists often perceive public debate on issues 
where there is a lopsided consensus—in face-to-face exchanges or through the mass media—“as 
an attempt to publicize the heresy and keep it alive scientifically rather than as a serious 
procedure for arriving collectively at the truth.”50 
The norms of ‘balance’ claimed by the institutional media create two additional perverse 
consequences when it comes to reporting on climate science.51 First, journalists that report on 
climate science often underplay the significant overlaps in scientific consensus that link 
industrial emissions of carbon dioxide with artificial climate shifts. If few scientists have a 
panoramic view of climate science because of its complexity as an area of inquiry, then 
journalists with multiple beats to cover are even more unlikely to have developed the ability to 
accurately synthesize cutting edge developments across a number of fields.52 This failure in 
discretion often leads journalists to give more credence to lobbyists, front-groups, and fringe 
views than they deserve. 53 A standard newspaper article, for example, might relate findings from 
two different sources, without identifying one of the sources as being funded primarily by oil and 
coal industries. The effect of this is to perpetuate the assumption that climate science has failed 
to produce any actionable findings and thus delay meaningful action to address the impending 
crisis. As journalist and climate activist Ross Gelbspan argues, a proportionalizing approach 
                                                
49 Ziman, “Debatable Scientific Questions,” 194. 
50 Ziman, “Debatable Scientific Questions,” 195. 
51 Robert Patterson and Ronald Lee have critiqued the notion of balance as it appears in regulatory 
decision-making as a move that inherently privileges technical discourse; see their “The Environmental Rhetoric of 
‘Balance’: A Case Study of Regulatory Discourse and the Colonization of the Public,” Technical Communication 
Quarterly (Winter 1997): 25-40. 
52 Julia Corbett and Jessica Durfee, “Testing (Un)Certainity of Science: Media Representations of Global 
Warming,” Science Communication (December 2004), 133; Kris Wilson, “Drought, Debate, and Uncertainty: 
Measuring Reporters’ Knowledge and Ignorance about Climate Change,” Public Understanding of Science 9 
(2000): 1-13. 
53 Julia Corbett, Communicating Nature: How We Create and Understand Environmental Messages 
(Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2006), 217. 
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might be more appropriate than the current model: journalists might focus on new research 
findings for 95% of the article, “with the skeptics getting a paragraph at the end.”54  
 The second problem involved with reporting ‘both sides’ of the climate science 
controversy is the debilitating phenomenon of the “dueling scientists.”55 As Environmental and 
Resource Studies scholar Stephen Bocking argues, “the spectacle of different experts interpreting 
the same thing differently contradicts assumptions about their objectivity.”56 Dueling scientists 
unnecessarily polarize technical issues, creating a “false dichotomy” that erodes more 
sophisticated assessment of possible points of agreement.57 When competing experts are trotted 
out, public consideration often turns toward comparisons of authority. Who is more qualified to 
speak? Who is being funded by what special interests? What is the track record of each expert? 
While these are often useful, and necessary, questions to ask, they often produces “whiplash 
journalism,” where differing, contradictory scientific reports result in public confusion.58  
                                                
54 Ross Gelbspan, Boiling Point: How Politicians, Big Oil and Coal, Journalists and Activists Are Fueling 
the Climate Crisis--And What We Can Do to Avert Disaster (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 73-4.  
55 Schneider, “‘Citizen-Scientist,’” 106. 
56 Stephen Bocking, Nature’s Experts: Science, Politics, and the Environment (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 2004), 30. Bocking suggests that the phenomenon of the dueling experts might have some 
positive consequences as well in demystifying the supposed objectivity of science: “The perception that experts can 
disagree—inevitably disagree, when they become involved in controversies—highlights how doing science always 
involves some judgment, and how these judgments can be shaped by values, as well as by professional, economic, 
and political factors. The realization that experts are not infallible, and do not have access to some unique, objective 
methods or perceptions, has resulted in an opening up of science beyond the scientific community” (31). Thomas 
Farrell and G. Thomas Goodnight similarly explore how disagreeing scientists during the Three Mile Island 
catastrophe hurt technical credibility during the crisis in “Accidental Rhetoric: The Root Metaphors of Three Mile 
Island,” Communication Monographs 48 (1981): 271-300. 
57 Stephen Schneider, Global Warming: Are We Entering the Greenhouse Century? (San Francisco, CA: 
Sierra Club Books, 1989), 203-4. 
58 See Andrew Revkin, “The Daily Planet: Why The Media Stumble Over the Environment,” in A Field 
Guide for Science Writers, eds. Deborah Blum, Mary Knudson, and Robin Marantz Henig (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 222-8; “Media Mania for a ‘Front-Page Thought’ on Climate,” Dot Earth, December 14, 
2007, http://dotearth.blogs. nytimes.com/2007/12/14/the-mania-for-a-front-page-thought-on-climate/; and “Climate 
Experts Tussle Over Details. Public Gets Whiplash,” New York Times, July 29, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/07/29/science/earth/29clim.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1219165225MmvSFWEJVtEQCkpz
ZnNtJg. 
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 To recap: according to late Habermas, public and technical communication must find 
translation stations where interchanges can be conducted in ordinary language. Yet, two of the 
most prominent translation stations, the state’s institutionalized space reserved for public 
comment and the institutional mass media, have trouble facilitating the conversation in a way 
that doesn’t just defer to the spectacular collision of expert discourses. It would be a mistake to 
assume that the twentieth century translation stations are doomed to failure. Surely they are not. 
Yet, on a rhetorical level, the norms that govern these translation stations are increasingly 
problematic. I will argue in the next section that science blogs like RealClimate offer an 
alternative to traditional translation stations in a way that might assist in cultivating public 
expertise on science controversies. 
5.4 RealClimate as a Translation Station 
 What kinds of topoi do the bloggers at RealClimate cover? What sorts of technical issues 
do they attempt to translate into ordinary language? RealClimate bloggers utilize categories and 
tags to organize their posts into themes, making for convenient access to similar posts.59 There 
are three significant divisions, based on the index page of RealClimate.60 The first category deals 
with specifically scientific issues regarding the state of climate science: aerosols, climate 
modeling, extreme events, paleo-climate, and so on. The second category addresses how climate 
                                                
59 The rise of categories and tagging has reintroduced the regular blogger to the concept of topoi. Topoi is 
the classical theory of invention that asked a rhetor to consider traditional, familiar lines of argument.  The 
categories that the RealClimate bloggers have organized are designed to sort the repeated themes that they regularly 
touch on. These categories function like topoi—they are the types of things one would need to know in order to be 
able to argue convincingly in favor of the climate science. Political blogs function similarly as catalogs of possible 
topoi, from very broad to very focused topics. Categories in more personal, ‘lifecasting’ blogs similarly function as a 
sort of ongoing, reflexive thematization of the topoi of everday life.  As these thematizations arise, and become 
recurring features in their blogging, they reveal more information about social types and processes. 
60 Group, “Index,” RealClimate, December 1, 2004, http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2004/ 
12/index/. 
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science is discussed in the media, with a special focus on ‘responses to common contrarian 
arguments.’ The final category considers scientific practice and delves into meta-issues like the 
significance of peer review, the meaning of consensus, and issues involved with communicating 
science. These three broad categories indicate three different areas where RealClimate performs 
a translation function, and I will explicate each in turn.  
Category 1: The Science Itself, In Which ‘Dummies Guide’ Becomes the Universal Hermeneutic 
 One of the key developments in the last decade regarding climate science and policy is the 
visual depiction of an artificial warming spike. Dubbed the ‘hockey stick,’ the upward tick at the 
end of the twentieth century corresponds with intensified human industrial activity and carbon 
dioxide production. It is a powerful visual enthymeme that dispels the skeptics’ criticisms as 
minor quibbles that simply don’t undermine the fundamental linkage between excess carbon 
dioxide and climate change.61 One of the scientists who founded RealClimate, Michael Mann, 
was lead author on the original paper published in the influential journal Nature in 1998.62 
Stephen McIntyre and Ross McKitrick criticized that piece in 2003 with an article published in 
Energy and Environment.63 The gist of their objection was that certain proxy data should be 
weighted differently, and with a more appropriate weighting system the blade of the hockey stick 
does not appear. In 2005, Representative Joe Barton, a prominent skeptic of climate change, 
                                                
61 This visual depiction might be seen as an extension of what Cara Finnegan calls the “naturalistic 
enthymeme” that asserts its own realism; see her “The Naturalistic Enthymeme and Visual Argument: Photographic 
Representation in the Skull Controversy,” Argumentation and Advocacy 37 (Winter 2001): 133-49. Michelle 
Gibbons has extended Finnegan’s insights about the naturalistic enthymeme in the context of how technical images 
are reframed in popular news stories in “Seeing the Mind in the Matter: Functional Brain Imaging as Framed Visual 
Argument,” Argumentation and Advocacy 43 (Winter and Spring 2007): 175-88. 
62 Michael Mann, Raymond Bradley, and Malcolm Hughes, “Global-scale Temperature Patterns and 
Climate Forcing over the Past Six Centuries,” Nature 392 (April 1998): 779-787. 
63 See their “Corrections to the Mann et al (1998) Proxy Data Base and Northern Hemisphere Average 
Temperature Series” in Energy and Environment 14 (2003): 751-772.  
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called Mann to testify in Congress about his data collection and method of analysis. Two 
different commissions studied Mann’s data, resulting in two drastically differing reports. 
Scientists in the consensus position signaled reaffirmation of the hockey stick, whereas skeptics, 
and others in the global-warming-industrial-skepticism complex, read validation into the 
continuing question marks concerning Mann et al.’s methodology.64 Most of the peer-reviewed 
literature concluded that Mann et al.’s initial climate reconstruction was essentially vindicated 
and independent reconstructions using various data sets have confirmed the initial hockey stick, 
creating what some call a ‘hockey team.’65 This is a microcosm of numerous scientific 
controversies today: seemingly credible, yet competing, scientific claims receive multiple so-
called ‘independent’ reviews that came to differing conclusions. What follows is an example of 
how RealClimate bloggers interpreted this controversy in order to provide non-specialists with a 
broader sense of the scientific justification for the validity of the hockey stick. 
On December 4, 2004, Michael Mann wrote “Myth vs. Fact Regarding the ‘Hockey 
Stick.’66 This post identified 4 (later updated to 5) myths regarding the recent hockey stick 
controversy.67 Mann dissects some of the claims that had been repeated by various critics. In the 
traditional ‘myth vs. fact’ model, Mann responds like this: 
                                                
64 For example, Steve McIntyre’s blog Climate Audit claimed vindication of their original critique in 
“Wegman Report Released,” Climate Audit, July 14, 2006, http://www.climateaudit.org/?p=750.  
65 A term coined by RealClimate bloggers. See Group, “Peer Review: A Necessary But Not Sufficient 
Condition II,” RealClimate, January 27, 2005, http://www.realclimate.org/index.php?p=111; see also Geoff 
Brumfiel, “Academy Affirms Hockey Stick Graph,” Nature, 441 (June 29, 2006): 1032-3. 
66 Michael Mann, “Myth vs. Fact Regarding the ‘Hockey Stick,’ RealClimate, December 4, 2004, 
http://www.realclimate.org/index.php?p=11, emphasis in original. 
67 This updating was announced in comments; Michael Mann, comment on “Myth vs. Fact Regarding the 
‘Hockey Stick,’ RealClimate, 11:58 a.m., December 4, 2004, http://www.realclimate.org/ index.php?p=11 
#comment-389. The ability of bloggers to go back and update posts demonstrates the ‘dynamic updating’ 
possibilities inherent in blogging as new understandings and interests are discovered; see Christopher Karpowitz and 
Jane Mansbridge, “Disagreement and Consensus: The Importance of Dynamic Updating in Public Deliberation,” in 
The Deliberative Democracy Handbook: Strategies for Effective Civic Engagement in the Twenty-First Century, 
eds. John Gastil and Peter Levine (San Francisco, CA: John Wiley & Sons, 2005): 237-53. The dynamic updating on 
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MYTH #1: The ‘Hockey Stick’ Reconstruction is based solely on two 
publications by climate scientist Michael Mann and colleagues (Mann et al, 
1998; 1999). This is patently false. Nearly a dozen model-based and proxy-based 
reconstructions of Northern Hemisphere mean temperature by different groups all 
suggest that late 20th century warmth is anomalous in a long-term (multi-century 
to millennial) context (see Figures 1 and 2 in “Temperature Variations in Past 
Centuries and The So-Called ‘Hockey Stick’”).68 
Mann relies on scientific consensus on this issue to back up his claim. By citing other 
scholarship confirming the hockey stick, and providing links to two figures, he adds credibility to 
his model by citing research that duplicates the hockey stick reconstruction. 
 Later in the same post, Mann debunks ‘Myth #4,’ that “Errors in the ‘Hockey Stick’ 
undermine the conclusion that late 20th century hemispheric warmth is anomalous.”69 He goes 
into detail with responses to McKitrick and McIntyre’s objections, emphasizing how their 
criticisms failed to pass peer review at Nature and had been rebutted by an article in the Journal 
of Climate. Mann mostly skirts the scientific thrust of their criticism, relying on the power of 
peer-reviewed science pitted against un-peer-reviewed research to do the persuasive work. In one 
way, this replicates the authority battles so often waged over ‘good’ and ‘bad’ science. Within 
that paradigm, the norms of science—i.e. peer review—are the key test for what kinds of 
scientific claims ought to be accepted. It might be problematic to assume that peer review carries 
as much weight in public realms as it does in technical spheres, though there is probably some 
                                                
blogs can be a double-edged sword: while it allows additions, useful modifications, and clarifications, it also enables 
erasure. 
68 Mann, “Myth vs. Fact,” RealClimate. 
69 Mann, “Myth vs. Fact,” RealClimate. 
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significant common sense recognition that peer reviewed science is preferable. Mann’s 
knowledge of why Nature declined to publish McIntyre and McKitrick’s comment skeptical of 
the hockey stick data reveals critical insider information to a wider audience. The footnotes to 
published scientific papers, with live hyperlinks where available, lend added authority to Mann’s 
post. 
 Yet, in the end, this post might defer too much to authority in trying to persuade the 
audience about the accuracy of the hockey stick research. Admittedly, it constructs a particularly 
compelling model of authority that is grounded in the norms of peer review and seemingly super-
majoritarian consensus. But the bloggers at RealClimate, in their explanation of the hockey stick 
research, move beyond authority claims in their descriptions of climate science. In February of 
2005, Gavin Schmidt and Caspar Amman produced a “Dummies Guide to the Latest ‘Hockey 
Stick’ Controversy.”70 The ‘dummies guide,’ a reference to the popular line of books that purport 
to simplify complex subjects, has become code for the process of turning technical language into 
more accessible and intelligible vernacular modes of communication.  
 Ironically, this post succeeds and fails as a dummies guide. Schmidt and Amman attempt 
to explain McIntyre and McKitrick’s critique of Mann et al.’s 1998 paper, with an in-depth 
explanation of the original methodology and the following critique. They begin by writing “due 
to popular demand, we have put together a 'dummies guide' that tries to describe what the actual 
issues are in the latest controversy, in language even our parents might understand.”71 After this 
introductory explanation, they offer two links to more technical descriptions of the material they 
                                                
70 Gavin Schmidt and Caspar Amman, “Dummies Guide to the Latest ‘Hockey Stick’ Controversy,” 
RealClimate, February 18, 2005, http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2005/02/dummies-guide-to-the-
latest-hockey-stick-controversy/. 
71 Schmidt and Amman, “Dummies Guide,” RealClimate. 
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cover.72 They then provide two more links to other RealClimate posts on “the wider climate 
science context” and the “relationship to other recent reconstructions (the ‘Hockey Team’).”73 
This preface by the RealClimate bloggers offers links to a buffet of topical posts, along a sliding 
scale of difficulty and specialization. The dummies guide itself is presented in a question and 
answer format, split into two parts. In ‘Technical Issues,’ Schmidt and Amman explain the 
method used by Mann et al., going into detail about Primary Component Analysis (PCA) and the 
significance of that method of statistical inquiry. The second part of the post deals with the 
application of that method to Mann et al.’s 1998 hockey stick paper and the critique by McIntyre 
and McKitrick. 
 The main point of this second part is that Mann et al.’s choice of PCA analysis was (a) 
appropriate given their object of study and (b) correctly applied. In order to prove that Mann et 
al. conducted the analysis correctly, Schmidt and Amman produce a series of graphs that show 
how McIntyre and McKitrick’s modified study has poorer “validation statistics,” or “skill.”74 
Their analysis shades toward more technical language in this part, which is mostly, but definitely 
not entirely, intelligible to non-specialists. The graphical depictions of the hockey stick using 
                                                
72 The first link is to Michael Mann, “False Claims by McIntyre and McKitrick Regarding the Mann et al. 
(1998) Reconstruction,” RealClimate, December 4, 2004, http://www.realclimate.org/index.php?p= 
8&lp_lang_view=fr. This post begins with links from ExxonSecrets.org and the Environmental Defense Fund to 
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maneuver, the post offers a detailed explanation of the Principal Components Analysis methodology, and then goes 
into depth in explaining the inaccuracies of the McIntyre and McKitrick critique. This critique is greatly aided by 
graphical depictions that clearly lay out the methodological problems in the McIntyre and McKitrick paper. The 
second post, Michael Mann, “On Yet Another False Claim by McIntyre and McKitrick,” RealClimate, January 6, 
2005, http://www.realclimate.org/index.php?p=98lp_lang_view=fr, covers similar terrain in extending defenses of 
the methodology used in the original hockey stick data. One addendum to this latter post that is included is a link-
heavy paragraph that explores how the McIntyre and McKitrick critique was amplified in non-peer reviewed 
literature—illustrating how the norms of different discourse communities operate. 
73 Stefan Rahmstorf, “What If … The ‘Hockey Stick’ Were Wrong?,” RealClimate, January 27, 2005, 
http://www.realclimate.org/index.php?p=114 and William Connolley, “Moberg et al: Highly Variable Northern 
Hemisphere Temperatures?”, RealClimate, February 15, 2005, http://www.realclimate.org/index.php?p=122. 
74 Schmidt and Amman, “Dummies Guide,” RealClimate. 
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these different methods of analysis certainly assist in comparing and contrasting competing 
interpretations of the data, and the explanations do make some sense out of the disparity between 
the two competing groups of scientists. After this detailed explanation, though, Schmidt and 
Amman summarize their dummies guide by writing 
So does this all matter? No. If you use the MM05 convention and include all the 
significant PCs, you get the same answer. If you don't use any PCA at all, you get 
the same answer. If you use a completely different methodology (i.e. Rutherford 
et al, 2005), you get basically the same answer. Only if you remove significant 
portions of the data do you get a different (and worse) answer. 
The post concludes by noting with a graphical representation that puts Mann et al’s 1998 
reconstruction together with numerous other separate reconstructions, each using different 
methods of analysis. The graph, with multiple temperature reconstructions overlapping each 
other looks like this:  
 
     Figure 2.  ‘Hockey Team’ reconstruction.  
The hockey stick figure again emerges, as a spike begins around 1900. In the end, Schmidt and 
Amman argue that, despite the critique of McIntyre and McKitrick, the preponderance of 
evidence indicates that the hockey stick was an accurate depiction. 
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 How did Schmidt and Amman fare as translators of highly technical material? Were they 
able to convert their modes of scientific proof to ordinary language? The comments on this post 
offer differing opinions. Several comments underlined the successful translation of the 
methodological issues. Commenter Gary Culhane writes  
Congratulations. Now you can break out a bottle of the good stuff. You are 
actually beginning to sound like Tim Lambert, the Australian math and computer 
science guy who can count and explain in a very basic way. Of course, it is still a 
little on the high end, but I can see it is very difficult to condense and digest to 
such a point that material can be thrown up in sports page language. But this piece 
really is a big jump forward in expository style and content.75 
John S. comments “I must congratulate you on a much clearer presentation of the current issues 
than has previously been set out.”76 Eli Rabett proclaims in comments “well, finally I understand. 
It is another case of confusing radians and degrees on the part of McKitrick. It would be 
interesting to look at the package he used for his analysis to see what the warnings are for use of 
the algorithm.”77 Rabett, in referencing the well-known mathematical mistake by MicKitrick that 
I recounted in the introduction to this chapter, further casts doubt on McKitrick’s credibility by 
linking him to another of his serious errors. Some commenters even aid the translation effort, 
explaining the post in an even more condensed form, as Lynn Vincentnathan does: 
                                                
75 Garry Culhane, comment on “Dummies Guide,” 3:22 p.m., February 18, 2005, 
http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2005/02/dummies-guide-to-the-latest-hockey-stick-
controversy/#comment-1320. 
76 John S., comment on “Dummies Guide,” RealClimate, 4:44 p.m., February 18, 2005, 
http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2005/02/dummies-guide-to-the-latest-hockey-stick-
controversy/#comment-1321. 
77 Eli Rabett, comment on “Dummies Guide,” RealClimate, 9:45 p.m., February 19, 2005, 
http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2005/02/dummies-guide-to-the-latest-hockey-stick-
controversy/#comment-1338. 
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I probably need the Complete Idiot’s Guide, but what I get out of this is, using the 
mean of the whole data set (if it does have an actual hockey stick shape) as zero 
creates a higher horizontal line from which all the data vary in various amounts & 
it tends to ‘pull up’ the negative differences & makes the positive differences look 
not so big (or it makes all the data look on average equally large in distance from 
the mean, both in pos & neg directions), making the whole thing look like nothing 
much is happening, aside from cyclical changes. Whereas, using the past (lower) 
data to establish a mean gives us a lower horizontal line from which data vary — 
making the past data look fairly cyclical (except for that mini-ice age), and the 
recent data look like it’s going into new and higher territory.78 
 But Schmidt and Amman did not please all readers with their translation. Commenter 
Florens de Wit submitted “I agree that this presentation is quite a good read, even for someone 
who has no prior knowledge of PCA; I doubt if my mother would understand it however.”79 Greg 
Johnson wrote “Ugh. This is so horribly written as to require a dummies guide to your dummies 
guide. I’m speaking as someone who was somewhat well-read as to the state of the science circa 
1993, who’s trying to brush back up on the subject.”80 Steven Corneliussen commented  
I don’t blame the RealClimate scientists for their often-stated preference simply to 
report scientific facts and to leave actual political debating to others. And I too use 
                                                
78 Lynn Vincentnathan, comment on “Dummies Guide,” RealClimate, 3:15 p.m., February 18, 2005, 
http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2005/02/dummies-guide-to-the-latest-hockey-stick-
controversy/#comment-1319. 
79 Florens de Wit, comment on “Dummies Guide,” RealClimate, 6:09 p.m., February 18, 2005, 
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80 Greg M. Johnson, comment on “Dummies Guide,” RealClimate, 10:31 p.m., March 15, 2005, 
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my mom as a calibration for keeping technical readability at the right level. But I 
have to say, it would heavily stretch my mom’s and my capacities to apply this 
dummies’ guide to what’s been asserted this morning in what may be the world’s 
most influential newspaper for denying RealClimate’s scientific facts.81 
The differing opinions about the satisfactory nature of the dummies guide perhaps reveals the 
varying levels of scientific literacy amongst the readers of RealClimate. Differing familiarity 
with scientific concepts makes translating key concepts challenging, for how can experts know 
when they have succeeded in translating their technical claims into ordinary language? 
The interactive format of the science blog is here a boon to translation efforts. Concepts 
that are poorly explained, or simply need more amplification, receive treatment in the comments 
section. Comment number 29 on the dummies guide post illustrates the process whereby citizens 
challenge the RealClimate bloggers’ foothold in common sense. In this comment, Mat McLean 
pushes the RealClimate bloggers to clarify some fuzzy concepts. I quote this comment in full to 
show how multiple areas of confusion received clarification through inline responses (in square 
brackets, preceded with ‘Response’) by Gavin Schmidt: 
Your dummies guide has confused me in an exponential sense even before I 
achieved a satisfactory base understanding of your theorem. In the first section, 
you use the ambiguous term ‘noisy records.’ Can you define ‘noisy records’ for 
my mom? 
[Response: A data record that has a signal (that you are interested in), and ‘noise’ 
that you aren’t. Like listening to a static-filled radio station.] 
                                                
81 Steven T. Corneliussen, comment on “Dummies Guide,” RealClimate, 12:48 p.m., February 18, 2005, 
http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2005/02/dummies-guide-to-the-latest-hockey-stick-
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From the second section please explain the following: Please explain in a geo-
metaphysical sense, the relationship between ‘climate data applications’ and ‘the 
physics’ of a given algorithmic situation. Please explain this so my mother could 
understand it. 
[Response: Think of a swing in a kid’s playground. It can move in a number of 
ways (or modes) (back and forwards, twisting, side to side) that can be predicted 
based on the physics (the length of the ropes, how far apart they are, the weight of 
the seat etc.). Now take a time series of the motion of a random swing. 
Numerically I can try and see what the most important patterns of movement are 
by doing a PC analysis. It’s likely (but not certain) that the first few individual 
PCs will resemble the modes I would have predicted based on the physics. But 
sometimes they won’t (if for instance someone was pushing the swing in a 
particular way). Thus the answers from the PC analysis may have a distinct 
physical meaning, but they don’t necessarily. When looking at climate data, the 
PCs may each have a distinct physical meaning, but not necessarily.] 
From Section 3: Explain the ‘Monte Carlo’ simulation for us ‘dummies’ before 
you apply it to your empirical position. Please do it in a way that my mom could 
understand. 
[Response: Monte Carlo is famous for it’s casinos. There, many games of chance 
are played that depend on random numbers (i.e. the sequence of roulette plays). 
Many methods in mathematics or statistics that use large amounts of random 
numbers to estimate whether something is coincidental or significant are therefore 
called Monte Carlo methods. For example, from many, many Monte Carlo 
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simulations we know that rolling a normal die gives a 6 about 1/6th of the time. If 
instead, a die gave you a 6 a third of the time (over a long enough period) you 
would judge that significant and might therefore suspect it was loaded. ] 
From Section 4: If your methods are objectively scientific, explain your ‘a priori’ 
parameters so my mom could understand them. 
[Response: The question really is do any ‘a priori’ assumptions affect the final 
result? The answer is no.] 
This should keep your plate full. I will wait with baited [sic] breath for your 
response that will, no doubt, assimilate nicely with invective for the truth, and the 
scientific method. 
[Response: Let me know how your mom gets on. -gavin]82 
Frankly, it’s difficult to determine whether or not this is a serious query on the part of McClain, 
or if it’s a cheeky troll aiming for attention. Regardless, Schmidt is able to clarify elements of the 
blog post that remained obscure, primarily through recourse to metaphor (“static-filled radio 
station,” “swing in a kid’s playground,” “Monte Carlo methods”). Metaphor has a central role in 
the conversion process between technical and ordinary language. As Schmidt’s response reveals, 
the bloggers at RealClimate often rely on metaphors to explain the basics of their technical 
claims. This coheres with Stephen Schneider’s claim that “if scientists do not find the metaphors 
to communicate, most citizens simply will not hear them.”83 Presumably, given Schmidt’s 
penchant for monitoring and responding to comments, this interaction could have unfolded in a 
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few more iterations, doing further translating work in explaining the method used to generate the 
hockey stick. Despite McClain’s lack of follow-up, the back-and-forth within this comment 
elucidates potentially obscure spots for other readers of this post. 
 This process whereby scientists and members of lay publics dialogue back and forth is a 
demonstration of what John Lyne and Henry Howe call the extra-disciplinary discourse frame of 
scientific communication.84 In these rhetorical situations, the expert’s role is to teach or advocate 
to an audience of non-disciplinary readers. We must, of course, be careful about how this role is 
theorized, since it can easily replicate power differentials that position the scientist as knower 
and the lay public as mere learners. If there can be said to be a check on this tendency, it is the 
dialogic nature of comments. The RealClimate bloggers are often pressed on their claims, and 
comments solicit increasingly specific levels of clarification. This clarification takes place, as 
McClain’s comment shows, in iterated episodes of public argument conducted through ordinary 
language.  
If commenters can be seen as a kind of proxy for broader patterns of public deliberation, 
the rehabilitation of the hockey stick metaphor was useful for interlocutors aiming to make sound 
public arguments. Take commenter Raymond Pierrehumbert, who claims  
there is a legitimate reason for putting so much energy into defending it. The 
‘hockey stick’ is an excellent educational tool. Much of the evidence and theory is 
complex and hard to explain. We are short on scientifically respectable arguments 
that can be immediately grasped by the public. I know from my own use of Mann 
et al when it first came out that it was a very good aid to public education about 
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Journal of Speech 76 (1990), 140. 
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the nature of the problem. This is what it means to be an ‘icon.’ The downside of 
an icon is that if it turns out to be wrong, or vulnerable, then skeptics can just try 
to pull down your icon and imply that everything else comes down with it.85  
Because the comments unfold a dialogic space, conversation is not limited to a strict citizen-
scientist interface; indeed, the comments provide opportunities for citizens to interact with and 
learn from each other. Joseph O’Sullivan notes “Raymond Pierrehumbert has provided some 
crucial information. I wondered why the ‘hockey stick’ was being singled out, and his comment 
explains alot. This removes much of the uncertainty about the attacks on the hockey stick. The 
attacks are political hits on the science.”86 The dialogic space in comments offers occasions for 
fellow lay citizens to give ‘real-world’ deliberative advice about the import of particular 
scientific arguments.  
Category 2: Climate in the Media, in Which Contrarians Get Taken to Task 
 Since one of the stated goals of RealClimate is to critique misrepresentations or poor 
interpretations of climate science in the institutional media, the blog’s authors regularly feature 
responses to various artifacts of popular culture. I will cover two such critiques here: their review 
of Michael Crichton’s novel State of Fear and line-by-line analysis of a Wall Street Journal 
editorial.  
 Michael Crichton’s novel State of Fear was exceptional because it produced a bibliography 
of ‘scientific’ sources skeptical about anthropogenic global warming. This bibliography, paired 
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with an ‘Author’s Message’ that claimed the extent of climate change is indeterminate (and 
indeterminable), received a significant amount of press coverage as an unusual addition to the 
genre of science fiction.87 Crichton, a well-known contrarian when it comes to anthropogenic 
climate science, received far more press attention for his citation of scientific literature than for 
the narrative pacing of the novel, which basically details the efforts of a wily band of do-gooders 
to thwart eco-terrorist plots designed to draw attention to global warming. Throughout the novel, 
characters digress into long explanations of climate science. Scientific graphs pepper the text. 
The list of citations at the end of the book is supposed to lend the argument made in the text a 
patina of credibility. State of Fear could well have gained traction in public discourse because of 
the popularity of Michael Crichton and the apparent authority of his sources. However, reviews 
of the book generally panned the scientific evidence Crichton cited, limiting the influence of the 
novel.88 
 Gavin Schmidt’s initial review focuses on identifying places in the novel where Crichton 
takes liberties in cherry-picking evidence to support his claim about the scientific uncertainty 
related to anthropogenic global warming.89 Schmidt’s catalog of Crichton’s errors shows an 
advantage of having scientists involve themselves with the artifacts of popular culture: they often 
know where the soft spots of an argument lie, and blogs now give a venue where these areas can 
be vigorously probed. Schmidt’s post is generative of lines of argument that can be used to 
discredit Crichton’s novel. In classical rhetorical terms, Schmidt is identifying points of stasis, 
                                                
87 Michael Crichton, State of Fear (New York: HarperCollins, 2005). 
88 For example, see Michiko Kakutani, “Beware! Tree Huggers Plot Evil to Save World,” New York Times, 
December 13, 2004, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9802E3DA1F31F930A25751C1A9629C8B63 
&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1 and David Kipen, “Crichton’s Evil Greens Can’t Scare Us,” San Francisco 
Chronicle, December 21, 2004, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2004/12/21/DDGU6ADRVI1.DTL. 
89 Schmidt later published a revised review in Grist, an environmental magazine. This marks a trend in 
blogging, whereby a blog post serves as a first draft for other kinds of writing.  
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where competing claims meet. As Schmidt thematizes the arguments, he adds hyperlink 
extensions to more conclusive summaries of specific issues. Schmidt does this by identifying 
three key lines of argument where Crichton misrepresents the scientific evidence: 
• Crichton identifies times and places where cooling trends are present, a phenomenon 
that undercuts the assumption that the globe is warming. Schmidt responds by noting that 
localized cooling in the Northern Hemisphere between 1940 and 1970 is explained by 
alternate causes, which, when controlled for, still indicate a warming trend. He goes on to 
note “global warming is defined by the global mean surface temperature. It does not 
imply that the whole globe is warming uniformly (which of course it isn’t). (But that 
doesn't stop one character later on (p381) declaring that ‘… it’s effect is presumably the 
same everywhere in the world. That's why it’s called global warming’).”90 Crichton has a 
character declare that the cooling of Antarctica proves global warming isn’t happening; 
Schmidt responds by linking to a prior RealClimate post titled “Antarctica Cooling, 
Global Warming?” that explains how climate change produces not just overall warming 
but climate oscillations. 
• Crichton uncharitably and selectively reads testimony by prominent climate scientist 
James Hansen. A character in Crichton’s novel claims that “Dr. Hansen overestimated 
[global warming] by 300 percent.”91 And so fact and fiction blur: James Hansen is 
probably the foremost citizen-scientist at the vanguard of the public debate over the 
certainty of climate science. His role in State of Fear is essentially to play the 
hyperventilating and erroneous scientist. Schmidt’s explanation of the genesis of the 
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300% figure usefully connects some dots for those unfamiliar with the backstory of 
James Hansen. Schmidt links to the paper in question by Hansen et al. in 1988 that 
posited three future scenarios for global warming, one with significantly more CO2, one 
that stays on the same course, and one that presumes no more CO2 emissions after 2000. 
After explaining that Hansen’s predictive model accurately accounted for the following 
ten years of global warming, Schmidt then defuses the 300% meme by claiming “The 
‘300 percent’ error claim comes from noted climate skeptic Patrick Michaels who in 
testimony to Congress in 1998 deleted the bottom two curves in order to give the 
impression that the models were unreliable.”92 Schmidt’s knowledge of the history of this 
debate, with a link to a NASA webpage that explains Michaels’ error, provides a 
panoramic perspective on the origin of this particular meme. 
• Crichton hones in on the Urban Heat Island Effect (UHIE) and ineffectiveness of 
satellite data as significant impediments to scientific certainty about climate change. 
Those who deny anthropogenic climate change often try to problematize the instruments 
of measurement for temperature or sea level rise. In this case, Crichton asserts that the 
Urban Heat Island Effect, a phenomenon whereby temperature increases are attributed to 
urbanization, is the real case of global warming. In response, Schmidt links to a 
RealClimate post that addresses the UHIE issue, and explains that recent scholarly papers 
have further corrected for the issue, which should increase confidence in temperature 
assessments. Similarly, Crichton questions the satellite data about rising sea levels in a 
                                                
92 Schmidt, “State of Confusion,” RealClimate. This move by Patrick Michaels was identified by James 
Hansen at a public debate hosted by the American Association for the Rhetoric of Science and Technology in 1997. 
The transcript was later published as James Hansen and Patrick Michaels, “Full Transcript of Inaugural AARST 
Science Policy Forum,” Social Epistemology 14 (2000): 131-80; the exchange is located at 160. 
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dialogue between two characters: “[Sea level is] rising faster, satellites prove it”; 
“Actually they don't.”93 Schmidt admits that satellite data can be problematic, but that 
Crichton’s conclusion overstates the degree of uncertainty on this point. 
 There is, of course, more to the review of State of Fear, but these are the essential points of 
stasis that Schmidt articulates and refutes. Based on the commenters’ reactions, the pedagogical 
implications of this post are tremendous. One reader wrote “Fascinating. So glad that now I 
won’t have to read Crichton’s loopy book. Many thanks for putting up this blog, it’s a 
tremendous resource.”94 Joseph Steig underlines the pedagogical value by noting “this is exactly 
the sort of analysis to which I will be so happy to point the readers of Crichton’s work that I will 
inevitably meet over the coming months.”95 RealClimate’s review was linked to by numerous 
other websites, including the well-known science blog Pharyngula,96 the Union of Concerned 
Scientists,97 and the Natural Resources Defense Council.98 Even Time magazine weighed in by 
reporting  
the Internet wasn't invented for RealClimate specifically, but it's hard to imagine a 
site more in line with the Web's original purpose: scientific communication. An 
assembly of climate researchers gives readers what's lacking virtually everywhere 
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else — straightforward presentation of the physical evidence for global warming, 
discussed with patience, precision and rigor, and, quite often, length, such as in a 
2,300-word evisceration of Michael Crichton's work of fiction, State of Fear.99 
Not everyone was convinced of Schmidt’s analysis. One commenter explains that a “point that 
comes across in the book is that these models shouldn’t be trusted without significant empirical 
evidence, particularly when policy is being based on them. And I tend to take the book’s side on 
this perspective;” the comment received an inline response that directed further queries about 
modeling to chapter 8 of the IPCC report on climate.100 The discussion that followed on the post 
tended to adhere to these kinds of quizzical reactions that were supplemented by inline responses 
directing interested readers to other sources that supported the general claims made in the 
review. 
 Michael Crichton isn’t the only significant contrarian taken to task on RealClimate. The 
bloggers at RealClimate regularly take on the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal, a 
famously skeptical band of climate contrarians that has used their disproportionate influence on 
public debate to delay any action on climate change. Though RealClimate regularly features 
posts critiquing the Wall Street Journal’s use of science, one particular episode demonstrates the 
power of blogging to host in-depth dissections of arguments.101 “The Wall Street Journal vs. The 
Scientific Consensus,” published June 22, 2005, was written collaboratively in response to an 
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editorial, “Kyoto by Degree,” printed in the Wall Street Journal a day earlier.102 In particular, this 
post demonstrates the capacity of blogs to perform line-by-line refutation, an argumentative 
process that has roots in formal debate.103 In a formal debate, interlocutors aim to refute each 
argument of their opponent in turn through a rigorous attention to each specific claim they make. 
The norms of the institutional media are generally not as detailed—competing views regularly 
talk past one another rather than directly refuting each other’s points. Blogging’s elevated place 
in the digital ecology is deserved partially because bloggers can so easily snag digital text and 
then interpose their own thoughts and refutations, rinsing and repeating as often as necessary. 
 The post begins by noting that the Wall Street Journal is virtually alone in believing that 
the case for anthropogenic warming is getting weaker. The RealClimate bloggers begin their 
critique by claiming to focus on the scientific controversy rather than the policy controversy: 
While we resist commenting on policy matters (e.g. the relative merits of the 
Kyoto Protocol or the various bills before the US Senate), we will staunchly 
defend the science against distortions and misrepresentations, be they intentional 
or not. In this spirit, we respond here to the scientifically inaccurate or incorrect 
assertions made in the editorial. 
RealClimate’s refutation of the editorial shows how the accumulative nature of their previous 
science blogging works to deepen their arguments—and how shallow quotation is the method the 
bloggers use to piece new arguments together. For every misrepresentation in the Wall Street 
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Journal editorial, the bloggers link to past RealClimate articles that more thoroughly explain the 
controversy. Figure 3 is two screenshots from the middle of this post. Though just a small 
portion of the entire post, it shows how bloggers can respond on-point to specific claims and add 
hyperlinks to buttress their detailed analysis:  
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Figure 3. Screenshot of RealClimate blog post.104 
The RealClimate post goes on like this for some length, creating a 2100 word response to a 500-
word editorial. Some of these refutations are particularly compelling, as when they respond to 
the Wall Street Journal’s citation of a 2003 Soon and Baliunas study. This study, the 
RealClimate bloggers pointed out, had been recently discredited in the news section of the Wall 
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Street Journal itself! This phenomenon might be called ‘expandable refutation’ because each 
hyperlink acts as an information rabbit hole leading to increasingly fine levels of detail. The 
underlying hyperlink technology offers a sort of reverse enthymeme: the audience doesn’t supply 
the premises from commonplaces forged through shared culture but is instead offered links from 
which to assemble the background knowledge needed to be fluent in talking about an issue like 
climate science. 
 If the blog post more or less successfully focuses on issues of scientific controversy, the 
comments section shows how quickly science and politics interpenetrate. A number of 
commenters emerged with contrarian evidence, which was rebutted by other commenters and 
occasionally the RealClimate bloggers. Again, the commenters show an appreciation for the 
translation function being performed. Edward Meyer writes  
thank you for the piece by piece rebuttal of the WSJ op-ed. This is one for sons, 
friends who don’t normally concern themselves with these matters, and my 
brother. But the detailed rebuttal is more: it characterizes as nothing else could 
have done the depth of anti-science ideology that is at work behind the scenes in 
government policy setting today.105 
Numerous commenters offered congratulations and noted they had linked this post to their own 
websites. John Monro wrote “as usual, a lucid, concise and unarguable (for those who care to 
listen) debunking of the standard global warming sceptics’ arguments. I have already linked your 
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site to my homepage.”106 “Great work. I’m proud to cite it,” added Mark York.107 “Bravo for Real 
Climate,” began Wayne Davidson, “much needed in responding to ignorance like this WSJ 
article which seem to thrive on apathy and a low sense of esteem for the scientific 
community.”108 Some commenters even urged readers to take action by writing civil society 
organizations to share a link to this RealClimate post. 109 Other commenters noted that this sort of 
detailed rebuttal presents a challenge to traditional modes of manufacturing consent. Regular 
commenter Dano explains  
the Internets has grown enormously since the strategy [of marginalizing the hockey 
stick research] began, which is starting to negate the whole disinformation campaign. 
Information moves both horizontally (out to you and me) and vertically (up to policy-
makers). Ideas are shared on the Internets, and as a result scientists are becoming 
more effective at distributing useful information upwards. This site is on the cusp of 
this information movement, and can be said to be both emergent and adaptive; both 
of these terms we should become more familiar with, BTW.110 
Dano’s comment captures the more continuous flow of information, and its seepage horizontally 
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into areas of society that had previously been more cordoned off from an interface with science. 
Perhaps commenters like Dano feel impelled to add their own vernacular theorizations of 
RealClimate’s function because they detect an underlying disturbance in the social imaginary. In 
other words, the presence of a new circulatory matrix distributing and discussing scientific 
controversies is a type of exigency that calls for sense-making of new deliberative practices by 
participants.  
Category 3: In Which the Importance of ‘Going Meta-’ Becomes Apparent 
 In response to the RealClimate review of Michael Crichton’s State of Fear, one commenter 
suggested that the current public debate about climate change was stale. This commenter 
identified Crichton’s book as the epiphenomenon; when in fact 
The real problem is a lack of understanding about science and its process. A 
superficial understanding of ‘science’ and the use of science in contexts like 
political science and social science, leads far too many people to the conclusion 
that if you present charts and graphs based on the past, the future can be 
predicted. Yet, the nature of charts and graphs is such that prediction seems to be 
magic.111 
On the one hand, this kind of comment clearly fetishizes science too much for those skeptical of 
science’s status as a grand narrative or wary about subscribing to a deficit model of science 
communication. But this comment does point to the contemporary dearth of discussion over 
meta-issues within science in traditionally public spaces or media. Much debate over the norms 
of science has become insular, taking place primarily in disciplinary journals and intimate 
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contexts like conferences. It’s a bit of a change from the earlier, thicker interpenetration of 
science and society in modernity. In the 18th century, the norms of science were generated, 
reviewed, revised and affirmed in active science societies. RealClimate fulfills a similar function 
for networked societies. This science blog offers not only translation of the latest scientific 
developments and rapid refutation of what they perceive as poor uses of science in society, but 
functions as a site where the norms of science are discussed and reviewed through lateral 
iterations of public argument between citizens and scientists. From the standpoint of the broader 
controversy, debates about scientific norms like peer review, consensus, and communicating 
scientific findings are needed because the climate controversy often seems log-jammed over 
determining the value of peer review, the extent and worth of scientific consensus, and the 
tendency for alarmism to dominate climate discussions.  
 Though it would be hard to prove, I suspect that the RealClimate bloggers realized that 
many of their arguments were heavily reliant on claims about consensus, peer review, media 
framing and other issues that shaded into more obviously politicized talk. Consequently, they 
often have posts that spark conversation about these issues. Two examples should suffice to 
illustrate how RealClimate opens dialogical space for discussion about meta-contextual issues in 
science. 
 On January 20, 2005, Michael Mann and Gavin Schmidt wrote “Peer Review: A Necessary 
But Not Sufficient Condition.”112 The post begins by recognizing that the scientists privilege 
peer-reviewed science on RealClimate, and link to an explanation of peer review by science 
journalist Chris Mooney. Mann and Schmidt confirm peer review’s utility, but then underline 
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potential problems: 
Put simply, peer review is supposed to weed out poor science. However, it is 
not foolproof — a deeply flawed paper can end up being published under a 
number of different potential circumstances: (i) the work is submitted to a 
journal outside the relevant field (e.g. a paper on paleoclimate submitted to a 
social science journal) where the reviewers are likely to be chosen from a pool 
of individuals lacking the expertise to properly review the paper, (ii) too few or 
too unqualified a set of reviewers are chosen by the editor, (iii) the reviewers or 
editor (or both) have agendas, and overlook flaws that invalidate the paper's 
conclusions, and (iv) the journal may process and publish so many papers that 
individual manuscripts occasionally do not get the editorial attention they 
deserve. 
The blogger’s nuanced read of peer review’s uses and limitations previews the direction they will 
be taking the argument. Given the ability of both sides to invoke peer-reviewed science, 
advocates on each side must develop distinctions that give opinion leaders a way to determine 
which peer-reviewed science should receive more credence. While contrarian climate scientists 
claim to have peer-reviewed results, much of the research that claims the biggest bang tends to 
be in journals with lower standards of peer review, as identified by the RealClimate bloggers. 
This post relates a few representative anecdotes where peer review failed in ways beneficial to 
the contrarians’ cause. 
 One of these accounts of peer review underperforming at weeding out bad science 
considers a paper that Willie Soon and co-authors published in the journal Climate Research that 
purported to show a warming period in the Medieval Ages (theoretically proving that warming 
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cycles were unlinked to human carbon emissions.) Mann and Schmidt recount the process that 
led to the discrediting of Soon’s research: 
The study was summarily discredited in articles by teams of climate scientists 
(including several of the scientists here at RealClimate), in the American 
Geophysical Union (AGU) journal Eos and in Science. However, it took some time 
[for] the rebuttals to work their way through the slow process of the scientific peer 
review. In the meantime the study was quickly seized upon by those seeking to sow 
doubt in the validity behind the scientific consensus concerning the evidence for 
human-induced climate change (see news articles in the New York Times, and Wall 
Street Journal).113   
The varying punctuations of the daily press and the scientific peer-review process allowed the 
Soon paper to seep into public discourse, even though it was fundamentally erroneous. (Partially 
for this reason, science blogs like RealClimate are often theorized as supplementing traditional 
peer review processes in a faster paced media environment.)114 Mann and Schmidt identify three 
specific flaws in the very human process of peer review. They begin by noting the controversial 
history of Climate Research editor Chris de Frietas, then noting that the chief editor and three 
additional editors resigned over the way the Soon paper was handled, and concluding with a 
quote from the publisher of Climate Research that the conclusions of the Soon paper could not 
be derived from the data.115  
 Mann and Schmidt continue by explaining how the Soon paper continued to make an 
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impression in various journals. They write “another journal which (quite oddly) also published 
the Soon et al study, ‘Energy and Environment,’ is not actually a scientific journal at all but a 
social science journal.”116 Now, to many a reader, this kind of line drawing might smack of 
disciplinary turf battles and the historical marginalization of the social sciences in favor of the 
so-called ‘hard sciences’ (let’s not imagine where the humanities lie in this formulation!) Fair 
enough; however, Mann and Schmidt follow up by noting that the editor of Energy and 
Environment, Sonja Boehmer-Christensen, admitted to a science journalist in the Chronicle of 
Higher Education “I'm following my political agenda — a bit, anyway. But isn't that the right of 
the editor?”117 Mann and Schmidt go on like this for numerous other outlets that have regularly 
published the research of skeptics, detailing with a litany of links the way that what had been 
claimed as peer reviewed science by contrarians was later discredited. They conclude by 
advocating for judiciousness when so-called ‘bombshell’ papers that ‘disprove’ anthropogenic 
warming are trumpeted in institutional media accounts.  
 They consequently nest their theory of peer review in an incrementalist view of science. 
With no apologies to Thomas Kuhn, Mann and Schmidt argue   
The current thinking of scientists on climate change is based on thousands of 
studies (Google Scholar gives 19,000 scientific articles for the full search phrase 
‘global climate change’). Any new study will be one small grain of evidence that 
adds to this big pile, and it will shift the thinking of scientists slightly. Science 
proceeds like this in a slow, incremental way. It is extremely unlikely that any 
new study will immediately overthrow all the past knowledge…Yet, one often 
                                                
116 Mann and Schmidt, “Peer Review,”’ RealClimate. 
117 Mann and Schmidt, “Peer Review,” RealClimate. 
349 
gets the impression that scientific progress consists of a series of revolutions 
where scientists discard all their past thinking each time a new result gets 
published. This is often because only a small handful of high-profile studies in a 
given field are known by the wider public and media, and thus unrealistic weight 
is attached to those studies. New results are often over-emphasized (sometimes by 
the authors, sometimes by lobby groups) to make them sound important enough to 
have news value. Thus ‘bombshells’ usually end up being duds.118 
This might be an erroneous view of science in the longer view, if one follows the Kuhnian 
revolutions line; yet, for practitioners, it’s a perfectly suitable worldview because it gives them 
something to do next. Is this the last word on peer review? Of course not. But in thematizing peer 
review, the scientists at RealClimate at least provide openings for critics to introduce their 
objections dialogically.  
 Commenters at RealClimate appreciated this explanation of peer review. Repeat 
commenter Dano observed “this essay demonstrates the value of RealClimate. It has been 
realized on this entry. Well done.”119 Steven Corneliussen wrote “thanks for this discussion and 
for its important applicability to all the rest of science.”120 Brian C self-consciously explained “at 
the risk of sounding like a fan-boi, this is a great piece of writing for people like me who have 
some knowledge of climate science, but don’t always fully understand how seriously to take the 
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contrarians.”121 Peter Wetzel, who identified himself as a scientist working on climate prediction 
models, remarked “this post provides excellent insight into the realities (imperfections) of the 
checks and balances that the scientific peer review system intends to impose on papers which 
reach the public. It is the best system yet devised to assure credibility in the discourse among 
scientists.”122 Commenter John Hunter magnified the claims made by Mann and Schmidt about 
his recent engagements with Boehmer-Christensen at Energy and Environment that confirmed 
the lax peer review standards operating at that journal.123 The openness of comments (even 
accounting for the practice of moderating comments) produced some bizarre contributions. For 
example, in a comment on this post, someone wrote that they had written a paper for a 
conference, but it had not been peer reviewed; they subsequently asked the RealClimate 
scientists to review it if they had any extra time.124  
 RealClimate bloggers have theorized issues close to the heart of scientific inquiry, like peer 
review, but they have also introduced posts about communicating scientific claims to non-
specialist audiences. In taking up these issues of communicating climate science, the bloggers 
show a high level of self-reflexivity regarding the public-technical interface. In one post, “How 
Not to Write a Press Release,” Gavin Schmidt opines about how a recent paper was cited in press 
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coverage as predicting global warming as high as 11 degrees in the coming decades.125 In reality, 
the paper in question produced a range of possible results, with 11 degree warming being a very 
low likelihood. Yet, the press release that accompanied the paper included this low likelihood 
number, which the press predictably ran with (“Mega-warming coming, scientists say!”) Schmidt 
suggests that this kind of alarmism unhelpfully sensationalizes the climate science, and wonders  
Why did this happen? Is it because the scientists were being 'alarmist', or was it more 
related to a certain naivety in how public relations and the media work? And more 
importantly, what can scientists do to help ensure that media coverage is a fair 
reflection of their work?126 
In this post, Schmidt identifies three rough spots in translation efforts. First, the institutional 
media “like a dramatic statement, and stories that say something is going to be worse than 
previously thought get more coverage than those which say it's not going to be as bad.”127 
Second, most journalists will read the press release instead of the paper, which reduces whatever 
caveats and calibrations that might temper sensationalist headlines. Finally, media frames funnel 
science stories into predetermined sluices. Schmidt argues that members of the press  
have a small number of preconceived frames into which they will place the story—
common ones involve forecasts of possible disasters, conflict within the community 
(the more personal the better), plucky Galileos fighting the establishment, and of 
course anything that interacts directly with politics, or political interference with 
science. This can be helpful if the scientific story fits neatly into one [of] the boxes, 
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but can cause big problems if the story is either more complex or orthogonal to the 
obvious frames.128 
The theory of framing, which had been popularized by the linguistics scholar George Lakoff, is 
treated here in order to identify how pre-existing frames impact novel science stories.129 Schmidt 
concludes that the paper abdicated a responsibility to good science communication by allowing 
the press release to run with the sensationalist but low likelihood 11 degree figure. 
 This post sparked 258 comments. Remarkably, the scientists and press officers involved 
with the sensationalized press release actually posted a comment that rebutted the suggestion that 
they sensationalized their findings in the press conference.130 Posted by Myles Allen, the 
comment contains emails that had asked members of the press who were at the original press 
conference if the scientists had sensationalized their findings, or if they had been appropriately 
cautious in explaining that runaway warming of 11 degrees was a low likelihood. This parallel 
account provided by Allen suggested that the fault lay not with the scientists, but with sloppy 
journalists somewhere down the publication line. Whether or not the press release and the 
subsequent criticism by Schmidt was on point or not is, of course, less relevant than the fact that 
a tight feedback loop had formed where the scientists involved in this episode could quickly 
respond with a behind the scenes account from their perspective.  
 Under the category “Communicating Climate” are a number of similar postings concerning 
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the rhetorical challenges in articulating technical claims.131 Gathered here are posts on 
journalistic convention, framing scientific issues, public understanding of science, and various 
other issues arising in expert-lay discourse. These posts invite a number of different themes. 
RealClimate blogger Rasmus Benestad shared some links to a conference he had attended on 
Communicating Science and Technology.132 Benestad’s post received a flurry of comments over 
the coming days. One of the most interesting sets of comments on this post involves the 
relationship between the deficit model and engagement model of communicating science, a topic 
that has animated science and technology studies and rhetoricians of science over the past 
decades. In this comment, RealClimate is situated as a third model that synthesizes both the 
deficit and engagement approach. Regular commenter Steve Corneliussen: 
To what extent did your conference engage the important contrast between the 
deficit model and the engagement model? In my experience too many scientists 
assume, without even realizing it, that science communication must be improved 
only under what some people call the ‘deficit model’—the name refers to the 
deficit in public knowledge about science—to the exclusion of what’s been called 
the ‘engagement model.’ (Maybe this contrast has been talked about in RC 
threads that I missed.) In fact, it’s my impression that many scientists aren’t even 
remotely aware of the contrasting approaches. But maybe that problem is 
diminishing. It seems to me, for example, that RealClimate.org itself represents a 
breakthrough in the relation of science and society precisely because RC balances 
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engagement-model benefits with deficit-model necessities.133 
Some comments later, Corneliussen adds in another comment: “A problem, though, is that 
deficit-model communication tactics—useful and important as they are—don’t account for all 
the dimensions of the communications challenge. Consider a particularly virulent dimension, a 
tactic that I believe I’m seeing increasingly employed against climate science: sarcasm.”134 He 
then provides an extended rhetorical analysis of the use of sarcasm in argument over climate 
science, with the conclusion that scientists need a richer view of communication to account for 
how scientific argument is conducted outside of field-specific sites. Corneliussen’s view captures 
a rhetorical perspective on language and argumentation that is often under-represented in 
scientific fora. Just as importantly, he identifies RealClimate as a site that can probe this 
rhetoricity by drawing public participation to the interactive back-and-forth of the blogosphere. 
 The bloggers at RealClimate adopt a remarkably self-reflexive attitude about their own 
orientation toward communicating climate science. In a post called “The Missing Repertoire,” 
Gavin Schmidt linked to a report published by the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), a 
think thank based in the UK, called “Warm Words: How Are We Telling the Climate Story and 
How Can We Tell it Better.”135 As Schmidt describes, the “basic point of the report was to 
present a textual analysis of the kinds of language (‘repertoires’) used in the media when 
discussing climate and to associate the different repertoire with the advocacy position of the 
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users and the likely effectiveness of that language in swaying opinion.”136 ‘Repertoire’ is an 
intriguing way to characterize competing ways of communicating climate science because it 
suggests a broad array of argumentative styles, modes of proof, and types of aesthetic 
performance. The IPPR report identifies three distinct repertoires that accept the basic 
presumptions of contemporary climate science: alarmism, techno-optimism, and small actions 
will save the world. There are considerably more denialist repertoires: “It’ll be alright”-ism, 
comic nihilism, rhetorical skepticism, free marketism, expert denialism, and warming is good. 
Each of these orientations has familiar arguments, unique commonplaces, and peculiar stylistic 
conventions. 
 But Gavin Schmidt identified RealClimate as participating in a repertoire that was missing 
from the IPPR report: 
In reading this list, I can find many examples of pieces that fall neatly into the 
boxes. But it strikes me that there is a huge missing category—and indeed one in 
which I think RealClimate might fall (along with some of the best reporting on the 
issue—Andy Revkin’s [environment writer for the New York Times] pieces for 
instance). That category is the straight ‘It’s serious (and interesting) but don’t 
panic’ repertoire. This is the language most often heard at scientific conferences 
and it surprises me that the IPPR authors didn't find enough examples to give it a 
description all it’s own.137 
Schmidt’s description of these rival repertoires underlines the stylistic gap between scientific 
communities and public spheres. Of course, it’s easy to be dubious about Schmidt’s 
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identification of RealClimate’s repertoire as ‘it’s serious (and interesting) but don’t panic’ 
against the clearly lacking ‘alarmism’ and ‘denialism’ repertoires. But RealClimate’s rigorous, 
sober scrutiny does, as I have shown in my textual analysis here, display cool but engaged 
expertise that presents an alternative to the more “excited style of journalism” which often results 
in public cynicism.138 The genesis of this collective persona of sobriety is probably due in part to 
the demands of forging a credible style when one lies at the intersection of technical and public 
spheres. In serving as a translation station where expert and lay publics meet, RealClimate 
bloggers have to bridge two very different discourse communities. This bridging requires a high-
level of self-reflexivity about style, proof, and jargon. Consequently, the sensationalist excesses 
of the mass-mediated public sphere and the excesses of insularity familiar to the technical sphere 
are both reduced because the claims made by each field are potentially open to critique from the 
other field. Consequently, RealClimate bloggers can critique sensationalist press coverage and 
overly technical language; moreover, their commenters can introduce critiques from anywhere 
along the spectrum of public to technical objections. That such criticisms can be introduced at 
any time requires RealClimate bloggers to keep these two audiences in mind while posting, for 
their posts must meet the norms of each audience. This permanent rhetorical situation induces a 
‘bridging rhetoric’ whereby scientists must account for technical and public audiences and 
communicate in a fashion intelligible to both. ‘Bridging rhetoric’ identifies a new form of power 
in a network society, a claim to which I now turn. 
5.5 Toward a Networked Sensibility: Blogging, Shallow Quotation, and Light Green Public 
Spheres 
 “In a world of networks,” Manuel Castells claims, “the ability to exercise control over 
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others depends on two basic mechanisms: the ability to program/reprogram the network(s) in 
terms of the goals assigned to the network; and the ability to connect different networks to ensure 
their cooperation by sharing common goals and increasing resources.”139 Programming power 
sets the basic conditions for persuasion: “control of, or influence on, the apparatuses of 
communication, the ability to create an effective process of communication and persuasion along 
lines that favor the projects of the would-be programmers, is the key asset in the ability to 
program each network.”140 Programmers have magnified power to control in an arena where, as 
Lawrence Lessig famously noted, “code is law.”141 Bloggers accrue programming power by 
designing their blog’s deliberative space to accept, for example, moderated or unmoderated 
comments. But bloggers are probably more famous for their roles as what Castells calls 
switchers. Switchers connect two or more networks together, stimulating or deactivating circuits 
of communication flows. Bloggers are switchers because they can direct the limited attention of 
readers through linking different communication networks together. At a micro-scale, that power 
is small. But aggregated over the entire blogosphere, that power is consequential in elevating 
certain posts or blogs over others. These are uniquely networked forms of power, not present in 
the modern age when switching and programming digital bytes were faint glimmers in a distant 
digital future. 
 The emergence of RealClimate as a translation station where public and technical 
discourses meet suggests a third type of power: the power to bridge different discourse 
communities (or language games). Bridgers, or those that attempt to translate the norms, claims, 
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and implicit understandings of one discourse community to another, have a new saliency in a 
internetworked world. I cannot claim that bridging discourses are entirely new—the genre of 
popular science writing suggests that ‘bridging’ has a long history. Yet, as a consequence of the 
multiplication of language games—partially supported by new digital media that supports 
increasingly niche discourse communities—this type of power has a more ubiquitous, and 
systematic, presence. Lyotard, in The Postmodern Condition obliquely predicted this form of 
power: 
in games of perfect information, the best performativity cannot consist in 
obtaining additional information … it comes rather from arranging the data in a 
new way, which is what constitutes a ‘move’ properly speaking. This new 
arrangement is usually achieved by connecting together series of data that were 
previously held to be independent. This capacity to articulate what used to be 
separate can be called imagination. Speed is one of its properties. It is possible to 
conceive the world of postmodern knowledge as governed by a game of perfect 
information, in the sense that the data is in principle accessible to any expert: 
there is no scientific secret.142 
This diagnosis brilliantly describes the features of bridging rhetoric. First, it is important to 
recognize the relationship Lyotard draws between perfect information and performativity.143 
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Lyotard suggests that in societies with no dearth of information, competing interlocutors in 
public deliberation can equip themselves with a dizzying array of competing arguments that 
often result in epistemic deadlock. Such an argumentative impasse certainly characterized the 
climate science debate through the 1980s and 90s. What is required for persuasive success, or the 
‘best performativity,’ is the capacity to arrange the data in imaginative new ways.144 RealClimate 
posts assemble claims imaginatively through the use of hyperlinks and line-by-line refutation. 
Second, this arrangement occurs in a way that brings together formerly disparate language 
games. On this point, too, RealClimate meets Lyotard’s expectations by connecting public and 
technical language games through the medium of ordinary language. Finally, Lyotard suggests 
that the speed of this imaginative re-arrangement drives the process, which might explain part of 
RealClimate’s success. The ability of RealClimate bloggers to present a rapid-response analysis 
of breaking developments in climate science feeds the churning, citational economy of the 
internet and networked media. 
 Bridging power is activated by one of the signature elements of blogging: the offset pull 
quote. When bloggers respond to items from other websites, they often excerpt quotes and then 
provide commentary on that quote. Sometimes, bloggers cherry-pick quotes that don’t do justice 
to the larger piece; this often sparks recriminations and clarifications throughout the blogosphere. 
This process should be understood as shallow quotation, which argumentation scholar Charles 
Willard has identified as the key way that claims are translated between different argument 
fields. Willard develops the idea of shallow quotation as a way to evade the incommensurability 
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thesis that maintained different fields of knowledge could not converse smoothly with each 
other. For Willard, critics and theorists need not worry about accepting certain positions or ideas 
wholesale, for “the depthless quotation of positions and theories might help ideas across field 
boundaries.”145 Willard is focused on how academic fields can develop more satisfying 
interdisciplinary projects, and shallow quotation is the method that his broader program of 
epistemics requires to get such a project going. Fortunately, this model can also assist us in 
theorizing the types of shallow quotation that allow technical and public discourses to 
interpenetrate on blogs like RealClimate. 
As a practice, shallow quotation invites reflexivity about the depth and faithfulness of its 
product: specific clips of prose. A shallow quotation, in a way, is an invitation to toggle between 
surface and depth reads of mediated artifacts. As Willard explains: “‘Shallow’ alerts us to the 
fact that we are doing something risky—something, indeed, that we often encounter in mistakes 
… The risk, then, is the incompetence of the non-native: One borrows an idea without 
understanding its context and thus misuses it.”146 This is the critique of the non-expert journalist 
writing on science issues: they shallowly quote incompetently. Print media is limited by material 
conditions, namely column space, that limits the capacity to argue over the shallowness or depth 
of any particular quotation. Internetworked digital media has considerably less such constraint, 
untethering analytical prowess from space limitations. These reduced space and time pressures 
allow expert blogs to develop arguments with as much sophistication as the situation or audience 
warrants. In each case, shallow quotation invents novel perspectives that can facilitate 
deliberation: “Whether shallow quotation is advisable depends on the purposes at hand, the 
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borders being crossed, and the realization that shallow quotation is a creation, not a distortion of 
reality.”147 In the case of RealClimate, the shallow quotes from scientific studies help to convert 
technical knowledge claims into publicly debatable propositions. As I have shown here, the web 
of posts on climate science that constitute RealClimate’s archive can also be shallowly quoted in 
more recent posts, as when the bloggers identify prior posts where they have covered certain 
issues. 
RealClimate is a site where the interpenetration of the public and technical spheres 
occurs, blurring the bloggers’ prior roles as private citizens and technical scientists into, as 
Steven Schneider hypothesizes, the “citizen-scientist.”148 The efforts at translation expand what 
William Kinsella calls “public expertise,” which has the potential to “counter monolithic 
technocratic decision making, or better yet, to engage in productive collaboration with technical 
specialists.”149 Kinsella argues that the 
ideal form of public expertise is technical competency acquired and used directly by 
affected citizens. Such competency need not, and cannot, replace the more 
specialized knowledge of technical or policy professionals, but it can provide 
members of the public with an adequate foundation for genuine dialogue with these 
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specialists. When this ideal is unreachable, public expertise can also take the form of 
technical knowledge made available to the public by supportive specialists through 
consultation, advising, education, or facilitation of citizen-directed research.150 
Kinsella maintains that public expertise can be cultivated by increasing the availability of 
intelligible technical discourse and by modeling some components of technical reasoning.151 As 
bloggers engage in this process, they become “knowledge brokers” capable of bridging different 
argument fields.152 
RealClimate bloggers, as developers of public expertise, replicate the counselor role that 
Kinsella identifies as crucial in developing public expertise: 
As consultants, facilitators, educators, or sages, specialists place their expertise 
into a larger civic conversation where it becomes a resource for public decision-
making. For that resource to be useful, it must include not only technical data and 
analyses but also guidance on how to understand and evaluate those technical 
products. These contributions can be viewed as the local knowledge of specialists, 
that is, their specific contributions to the large dialogue. Viewed this way, 
specialists and nonspecialists assume parallel and complementary roles in the 
production of public expertise.153 
Nurturing public expertise activates a virtuous deliberative cycle, because “as people’s 
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competence to participate in environmental decisions has become more apparent, the consensus 
has developed that they have a right to opportunities to exercise these capabilities.”154 This 
positive spillover from facilitating public expertise might well counter the placebo effect of ritual 
participation in science and technology controversies.  
 RealClimate’s ability to serve as a translation station, bridging technical and public 
argument fields, has been detected by the institutional media. Some commentators like Henry 
Farrell situated RealClimate in the context of science blogging in general: 
Scientists who are dismayed at the sloppy treatment of science in the media have 
set up group blogs including the Panda's Thumb (evolution), RealClimate (global 
warming and climate science), and Cosmic Variance (physics). Other disciplinary 
group blogs include Savage Minds for anthropologists; the Volokh Conspiracy, 
Balkinization, and Prawfsblawg for legal scholars; the Duck of Minerva for 
international-relations theorists; and Cliopatria for historians. All of those blogs 
weave back and forth between the specialized languages of academe and the 
vernacular of public debate. They are creating a space for dialogue between the 
two, connecting them together, and succeeding, to a greater or lesser degree, in 
changing both.155 
On a New Republic blog, Bradford Plummer wrote “for a more thorough look at the IPCC's sea-
rise predictions, and why they're likely underestimates, this RealClimate post is a good place to 
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start. (It's readable, even for non-experts.)”156 A Salon article references RealClimate by arguing 
“there are few things the blogosphere excels more at than debunking revisionist lies about global 
warming.”157 The site “nail[s] the myth that scientists struggle to communicate their work.”158 
RealClimate bloggers “get into the nitty-gritty of climate research, interacting earnestly with fans 
as well as foes in long strings of reference-rich commentary.”159 These meta-reflections confirm 
RealClimate’s success at creating a dialogical space for a hybrid of public-technical 
argumentation. 
 RealClimate also has entered into the citational economy of blogs, letters to the editor, 
and press features as a trusted source for intelligible commentary on climate science. Bloggers 
link to RealClimate with their own shallow quotation of RealClimate posts, as in this post: “As 
usual, you can get most of what you need at Real Climate. Here's the most pertinent piece. The 
short version is that a combination of changes to ocean currents and airflow around Antarctica 
mean that warming there was always expected to lag far behind the rest of the planet.”160 Those 
who deny anthropogenic climate change are referred to “accessible blogs on climate change, 
such as www.celsias.com or www.realclimate.org.”161 The scientific ethos of the RealClimate 
bloggers is used as a credibility booster for RealClimate posts. In a letter to the editor, citizen 
Sam White writes “if you want to read what scientists, who have no connection to King Coal and 
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Big Oil, have to say, go to www.realclimate.org or www.ucsusa.org/global_warming.”162 
Another letter to the editor opines “where do these hopeful skeptics get the idea that they are the 
only ones trying to find chinks in the body of climate change evidence? The real climate 
scientists make a living looking for alternative explanations (www.realclimate.org).”163 In 
addition, a Newsweek article concludes “it is wrong to think that the ‘skeptics’ arguments have 
gone unanswered. One group of climate researchers does this very well, at 
http://www.realclimate.org/.”164 These comments indicate that RealClimate is at the center of a 
robust debate about climate science in the public sphere. 
 In fact, RealClimate might best be understood as part of an emerging ‘green public 
sphere,’ though some might want to call this communicative network a ‘light green public 
sphere.’165 For Robyn Eckersley, a green public sphere exists  
by providing fulsome environmental information and the mechanisms for 
contestation, participation, and access to environmental justice—especially from 
those groups that have hitherto been excluded from, or under-represented in, 
policy-making and legislative processes. Such mechanisms are not only ends in 
themselves but also means to enhance the reflexive learning potential of both the 
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state and civil society.166 
Seen in light of this description of the green public sphere, RealClimate’s blogging activities can 
be understood as a hybridization of the deficit and engagement model of science communication. 
The task of the green public sphere is to sustain and expand opportunities for informed public 
participation. RealClimate might be ‘light green’ because the bloggers limit themselves to what 
they perceive as purely ‘scientific’ claims, rather than advocating vehemently for one particular 
policy approach. In all likelihood, the green public sphere will need to accommodate all shades 
of green if the major environmental challenges of the network society are to be met. In any case, 
RealClimate’s ability to shallowly quote science into public spheres of deliberation demonstrates 
one central characteristic of any kind of green public sphere. 
 
                                                
166 Robyn Eckersley, The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2004), 140. 
 367 
CHAPTER 6—CONCLUSION 
6.1 Welcome to the Noosphere 
 I began this dissertation with the claim that the blogosphere can be seen as a proxy for the 
broader developments toward the network society. By better understanding the blogosphere, we 
can better understand networked sensibilities—in particular, how networked societies organize 
attention. I have marked three tropes as elements of this networked imaginary: flood the zone, 
ambient intimacy, and shallow quotation. These three tropes capture novel practices of publicity, 
solidarity, and translation in networked societies. In explicating these three tropes within my 
analysis of the case studies, I have attempted to show how the rhetorical challenges of invention, 
emotion, and expertism are negotiated in an increasingly hypercomplex, digitally mediated, 
global information environment. These tropes give critics and theorists of digital public culture a 
grammar to talk about the rhetorical activities occurring in the blogosphere and a more complete 
account of the networked imaginary. 
 The networked imaginary comes into sharper focus with historical comparison. In the 
classical imaginary, inquiry was guided by a love of wisdom and conducted in the marketplace 
constituted primarily by the agora. In the modern imaginary, inquiry was directed by the 
assumption that knowledge is power and the marketplace of ideas would filter out bad from 
good. In the networked world, inquiry is motivated by the assumption that information is control 
and that the marketplace of attention is the starting point for public deliberation. Networked 
practitioners of public argument—bloggers foremost amongst them—have thus designed new 
ways of concentrating this attention as a spur to deliberation. 
 In many ways, theorizing public deliberation in a networked society evokes themes that 
animated the spirited dialogue between John Dewey and Walter Lippmann in the 1920s and 
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1930s, another time of dramatic socio-cultural and economic change that coincided with the 
introduction of new media. In that era, it was the broadcast media that introduced new 
information and deliberation practices into formerly print based social networks. Each case study 
has tapped into an element of the wide-ranging Dewey-Lippmann debate. Chapter 3, Flood the 
Zone, makes the case that the practice of flooding the zone stabilizes the space of appearance 
between interlocutors, especially since blogs support many-to-many communication. In that 
chapter, I follow Dewey in arguing that an expanded space of appearance might prevent the 
public’s perpetual problem of eclipse. Chapter 4, Ambient Intimacy, argues that the circulation 
of affect into public deliberation disrupts the stereotypes that Lippmann believed organized our 
social world. On this point, too, I side with Dewey in suggesting that novel modes of 
communication can transform these stereotypes. Chapter 5, Shallow Quotation, also echoes some 
Deweyan themes in advocating for a translation between science and common sense rather than 
the technocratic decision-making defended by Lippmann.1 
 Complementing the Burkean and Habermasian forces animating this dissertation is a 
certain Deweyan spirit.  Dewey’s claim that the public needs better methods of debate and 
discussion is in line with the case I’ve made for the unique contribution of blogging to public 
deliberation. Lippmann’s preference was for technocratic decision-making to pick up the 
deliberative slack in complex societies—only the experts could take into account all the data and 
judge it credibly. This dissertation has suggested that internetworked blogs provide an alternative 
to purely technocratic decision-making insofar as they encourage deliberative legitimation 
processes that draw in citizen participation. In each case study, I have identified the deliberative 
‘traps’ that have stunted public conversation and democratic decision-making: the corporate 
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political economy of the institutional mass media with its narrowed range of discourse, the strict 
public-private distinction with its associated rhetorical norms, and the insularity of scientific 
discussion with its disengaged practitioners. 2 The Habermasian account of public deliberation 
fails in accounting for these deliberative traps precisely because he adopts an arhetorical 
perspective on communication and deliberation. A rhetorical approach to blogging shows how 
the introduction of a new digital mode of communication reconfigured each of these traps during 
the popularization phase of blogosphere growth from 2001 to 2006. In contradistinction to the 
technocracy that shaped so much of modernist public deliberation, digital public culture is 
increasingly influenced by what might be called the ‘noocracy.’ I develop this term as a secular 
extension of what Teilhard de Chardin called the noosphere. 
The mid-twentieth century paleontologist and Jesuit priest Teilhard de Chardin perceived 
three distinct developments in the evolution of life in his 1955 book The Phenomenon of Man.3 
During geogenesis, the earth was formed out of the bits and specks of the universe, laying the 
groundwork for the second evolutionary stage, biogenesis—the birth of life. Biogenetic 
evolution eventually shaded into psychogenesis, or the development of human personality and 
communicative complexity. He explains that the first time a sentient creature “perceived itself in 
its own mirror, the whole world took a pace forward.”4 De Chardin identified a third phase yet to 
come: noogenesis, (from the Greek noos, meaning mind) the stage of self-reflexive mindfulness. 
The ever-increasing reflective powers of humanity open up new horizons in noogenetic 
                                                
2 Ken White, “The Dead Hand of Modern Democracy: Lessons for Emergent Post-modern Democrats,” in 
Extreme Democracy, eds. Mitch Ratcliffe and Jon Lebkowsky (2005), http://extremedemocracy.com/chapters/ 
Chapter%20Eight-White.pdf 
3 Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, trans. Bernard Wall (London: Harper & Row, 1959 
[1955]). 
4 De Chardin, Phenomenon of Man, 181. 
370 
development, promising to usher in what de Chardin calls the noosphere. De Chardin theorizes 
the noosphere as a sparking forth of interconnected reflection: 
The recognition and isolation of a new era in evolution, the era of noogenesis, 
obliges us to distinguish correlatively a support proportionate to the operation—
that is to say yet another membrane in the majestic assembly of telluric layers. A 
glow ripples outward from the first spark of conscious reflection. The point of 
ignition grows larger. The fire spreads in ever widening circles till finally the 
whole planet is covered with incandescence. Only one interpretation, only one 
name can be found worthy of this grand phenomenon. Much more coherent and 
just as extensive as any preceding layer, it is really a new layer, the ‘thinking’ 
layer.5 
The noosphere, in this telling, is as significant as the stages of geogenesis and biogenesis; it is 
the conceptualization of this thinking layer that might be the most dramatic addition to the 
networked social imaginary. For de Chardin, this new thinking layer will produce ever more 
sophisticated states of consciousness, resulting in a convergence of the personal and universal in 
the Omega Point, a version of the singularity.6 A contemporary reader may find much to disagree 
with de Chardin about, including his progressive evolutionary teleology, his religious 
metaphysic, and his defense of a “nobly human form of eugenics.”7 These substantial objections 
aside, de Chardin’s theorization of the noosphere provides some perspective—however 
incongruous—to current theory about digital media and human intercommunication. Three 
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features of the noosphere bear directly on this study of the blogosphere and the networked 
imaginary: (1) hominisation, (2) complexity, and (3) emergence. 
The noosphere is characterized above all by increasing hominisation, or enhanced 
reflection and consciousness. De Chardin’s narrative of hominisation goes from instinct to 
thought, and from basic thought to abstract thought epitomized by the growth of logic, art, and 
the sciences.8 Foreshadowing the middle Habermas of The Theory of Communicative Action, de 
Chardin argues that the basic engine driving hominisation is interaction.9 The fibers of the 
noosphere thicken with increasing commercial and intellectual contact between people, since 
these patterns of interaction organize society and establish collective memory and common 
ground.10 “Psychic inter-activity” energizes the noosphere.11 Julian Huxley, in his introduction to 
Phenomenon of Man, suggests that “higher levels of hominisation” inevitably occur because 
“idea will encounter idea, and the result will be an organized web of thought, a noetic system 
operating under high tension, a piece of evolutionary machinery capable of generating high 
psychosocial energy.”12 Huxley might as well have been referring to the internet. 
Hominisation is intimately related to complexity. Huxley identifies the increase in 
knowledge and “psychosocial pressures” as the key elements responsible for producing the 
complexification of the noosphere.13 For de Chardin, humans become “more vitalized as they 
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become increasingly complex.”14 Rising complexity requires humans to push their adaptive 
capacities, encouraging them to generate new modes of interconnection able to account for the 
tension between the plurality of life and the common good. Knowledge of self and other, and the 
potential web of relationships between the two, is increasingly the product of complex societies. 
But even de Chardin cannot fathom the extent to which some future version of the noosphere 
will exert influence. Noting the millions (now billions) of “human vibrations,” he asks “have we 
ever tried to form an idea of what such magnitudes represent?”15 As Huxley summarizes, “we 
should consider inter-thinking humanity as a new type of organism, whose destiny is to realize 
new possibilities for evolving life on this planet.”16 
In his discussion of the noosphere, De Chardin foreshadows the field of complexity 
studies, especially as it relates to the concept of emergence. As he explains, the “very act by 
which the fine edge of our minds penetrates the absolute is a phenomenon, as it were, of 
emergence.”17 Here, de Chardin’s religious metaphysic starts to guide his theory in a direction I 
would shy away from; luckily, secular versions of emergence can take the reins from here. 
Emergence, or the self-organization of collective intelligence, is found in everything from ant 
colonies to the open source software movement.18 The very process of persuasion is perhaps 
more akin to emergence than to anything else; for what else is the process of persuasion but a 
gradual accretion of experiences and ideas brought together in a specific rhetorical moment? 
Such a perspective on persuasion is an alternative to intentionalist models and recognizes that, as 
                                                
14 De Chardin, Phenomenon of Man, 300. 
15 De Chardin, Phenomenon of Man, 285.  
16 Huxley, “Introduction,” 20. 
17 De Chardin, Phenomenon of Man, 219. 
18 Steven Johnson, Emergence: The Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities, and Software (New York: 
Scribner, 2001).  
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de Chardin claims, the additivity of human experiences is central to the character of the 
noosphere.19 The noosphere is that layer of human activity that processes this additivity of 
experience, storing it for future generations even as actors in the noosphere recontextualize social 
knowledge to gain legitimation in concurrent episodes of public interactions. The noosphere 
might best be thought of as the element of the networked imaginary that coordinates 
hominisation, hypercomplexity, and emergence; that layer which manages surplus information 
flows. 
The linkages to internetworked forms of communication, especially blogging, should be 
apparent. Might we see blogging as contributing to hominisation in the process of a weaving an 
organized web of thought? Can blogging be seen as a way to amplify billions of human 
vibrations in an effort to accommodate complexification? Is blogging best understood through 
the metaphor of emergence? Even lukewarm acceptance of de Chardin's conceptual scheme 
makes it reasonable to view internetworked technologies as constituting a meta-critical thinking 
layer facilitating a multilogue of digitally connected citizens. This secularized version of the 
noosphere is not a public sphere proper, but rather a “public of publics.”20 One might push this 
even further by situating the noosphere with respect to two key terms in the Habermasian 
system: lifeworld and system. For Habermas, the lifeworld is produced in the social context of 
the everyday circulation of people in their face-to-face communities.21 At risk of simplification, I 
would argue that the lifeworld is primarily produced and sustained by embodied speech acts that 
teach each about the other, the foundation of democratic practice. With the onset of the modern 
                                                
19 De Chardin, Phenomenon of Man, 224.  
20 See James Bohman, “Expanding Dialogue: The Internet, the Public Sphere and Prospects for 
Transnational Democracy,” in After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere, eds. Nick Crossley and 
John Michael Roberts (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 140. 
21 Jürgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action. 
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age came what Habermas calls the system, or the administrative apparatus required to manage 
complex democratic governments. The genius of modernity was the concept of publicity, which 
was seen as an essential check on the abuse of power. Publicity was tied directly to the print 
media of the time, and later to broadcast media like radio and the television, all of which could 
focus resources on the state in order to ensure that decisions were being made based on 
defendable reasons rather than mere will or whim. The networked world has actualized the 
noosphere, that thinking layer emerging from material practices but taking shape in the 
dematerialized zone previously referred to as ‘cyberspace.’ While the noosphere might have 
been born with the self-reflexivity that began with the first look in a mirror, its potential could 
not be realized without its own unique medium: the internet.22 
The lifeworld socializes, the system administers, the noosphere focuses attention. The 
noosphere’s primary function must be to focus attention in an information-rich world; neither the 
lifeworld nor the system is equipped to manage the proliferation of information in media-rich 
environments. The concept of the noosphere not only captures the information-processing 
requirements of networked societies but also the information-structuring capacities attached to 
internet-driven modes of communication.23 Flooding the zone, creating ambient intimacy, and 
                                                
22 It is for this reason that theorists of networks and governance have begun to speak of ‘post-bureaucratic’ 
governance; see Bimber, Information and American Democracy, chapter 6 and Jodi Dean, Jon Anderson, and Geert 
Lovink, “Introduction: The Postdemocratic Governmentality of Networked Societies,” in Reformatting Politics: 
Information Technology and Global Civil Society, eds. Jon Anderson, Jodi Dean, and Geert Lovink (New York: 
Routledge, 2006): xv-xxix. 
23 David Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Promise of Noopolitik,” First Monday (August 2007), 
http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue12_8/ronfeldt/index.html. They clarify this distinction by noting “The noosphere, 
like the mind, is an information–processing and an information–structuring system — and this is an important 
distinction. The processing view focuses on the transmission of messages as the inputs and outputs of a system. In 
contrast, the structural view illuminates the goals, values, and practices that an organization or system may embody 
— what matters to its members from the standpoint of identity, meaning, and purpose, apart from whether any 
information is really being processed at the time. While the processing view tends to illuminate technology as a 
critical factor, the structural view is more likely to uphold human and ideational capital.” See also eds. John Arquilla 
and David Ronfeldt, In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, Calif.: 
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shallow quotation are three ways that the blogosphere excels in structuring information in 
attention-gathering ways. The primary contribution of the noosphere is thus to structure 
information in a way that focuses attention, and, as I covered in Chapter 1 with recourse to 
Richard Lanham, such a process is intrinsically rhetorical.  
Adding the noosphere into the conceptual apparatus of rhetoricians provides an additional 
way to initiate theoretical development of the networked imaginary in a rhetorical register. The 
idea of the noosphere orients scholars to the communicative dimensions of the networked 
society.  Consequently, what separates this study from other work on the economy and sociology 
of the network society is a focus on the rhetorical imaginary that has emerged with blogging. As 
I have explored here, the tropes flood the zone, ambient intimacy, and shallow quotation explain 
three functions of the noosphere in inventing arguments, creating stranger sociability, and 
translating interfield claims. These tropes signal new practices in the networked imaginary that 
facilitate deliberative legitimation processes. 
6.2 The Birth of Hyperpublicity 
Consider the following three examples made possible by the noosphere:    
(1) A few years ago, I unfortunately joined a social networking site which promptly raided 
the address book in my email account and sent an invite to join the site to literally 
everyone I had emailed in the past two years. This event was, needless to say, 
professionally embarrassing and personally mortifying.  
                                                
RAND, 1997), http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR880/index.html and John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 
“Preparing for Information–Age Conflict, Part I: Conceptual and Organizational Dimensions,” Information, 
Communication, and Society (Spring 1998): 1–22. 
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(2) A student of mine, in a class conversation about social networking sites, confessed that 
she had recently discarded several job applications at her place of employment because, 
upon googling the candidates, she could not find their Facebook page. “If you don’t have 
Facebook in this day and age,” she said, “it’s like you don’t exist.” 
(3) Political operatives are increasingly wary of being ‘caught on tape.’ When Karl Rove 
visited a class at the University of Pittsburgh in 2007 to give a talk, he was insistent that 
no recording devices or cameras be present, going so far as to have one of his aides 
ensure that short video clips shot from a digital camera be erased prior to his departure 
from the venue. 
The strengthening of the noosphere’s fibers through internetworked technology is a mixed 
blessing.24 From the vantage point of late 2008, there are two related propositions I would 
advance: (1) all discourse is a blogger away from being public and (2) the chance of 
narrowcasted communicative acts crossing over into the broadcast media is greatly increased.25 
These two propositions should, in many ways, be heartening for advocates of public deliberation. 
New actors are self-organizing at the periphery of communication and influence networks, 
forming critical bonds of solidarity and generating novel modes of perceiving and interacting 
with the social world. The case studies here suggest some constructive uses of this new digital 
technology, with blogging as the synecdoche that represents internetworked communication. 
Yet, I would like to pause in this conclusion by considering how the twinned forces of publicity 
and discipline intertwine again around digital technologies, with some serious implications for 
                                                
24 James Carey elegantly articulated a pragmatic theory of digital media study by suggesting that “every 
gain is simultaneously a loss” in “Historical Pragmatism and the Internet,” New Media and Society 7 (2005), 447 
25 As Aaron Barlow writes, “the combined postings of people (and the press) from every corner of the 
world are beginning to make it possible to find out what is happening anywhere, anytime” (Rise of the Blogosphere 
153); “one day, no major event will occur anywhere in the world without people recording it on cell phones and 
broadcasting it on a blog” (162). 
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the practice of rhetoric and argumentation. I suggest that the term hyperpublicity captures the 
potential constraints of a digital media-rich noosphere produced and propagated by global 
citizens. Hyperpublicity denotes a massive expansion in the capacity of personal media to record, 
archive, and make searchable thoughts, events, and interactions in publicly accessible databases. 
If broadcast media spurred publicity during the time of the bourgeois public sphere, then it seems 
a logical step to conclude that more freely available digital media kinetically amplifies publicity. 
Because of this surplus publicity, new digital tools like blogging are all the more necessary to 
focus attention. But, like Foucault, who acknowledged the democratic potential but also new 
disciplinary techniques in the rise of publicity during the 18th and 19th centuries, I see 
hyperpublicity as a phenomenon with double potential to enrich and threaten public life in the 
21st century world.  
An example from the 2008 presidential primary campaign illustrates how public 
deliberation changes in an era of hyperpublicity. A heated primary campaign for the Democratic 
presidential nomination between Senator Barack Obama of Illinois and Senator Hillary Clinton 
of New York was playing out in the intercastings of a matured blogosphere. Part of the ripening 
of blogging has been the creation of advertisement and donation funded hubs that function as 
clearinghouses for politically interested citizens. The Huffington Post is one such hub. It is a 
politically left online news/politics site that incorporates numerous blogs as part of a running 
daily commentary on breaking stories. Founded by political commentator Ariana Huffington, the 
site has become one of the most popular on the web. As part of their coverage of campaign 2008, 
The Huffington Post set up a series called ‘Off the Bus,’ which was a separate area of the website 
featuring commentary from citizens (as opposed to the press corps and pundits, who often ride 
‘on the bus’ with the candidates.)  
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On April 11, 2008, Mayhill Fowler, a retiree who had taken up citizen journalism, posted 
an extensive report in The Huffington Post’s Off the Bus section about a speech presidential 
candidate Barack Obama had recently made to a group of fundraisers in San Francisco. Fowler, a 
regular blogger at The Huffington Post, was following the Obama campaign as the Democratic 
primary race was finishing up with voting in Pennsylvania, Indiana, and North Carolina. Fowler 
had been in attendance at the fundraising speech with an audio recorder. In her blog post, she 
quoted Obama extensively: 
‘You go into some of these small towns in Pennsylvania, and like a lot of small 
towns in the Midwest, the jobs have been gone now for 25 years and nothing's 
replaced them,’ Obama said. ‘And they fell through the Clinton Administration, 
and the Bush Administration, and each successive administration has said that 
somehow these communities are gonna regenerate and they have not. And it's not 
surprising then they get bitter, they cling to guns or religion or antipathy to people 
who aren't like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment as a way 
to explain their frustrations.’ Obama made a problematic judgment call in trying 
to explain working class culture to a much wealthier audience. He described blue 
collar Pennsylvanians with a series of what in the eyes of Californians might be 
considered pure negatives: guns, clinging to religion, antipathy, xenophobia.26 
As one might expect, this launched a flurry of conversation about the implications of Obama’s 
comments. From one perspective, this confirmed the perception that Obama was, in the words of 
a famous 2004 political advertisement, a Volvo-driving, latte-drinking, East coast liberal elitist 
                                                
26 Mayhill Fowler, “No Surprise that Hard-Pressed Pennsylvanians Turn Bitter,” The Huffington Post, April 
11, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mayhill-fowler/obama-no-surprise-that-ha_b_96188.html. 
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who was condemning conservative lifestyle choices to a group of wealthy San Francisco elites. 
From another perspective, Obama’s comments reflected what had become a sort of common 
sense for Democratic strategists: that Republicans had mastered the ability to get citizens to vote 
against their economic interests by playing up culture war wedge issues.27 Either way, the story 
presented a significant challenge to the Obama campaign. The course of this story reveals the 
extent to which blogging has become incorporated into public life. 
 After splashing down on The Huffington Post, Fowler’s story was picked up by the 
institutional media. “The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, The Washington Post, 
CNN.com, the Associated Press, Fox News, Reuters, Politico, the Lou Dobbs Show, Hardball, 
Olbermann’s Countdown, The Atlantic.com, The DailyKos, TalkingPointsMemo and myriad 
other outlets” all covered the story.28 Cable television news latched on, as did talk radio. The 
original story at The Huffington Post quickly collected over 5000 comments. Parallel sites like 
the left-leaning DailyKos and the right-leaning RedState picked up the comments and debated 
their implications. The scale and depth of frenzy over Obama’s comments—dubbed 
‘Bittergate’—was magnified by the millions of new voices on blogs, social networking sites, 
video portals, and other web-based sub-media.  
 Some argued that Fowler had violated traditional press norms that kept fundraisers off the 
record (which she confessed to not realizing.)29 Others defended Fowler’s approach as useful 
precisely because it did violate the staid norms of the press corps. Fowler “violates almost all of 
                                                
27 This sort of common sense is best articulated in Thomas Frank’s What’s the Matter with Kansas?: How 
Conservatives Won the Heart of America (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004). 
28 Marc Cooper, “Inside the Obama-Guns-God-Bitterness Storm,” MarcCooper.com, April 11, 2008, 
http://marccooper.com/inside-the-obama-guns-god-bitterness-storm/. 
29 Katherine Seeyli, “Blogger is Surprised by Uproar Over Obama Story, but Not Bitter,” New York Times, 
April 14, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/14/us/politics/14web-seelye.html?scp=3&sq=bitter&st=nyt. 
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the conventions of traditional reporting (though not its ethical code) and that's what makes it all 
so damn interesting … It’s also quite a bit of fun to see how a report like hers can actually set the 
agenda for the entire national press.”30 Fowler was both credited and elided as breaking the story 
in various outlets, showing how bloggers’ reporting contributions are still often marginalized 
even as they have gained prominence as facilitators of public deliberation.31 
 Should Fowler, an avowed Obama supporter, have published these comments, knowing 
the firestorm they were likely to ignite? Should she have respected the semi-public nature of the 
fundraiser? Should she have been allowed to bring an audio recorder to the talk? The logic of 
blogging almost mandates that she do exactly what she did. From her perspective, a statement 
articulated in private by Obama betrayed some unwarrantable assertions about small-town 
America and she used her blog megaphone to put those issues on the public agenda. She was 
able to activate the hyperpublic realm (and the hyper publics of the blogosphere!) much in the 
way that proponents of Habermasian-style public deliberation advocate. And perhaps Obama 
should have been called to task for his comments, since they were arguably the kinds of ‘private 
reasoning’ that norms of publicity were designed to hinder.  
 That the Fowler-Bittergate story shows how (hyper)publicity serves democratic ends is 
too simple a conclusion to draw from the episode. The comments of some fundraiser observers, 
and Obama himself, suggest the dangers of hyperpublicity. David Coleman, a Huffington Post 
blogger who also attended the San Francisco event with Fowler, added more context worth 
quoting from at length: 
                                                
30 Cooper, “Inside the Obama.” 
31 Jay Rosen, “The Uncharted From Off the Bus to Meet the Press,” The Huffington Post, April 14, 2008, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jay-rosen/the-uncharted-from-off-th_b_96575.html?view=print. 
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Rather than his seizing the opportunity to recite stump-worn talking points at that 
time to the audience—as I believe Senator Clinton, Senator McCain and most 
other more conventional (or more disciplined) politicians at such an appearance 
might do—Senator Obama took a different political course in that moment, one 
that symbolizes important differences about his candidacy. The response that 
followed sounded unscripted, in the moment, as if he were really trying to answer 
a question with intelligent conversation that explained more about what was going 
on in the Pennsylvania communities than what was germane to his political 
agenda. I had never heard him or any politician ever give such insightful, 
analytical responses. The statements were neither didactic nor contrived to 
convince. They were simply hypotheses (not unlike the kind made by de 
Tocqueville three centuries ago) offered by an observer familiar with American 
communities. And that kind of thoughtfulness was quite unexpected in the middle 
of a political event. In my view, the way he answered the question was more 
important than the sociological accuracy or the cause and effect hypotheses 
contained in the answer. It was a moment of authenticity demonstrating informed 
intelligence, and the speaker's desire to have the audience join him in a deeper 
understanding of American politics.32 
Coleman’s account might be explained away as a partisan defense of Obama. But I think that his 
explanation deserves more credit. He explains that Obama’s comments were essentially 
unscripted, veering away from talking points and stump speeches—and that was what made 
                                                
32David Coleman, “I Was There: What Obama Really Said About Pennsylvania,” The Huffington Post, 
April 14, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-coleman/i-was-there-what-obama-re_b_96553.html.  
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Obama an interesting candidate. Rather than sticking to the tightly disciplined framework of 
most campaigns, Obama’s comments were delivered in the spirit of genuine inquiry. While we 
might question these feelings of authenticity (or at least the ultimate value of such a gooey 
concept), what I think this episode demonstrates is the tension between spontaneity and 
recordability.  
Obama felt more comfortable in speaking off the script because he apparently felt 
confident that the people he was speaking with were allies, and that what was said in the room 
would more or less stay in the room. Marc Cooper, one of the editors of Off the Bus, confirmed 
this unscriptedness by noting “Obama was indeed more loose-lipped than usual;” but he 
followed up with what is now the sine qua non of political campaigning: “He should be more 
careful in his choice of words when he is staring into so many video cams, no matter who is 
holding them.”33 Obama’s explanation was  
that I just mangled it, which, you know happens sometimes. The point that I was 
making was actually two separate points that got conflated. Number One, that 
people who had felt abandoned by Washington and political leaders when it 
comes to an economy that’s falling apart, they find stability in those things that 
they count on—their faith, the traditions that have been passed down generation 
to generation and in many rural communities that includes hunting, their family, 
their community—those are positive things.34  
                                                
33 Seeyli, “Blogger is Surprised.”  
34 Will Bunch, “Obama Says He ‘Misspoke But Didn’t Lie’ About Smalltown Pa.,” Attytood (Philadelphia 
Enquirer), April 14, 2008,  http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/attytood/Exclusive_Obama_says_he_misspoke_but_ 
didnt_lie_about_smalltown_Pa.html. 
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One can see this maneuvering as just that: an able politician playing the cynical game of word-
parsing in order to wiggle out of a tough spot. However, I think it is just as likely that Obama is 
being honest in confessing that he made a mistake of poorly choosing words, but that, in the 
twenty-first century, he’s stuck with the life he makes, mistake or not.  
 Obama’s fate, justified or not, is not a singular example of being tripped up by the 
ubiquitous presence of recording devices. In August 2006, Virginia’s George Allen was in the 
midst of a re-election campaign for his Senate seat. Allen was in a tough fight against Democrat 
Jim Webb in a contest that was widely seen as a bellwether for Republican fates in Congress. 
One of Webb’s aides, S.R. Sidarth, followed Allen around to each campaign stop in what has 
become standard operating procedure for campaigns keeping tabs on each other. On a sunny day 
in Breaks, Virginia, Allen singled out this aide, who happened to be filming every minute of 
Allen’s actions for opposition research, by referring to Sidarth, who is Indian, as a ‘macaca.’ 
‘Macaca’ is a slur widely used in francophone Africa that means ‘monkey.’ A whirlwind of 
controversy soon followed, with allegations of wider racism sticking to Allen much more 
credibly after his well-documented ‘macaca moment.’ The video almost immediately went viral 
on video sharing websites like YouTube, and was circulated through blogs, emails, and social 
networking sites. Allen eventually lost the election, in part because of the negative publicity from 
this videotaped moment. While this one instance ought not be overplayed as causing Allen’s 
loss, “there was no question in anyone’s mind that the YouTube culture—in which every public 
moment can be clipped, cropped and distributed instantly across the globe by anyone at any 
time—had changed the rules of the game.”35 
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The George Allen-‘macaca’ incident generated intense speculation about the effects of 
new information technology on public deliberation. In a review of the implications of this 
‘YouTube Election,’ New York Times reporter Ryan Lizza wondered 
If campaigns resemble reality television, where any moment of a candidate’s life 
can be captured on film and posted on the Web, will the last shreds of authenticity 
be stripped from our public officials? Will candidates be pushed further into a 
scripted bubble? ... [Critics] see a future where politicians are more vapid and risk 
averse than ever. Matthew Dowd, a longtime strategist for President Bush who is 
now a partner in a social networking Internet venture, Hot Soup, looks at the 
YouTube-ization of politics, and sees the death of spontaneity. ‘Politicians can’t 
experiment with messages,’ Mr. Dowd said. ‘They can’t get voter response. 
Seventy or 80 years ago, a politician could go give a speech in Des Moines and 
road-test some ideas and then refine it and then test it again in Milwaukee.’  He 
sees a future where candidates must be camera-ready before they hit the road, 
rather than be a work in progress. ‘What’s happened is that politicians now have 
to be perfect from Day 1,’ he said. ‘It’s taken some richness out of the political 
discourse.’36 
Dowd’s diagnosis of contemporary political campaigning is provocative. Candidates, in his 
telling, are becoming risk-averse because of the ubiquitous presence of recording devices on the 
campaign trail. Any slip up immediately becomes the gaffe-of-the-moment, parsed by bloggers 
and amplified through the institutional broadcast media. A candidate’s ideological evolution on 
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issues becomes evidence of flip-flopping, with ‘before’ and ‘after’ video clips spliced together in 
damning juxtaposition. No longer can a candidate successfully narrowcast any more without risk 
of being called out for saying one thing to a particular audience and another thing to another 
audience. To be clear, this situation is not entirely bad; catching politicians in contradictions, or 
publicizing occasions where craven politicians over-pander to an audience in private, are still 
useful exercises in a democratic system that depends on citizen oversight. 
 However, hyperpublicity is a double-edged sword, and Dowd’s concern that politicians 
must now become more scripted and take less risks on the campaign trail threatens the vibrancy 
of political dialogue. Why are spontaneity and experimentation to be valued in democratic 
politics? Why is risk-taking important in the democratic process? Though these might not appear 
to be the paramount values of democracy, scholarship emerging from late twentieth century 
argumentation studies underlines the importance of risk-taking in the process of disagreement. In 
fact, Wayne Brockriede’s pivotal “Arguers as Lovers” locates self-risking as a central feature of 
argumentation.37 Because humans so closely associate their beliefs with their selfhood, it is 
understandable why the self feels put on the line when beliefs are challenged through argument. 
Arguments so often become quarrels because arguers are not willing to undergo mutual 
transformation that might occur as a result of risk-taking exchange. Indeed, for argumentation to 
be fruitful, interlocutors must be open to changing their own opinions on an issue, or be open to 
the possibility that the disagreement might be transformed through the process of argumentation. 
In Brockriede’s formulation, arguers must think of themselves as loving their co-arguers, and 
                                                
37 Wayne Brockriede, “Arguers as Lovers,” 7. Brockriede draws on Maurice Natanson’s assessment of 
rhetoric, argumentation, and risk, in “The Claims of Immediacy,” in Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Argumentation, eds. 
Maurice Natanson and Henry Johnstone, Jr. (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965): 10-
19. Natanson claims that for argument to succeed as a philosophical or rhetorical proposition necessarily requires 
one to risk themselves.  
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being open to change even as they seek to change their interlocutor. Even on the presidential 
campaign trail, candidates must be willing to listen and engage citizens through arguments that 
change according to the dictates of the rhetorical situation. Yet, if candidates are unwilling to do 
so because of the potential that their attempts at engaging citizens will backfire in wider spheres 
of public deliberation, then they have every incentive to resort to canned stump speeches.38 The 
predictable result is that political dialogue might become increasingly scripted, with candidates 
reticent to wander beyond safe zones marked off by narrow and bland talking points. 
 Though presidential politics are surely an extreme example, the potential for 
hyperpublicity to reduce risk-taking and experimentation in other arenas of human life are 
certainly possible. Take the classroom, for example. Instructors are increasingly wary that what 
they say, or wear, or assign will end up on RateMyProfessor.com, or student blogs, or Facebook 
pages. Consequently, instructors must be exceedingly careful about decisions made and actions 
taken in the classroom. In many cases this is all to the good. However, teaching is by design full 
of failed experiments, spontaneous remarks, and accommodations to specific situations. The 
semi-public nature of the classroom can easily become a site that attracts the attention of publics 
from the outside. Can teaching thrive in a space where public scrutiny can be directed at every 
thing said and done in the classroom? Is it possible to encourage open thinking when broader 
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campaigning in his neighborhood in Toledo. Wurzelbacher asked if Obama’s tax policy would increase his own 
taxes; Obama gave an extended answer that was caught on tape and posted to YouTube. In the final presidential 
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publics have a tendency to immediately judge what is happening in a situation that they are not 
themselves a part of?  
More of life and culture is becoming public life and public culture. From individual blogs 
to MySpace and Facebook pages to video-sharing portals, an increasing amount of deliberation 
and conversation is occurring in potentially public contexts. These various modes of online 
discourse often float under the signifier ‘social networking’ sites. But social networking isn’t the 
novelty here—publicity is.39  After all, people have been socially networking since the dawn of 
sociality. Only recently have corporations tapped into the phenomenon as a marketable concept 
(selling what we already do back to us under the guise of something radically new). At first 
blush, it is difficult to anchor a legitimate criticism of the novel uses of publicity I have outlined 
here—there is strong social consensus, for example, in supporting the chastisement of public 
figures for their use of racial epithets or sweeping generalizations. But do these changing 
conditions of public culture suggest a sea change in practices of human interdependence?  
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issue11_9/barnes/index.html; danah boyd, “Social Network Sites: Public, Private or What,” Knowledge Tree, 13 
(May 2007), http://kt.flexiblelearning.net.au/ tkt2007/?age_id=28; danah boyd and B. Ellison, “Social Network 
Sites: Definition, History and Scholarship,” Journal of Computer Mediated Communication 13 (2007), 
http://jcmc.indiana.edu/ vol13/issue1/boyd.ellison.html; R. Gross and A. Acquisti, “Information Revelation and 
Privacy in Online Social Networks,” Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (2005), 
http://privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/projects/ facebook/facebook1.html; P.G. Lange, “Publicly Private and 
Privately Public: Social Networking on YouTube,” Journal of Computer Mediated Communication, 13 (2007), 
http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/lange.html. One blogger has coined ‘publicy’ as a way to capture how new 
digital technologies blur the public and private; see Mark Federman, “Blogging and Publicy,” What is the Message?, 
December 19, 2003, http://web.archive.org/web/20040808133711/http://www.mcluhan.utoronto.ca/blogger/ 
2003_12_01_blogarchive.html#107184093362428431. As a consequence of new exposure to publicity, bloggers and 
other online actors have exposed themselves to a new field of risks; see Yasmin Ibrahim, “The New Risk 
Communities: Social Networking Sites and Risk,” International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics 4 (2008): 
245-53. Though advocates of social networking sites remind privacy critics that users can determine their own 
privacy settings, Adam Tyna has persuasively made the case that the ‘value of belonging’ outweighs the ‘value of 
privacy’ in “Rules of Interchange: Privacy in Online Social Communities—A Rhetorical Critique of MySpace.com,” 
Journal of the Communication, Speech & Theatre Association of North Dakota 20 (2007): 31-39. 
388 
In order to theorize the effects of hyperpublicity, I would like to spotlight an 
underappreciated element of Habermas’s account of the bourgeois public sphere. Especially at 
the beginning stages of the development of bourgeois publicity practices, deliberation was 
rehearsed in semi-public places. Such an unsettling rearrangement of political power could not 
have arrived on the public stage too quickly for fear of being quashed before reaching a critical 
mass. Semi-publicity, I argue, was a historical precursor to a wider array of publicity practices. 
As Habermas writes: 
  The coming together of private people into a public was therefore anticipated in  
  secret, as a public sphere still existing largely behind closed doors. The secret  
  promulgation of enlightenment typical of the lodges but also widely practiced by  
  other associations and Tischgesellschaften has a dialectical character. Reason,  
  which through public use of the rational faculty was to be realized in the rational  
  communication of a public consisting of cultivated human beings, itself needed to 
  be protected from becoming public because it was a threat to any and all relations  
  of domination. As long as publicity had its seat in the secret chanceries of the  
  prince, reason could not reveal itself directly. Its sphere of publicity had still to  
  rely on secrecy; its public, even as a public, remained internal.40   
One strange paradox of critical publicity, then, is its incubation in semi-public places.41 Publicity 
and secrecy were symbiotically linked, not diametrically opposed. This secret incubation 
                                                
40 Habermas, Structural Transformation, 35. 
41 The coffeehouses at the time of the bourgeois public sphere provided semipublic space for discussion to 
flow over a number of issues that would later be written up and circulated to non-present others by print. 
Coffeehouses and biergartens of Europe are often thought of as constituting the ‘public sphere,’ though as I am 
theorizing them, I take them more as precursor, semi-public places. As John Durham Peters has written, there is no 
real publicity without media, which extends the voices of participants in semi-public places (“Distrust of 
Representation,” 549, 566.) Only mass-mediated discourse can meet the demands of publicity capable of organizing 
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occurred because of the presence of old forms of authority, namely, the complex relations of 
power wielded by aristocracy. Would such incubation be necessary today, with the formal 
decline of aristocratic power? Perhaps not, though I will suggest that there is still a benefit to 
semi-public deliberation. 
Semi-publicity licenses experimentation in form and content, an important stage in 
stimulating non-instrumental public reasoning. In the context of the bourgeois, literary public 
spheres were designed to facilitate “purely ‘human relations’” outside of the circumference of 
dominant power relations.42 As the modality of letter writing developed, the banality of everyday 
life was paired with a glimpse into the extraordinary meaning-making conducted by individuals. 
The individual experience of the world was fetishized in bourgeois practice of the time, enabling 
circles of comrades to test ideas that they might not otherwise introduce into conversation. Since 
understanding was the dominant goal, judgment was temporarily suspended. Would the converse 
be true? Do spaces of perpetual judgment undermine understanding? Are people willing to risk 
themselves and experiment as much if they realize that their rhetorical production might be 
circulated to virtually any audience? In a way, modernity’s true gift was to spawn a series of 
semi-public institutions that were dedicated to cultivating different ways of thinking and 
speaking. One such semi-public space is found in the conceptualization of the classroom as a 
‘safe space’ where students are encouraged to experiment with ideas before engaging broader 
publics.43   
                                                
political identities and coordinating socio-political activity: namely wide circulation and in-theory availability to 
interested and affected parties. Inasmuch as the coffeehouses and other public places drew from and contributed to 
print media of the time, they participated in the publicness Habermas requires for democratic practice. 
42 Habermas, Structural Transformation, 49. 
 43 This pedagogical insight has been developed most extensively by Rosa Eberly in Citizen Critics: Literary 
Public Spheres (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000) and Gordon R. Mitchell, “Simulated Public 
Argument as a Pedagogical Play on Worlds,” Argumentation and Advocacy 36 (Winter 2000): 134-50. Eberly 
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Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede apply this pedagogical insight to the larger 
sphere of public deliberation. They note that “discussion [is] an intelligent, purposeful 
interchange of ideas carried on in a conversational pattern. The atmosphere is informal and 
permissive.”44 In their telling, and in deliberation scholarship more generally, discussion is 
theorized as a useful activity that draws strength from informality and permissiveness (especially 
as it is contrasted to the more formal practice of debate, in which an arbitrator makes a judgment 
after hearing competing cases.) As interlocutors argue, they engage in risk-taking by remaining 
open to the possibility that the process of argumentation will change themselves as much as their 
partners. Informal, semi-public atmospheres facilitate this type of risk-taking; though I do not 
mean to foreclose the possibility that even in hyperpublic situations co-arguers do occasionally 
take risks. The empirical question for future research is to gauge whether, and how much, risk-
taking is reduced in hyperpublic deliberation. I speculate that there are two key reasons why 
hyperpublicity might reduce risk-taking. 
First, in an era of hyperpublicity, the appreciation for the situatedness of discourse might 
well decline. The fixity of one’s words in searchable archives is at odds with the flexibility 
necessary to compromise without being labeled as an opportunistic flip-flopper.45 While there 
has always been a ‘compare and contrast’ approach to a political candidate’s record, the 
noosphere’s tools for recording, archiving, and searching enhances the ability of critics to 
                                                
argues that the classroom can function as a proto-public space where students generate topoi from texts that can then 
inform other public practices (170). Mitchell's work suggests that the insulated academic tournament debate 
competition provides a similarly safe space for students to experiment with ideas and thus facilitate their opinion-
formation before they are thrust into public deliberations with more at stake than tournament victory. 
44 Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, Decision By Debate (Dodd, Mead, & Company: New York, 
1969), 9. 
45 Ekaterina Haskins explores how digital media have exponentially expanded the archive function in  
“Between Archive and Participation: Public Memory in a Digital Age,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 37 (2007): 401-
22. 
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identify contradictions or tensions within one’s public record. The situatedness of Obama’s 
speech was lost on Fowler and other press critics, and Obama undoubtedly learned a lesson about 
going off-script as a result. 
Second, hyperpublicity interacts with the condensation of time and space caused by 
information-technology to privilege efficiencies in public deliberation. As Ron Greene has noted, 
“the temporality of rhetorical deliberation attempts to arrest the speed of discourse so a judgment 
can be made about a particular event.”46 With the quick addition and circulation of information, 
and the enfolding of more stakeholders in the deliberative process, rhetorical deliberation can 
become more ‘efficient’ (because information can be spread quickly and widely to aid dispute 
resolution). At the same time, though, public deliberation requires certain inefficiencies in order 
to facilitate social adjustments. As Kenneth Burke wrote in a defense of inefficiency that could 
be extended to public deliberation,  
efficiency breeds but the necessity of more efficiency. It requires not only a 
mounting expenditure of eternal vigilance, but a nicety of adjustment whereby the 
eternally vigilant are also the authoritative … ‘Efficiency’ was required to 
develop the machine. ‘Inefficiency’ is required as the counter-principle to prevent 
the machine from becoming too imperious and forcing us into social complexities 
which require exceptional delicacy of adjustment.47  
The internet has been lauded for rapidly smoothing commercial efforts through improved 
efficiency. Yet, those same efficiencies might not work well in public deliberation, which often 
requires longer waves of time to make informed decisions. Democratic deliberation, with its 
                                                
46 Greene, “Rhetorical Pedagogy,” 437. 
47 Kenneth Burke, Counter-Statement, 120-1. 
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inherent inefficiencies, might well be in tension with media that accelerate the decision-making 
cycle faster than its historical pace.  
Thinking through the effects of hyperpublicity doubtlessly requires a more robust 
research program; however, I hope to have outlined some tentative directions by suggesting how 
hyperpublic reasoning might erode the conditions that energize liberal public argument. In the 
end, the biggest challenge that hyperpublicity poses to traditional public deliberation is in 
partially foreclosing the dissipation of speech. The dissipation of speech refers to the 
ephemerality that inheres in the speaking situation. That speech dissipates after utterance, 
receding into listeners’ memories, means that historically there has been no perfect account of 
communication. Speech, as a medium, is almost designed to facilitate misrememberings, partial 
hearings, and imperfect accounts. Yet, with the archivability and searchability of massive 
databases, the memory function of rhetorical activity now has a more central role in public 
discourse. While there are undoubtedly benefits to having a crisper public record of what was 
said by whom and when, there may be times when deliberating citizens would prefer to have a 
fuzzier accounting of what has happened in the past in order to make it easier to work out what 
should be done in the future. 
6.3 Rhetoric, Argumentation, and Deliberation in Digital Public Culture 
 What do the insights generated from this dissertation mean for the study of rhetoric, 
argument, and public deliberation? Public discourse emerging from the blogosphere suggests a 
series of continuities and discontinuities with prior analog modes of public communication. In a 
way, blogging illustrates a dramatic evolution in public address. Traditionally, scholars of 
rhetoric focused on the ‘stand-up podium speech’ that marked public discourse through most of 
human history. It should be apparent that while such a focus is still useful in understanding how 
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meanings are made and circulated, it is wholly inadequate to capture the variegated ways that 
people now participate in public deliberation. Bloggers both address publics and critique the 
public address of others. Scholars in rhetorical/communication studies will increasingly find rich 
texts to analyze in the form of blogs that relate features of everyday life and even reflexively 
interrogate communication practices. The missives from the blogosphere are unparalleled as 
glimpses into the sense-making of deliberating citizens. Research in this area must continue in 
order to understand the dramatic revisions occurring as the modernist social imaginary gives way 
to a networked one.  
 This area of research into digital media and networked public culture can benefit from an 
engagement with that oldest of democratic arts, rhetoric. My research has modeled an attempt to 
use rhetorical insights to perform a systems-level analysis and critique of public deliberation as 
mediated through the blogosphere. The three challenges that I articulated in the introduction—
invention, emotion, and expertism—are examples of how such a systems-level approach to 
studying public deliberation can benefit from rhetorical theory. Many of the challenges for public 
deliberation (and for public deliberation scholars) are rhetorical ones, and properly so if the 
information age offers, as I explained in the introduction, an opportunity for renewed 
appreciation of the persuasive arts. Such an approach is not without risks; namely, that fixating 
on the ‘macro’ necessarily elides important differences in various ‘micro’ situations. I am wary 
of this tendency, especially given my tendency to draw on terms like ‘modernist sensibilities’ 
and ‘network society’ that necessarily over-generalize about specific practices. I have attempted 
to ameliorate this tension with a close focus on the circulation of textual artifacts, but future 
research would do well to probe this sustaining tension between systems-level deliberative 
deficiencies and specific practices of digital media users.  
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 Though rhetoric plays a central role in this project, so does the term argumentation. The 
relationship between rhetoric and argumentation is a complex one. One might think of 
argumentation as a subset of rhetoric, acknowledging that the means of persuasion expand 
beyond the narrow rational-critical norms of argument. The ascendance of ‘visual rhetoric’ as a 
subfield of inquiry illustrates that rhetoric’s purview is broad enough to accommodate a variety 
of different communicative acts. Yet, one might also theorize rhetoric as just a subset of 
argumentation by emphasizing rhetoric’s traditional focus on stylizing arguments. The 
philosophical study of argumentation certainly prefers to sublimate the rhetorical to the 
dialectical. There is, of course, considerable overlap between the two terms: both rhetoric and 
argumentation are interested in proof, audience, reasoning, ethical norms, and reflexivity.  
 In fact, scholars of rhetoric and argumentation often turn this overlap into a symbiotic 
relationship. In one sense, the study of argumentation needs a strong sense of rhetoric in order to 
accommodate the situatedness of argument. The study of argumentation without a rhetorical 
foundation can quickly slide into abstract analysis of form and validity at the expense of the 
particulars of a situation. Rather than going in the direction of abstract analysis of blog-borne 
argumentation, I have underlined the significance of digital public culture in shaping the 
circulation of arguments. Likewise, rhetorical scholarship that draws on insights from 
argumentation theory partially inoculates rhetoric against the charge of ‘mere style,’ for the 
language of justification that accompanies the analysis of argument draws attention to how form 
and content blur in persuasive contexts. Argument emerging from networked publics has 
profound presentational differences from analog technology which must be accounted for; yet, 
an appreciation for the fundamentals of argumentation theory can check the wilder speculations 
about frictionless communication in a digital world. 
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 My sensitivity to rhetoric and argumentation as modes of inquiry also emerges in the 
identification and explication of the tropes that lie at the center of this dissertation. ‘Flood the 
zone,’ ‘ambient intimacy,’ and ‘shallow quotation’ are metaphors—rhetorical figures—that 
identify novel practices of public argument through digital media. I argued in the Introduction 
that metaphors were key sites where social imaginaries are formed, consolidated, and revised; in 
the case of the blogosphere, these tropes emerged organically from vernacular theorization about 
the impact of blogging and have now receded into the background as participants carry on with 
the common sense understanding derived from the networked imaginary.  
 The study of rhetoric and argumentation also meet in the interplay that occurs between 
criticism and production.48 Both rhetoric and argumentation identify the criticism of public 
discourse as a key way to improve one’s own understanding of what makes ‘good rhetoric’ or 
‘good argument.’ By criticizing strong exemplars alongside poor examples, citizens looking to 
practice deliberative rhetoric can develop more sophisticated tools by which to intervene in 
ongoing controversies. My critical approach to blogging similarly adds an important dimension 
to theorizing rhetorical production in digitally mediated environments. Advocates looking to 
produce public discourse through the blogosphere may well find some guidance in the themes 
that I have drawn through my discussion of flooding the zone, ambient intimacy, and shallow 
quotation. In this way, citizens might engage in public discourse with the reflexivity needed to 
craft compelling messages in digitally networked contexts. 
 
 
                                                
48 A point made also by Wayne Brockriede in “Rhetorical Criticism as Argument,” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 60 (1974): 165-74. 
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